award to be made either before or at the time of pronouncing final judgment, as to the Court may seem fit.”

How ascertained and paid.] The justices at sessions are to make such regulations, with respect to the costs to be allowed, as to them shall seem just and reasonable, and may from time to time alter the same; such regulations to be approved of by one justice of gaol delivery for the county. 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 26.

The attorney for the prosecution makes out a bill of the costs and expenses, according to the regulations established at the particular Quarter Sessions. He then takes it to the Clerk of the Peace, who will tax it, and give him an order for the amount; for which he is to be paid one shilling for the prosecutor, or sixpence for each other person, whose expenses are allowed. See 7 G. 4, c. 64, s. 24. In counties, &c. this order is upon the treasurer of the county, riding, &c., and is paid out of the county rate; ld.; in boroughs, having separate Quarter Sessions, the order is upon the treasurer of the borough, and is paid out of the borough fund. 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, s. 113.

10. Restitution of Stolen Goods.

As to goods &c. obtained by larceny, embezzlement or false pretences, it is enacted by stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 57, that" if any person guilty of any such felony or misdemeanor as aforesaid, in stealing, taking, obtaining or converting, or in knowingly receiving, any chattel, money, valuable security or other property whatsoever, shall be indicted for any such offence, by or on behalf of the owner of the property, or his executor or administrator, and convicted thereof: in such case the property shall be restored to the owner or his representative; and the Court before whom any such person shall be so convicted, shall have power to award from time to time writs of restitution for the said property, or to order the restitution thereof in a summary manner : Provided always, that if it shall appear, before any award or order made, that any valuable security shall have been bonâ fide paid or discharged by some person or body corporate liable to the payment thereof, or being a negotiable instrument shall have been hona fide taken or received by transfer or delivery, by some person or body corporate, for a just and valuable consideration, without any notice, or without any reasonable cause to suspect that the same had by any felony or misdemeanor been stolen, taken, obtained or converted as aforesaid, in such case the Court shall not award or order the restitution of such security."

CHAPTER III.

The Practice of the Court of Quarter Sessions, as a Court of

Appeal.

SECTION 1.-APPEALS GENERALLY.

In what Cases an Appeal lies.

It has already been observed, that the Court of Quarter Sessions derives its jurisdiction entirely, either from the commission of the peace, or from the provisions of certain acts of parliament. No jurisdiction whatever, as a court of appeal, is given to it by the commission; see ante, 2—9; jurisdiction in that respect, therefore, can be given to it by statute only. There is no general statute upon the subject; but the power of appealing to the Sessions is given by different statutes in particular instances. An appeal is thus given, against orders of removal, by stat. 13 & 14 C. 2, c. 12, s. 2, and 3 W. & M. c. 11. s. 9, 10; against poor rates, by stat. 17 G. 2, c. 38, s. 4; against county rates, by stat. 57 G. 3, c. 94, s. 2; against the appointment of overseers, by stat. 43 El. c. 2, s. 6. and 17 G. 2, c. 38, s. 4; against the allowance or disallowance of overseers' accounts, by stat. 17 G. 2, c. 38, s. 4, and 50 G. 3, c. 49, s. 2; against summary convictions in several particular instances, by some other statutes; and in some other cases. And it must appear to be given expressly by the words of the statute; it cannot be implied. Where a statute (25 G. 3, c. 72,) which imposed a certain excise duty upon cottons, &c., referred to the old excise statute, 12 C. 2, c. 24, and enacted that all powers and authorities, clauses, matters and things in that statute, and every other act relating to the excise, provided, for the securing, enforcing, mitigating, recovering, adjudging and ascertaining of the duties therein mentioned, should be applied to the managing, mitigating, adjudging, ascertaining and recovering the duties granted by that Act, in as full a manner as if such powers, &c. were repeated and re-enacted in that Act; and upon an application for a mandamus to the justices at Sessions to receive an appeal against a conviction for an offence under stat. 25 G. 3, c. 72, it was argued, that although that sta

tute did not expressly give the appeal, yet the statute 12 C. 2, and other excise Acts did, and that therefore such appeal clause in the former statutes must be deemed to be embodied in this Act, and the party convicted had consequently a right to appeal; but the Court held, that the appeal clause, which was a special provision, could not be deemed to be included in the general words abovementioned, and that no appeal lies unless it is given by express words. R. v. JJ. of Surrey, 2 T. R. 504. And see R. v. Skone, 6 East, 514. R. v. JJ. of Staffordshire, 12 East, 572. But see R. v. Mayor of Liverpool, 3 D. & R. 275, semb. cont. On the other hand, where an appeal is given by the express words of a statute, the party shall not be deprived of it by any thing to be implied from other clauses in the Act. See R. v. JJ. of Salop, 2 B. &Ad. 145. R. v. JJ. of Hants, 1 B. & Ad. 654. Where there is such an express provision, therefore, the only question is, whether the particular grievance of which the party complains, and against which he intends to appeal, comes within the words and meaning of the appeal clause in question. Some of these clauses are specific enough, and there is no difficulty in judging to what grievances they extend; but much the greater number are couched in generic terms, (such for instance as, "if any person shall think himself aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance of this Act," &c.) and it often becomes a question whether a particular grievance comes within the general words of the statute. See R. v. Tucker, 3 B. & C. 544. R. v. JJ. of St. Alban's, 3 B. & C. 698. R. v. JJ. of Kent, 9 B. & C. 283. R. v. JJ. of Devon, 4 M. & S. 421.

By and against whom the Appeal is to be brought.

