may be cross-examined by the appellant's counsel, and reexamined by the counsel for the respondents. The counsel for the appellant next addresses the Court, and either confines his observations to the respondents' case and proofs, in which case the respondents' counsel has no right to reply; or, after observing upon the respondents' case and proofs, he may open a case for the appellant, and adduce evidence and witnesses in support of it, which witnesses may be cross-examined by the respondents' counsel, and re-examined by the counsel for the appellant. The respondents' counsel is thereupon entitled to the general reply; or before he replies, he may call witnesses to disprove the case set by the appellant, in which case the appellant's counsel has a right again to address the Court, (confining his observations, however, to the testimony of the witnesses so called by the respondents); and then the respondents' counsel is entitled to a general reply upon the whole case. 1 Arch. P. L. 20, 21. Where, upon the hearing of an appeal against an order of removal, the counsel for the appellants, admitting a primâ facie case for the respondents, opened a case of a subsequent settle. ment elsewhere, and proved it; the counsel for the respondents, instead of calling witnesses to disprove that case, and then replying, replied in the first instance, and then proposed to call witnesses but the Sessions refused to allow him to do so, and decided the case for the appellants. Upon a motion for a mandamus to the justices to enter continuances and rehear the appeal, the Court of King's Bench held, that as the appeal was actually heard, they could not interfere, unless a case were stated for their opinion by the Sessions. R. v. JJ. of Carnarvon, 4 B. & Ald. 86.

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As soon as the case has thus been closed on both sides, the Court by their chairman, or in boroughs the recorder, deliver the judgment, and either confirm the order &c., or quash it.

Proceedings in Criminal Cases.] As this subject will be treated of in detail hereafter, a very short statement of the practice of the Court of Quarter Sessions in trials by jury will be sufficient in this place.

After the Court has been opened, by the cryer making proclamation, as is already mentioned, ante, p. 23, the clerk of the peace, after calling upon the sheriff to return the precept to him delivered, and which is returned accordingly, and after calling over the names of the chief constables, bailiffs, &c., then calls and swears the grand jury. The usual proclamation against vice and profaneness is next read by him, and then the chairman of the Court charges the grand jury. After the charge has been delivered, a bill or bills of indictment, on which the witnesses have been sworn, are delivered to the grand jury; they thereupon retire to their room, examine the witnesses whose names

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are indorsed upon each bill, and return into Court with such bills as they have examined, having indorsed upon them the words "A true bill," or " Not a true bill," according as they find or ignore them. Other bills are then delivered to them, and so from time to time, until all the business to be done by the grand jury has been in like manner disposed of by them; and they are then discharged by the chairman.

Whilst the grand jury are engaged with the first bill or bills delivered to them, the clerk of the peace calls over the names of the common jury, and the first twelve, who answer to their names, go into the jury box. And as soon as the grand jury return a bill of indictment indorsed " A true bill," the prisoner, against whom the bill is found, is then placed at the bar, and arraigned upon it, and he pleads either guilty or not guilty. If he plead guilty, of course all that then remains to complete the proceeding, is the judgment of the Court upon him. But if he plead not guilty, the jury are then sworn, (the prisoner, in the case of felony, being previously told that he may challenge them or any of them before they are sworn); the clerk of the peace then charges the jury with the prisoner, by reading over to them the indictment, plea, &c. The counsel for the prosecution next states the case to the jury, and calls the witnesses to prove it; which witnesses may be cross-examined by the prisoner or his counsel, and re-examined by the counsel for the prosecution. The prisoner or (in cases of misdemeanor) his counsel may then address the jury in his defence, and may call his witnesses to prove it, which witnesses may be cross-examined by the counsel for the prosecution, and re-examined by the prisoner or his counsel; or he may call witnesses to character, and it is not usual in practice to cross-examine them, except under very peculiar circumstances. If, in a case of misdemeanor, the defendant call witnesses to prove facts, the counsel for the prosecution is entitled to the general reply.

