10. It is only in cases where there is no incumbent to hold over, that the law will allow the appointment of the Executive to fill the office. Ib.

11. The present incumbent of the office of Comptroller is entitled to hold the office until his successor is elected and qualified; and such successor may be elected at the general election of 1858, and when qualified will hold his office for the term of two years, and until his successor is qualified. Ib. 12. The first clause of the fourth section of Article VI of the Constitution, which section provides that "the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases when the matter in dispute exceeds two hundred dollars; when the legality of any tax, toll, or impost, or municipal fine, is in question; and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, on questions of law alone," is construed to mean that the Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction in all cases; provided, that when the subject of litigation is capable of pecuniary computation, the matter in dispute must exceed in value or amount two hundred dollars, unless a question of the legality of a tax, toll, impost, or municipal fine, is drawn in question. Conant v. Conant, 249.

13. The Supreme Court possesses appellate jurisdiction from a decree rendered in a suit for divorce from the bonds of matrimony. Ib.

14. The question, as to whether the act of the Legislature, organizing the Superior Court of the city of San Francisco, was, in its general provisions, constitutional, is put to rest upon the doctrine of stare decisis. Hickman v. O'Neal, 292.

15. The act of the Legislature, giving the power to the late Superior Court of the city of San Francisco to send its process beyond its territorial limits, was constitutional. Ib.

16. That Court was no less "an inferior Court," from the possession of the power to send its process out of the city. Its jurisdiction was not enlarged by the possession of that power. The prescribing of this mode, or any other mode, of enforcing its decree or exercising its powers, is merely a matter of remedy or practice, which is left to the legislative direction. Ib. 17. "Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine;" but after the determination of a matter over which the Court has this cognizance, it can not be contended that a law, fixing the mode by which effect is to be given to a lawful judgment, is not a mere subject of municipal regulation, which has nothing to do with a question of jurisdiction. Ib.

18. That Court was not intended to be an inferior Court in respect to the mode of enforcing its process, but in respect to the character of the subjects of its jurisdiction, and a subordinate relation to other tribunals. Ib.

19. It is not disputed that the law of the forum can regulate the remedy, which, generally speaking, forms no part of the contract, and thus is not within the constitutional interdict. But it is just as well settled that the Legislature has no right so to regulate the remedy as that it shall destroy the contract by denying all means of enforcement. A right without a remedy, is, practically, no obligation at all. A contract is just as much impaired by a prohibition to sue upon it, as it is by direct legislative action declaring it void. Scarborough v. Dugan, 305.

20. The twenty-fifth section of Article IV of the Constitution, which requires that every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title, is merely directory; it does not defeat laws passed in violation of it. Pierpont v. Crouch, 315.

21. The Court of Sessions, under the Constitution, can only exercise powers of a judicial character. Hardenburgh v. Kidd et al., 402.

22. The assessment of taxes is not a judicial act; it partakes of no element of a judicial character. It is a legislative act; it requires the exercise of legislative power, which, for certain governmental purposes in the county, may be devolved upon a board of supervisors, but can not be delegated to any branch of the judicial department. Ib.

23. The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1853 and 1854, authorizing the Court of Sessions to assess a tax for county purposes, are unconstitutional-and the assessment made thereunder, and a subsequent levy upon and sale of property in the enforcement of such assessment, are void. Ib.

CONVEYANCE.

See DEEDS; MORTGAGE, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

1. Contracts for the sale of land were, under the Mexican law, and by the custom of California, required to be in writing, and although all the forms prescribed were not strictly followed, still it was necessary that the instrument should contain the names of the parties, the thing sold, the date of the transfer, and the price paid. Stafford et al. v. Lick et al., 12.

2. The following instrument held not to be a conveyance: "By this present I give ample and sufficient power to Don José de Jesus Noe to use or dispose of my lot which I hold granted, as may best seem to him; and, in testimony, I give the present power, in the place of Yerba Buena, the 6th day of October, 1846." Ib.

3. A executed to B, C, D, and E, an instrument which commences in the ordinary form of a deed of bargain and sale, purporting to convey to them, in consideration of $125,000, the property therein described, with a general warranty of title against the claims of all persons; this clause then followed by a power of attorney authorizing the grantees to take possession, sell, and convey, or lease the property, in the name of the grantor, and to receive the purchase-money and rents, and that grantor would not sell, lease, or authorize any other person to sell or lease the premises, or revoke the power given, unless the grantors neglected to pay the said sum of $125,000, in instalments, specified therein, with a covenant that if said amount was paid at the time specified, the instrument should take effect as a full and complete conveyance in fee of the property; and also a covenant that if grantor should fail to fulfill his covenants, the instrument should take effect as a conveyance: Held, that such instrument was intended as a conveyance upon condition precedent, and that grantees could acquire no title under it until the condition was performed, and when so performed, the title vests in the grantees without any further act on the part of the grantor. Brannan v. Mesick et al., 95.

