EVIDENCE. Railway Company. that Act, to appoint by will attested (2). Of Negligence on the part of by three witnesses, is well executed by a will attested by two witnesses in conformity with the 9th section of that Act. Hubbard v. Lees, ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH COMPANY. See INSURANCE, (2). EQUITABLE DEFENCE. See BILL OF EXCHANGE. 418 I. The defendants' railway crossed on a level a public footway; and on each side of the line were swinggates through which passengers entered. At one of these gates the view and down the line was obup structed by the piers of a railway bridge which crossed it, but near the line there was a clear view of 300 yards in each direction. A woman who approached the line by that gate waited until a luggage train had passed, and immediately afterwards proceeded to cross the line, when a person on the other side Void Marriage by reason of Impo- twice called out to her, but, being tence of Husband. To an action on a covenant, in consideration of marriage, to pay an annuity during the life of the husband, the defendant pleaded, as a defence on equitable grounds, that the marriage was null and void by reason of the impotence of the husband.-Held, a bad plea. Edward Cavell and Another v. Prince, 368 EVIDENCE. See BANKRUPTCY, (6). (1). Entries in New Testament.— Correspondence between Members of same Family. In questions of pedigree, entries of births, deaths and marriages of members of the family in a New Testament, produced from the proper custody, are evidence without proof of the handwriting. deaf, she did not hear, when an express train, which the luggage train had prevented her from seeing, knocked her down and killed her. Thirty-six passenger trains passed along the line daily, besides luggage trains. No person was stationed at the crossing to warn passengers of danger, but caution boards were placed there.-Held, that there was no evidence for the jury of negligence on the part of the defendants. Stubley, Administrator of Mary Stubley, deceased, v. The London and North Western Railway 83 Company, II. The defendants' railway intersected a public foot and carriage way upon the level close to a station At the on the defendants' line. place of intersection swing carriage gates opened both ways, and there was also a swivel gate on each side of the line for persons on foot. The return-ticket holder, plaintiff, a while crossing the line at this place to reach the passenger station, was killed by an overdue express. At the time of the accident one of the swing-gates was partially open and So, also, correspondence between members of the same family, in which they respectively address one another as relatives. Hubbard v. Lees, 418 740 EXECUTION. GUARANTEE. there was no gatekeeper.--Held, sale as required by the 73rd section. 93 A witness may refresh his memory as to the day on which certain proceedings at which he was present took place, by referring to a newspaper containing a report of those proceedings, and which he read at the time the facts were fresh in his recollection, and then knew that they were correctly reported. Dyer v. Best, 189 FREIGHT. Delivery of Goods to third Person in pursuance of Indorsement of Bill of Lading, and Acceptance of his Substituted Liability for Freight. To a declaration on a bill of lading for freight of goods "to be delivered as ordered" unto the defendant or his assigns, the defendant pleaded that before the arrival of the goods he endorsed the bill of lading: "Deliver to Messrs. W. & K. or order, looking to them for all freight, without recourse to us." The plea then stated that plaintiffs accepted the indorsement, and delivered the goods in pursuance thereof to Messrs. W. & K. as the persons entitled to Postponement by Sheriff of Sale under the goods, and not to the defendant. Fi. Fa. at request of Judgment-Held, on demurrer, that the facts Debtor, and Subsequent Negligent EXECUTION. See BANKRUPTCY, (8), (9). Sale. On the 20th July a sheriff levied under a fi. fa. a judgment debt exceeding 501. At the request of the execution debtor the sheriff's officer postponed the advertisements of the sale until the 25th July, and on the 26th sold the goods without proper care in lotting them, and greatly under their value. On the 1st August the execution debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt, and his assignees brought an action against the sheriff for not advertising the stated in the plea shewed that the plaintiff's had accepted the substi tuted liability of Messrs. W. & K., and consequently could not enforce their claim for freight against the defendant. Lewis and Another v. McKee, 674 GAMING. See RACE, (1). GUARANTEE. Liability for Future, as well as The defendant's son was indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of 1701., being the aggregate of several monthly accounts for coal supplied. The plaintiffs having refused to supply any more coal unless the accounts were settled, the defendant paid them 97., and gave them a bill of exchange for 617., and the following guarantee, signed by his father:-"In consideration of the credit given by the H. G. Coal Company (the plaintiffs) to my son, J. P., for coal supplied by them to him, I hereby hold myself responsible as a guarantee to them for the sum of 1007.; and in default of his payment of any account due I bind myself by this note to pay to the H. G. Company whatever may be owing, to the amount not exceed ing the sum of 100l."