In holding that defendant is not protected by grant we have not overlooked the argument of defendant's counsel, in which it is urged that the practical construction given to prior grants by plaintiff's and defendant's predecessors in title would fix the height at which the water might be carried. This argument might have some persuasive force were it not for the fact that it rests upon a question of fact, namely, whether the water was really carried as high at that time as at the present time. This question of fact is the same question of fact that is involved in the other claim of defendant, namely, that it has a prescriptive right to flow the lands up to the present height.

2. We are not impressed that defendant has established its right of increased flowage of plaintiff's land by prescription. The testimony was, of course, in conflict. Several witnesses testified that the water was being carried no higher than it had been in the past with the old dam. Plaintiff's proofs show that the water is carried much higher with the present dam and that the increased capacity of the new dam has been utilized in part. Witnesses who have been familiar with the springs for many years, some of whom helped to install plaintiff's water works, testified that the water was carried at a level much below the springs. It is also shown that the water from these springs was utilized by some of plaintiff's predecessors in title, and that plaintiff has used the water from these springs for domestic purposes since his purchase in 1901, and that now they are submerged.

3. Much attention has been given by counsel in their briefs to the character of the relief granted plaintiff by the trial court. Defendant's counsel contend that if this court disagrees with their contention upon the merits that it is a case where injunctive relief ought not to be granted but damages instead should be fixed because the injury which would result to defendant

if it were obliged to lower the dam would greatly outweigh the grievance of the plaintiff. Fox v. Holcomb, 32 Mich. 494; Hall v. Rood, 40 Mich. 46 (29 Am. Rep. 528); City of Big Rapids v. Comstock, 65 Mich. 78.

During the progress of the hearing plaintiff offered in open court to discontinue the case if defendant would pay the costs, on condition that it would install an electric pump and furnish plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, electricity to operate it. In view of this offer and the very large industrial interests which rely on this water power, we think the chancellor was right in recognizing and applying this principle to the extent at least of permitting defendant to compensate plaintiff without injury to its water power. We are not impressed, however, that one of the alternatives laid down by him is the best that can be prescribed. To install a pump, keep it in operation and furnish electricity to operate it, practically in perpetuity, is not as desirable as a money consideration. Such an arrangement would require much bookkeeping and accounting on the part of the defendant and would give rise to endless controversy, and if, at the end of defendant's corporate existence, its charter should not be renewed, another difficulty would arise. There is not much testimony in the record bearing on the question of damages. The only direct proof of the damages comes from the testimony of the plaintiff, who stated that they were $1,500. To supply an equally efficient service plaintiff would be obliged to connect with the city system, the nearest hydrant of which is 700 feet away. Or a windmill or an electric pump could be installed. Either one of the latter methods would give plaintiff the benefit of the spring water for domestic purposes. The other method, of course, would not. Any one of these methods involves installation and maintenance charges. To be deprived of a system of water works as inexpensive as the present

one, and one furnishing as wholesome water as it does for domestic purposes, is to be deprived of a valuable right, and where the courts apply this equitable rule full compensation should be awarded. We are disposed to alter the decree by substituting a provision for the payment of $1,500, for the alternative that defendant should install an electric pump and furnish electricity to operate the same. Defendant will be required to make and file an election within 30 days after this opinion is filed. In the event that no election is filed and no payment is made within that time, the dam will be reduced in height in accordance with the decree of the trial court.

Subject to this change the decree may be affirmed without costs to either party in this court.

OSTRANDER, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF YALE v. HARNDEN.

1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-INTEREST IN LANDS-PAROL AGREEMENT. A parol agreement between a son and his father and stepmother whereby the son worked an 80-acre farm, the title to which was in himself and a brother subject to a life estate in the parents and survivor, whether it be called a trust or power over or concerning the land, or an estate or interest in lands, or a lease exceeding a year, was void under the statute of frauds (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 11975), and at most was good only as a lease for a year. 2. CREDITORS' BILL-AMOUNT DUE JUDGMENT DEBTOR-INFERENCES. A creditor's bill, filed to reach assets of a father in the hands of a son who worked a farm for the father and stepmother under a parol agreement with no definite time See notes in 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 330; L. R. A. 1915E, 563.

of tenure or payment to give them their support, where nothing was shown or inferable as due, was properly dismissed.

3. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

RESERVATION OF LIFE ESTATE

CREDITORS' BILL-IMPUTATION OF Fraud.

No fraud in the conveyance of a farm from parents to a son, reserving a life estate, can be imputed to them on suit by judgment creditor's bill for a debt incurred by the father 15 or 16 years after the conveyance.

Appeal from St. Clair; Law, J. Submitted October 18, 1918. (Docket No. 93.) Decided February 7, 1919.

Judgment creditor's bill by the First National Bank of Yale, Michigan, against Andrew J. Harnden and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Jay B. Weymouth, for plaintiff.

C. F. Gates, for defendants.

STEERE, J. On November 2, 1899, defendants Andrew J. Harnden and Mary, his wife, conveyed to defendant George Harnden by warranty deed the S. W. 1/4 of the S. E. 14, of section 35, town 10 north, of range 14 east, in the county of Sanilac, for an expressed consideration of one dollar, with the following reservation:

"It being especially provided that the said parties of the first part hereby reserve the entire use, profit, possession and control of the said premises for and during their natural lives, jointly, and also during the life of the survivor. It is also especially provided and agreed that the said party of the second part shall pay all taxes and assessments against said premises; also agreed that the said party of the second part shall clear said premises from all existing incumbrances and shall keep the same clear with the exception of a mortgage of $250 to be made and fully paid according to its terms by the said party of the second part." See note in 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213.

On the same day they conveyed to Eber Harnden by warranty deed the southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of the same section for an expressed consideration of one dollar with the same reservations and recitals above quoted. These instruments were duly recorded in the office of the register of deeds of Sanilac county.

Andrew J. Harnden is the father of the grantees George and Eber Harnden. Mary J. Harnden, whom he married not very long before the date of these conveyances, is his second wife and their stepmother. He was at that time about 60 years of age, and she about 40. The land conveyed as stated was for many years owned, cultivated and occupied by Andrew J. Harnden with his wife and family, until his children were grown and his home broken up by the death of his then wife. He thereafter lived at the old home with his son George until his second marriage, in 1899, when he went to live with his present wife, who then ran a store and had a house in the village of Yale, some ten miles distant from his old home farm, which George occupied and worked.

What, if any, occupation Andrew J. Harnden followed or what other resources he had after 1899 does not appear, but in September, 1915, he gave a promissory note for $75, due September 1, 1916, to William McIntyre of Roseburg, which was sold to plaintiff before maturity, and on April 1, 1916, he gave a note to the Yale State Bank for $22.60, due six months after date, in renewal of a former note, which was sold to plaintiff prior to April 16, 1917.

On April 16, 1917, plaintiff brought suit upon those notes in a justice's court of St. Clair county against defendant Andrew J. Harnden, recovering a judgment of $106.83, with $3 costs, and on April 26, 1917, removed the judgment by certified transcript to the circuit court of St. Clair county. Execution was then