4. Such condition precedent must be strictly and punctually performed before the estate can vest or be enlarged. Ib.

5. The registration of such instrument is sufficient to put a subsequent purchaser on inquiry as to the performance of the conditions. Ib.

6. Until the payments are made, the title is in the grantor, and would pass to a subsequent purchaser after the time fixed for the payments. Ib. 7. A conveyance giving a preference, is not fraudulent, though the debtor be insolvent, and the creditor be aware at the time that it will have the effect of defeating the collection of other debts. To avoid the conveyance, there must be a real design on the part of the debtor to prevent the application of his property, in whole or in part, to the satisfaction of his debts. A creditor violates no rule of law when he takes payment or security for his demand, though others are thereby deprived of all means of satisfaction of their own equally meritorious claims. Dana v. Stanfords et al., 269.

8. Where the following instrument was endorsed on a deed, viz.: "Know all men by these presents, that I, the within-named Avert M. Van Nostrand, of the city of San Francisco, State of California, in consideration of $8,000, paid to me by Rodman M. Price, of the city of New York, have assigned to the said Rodman M. Price, and his assigns, all my interest in the within instrument, and every clause, article, or thing, therein contained, and do hereby constitute the said Rodman M. Price, my attorney, in my name, but to his use, to take all legal measures which may be proper for the complete recovery and enjoyment of the assigned premises, with the power of substitution. Witness my hand and seal this 30th day of August, 1850. A. M. VAN NOSTRAND;" and such instrument was executed without the knowledge of the grantee named therein, and without any consideration therefor, and was not under seal: Held, that the instrument did not pass the legal title to the premises, and created only an equity in the grantee. Dupont v. Wertheman, 354.

9. The purchaser of an equitable title takes the property, subject to all existent equities. He is not within the rule which protects a bona fide purchaser for value, and without notice, of the real or apparent legal title. Ib.

10. Where C. T., S. P., J. H. P., and W., were partners in the ownership of a saw-mill, and carrying on the mill business, and subsequently they executed an instrument, C. T., and W., of the first part, and S. P., and J. H. P., of the second part, which ran as follows: "The party of the first part have bargained, sold, and by these presents do convey unto the party of the second part, all their right, title, and interest, in and to a certain saw-mill,” etc., and this clause was followed with certain stipulations as to the manner of payment of the consideration-money, with a condition that if the party of the second part fail to comply, then the property to be delivered up to the party of the first part, to be used and disposed of to pay the consideration: Held, that the conveyance of the property is not, in any degree, dependent upon the performance of the conditions. The transfer is in presenti. Cayton v. Walker et als., 450.

11. The condition that the party of the second part shall deliver up the property, upon a failure to comply with its terms, to the party of the first part, to be sold by them to pay the debts of the firm outstanding, then to pay the balance over to the party of the second part, is only a trust retained upon the property sold, which may be enforced like any other trust. A Court of Equity would enforce it as a mortgage or vendor's lien. Ib.

12. Nor would such an instrument be invalid, because, under the facts of this case, one of the parties named in the caption as parties of the first part, did not sign the same, especially where such party does not complain, and the rights of the other partners are in no degree affected by it. Ib.

13. Such an agreement as that here set out is a bar to an action by bill, of one of the partners against the others, for an account and dissolution, and sale of the partnership property. Ib.

14. Until a consummation of a sale of real property upon execution is made by a conveyance from the sheriff, the estate remains in the judgment-debtor. Until then, the purchaser possesses only a right to an estate which may afterwards be perfected by conveyance. Cummings v. Coe, 529.

CORPORATION.

See CITY AND COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, 1, 2; PRACTICE, 41;
SUMMONS-SERVICE OF, 3.

1. N., the president and managing agent of a corporation for ditch and mining purposes, and who was vested, by a resolution of the company, with discre

tionary powers as to "all matters pertaining to the prosecution of the projects of the company," and who had been in the habit of making such contracts as he deemed necessary for the good of the corporation, purchased of plaintiff and one S., in the name and for the use of the corporation, a house, to be used as an office for the corporation, and a boarding-house for the laborers employed by the corporation, for $3,000, $500 of which N. paid down, and to secure the balance he gave a mortgage, in the name of the corporation, on the premises. N. then, as agent, took possession of the premises, and, subequently, several meetings of the trustees of the corporation were held in the house. Six weeks after the purchase, at a meeting of the trustees, a resolution was offered and rejected, declaring the contract legal and valid. Subsequently, the premises were destroyed by fire. The present plaintiff, who had obtained S.'s interest in the debt, brought suit against the corporation to recover the amount, and for a foreclosure of the mortgage: Held, that N. had authority to make the contract to bind the corporation; and if such authority were doubtful, the acts of the corporation amounted to a ratification of the contract. Shaver v. Bear River and Auburn Water and Mining Co., 396.

