JURISDICTION.

See COUNTY COURT, 1 to 7.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 1, 2. 3.

JURY AND JURY TRIAL.

1. There being some evidence of an
acceptance and promise to pay,
for services rendered on special
contract, a request to charge the
jury, that if they find that the ser-
vices were not performed in a
workmanlike manner, they must
find for the defendant, is properly
denied. The most that defendant
can claim in such case is to recoup
damages. Hollis v. Wagar. 4

2. A mother, and her illegitimate
child (born in Otsego county) being
chargeable for their support as
paupers, upon the town of McDon-
ough, Chenango county, and pro-
vided for by that town at the
county poor-house in the town of
Preston, in Chenango county, the
overseers of the poor of the town
of McDonough applied to a justice
of the peace, of their county, who
went to Preston, took the exami-
nation of the mother, and there-
upon issued his warrant, upon
which the putative father was ar-
rested and brought before him.
-Held, the justice acted without
jurisdiction, and was liable for
damages, as were also the over-
seers who induced him to act. Id.

3. It seems that if the overseers had
brought the mother into the town
of McDonough, and had her ex-
amination taken there, the plaintiff
might have been properly arrested.

2. On the trial of an action before a
justice of the peace, for trespass by
defendant's cattle, triers were ap-
pointed, and a juror was, on their
decision, excused for favor; the
defendant then asked that all the
jurors summoned might be tried by
triers. The justice examined them
separately, under oath, and they 4.
testified that they believed the law
in relation to cattle running on
the highway to be a good law.
No other objection to their com-
petency appearing.-Held, the jus-
tice properly refused to submit
the testimony of the jurors to
triers. McNall v. McClure. 32

Id.

The court excluded evidence of

the advice of counsel offered in
mitigation, but charged the jury
that it was not a case for smart
money; and the jury gave a ver-
dict for substantially the actual
damages proven.-Held, no error
was committed to the prejudice of
defendants.
Id

JUSTICE'S COURT.

See COURT OF A JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE.

JUVENILE DELINQUENTS.

See WITNESS, 1, 2, 3.

LABORERS.

74

See CONTRACTOR, 1, 2.

1. The defendant, owning and occu-
pying a house and lot, conveyed
the same to his infant daughter, who

MANDAMUS.

1. A mandamus lies against the
comptroller, to compel payment
of moneys appropriated by the
legislature, to the improvement of
navigation, &c., on his refusal to
pay the same. People v. Allen. 248

MARRIED WOMEN.

1. The promissory note of a married
woman, given for goods which had
beer purchased by her upon credit,
for family use, while her husband
is residing and cohabiting with her,
and supporting his family, is abso-
lutely void, and has no foundation,
either in law, equity, conscience or
good morals, unless there is some
special agreement by which the
goods are sold to the wife, for her
exclusive use, upon the credit of
her separate property, and not upon
the credit of her husband. Smith
V. Allen.
101

2.

resided with him as a member of
his family, and the house being
destroyed by fire, employed the
plaintiffs to build him a dwelling,
upon the old foundation; the plain-3.
tiffs performed the work, and filing
the required notice (Laws 1854, p.
1,086, chap. 204, extended Laws,
1858, p. 324, chap. 204), claimed a
mechanic's lien for the value of the
labor and materials; defendant
took possession of the new house,
and continued to reside there with
his said family. In an action under
the statute for judgment, as upon
a mechanic's lien,-Held, the de-
fendant had no interest in the
house erected, other than as guar-
dian of his daughter, and the plain-
tiffs had obtained no lien thereon.
Copley v. O'Neil.

214

See JUDGMENTS AND EXECUTIONS, 3.
BOARDING-HOUSEKEEPER, 1, 2.

LOCAL AND PRIVATE PURPO-
SES.
See LEGISLATIVE POWER, 1, 2, 3, 4.

4. The case of Goulding v. Davidson
(26 N. Y., 604), cited, and dis-
tinguished.
Id.

5. Plaintiff was a married woman,

and being in possession of premises
belonging to her husband, who had
absconded, and while preparing to
leave the same, made a contract
for a certain sum with the defend-
ant, who held a mortgage on the
premises which was due, to remain
for a time, and at the end thereot
deliver possession to him. In an
action by the plaintiff, after per-
formance by her, to recover the sum
which the defendant agreed to pay.
-Held, the promise to pay was sup-
ported by a sufficient consideration.
Hart v. Young.

417

1. An employee, who contracts for
the performance of hazardous

In view of the brakeman's knowl-
edge as to the bridge, his omission
to avoid the accident, by stooping,
was such want of ordinary care
and caution as would have defeated
his action, if otherwise maintain-
able.
Id.

4. Having assumed the risk of mjury
to his person, from the bridge, evi-
dence offered by him upon the trial,
tending to show its dangerous
character, was properly excluded.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

See DAMAGES.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES, 8.

MECHANIC'S LIEN.

See LIEN, 1.

MINISTERIAL ACT.

Id.

duties, assumes such risks as are See SUPERINTENDENT OF CANALS, 1.

incident to their discharge, from
causes open and obvious, the dan-
gerous character of which he has
had opportunity to ascertain.
Semble. Owen V. N. Y. Cent. R. R.
Co.
108
2. A brakeman, in the employ of a
railroad company, while discharg-
ing duties in the line of his employ-
ment, upon the roof of a freight
car, was carried against a highway
bridge, and sustained injuries, for
which he brought an action against
his employer. The bridge was
some three and a half feet higher
than the top of the highest freight
car in use by the company, and had
so remained for many years, and
since the construction of the rail-
way. The brakeman had entered
into the employment of the com-
pany with knowledge of the posi-
tion and height of the bridge, and
he had had opportunity of inform-
ing himself as to its continuance
in the same position.-Held, that
the plaintiff should have been non-
suited, the danger from the bridge
being clearly incident to the labor
he undertook to perform. Id.

MONEY PAID.

1. The plaintiff having been com-
pelled, by levy and sale of his prop-
erty, to pay the unpaid tax, of a
former occupant of his premises,
with which he had been charged
upon the annual assessment rolls,
by the board of supervisors, as a
returned tax, and for which he was
not liable, sued the county to
recover the amount so paid.—
Held, the complaint stated no cause
of action. Newman v. The Super-
476
visors of Livingston County.

1.

MONEY PAID BY MISTAKE.

It is, it seems, a sound principle of
law, that in an action for money
paid by mistake in facts, the plain-
tiff should recover irrespective of
any negligence with which he may
be chargeable, unless it has caused
injury to the defendant. Union