that the courts will not pause in the trial of a cause to open up a collateral inquiry of whether a wrong has been committed in obtaining information which a witness possesses. Cluett v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 193; People v. Campbell, 160 Mich. 108 (34 L. R. A. [N. S.] 58); People v. Aldorfer, 164 Mich. 676. But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld: Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 (31 L. R. A. 163).

In the instant case the evidence taken before the magistrate and returned to the circuit court conclusively established the invalidity of the search and seizure and the invasion of defendant's constitutional rights. The circuit judge did not err in directing the return of the liquor to the defendant.

2. We shall consider the first and second assignments of error together as they involve but one question. The trial judge was of the opinion that the act under which the information was filed was superseded by a later one and for this reason quashed the information. Act No. 161, Pub. Acts 1917, under which this information was filed, was approved May 2, 1917. It will hereafter be called the "Damon Act." Act No. 338, Pub. Acts 1917, was approved May 10, 1917. It will hereafter be called the "Wiley Act." Both acts by their terms became effective on and after May 1, 1918.

We shall first consider the argument advanced on behalf of the people that the Wiley Act was passed to prohibit the dealing in intoxicating liquors, the business, except for the permitted purposes, while the

Damon Act was passed to prohibit and prevent its private use. This is the foundation of the argument at the bar by the learned counsel for the people. It was forcefully presented and the people's case largely rests upon its soundness. A reading of section 4, however, convinces us that it cannot be maintained. This section provides:

"Any person who, himself or by his clerk, agent or employee, shall violate any of the provisions of this act," etc.

Clearly if the legislature by the Damon Act solely designed to prohibit and prevent the personal use of intoxicating liquors there would be no occasion to use the words clerk, agent or employee. The use of these words in the fourth section of the act, the penal section, eliminates the argument that the Damon Act was designed to cover and apply only to a field not contemplated by the Wiley Act.

The Damon Act simply prohibits, with a penalty for its violation, the bringing into, carrying, receiving or possessing of intoxicating liquors except for the permitted purposes, and by reference adopts applicable laws pertaining to search and seizure. It makes no attempt to provide for the lawful sale of liquors for medical, mechanical, chemical, scientific or sacramental purposes recognized in the constitutional amendment (Art. 16, § 11). Its absence of detail and definiteness might well have prompted the thoughtful legislator desiring to carry out the mandate of the constitutional amendment to insist upon a complete, comprehensive act, superseding it, and covering the entire field. While we may not inquire into the intent of the legislator we are bound to ascertain the legislative intent; and this we must determine by what was done by the legislature as an entity. If the subsequent act of the legislature operates to supersede the earlier act the

latter act must be accepted as the latest and final declaration of the legislative will.

The Wiley Act is a comprehensive measure of 61 sections completely covering the field and expressly repealing all acts or parts of acts in conflict with its provisions. It shows careful thought in its preparation, a recognition of constitutional rights without detracting from its virility. It provides in detail and definiteness the manner of sale of liquors for medical, mechanical, chemical, scientific and sacramental purposes, both by wholesale and retail, and prohibits all others.

Repeals by implication are not favored in the law. But where the later act covers the whole subject, contains new provisions evidencing an intent that it shall supersede the former law or is repugnant to the earlier act it operates as a repeal. In Shannon v. People, 5 Mich. 85, the rule was quoted with the citation of a large number of authorities in the following language:

"That where a subsequent statute covers the whole ground occupied by an earlier statute, it repeals, by implication, the former statute, though there be no repugnance."

In Breitung v. Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217, it was said by this court, speaking through Justice MARSTON:

"The rule is that the latter act operates to the extent of the repugnancy, as a repeal of the first, or, if the two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter covers the whole subject of the first, and contains new provisions showing that it was intended as a substitute, it will operate as a repeal."

In Attorney General v. Commissioner of Railroads, 117 Mich. 477, it was said:

"While repeals by implication are not favored in the law, yet it is a rule of construction followed by this court and other courts that a statute revising the whole subject of a former statute, and intended as a

substitute, operates as a repeal of the former law, though it contains no words to that effect."

Chief Justice LONG writing for the court in Porter v. Edwards, 114 Mich. 640, said:

"The rule is well settled that a new statute covering the same ground as the former act supersedes it for all further cases, without the necessity of repealing words."

In Graham v. Muskegon County Clerk, 116 Mich. 571, it was said by Mr. Justice MONTGOMERY:

"That a later act which covers the whole subject repeals prior acts repugnant thereto is established doctrine."

See, also, People v. Bussell, 59 Mich. 104; Feige v. Railroad Co., 62 Mich. 1; People v. Furman, 85 Mich. 110; Attorney General v. Parsell, 100 Mich. 170; Board of Sup'rs of Saginaw Co. v. Hubinger, 137 Mich. 72.

In the Wiley Act we have an act, carefully prepared, covering the field with minuteness of detail in many particulars, expressly repealing all former acts inconsistent with its provisions, passed to put into effect the mandate of the people declared in the constitutional amendment but recently adopted and fresh in the minds of the members of the legislature, dealing with the same subject-matter as the former act, that of intoxicating liquor, complete in itself, containing the latest expression of legislative will.

We are constrained to hold in view of the former decisions of this court that the learned circuit judge correctly held that it superseded the Damon Act.

3. Upon the argument it was insisted that by the so-called Reed amendment (section 5, Act of March 3, 1917, 39 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 1069), congress had legislated upon the question of interstate com

204-Mich.—37.

merce in intoxicating liquor, and that congress having occupied the field committed to it by the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution all legislation by the State upon the subject of interstate shipments of intoxicating liquor must fail. We do not find it necessary to consider this question. Upon this record it is undisputed that defendant purchased this liquor within this State when and where its sale and possession were lawful.

It follows that the judgment must be affirmed.

BIRD, C. J., and MOORE, BROOKE, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred with FELLOWs, J.

STEERE, J. I concur in the conclusion that the "Damon Act" is repealed by the "Wiley Act," which is the controlling question involved.

OSTRANDER, J., did not sit.

FRENCH v. PERE MARQUETTE RAILWAY CO.

1. CARRIERS-BILL OF LADING-DELIVERY WITHOUT SURRENDER OF BILL LIABILITY.

Where a bill of lading or a shipping receipt contains a clause providing that a third person shall be notified of the arrival of the goods, or where it contains this clause and an additional clause reciting that the goods are shipped to the consignor's order, the carrier is not authorized to treat the person to be notified as a consignee, and if it delivers the goods to him without production and surrender of the receipt or the bill of lading, it will be liable to the true owner of the goods for any loss resulting from such delivery.