When the case is closed on both sides, the chairman, or in boroughs the recorder, sums up the evidence to the jury, who, after deliberating upon the case, return their verdict of " 'guilty" or not guilty" to the clerk of the peace, who records it accordingly. If the prisoner be acquitted, the Court will order him to be discharged either then or at the end of the sessions; but if found guilty, the chairman or recorder delivers the judgment of the Court, by passing sentence upon him. In some Courts of Quarter Sessions, sentence is thus passed upon each prisoner, immediately after he is convicted; in others, at the end of each day, on all the prisoners who on that day have been convicted; and in others, not until the end of the sessions, when sentence will be passed upon all the prisoners who have been convicted during the sessions.

Contempts of the Sessions, how punishable.] Contempts of the Court of Quarter Sessions, such as abuse or contemptuous words of it or any of its members, if committed in the face of the Court, may be punished in a summary manner; that is to say, the Court may order any of its bailiffs to take the party into custody, and may order him to be detained in prison for a reasonable time, as a punishment for his contempt. See 2 Hawk. c. 1. s. 15. c. 22. s. 1. So, any riotous, noisy, or indecent conduct in Court, calculated to interrupt the business of the Court, or to bring its proceedings into disrepute, may be treated in the same way as contempts. Where, in an action for false imprisonment by a woman against a magistrate, it appeared that the plaintiff having obtained a warrant for an assault against some other person, which was not executed, called upon the defendant, a magistrate, upon the subject; and he being engaged upon other business in his private office at the time, she forced her way into his room, behaved there with great indecency, making a great noise, and insisting on her business being attended to; the defendant desired her to be quiet, and threatened to commit her unless she altered her conduct; but she still persisting, he committed her to Bridewell, where she remained two months. Lord Kenyon, C. J. expressed some doubt whether a magistrate," not sitting as a chairman of a Court, but at his private office," could commit for a contempt; but thinking it a matter fit to be seriously considered and determined by the whole Court, he directed a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the point. The case seems to have been afterwards argued, but no judgment was delivered. Pettit v. Addington, Peake R. 87. See R. v. Ellers, 1 Wils. 222. But for contemptuous words by one of the justices of the Court to another, the party, it seems, is not punishable. Hawk. c. 8. s. 46.

Contempts of the Court, such as disobedience of its lawful orders, libels upon its administration of justice, or the like, committed, not in the face of the Court, but out of Court, are punishable, not in a summary way as contempts committed in the face of the Court, but as misdemeanors at common law, upon indictment, by fine or imprisonment, or both. Where upon the trial of an information, filed by the Attorney-General against the proprietor of a newspaper, for a libel on a judge and jury, before whom the captain of a merchant ship had been tried for murder and acquitted, the libel affirming that the prisoner had murdered one of his crew, and in a gross and abusive style censured the judge and jury for acquitting him: it was contended, on the part of the defendants, that every one has a right to canvass the proceedings of Courts of Justice, and that the article complained of was a fair exercise of that right. Grose, J. said it certainly was lawful, with decency and candour, to discuss the propriety of the verdict of a jury or the decisions of a judge; and if the defendant should be

thought to have done no more in this instance, he would be entitled to an acquittal; but, on the contrary, he had transgressed the law, and ought to be convicted, if the extracts from the newspaper set out in the information contained no reasoning or discussion, but only declamation and invective, and were written, not with a view to elucidate the truth, but to injure the character of individuals, and to bring into hatred and contempt the administration of justice in the country. The defendant was found guilty on this and a similar information, and sentenced to three years imprisonment. R. v. White, 1 Camp. 359. and see R. v. Watson, 2 T. R. 199. But words spoken of a magistrate, in his absence, are not the subject of an indictment. R. v. Weltje, 2 Camp. 142. R. v. Wrightson, 2 Salk. 698. R. v. Pocock, 2 Str. 1157.