-Held, that this was a continuing guarantee, and applied to future as well as the accounts then due. Wood and Another v. Priestner, 681 cepted to), upon which the Judge told the jury they were at liberty to find "that parcels had been carried by the defendants for other persons," viz., the wholesale houses, "containing goods of a like description, and under like circumstances, at a less rate than such goods were carried by them for the plaintiff, and that the defendants knowingly and purposely charged the plaintiff more than other persons." The plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment, and in the Exchequer Chamber the exceptions were overruled, and judgment affirmed. The defendants continuing the same charges, the plaintiff issued a fresh writ of summons indorsed with a claim for an injunction, and applied under the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, ss. 79 and 82, upon affidavits stating facts substantially similar to the evidence adduced on the trial, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from charging him "for the carriage of his goods otherwise than equally with all other persons, and after the same rate, in respect of goods of the like description under the like circumstances." -Held: that this was not a case in which the Court would enjoin under that Act. Sutton v. The South Eastern Railway Company, 325 When Risk attaches where Vessel Insured "at or from" a Foreign Port. Where a vessel is insured "at or from" a foreign port at which she is expected to arrive, the risk attaches when she first arrives at that port in such a seaworthy condition as to be enabled to lie there in safety. Houghton and Others v. The Empire Marine Insurance Company, Limited, 44 (2.) Risk and Contingency of Laying Down Electric Telegraph Cable. An electric telegraph Company, being about to lay down an electric cable between Ireland and Newfoundland, a shareholder in the Company effected an insurance in the common form of a marine policy of insurance, with the following words in the margin of the policy: "and to continue until the said cable be laid in one continuous length between Ireland and Newfoundland, and until 100 words shall have been transmitted from Ireland to Newfoundland, and vice versâ ; the risk of this policy then to cease and determine; this policy, in addition to all perils and casualties herein specified, shall cover every risk and contingency attending the conveyance and successful laying of the cable from and including its lading on board the Great Eastern' until 100 words be transmitted from Ireland to Newfoundland, and vice versâ; and it is hereby distinctly declared and agreed that the transmission of the said 100 words shall be an essential condition of the policy." The ship sailed from Ircland with cable on board of the length of 2200 miles, and after about 1200 miles of it had been laid down, in consequence of the electric current not acting, some of it was drawn back into the ship, and whilst this was being done a part of the cable which was on board broke, and the broken end fell into the sea. Some fruitless endeavour was made to raise it, but ultimately the ship returned with the remainder of the cable, about 1200 miles in length, on board.-Held: First, that the insurance was not on the cable, but on the risk and contingency of successfully laying it down. Secondly, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for a total loss. 221 Wilson v. Jones, (3). Deduction of one-third new for old in respect of Repairs. A marine policy of insurance contained the following clause:-" The usual deduction of one-third of the amount of repairs will not be made by this Company in the case of ships built within the limits of the United Kingdom until after eighteen months, or in the case of Colonial built ships until after twelve months from the date of the builder's certificate; but after such dates respectively the deduction will be made." By custom, underwriters make a deduction of one-third, new for old, only in respect of repairs made after the first voyage of a vessel.-Held, that the expression "usual deduction" had reference to the quantum only, and that in the case of a Colonial built ship the underwriters were entitled to make the deduction of one-third, after twelve months from the date of the builder's certificate, although the ship had not completed her first voyage. Byrne v. The Mercantile Insurance Company, Limited, 506 (4). Policy underwritten by Brokers for greater Amount than authorized by his Principal. A broker at Liverpool was authorized by his principal in London to underwrite in the name of the latter policies of marine insurance, not exceeding 100l. on any one vessel. Order under 12th Section of Common Law Procedure Act, 1860. B. assigned to T., by way of mortgage, certain policies of assurance. Parties interrogated. 171 T. delivered the policies to the de- (3). Answers tending to criminate fendants, to collect the money due thereon. The defendants failed to do so, and T. sued them for the policies, declaring on the special contract, with counts in trover and detinue. Afterwards B. sued the defendants for the polices, and upon an interpleader summons Bramwell, B., ordered that the action by T. be stayed until further order; that T. be at liberty to defend the action by B., giving the defendants an indemnity, and that B. give them security for costs.-Held: that the order was just and reasonable, and that the Judge had power to make it under the 12th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1860. Tanner v. The European Bank. Bowen v. Same, 398 INTERROGATORIES. (I). In Trover. In an action of trover the defendant will not be allowed to inter It is no objection to the delivery section of the Common Law Proceof interrogatories under the 51st dure Act, 1854, that the answers gated, but he may on that ground would criminate the party interro refuse to answer them. Where, however, it appears that but with some sinister object, the interrogatories are not put bonâ fide, Court will, in the exercise of its discretion, disallow them. fendants, as a partnership firm of In an action charging the deattornies, with negligence in investdefendants, who was not an attorney, ing the plaintiff's money, one of the objected to the delivery of interrogatcries to him for the purpose of ascertaining whether he was a partner in the firm, inasmuch as the answers might render him criminally liable under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 2.Held, that the interrogatories ought to be administered, and that the defendant might safely answer them, |