of which four were curricle guns. Beside that of the carabineers, of which no return has been published, the loss of men has been stated at fifty-three killed, thirty-four wounded, and two hundred and seventy-nine prisoners or missing. Among the wounded were two lieutenants and three serjeants. Among the prisoners and missing were two majors, three captains, six lieutenants, three ensigns, two officers of the staff, ten serjeants, and two drummers. Of the privates missing, the greater part (soldiers of the Longford and Kilkenny militia) were afterwards found to have deserted to the enemy, which, with other circumstances, gave some grounds for suspicion that treachery had some share in the defeat at Castlebar. That not one of these deserters escaped the death which their defection merited, is perhaps not unworthy of remark. The loss of the French in killed and wounded is, with probability, said to have been greater than that of our troops, though not satisfactorily stated.

The marquis Cornwallis, who from the first intelligence of the invasion, had, notwithstanding the smallness of the invading army, been so sensible of the danger which might thence arise, as to have determined to march in person against the enemy, arrived at Philipstown on the 26th of August; whence he proceeded next day to Kilbeggan, having by the way of the grand

canal made a progress of forty-four Irish, or fifty-six English miles in two days. Receiving here, on the 28th, very early in the morning, the disagreeable news of the defeat at Castlebar, he advanced to Athlone, where he was positively informed by many who had fled through Tuam, particularly a lieutenant of the carabineers, and captain O'Donnel of the Newport-Pratt yeomen, that the French had pursued the army of general Lake to Tuam, driven it from that post, and taken possession of the town. If such a pursuit had been possible to the French, after their exhausting march to Castlebar, even this extraordinary report might have been true, since general Lake, having lost his artillery and ammunition, thought the post of Tuam unsafe with panic-struck troops, many of them also disorderly, and judged a retreat expedient nearer to Athlone. Even on this town, sixty-three miles from the French army, which never moved farther in that line than Castlebar, an attack was apprehended, and pickets and patroles were advanced far on the roads to Tuam and Ballinasloe.

From these facts a judicious reader, acquainted with the state in which Ireland then was, where multitudes were prepared to rise in rebellion as soon as they should see any force in a probable condition to support them, may very probably be of opinion, that, if such a man as Cornwallis

had not been at the head of the Irish administration, with full power to act according to his own judgment, the consequences of this petty invasion might have speedily become very ruinous to this kingdom. His excellency saw that the utmost caution was expedient, as well as vigour in the movements of his forces. The motions of the main army immediately under his own command, were calculated to cover the country, to intimidate the abettors of rebellion, and to afford an opportunity of rallying to any smaller bodies of troops which might be defeated; while these bodies were ordered to harass the enemy as much as possible without running risks, or engaging in battle without almost a certainty of success. The marquis proceeded on the 30th of August in the road to Castlebar, and arrived on the 4th of September at Hollymount, whence he intended to advance to the attack of the French army posted at Castlebar, fourteen miles distant, till in the evening of the same day he received intelligence that the enemy had abandoned that post in the morning, and had marched in the direction of Foxford.

After their victory at Castlebar, the French received great additional accessions of Irish peasantry to their standard, chiefly, as before, from the western and mountainous parts of the county of Mayo. To furnish these multitudes with. fire-arms, the stores brought from France were

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quite insufficient, though, according to the account of colonel Charost to the bishop of Killala, five thousand five hundred muskets were distributed in the last mentioned place to the insurgents. These new levies of mountaineers were generally very awkward in the use of guns, and proved to be of no very effectual aid to the French, who had expected far more powerful assistance from the Irish. They had also expected to be immediately followed by additional troops and stores from France. Totally disappointed in the former expectation, and seeing little prospect of being gratified in the latter, they began to suspect that they had been sent on a desperate errand, as a forlorn hope, to annoy, not to conquer, the enemies of their country. Like brave and faithful soldiers, they resolved to perform their duty, even in this case, and to make every effort in their power against the British government, until irresistible necessity should compel them to surrender.

General Humbert, having ordered, on the 1st of September, the troops left at Killala to repair to the main body, commenced a rapid march, very early in the morning of the 4th, from Castlebar, through Foxford, toward the town of Sligo, perhaps with a design of attempting to approach the county of Donegal, where the additional forces from France were expected to make a landing. Lieutenant-colonel Crawford,

with a body of troops, supported by another under general Lake, hung upon his rear, another under major-general Moore watched his motions at a greater distance; while the marquis Cornwallis, with the main army, moved in a nearly parallel direction from Hollymount, through Clare and Ballyhaunis, toward Carrick-on-Shannon, intending to regulate his subsequent notions by those of the enemy.

The advanced-guard of the French havingpassed Tubbercurry, after a skirmish with some yeomen guards, and arrived at Coloony, was opposed on the 5th by colonel Verreker of the the city of Limerick militia, who had marched from Sligo for the purpose, with three hundred infantry, thirty of the 24th regiment of light dragoons, and two curricle guns. The colonel found the enemy arranged for his reception between him and the town of Coloony. After a smart action of about an hour's continuance, he was obliged to retreat, with the loss of his artil lery, to Sligo, whence he withdrew his little army to Ballyshannon. He has stated his loss of private soldiers at only six killed and twentytwo wounded. Himself and four other officers were slightly wounded, and one, ensign Rumley, slain. He was informed that the loss of the French exceeded fifty, of whom thirty were wounded. As colonel Verreker certainly proved