would not invalidate an otherwise
valid election; but would cast on
the parties claiming under it, the
burden of showing that the voters
so challenged were, or appeared by
the transfer books when closed, to
be actually shareholders in the
company for the number of shares
so voted.
Id.
See MARRIED WOMEN, 1, 2, 3.
1. S. executed to plaintiff, who was
his creditor, a bond and mortgage,
to secure an indebtedness, and
plaintiff also recovered a judgment
against him. S. then conveyed to
plaintiff the mortgaged premises, in
payment of his indebtedness to him,
including that upon the bond and
mortgage and judgment. - Held,
plaintiff was neither a creditor of
S., nor a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, and not entitled, as
such, to question the bona fides of a
mortgage prior to own in time and
record, given while S. was so in-
debted to him, and of which he had
no actual knowledge, until after
the conveyance to him. Shadbolt
v. Bassett.
121
2. And, it seems, to construe such
writing as covering such a continu-
ing order, would give it the effect
of a continuing guaranty.
Id.
3. Held, further, that an action upon
the guaranty could not be main-
tained for miscellaneous articles,
constituent parts of "chamber
suits," but out of which it did not
appear that any such suit, as under-
stood by the parties, could have
been made; and although a custom
of which R. had knowledge was
shown, for the wholesale trade to
sell retail dealers such separate
articles, with a view to their ar-
rangement afterward into such
suits.
4. And it seems, when a guardian
See ACTION, 1, 2.
INN-KEEPER, 1, 2, 3, 4.
1. By the present laws of this State,
the husband is not liable for the
wrongful act of his wife, who,
claiming a lien upon the personal
property of a third person, refuses,
on demand, to deliver it to such
third person, who is the owner,
where the wife claims such lien as
her own separate property, al-
though, in fact, she has no lien, and
refusal amounts to a conversion.
Peak v. Lemon.
295
2. And if the wife makes such refusal
in the company or presence of her
husband, the latter is not liable for
such wrongful act of hers, nor is
there any presumption that she is
under the coercion, command, or
direction of her husband, where
she asserts her own claims in rela-
tion to her separate property. Id.
3. It is the nature and not the validity
of the wife's claim, respecting her
separate property, which is the test
of her liability and of her husband's
exemption.
Id.
See MARRIED WOMEN, 1 to 7 inclusive
CONTRACT, 6.
erects a building, especially a dwell- IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS.
ing on the ward's land, it becomes
a permanent annexation, however
attached to the soil.
See COUNTY COURT, 1, 2.
INFANT, 1, 2.
1. A hotel-keeper who has received
from his guest a satchel, such as is
ordinarily used to contain clothing,
and with no other information as
to its contents, than that it con-
tains property of value, cannot
avoid liability for a loss of coin
contained in the satchel, on the
ground that the guest was negli-
gent in placing it there. Kellogg v.
Sweeney.
397
1. A special guardian, appointed on
the judicial sale of a minor's real
property, being liable for money
received therefrom, conveyed to 2.
one of the sureties upon his bond,
a farm, subject to a mortgage, upon
trust, that the surety reimburse
himself from the rents and profits,
or proceeds thereof, for such sums
as he might be required to pay by
reason of liabilities of the latter,
on the grantor's account. The
farm was then conveyed by the
suty to the minor, under agree-
ment between them and the special
guardian (who was insolvent), that
it should satisfy the bond, and dis-
charge the special guardian and
his sureties from liability thereon.
The mortgage being afterward fore-
closed, the surety purchased at the
foreclosure sale, and went into
occupation; the minor, attaining
his majority, elected to ratify the
agreement and, deed pursuant
thereto.-Held, the purchase by the
surety was voidable by the minor,
when he came of age. Stiles v.
Beeman.
1. M. having possession of lands,
under a contract for their pur-
chase from C., effected an insur-
ance on the buildings thereupon,
and, after they were in part des-
troyed by fire, directed the in-
surer to pay the loss to C., and at
the same time assigned to C. the
policy; the insurer refused to
approve of the assignment, because
it included the insurance upon the
buildings destroyed; the assign-
ment then being amended, by con-
sent of parties, to meet the insurer's
objection, the latter, reciting that
C. had purchased the property,
indorsed an approval.-Held, there
was no breach of a condition not
to assign without the insurer's
approval. Manley v. Insurance
Company of N. America.
6. An execution was issued to the
sheriff in September, 1838; on the
26th of the same month, he caused
notice of the sale of certain real
estate, belonging to the judgment
debtor, for the 1st November en-
suing, to be inserted in a news-
paper, printed in the proper county,
and continued once a week, for six
successive weeks, and sold said
property under the execution, at an
adjourned day of sale. The judg
ment debtor died in October, 1838.
-Held, a valid sale, as against
the heirs-at-law of the judgment
debtor, notwithstanding the latter's
death pending the advertisement.
Wood v. Moorhouse.
7. Notices of the sale were posted
by the sheriff for a shorter time
than directed by the statute; the
plaintiff in the execution purchased
at the sale, without knowledge of
the irregularity, for less than his
judgment, and assigned the certifi-
cate, for a valuable consideration;
and the same was several times
further assigned to assignees for
value and without notice; and
within fifteen months after the sale,
the last assignee, who was also
owner by assignment of a judg-
ment lien on the property, redeemed
the premises, and obtained a sher-
iff's deed therefor. In 1843, a
mortgage, executed in 1835, upon
the property, was foreclosed, the
property sold, and the purchaser
entered at once into possession,
and continued to occupy through
those claiming under him at the
time of this suit. The heirs-at-
law of the judgment debtor, the
eldest of whom, at the time of his
death (October 1838), was seven
years of age, not being made par-
ties to the foreclosure, brought this
suit, in 1862, to redeem the property
from the said mortgage.-Held, the
plaintiff's title in the property had
been divested by the execution
sale, redemption, and deed thereon,
and the complaint was properly
dismissed.
tor, by reason of defects or irregu
larities in the proceedings to sell.
Id.
11. It seems that every person buy-
ing at a sheriff's sale, for the pur-
pose of satisfying an honest debt,
is a bona fide purchaser. Id.
12. It seems that the statute relating
to the time and manner of giving
notice is directory merely, and non-
compliance with its provisions does
not vitiate the sale; and if manda-
tory, the remedy is by motion.. Id.
13. That where a sale is made in viola-
tion of law, e. g., at a time before
sunrise, &c., the purchaser will be
presumed to know the law, and
though he acts in good faith, that it
is not in accordance therewith h;
otherwise, however, where th
sheriff's proceedings have been i›-
regular. In the latter case, the
purchaser is at liberty to presuire
that the officer has discharged his
official duty.
Held, therefore, that it would be
presumed in favor of the proceed-
ings on the redemption in ques-
tion, that the money was paid by
the redeeming creditor to the pur-
chaser, creditor, or officer making
the sale, as required by §§ 59 and
60, 2 R. S., 373.
15. Also, that such creditor had pro-
duced a certified copy of the judg-
ment on which he redeemed.
together with a verified copy of
the assignment, or an affidavit of
the amount due (§ 60).
Id.
16. Also, that such creditor had
caused the execution of all assign-
ments of the certificates to be ac-
knowledged, or proved as deeds,
as required (Id. 297, § 69), and to
be filed in the office of the county
clerk.
Id.
See ESTOPPEL, 1, 2, 3.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
See DISCRETION.
See COUNTY COURT, 1 to 7.
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