Economics, Values, and OrganizationAvner Ben-Ner, Louis Putterman In this path-breaking book, economists and scholars from diverse disciplines use standard economic tools to investigate the formation and evolution of normative preferences. The fundamental premise is that an adequate understanding of how an economy and society are organized and function cannot be reached without an understanding of the formation and mutation of values and preferences that determine how we interact with others. Its chapters explore the two-way interaction between economic arrangements or institutions, and preferences, including those regarding social status, the well-being of others, and ethical principles. Contributions have been written especially for this volume and are designed to address a wide readership in economics and other disciplines. The contributors are leading scholars who draw on such fields as game theory, economic history, the economics of institutions, and experimental economics, as well as political philosophy, sociology and psychology, to establish and explore their arguments. |
Contents
Values and institutions in economic analysis | 3 |
THE FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS AND VALUES | 71 |
Normative expectations the simultaneous evolution of institutions and norms | 73 |
A utilitarian theory of political legitimacy | 101 |
Why do we care what others think about us? | 133 |
Starting with nothing on the impossibility of grounding norms solely in selfinterest | 151 |
THE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION OF VALUES IN FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES | 169 |
Did Father know best? Families markets and the supply of caring labor | 171 |
How do we know whether a monetary transaction is a gift an entitlement or compensation? | 329 |
THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK TRUST AND INCENTIVES | 335 |
How effective are trust and reciprocitybased incentives? | 337 |
Worker trust system vulnerability and the performance of work groups | 364 |
Trust beliefs and morality | 408 |
Institutional commitment values or incentives? | 419 |
MARKETS VALUES AND WELFARE | 435 |
Institutions and morale the crowdingout effect | 437 |
How communities govern the structural basis of prosocial norms | 206 |
Moral overload and its alleviation | 231 |
Moral diversity and specialized values some observations | 267 |
SOCIAL NORMS AND CULTURE | 273 |
Social norms as positional arms control agreements | 275 |
Bribes and gifts | 296 |
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agents altruism analysis argued behavior belief benefits bribes Cambridge caring labor chapter choice choose compensation convention cooperation coordination corrupt costs cultural developed economists effect effort levels empathetic preferences enforcement evolution evolutionary evolutionary game theory Evolutionary Psychology example experiment favor Figure firms function game theory genetic gifts Harsanyi Hawk-Dove game high effort equilibrium high vulnerability homo economicus human incentives income increase institutions interactions intrinsic motivation investment Jane Mansbridge Journal of Economic median game minimum game moral dissonance moral overload Nash equilibrium nomic normative expectations one's organizations original position outcomes payment payoff percent person play players political prisoner's dilemma problem process-regarding punishment quid pro quo rational reciprocity result role rules satisfaction self-interest service labor shirking social contract social norms society strategy structure subjects tion trade trust ultimatum game University Press utilitarian utility V₁ values veil of ignorance workers