By whom.] This is always mentioned in the clause of the statute giving the appeal, either specifically or in general terms; and it is a question entirely of construction, whether the party, as well as the grievance, comes within the meaning of the clause. Where the words are specific, there is usually no difficulty upon the subject; but where the words are general-if any person shall think himself aggrieved, or the like-it sometimes becomes a question of difficulty whether the party seeking to appeal is a party aggrieved within the meaning of the statute. Where a licensed publican appealed, as a party grieved within stat. 9 G. 4, c. 61, (the Licensing Act,) s. 27, because the magistrates granted a licence to another person, who had set up a public-house within a few yards of his house; the Court held, that he was not a party aggrieved within the meaning of the statute; those only who were immediately aggrieved by the act done, and not those who were merely consequentially injured, were within the meaning of this appeal clause. R. v. JJ. of Middlesex, 3 B. & Adolph. 938. In another case it became a question who was to be deemed a party aggrieved, within the appeal clause in the Old Highway Act,

(13 Geo. 3, c. 78,) so as to appeal against the appointment of surveyors of the highways; and the Court said, that every inhabitant must be deemed to be aggrieved by a bad appointment of surveyors. R. v. JJ. of St. Alban's, 3 B. & C. 698.

Where one of eight overseers in a parish appealed against the allowance of the constable's accounts, although the other overseers dissented from the appeal: the Court held, that one overseer alone could not appeal in this case; the statute (18 G. 3, c. 19, s. 4,) gave authority to the overseer or overseers to appeal, if they found that the parish was aggrieved; and as they have thus to exercise a judgment in bringing the appeal, such appeal could not be instituted by a less number than the majority of them. R. v. JJ. of Lancashire, 5 B. & Ald. 755. On the other hand, where six several persons, rated to the poor by the same rate, jointly appealed against it, on the ground that some persons had been omitted and others underrated, and the Sessions refused to entertain the appeal, on the ground that there ought to have been a separate appeal by each appellant: the Court, upon application, granted a mandamus to the justices to enter continuances and hear the appeal, holding that there was nothing in the objection. R. v. JJ. of Sussex, 15 East, 206. So where several jointly appealed against a rate, each claiming exemption on a distinct ground from the other,-one because he was rated for ships, another for money lent on mortgage, another for household furniture, another for his pay as captain in the navy, &c.-it was deemed unobjectionable on this ground. R. v. White et al. 4 T. R. 771. Also, where there was one appeal against four rates, the Court held it to be sufficient. R. v. JJ. of Suffolk, 1 B. & Ald. 640.

Against whom.] The appeal is deemed to be brought against those to whom notice of appeal is directed by the statute to be given. An appeal against an order of removal, is deemed to be against the churchwardens and overseers of the removing parish or township, because the statute directs the notice of appeal to be directed to them. 9 G. 1, c. 7, s. 8. In an appeal against a poor rate, the notice of appeal must be given to the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish, &c. 17 G. 2, c. 38, s. 4, and to such occupiers and inhabitants as in the notice are stated to be omitted in the rate or underrated; R. v. JJ. of Berkshire, Doug. on Elections, 132. R. v. Brooke, Bart. 9 B. & C. 915; and the appeal must be deemed to be against them. In an appeal against the allowance of overseers' accounts, the notice of appeal must be given to "the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish," &c.; 17 G. 2, c. 38, s. 4. 41 G. 3, c. 23, s. 4. see R. v. JJ. of Norfolk, 2 B. & Adolph. 944; which was intended and in practice is construed to mean, the persons whose accounts are the subject of the appeal, although at the time they are no longer overseers; and the appeal is accordingly deemed

to be against them. But in an appeal by overseers against the disallowance of items in their accounts, the statute (50 G. 3, c. 49, s. 2,) makes no mention of notice of appeal, nor has any case been decided upon it; but as the notice is to be against the order of the justices in special sessions disallowing the items, and such order is not made at the instance of the parish or any other person, the justices perhaps are to be deemed the respondents. In appeals against county rates, the notice of appeal must be given not only to those who made the rate, but also to the Clerk of the Peace and the hundred constable; 57 G. 3, c. 94, s. 2; and they are to be deemed the respondents. In appeals against convictions, the notice is sometimes required to be given to the prosecutor alone, as in the summary convictions under Peel's Acts, 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 72, and c. 30, s. 38; sometimes to the magistrates alone, sometimes to both; and the appeal is accordingly intituled. In many cases, where an appeal is given, it is not mentioned to whom the notice of appeal is to be given: in such a case, if the proceeding appealed against, be the act of a justice of the peace, at the instance of some party who has an interest to support it, the notice of appeal may be directed to the party, or perhaps to both the party and the justice; but if it be the act of the justice, and not at the instance of a party, then it should seem that the notice of appeal must be given to the justice only, even although a party be really interested in the

event.

To what Court the Appeal is to be.

The appeal must be made to the Court of Quarter Sessions, holden for the county or borough within which, or by the justices of which, the act complained of was done. And where the sessions are holden in different divisions of a county or riding by adjournment, the appeal not only may be to the sessions holden within that division where the order or conviction &c. appealed against was made, R. v. JJ. of Sussex, 7 T. R. 107, but it seems that it must be; for otherwise it would be in the power of the appellant to harrass the respondent, by entering the appeal at a sessions for a distant division of the county, and it might otherwise be attended with mischievous consequences. R. v. Coyston, 1 Sid. 149.

Formerly, against orders of removal, made by the justices of a borough which was not a county of itself, the appeal must have been to the sessions of the county within which the removing parish was situate. 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 30, s. 6. and see Id. s. 8. 9 G. 1, c. 7, s. 7. R. v. Wendover, 2 Salk. 490. R. v. Malden, Set. & Rem. 10. So in corporations or franchises not having four justices, all appeals against rates, and against overseers' accounts, might be brought to the sessions of the county. 17

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