When, how, and to what Time the Court may be adjourned.] If the Sessions last more than one day, they must be adjourned to another, and so on until the business is finished; if there be no adjournment, the Sessions are at an end, and the justices cannot afterwards legally proceed with the business. Thus, where an appeal was entered at the General Quarter Sessions for Suffolk, held on the 7th April, and the Sessions were then adjourned to the 9th April at Woodbridge, but nothing could be done for want of a sufficient number of justices; on the 11th April a Sessions was holden at Ipswich, and adjourned to the 14th at Bury, where the appeal was determined. But this was holden to be wrong; there being no adjournment of the Sessions from the 9th to the 11th April, the Sessions had no jurisdiction when they determined the appeal. R. v. Polstead, 2 Str. 1262. See also R. v. Hadingham, Burr. S. C. 112. So, where it appeared that the Sessions for the county of Lincoln were holden on the 9th January at Kirton, and then adjourned to the 11th at Caistor, where however they were not holden; on the 13th the Sessions were holden, without adjournment, at Horncastle, where an appeal was heard, and an order of removal quashed. But the Court, upon application, quashed the order of Sessions, holding that after the Quarter Sessions for the county holden at Kirton, no other Sessions could have been holden in the same quarter but by adjournment; the justices therefore had no authority to try the appeal, or quash the order. R. v. West Torrington, Burr. S. C. 293. As to this latter decision, there can be no doubt of its propriety in point of law; but the reason given for it is not exactly correct, and may possibly be a mistake of the reporter: for it is well understood now, that according to the fair construction of the statutes upon the subject, the justices may hold a General Sessions and a Quarter Sessions during the same quarter; see ante, p. 16; but to enable them to hold the second Sessions, without adjournment, there must be a new precept issued to the

sheriff to summons the sheriff, new summons to the jurors, constables, &c. &c., which was not so in the case above-mentioned.

In counties, the adjournment must be by two justices, at the least; for it is laid down, that if there be not justices enough present to hold a Sessions, there are not enough to adjourn it legally; and if in such a case the Sessions were actually adjourned, every act done at such adjourned Sessions would be void. R. v. Westrington, 2 Bott, 981. In boroughs within the Corporation Act, the adjournment is by the recorder or his deputy; and in their absence it may be by the mayor. 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, s. 106. The adjournment is made by proclamation by the cryer of the Court, thus: "Oyez, Oyez, Oyez, All manner of persons who have any thing further to do at the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace for this county, let them depart hence, and give their attendance at [“ this place" or at in this county,"] on ["the morrow" or "Tuesday the 3d day of April instant," as the case may be]" at [nine] of the clock in the forenoon. God save the King and this honourable Bench." The clerk of the makes a minute of the adjournment in his book accordingly.

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The Sessions may be thus adjourned, either until the next day, or to any other day before that on which the next Quarter Sessions are to be holden. See 2 Str. 832, 865. Thurston v. Slatford, Lutw. 911. Linfield v. Battle, 2 Salk. 605. Where an indictment was found against a constable, for not obeying a justice's order, at the Epiphany Sessions, and the defendant was afterwards tried, convicted, and sentenced at an adjournment of those Sessions holden on the 3d May, (which was after the Easter Quarter Sessions had begun): upon error brought, the Court reversed the judgment, on the ground that the Court of Quarter Sessions have no authority by law to adjourn to a day beyond that on which the next Sessions are to be holden. R. v. Grince, T. 4 G. 1. 19 Vin. Ab. 358. It has therefore been holden, that in stating the style of an adjourned Sessions, in the caption of an indictment, order of Sessions, or the like, it is not sufficient to say ' at such a Sessions holden by adjournment on such a day,' but the holding of the original Sessions, and the day on which it was holden, must be set forth, and that it was continued from thence to such further time by adjournment, in order to show that no other Sessions had intervened; and for this defect, in one case, judgment upon an indictment was arrested, and in another an indictment was quashed; R. v. Fisher, R. v. Saunders, 2 Str. 865; and in another, an order of Sessions was quashed. St. Michael Coslany v. Ipswich, 2 Str. 831.

Where an application was made to a Court of Quarter Sessions under a particular act of parliament, and the Sessions then entertained it, but adjourned the consideration of it to a future day certain, before which day the act of parliament was repealed; the Court of King's Bench held that the jurisdiction of the Ses