2. A corporation may bind itself by a note and mortgage, made by its president and secretary, and signed by them in their official capacity, as such. Rowe v. Table Mountain Water Co., 441.

COUNTY.

See APPEAL, 13; COUNTY INDEBTEDNESS; SUPERVISORS.

COUNTY INDEBTEDNESS.

1. The board of supervisors are not empowered to create a debt or liability on the part of the county, for any purpose except as provided by law. Foster v. Coleman et al., 278.

2. When the account of a deputy assessor for $1650 was audited and allowed by the board, and ordered to be paid, the order being in the following words: "Ordered, the sum of four thousand one hundred and twenty-five dollars be paid out of the fund for current expenses, to equal sixteen hundred and fifty dollars, in cash, at the rate of forty cents per dollar-October 29, 1856;" and in pursuance of such order the county auditor drew his warrant for $4125 upon the treasurer, and delivered it to the deputy assessor, who presented it to the treasurer, and by him it was endorsed and registered in its order of presentation, among the legal warrants against the county: Held, that the order was made without authority, and was void, and the fact that the market or cash value of county warrants was only forty per cent. of the nominal amount, and the object of the action of the board was to give that which was, at the time, an equivalent to cash, did not justify the action of the board. Ib.

3. The private property of an inhabitant of a county is not liable to seizure and sale on execution for the satisfaction of a judgment recovered against the county. Emeric v. Gilman, 404.

4. No execution can issue upon a judgment rendered against a county. When a judgment is rendered against a county, it is the duty of the supervisors to apply such funds in the treasury of the county as are not otherwise appropriated, to its payment; or if there are no funds, and they possess the requisite power, to levy a tax for that purpose, and if they fail or refuse to apply the funds, or to execute the power, resort may be had to a mandamus. But if they have no funds, and the power to levy the tax has not been delegated to them, the Legislature must be invoked for additional authority. Ib.

5. A county may assign and transfer a warrant drawn in its favor by another county on its treasurer, so as to invest the holder with the right to demand payment thereon. Beals v. Evans, (Treas.,) 459.

6. It was not intended by the provisions of the ninth section of the Act of 1855, "to create a board of supervisors in the counties of this State, and to define their duties and powers," which requires the property belonging to the county to be sold at public auction, that this provision should apply to choses in action. Ib.

7. Nor was it the intention of the Legislature, by the provisions of the ninth section of the Act of April 27, 1855, "to provide for the ascertainment of the indebtedness of Calaveras county, prior to the organization of Amador county; and to provide for the payment of that portion due from Amador county to the county of Calaveras," or by the general laws on the subject of payment of the indebtedness of counties, that the whole special fund raised by that act should remain with the treasurer until all of it should be needed for the payment of that indebtedness in one sum. Ib.

8. Payment may be demanded of the treasurer of Amador county, by the holders of warrants issued in pursuance of that act, at any time when there are funds in the hands of the treasurer to meet the same, and a receipt, and corresponding credit endorsed on the warrant, will be sufficient to protect the county and the officer making the payment. Ib.

COURTS OF SESSIONS.

1. The Court of Sessions, under the Constitution, can only exercise powers of a judicial character. Hardenburgh v. Kidd et al., 402.

2. The assessment of taxes is not a judicial act; it partakes of no element of a judicial character. It is a legislative act; it requires the exercise of legislative power, which, for certain governmental purposes in the county, may be devolved on a board of supervisors, but can not be delegated to any branch of the judicial department. Ib.

3. The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1853 and 1854, authorizing the Court of Sessions to assess a tax for county purposes, are unconstitutional-and the assessment made thereunder, and a subsequent levy upon and sale of property in the enforcement of such assessment, are void. Ib.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See INDICTMENT; JURY AND JURORS, 3.

1. By the eleventh section of the "Act concerning Crimes and Punishments," the distinction, existing at common law between principals of the first and second degree in crime, is abolished. The People v. Bearss, 68.

2. So is the distinction between principals and accessories before the fact, so far as such distinction is capable of abolition. Ib.

3. Accessories may, by the act of this State, be indicted and tried with the principal, or separately, and either may be convicted or acquitted without reference to the previous conviction or acquittal of the other. Ib.

4. At common law, aiders and abettors might be convicted, though the principals in the first degree had been acquitted. The statute of this State has not altered the law in this respect. Ib.

5. Where W., R., and B., were indicted for the crime of murder, the indictment charging all the parties as principals, but in the statement of facts constituting the offence, alleging that the fatal blow was struck by W., and that