saw that the money was spent for necessaries,35 or it was loaned at the husband's request. 36 But the lender may recover the money from the husband in equity." At common law the husband is liable for the necessary expenses of decently burying his deceased wife, although the wife was living apart from her husband,39 and 38 83; Gill v. Read, 5 R. I. 343; Marshall v. Perkins, 20 R. I. 34; Knox v. Bushell, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 334; Grindell v. Godmond, 5 Ad. & El. 755; Earle v. Peale, 1 Salk. 386. Contra: Kenny v. Meislahn, 69 N. Y. App. 572. 35. Gafford v. Dunham, 111 Ala. 551; Reed v. Crissey, 63 Mo. App. 184; Marshall v. Perkins, 20 R. I. 34. 36. Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 83. 37. Reed v. Crissey, 63 Mo. App. 184; Leuppie v. Osborn, 52 N. J. Eq. 637. And see Skinner v. Tirrell, 159 Mass. 474. Money advanced to a wife deserted by her husband for the purchase of necessaries and actually spent for necessaries can be recovered in equity from the husband, and it is not necessary that the petitioner claim upon the rights of the person who furnished the necessaries. Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510. Citing Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 83; Harris v. Lee, 1 P. Wms. 482; Deare v. Soutten, 9 L. R. (Eq. Cas.) 151 (note); Jenner v. Morris, 3 DeG. F. & J. 45, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 375. "We think that the line of separation between necessaries and money loaned for the purpose of purchasing them may well be obliterated. So far as the husband is concerned they are practically convertible terms. His burthen will not be increased if he is made liable for money; the scope of the word necessaries will not thereby be broadened; the lender will be compelled to prove an actual expenditure for them; the law has discharged its duty to the husband in protecting him from liability for anything beyond them; it only discharges its duty to the wife by making it impossible for him to escape liability for these irrespective of the method by which he forces her to obtain them. If he has any preference as to that method the law will secure it to him; if he refuses to adopt any, he is not to be heard to complain if she is permitted to elect, provided always that she is kept within the small circle of necessity. It is not certain that credit will, under all circumstances, supply necessaries to the wife; at times they may not be had without money, and accidents of time, place, or distance may bring about such a state of things as that a friend may be able and willing to place money in her hands upon her husband's credit, who cannot personally attend to its disbursement." Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510, 517. Money furnished to the wife and actually spent for necessaries can be recovered in equity from the husband. "By the force of the principle under consideration, it is manifest that the husband's liability rests not on his misfortune, but on his faulton his refusal to do his duty to his wife. It has no other foundation. It is only in cases where he has deserted or abandoned his wife without making a provision for her support, that he has been held liable for money advanced." Leuppie v. Osborn, 52 N. J. Eq. 637, 641. Citing Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510. 38. Lott v. Graves, 67 Ala. 40, 43; Sears v. Giddey, 41 Mich. 590; Ambrose v. Kerrison, 10 C. B. 776. It is the husband's duty to bury his deceased wife in suitable form and he has no right to charge it against her estate. Staples' Appeal, 52 Conn. 425; Cunningham v. Rear he had no notice of her death,10 and the wife had separate estate." INSANE PERSON.--An insane person is liable for the reasonable value of necessaries furnished him,42 or his wife and family. The liability is imposed by law and is not measured by the terms of an express promise." An insane person is liable for necessaries furnished after adjudication, if his guardian fails to provide them.45 Necessaries include board, washing and maintenance," don, 98 Mass. 538. But see Gen. St. (Conn.), 1902, § 379. 39. Scott v. Carrothers, 17 Ind. App. 673; Seybold v. Morgan, 43 Ill. App. 40; Carley v. Green, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 106; Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574; Jenkins V. Tucker, 1 H. Bl. 90; Bradshaw v. Beard, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 344. 40. Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538; Bradshaw v. Beard, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 344. 41. Staples' Appeal, 52 Conn. 425; Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala. 89; Lott v. Graves, 67 Ala. 40, 43; Matter of Weringer, 100 Cal. 345; Waesch's Est., 166 Pa. St. 204; Bertie v. Chesterfield, 9 Mod. 31. 42. Ex parte Northington, 37 Ala. 496; Borum v. Bell, 132 Ala. 85; Henry v. Fine, 23 Ark. 417; McCormick v. Littler, 85 Ill. 62; Miller v. Hart, 135 Ind. 201; Sawyer v. Lufkin, 56 Me. 308; Kendall v. May, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 59; Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133; Surles v. Pipkin, 69 N. C. 513; Tally v. Tally, 22 N. C. (2 Dev. & B. Eq.) 385; Stannard V. Burns. 63 Vt. 244; Hallett V. Oakes, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 296; Reando v. Misplay, 90 Mo. 251; Van Horn v. Hann, 39 N. J. L. 207; Richardson v. Strong, 35 N. C. (13 Ired.) 106; Beals v. See, 10 Pa. St. 56. Manby V. Scott, 1 Sid. 112; Stiles v. West, 1 Sid. 109; Baxter V. Earl of Portsmouth, 2 C. & P. 178, 5 B. & C. 170; In re Rhodes (1894), L. R. 44 Ch. D. 94 C. A.; 1 Mechem on Sales, 84; Benjamin on Sales, § 29; 2 Page on Contracts, § 897. A lunatic during his life, and his administrator afterward, is liable for necessaries furnished to him before and during his insanity. Van Horn v. Hann, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vroom) 207. Citing Baxter v. Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170. 43. Booth v. Cottingham, 126 Ind. 431; Pearl v. McDowell, 26 Ky. (3 J. J. Marsh) 658; Shaw v. Thompson, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 198. 44. Palmer v. Hospital, 10 Kan. App. 98. An express contract provided for rendering services in caring for, nursing and ministering to the health and comfort of a person who afterward became insane; that event put an end to the express contract and prevented making a new one. "The law implied a liability on the part of the lunatic (which became binding after her death also upon her estate) to pay upon quantum meruit what such necessaries were reasonably worth." Waldron v. Davis, 70 N. J. L. (41 Vroom) 788. Citing Van Horn v. Hann, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vroom) 207; Hallett v. Oakes, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 296; Kendall v. May, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 59; Richardson v. Strong, 35 N. C. (13 Ired.) 106; Pearl v. McDowell, 26 Ky. (3 J. J. Marsh.) 659. 45. 2 Page on Contracts, § 897. Citing Creagh v. Tunstall, 98 Ala. 249; Seaver v. Phelps, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 304; Darby v. Cabanne, 1 Mo. App. 126; Stannard v. Burns, 63 Vt. 244; Maughan v. Burns, 64 Vt. 316. The estate of an insane person may be liable by statute for his support in an asylum. Camden County v. Ritson, 68 N. J. L. 666; Barnes v. Hathaway, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 452, 457; medical services," nursing," preservation of his estate," legal services to adjudicate his sanity,50 and, where he is wealthy, even luxuries.51 The lender of money expended for necessaries is subrogated to the rights of those supplying them.52 DRUNKARD.-A drunkard is liable for the reasonable value of necessaries furnished to himself or his wife and family, even after adjudication as a common drunkard.53 Necessaries include food and clothing, nursing, and attorney's services." 54 55 56 SPENDTHRIFT.-A spendthrift is liable for necessaries furnished to himself or his family.57 THE MASTER OF A VESSEL has an implied authority to bind the owner for the price of necessaries supplied for the vessel.58 Blaisdell v. Holmes, 48 Vt. 492; Dane v. Kirkwall, 8 C. & P. 679; Nelson v. Duncombe, 9 Beav. 211. A lunatic's wife has no greater authority to pledge his credit than a sane man's wife, Richardson v. Dubois (1869), L. R. 5 Q. B. 51. 46. LaRue v. Gilkyson, 4 Pa. St. 375. 47. Booth v. Cottingham, 126 Ind. 431. 48. Richardson v. Strong, 35 N. C. (13 Ired.) 106. 49. Williams V. Wentworth, 5 Beav. 325. 50. Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y. 312. See Freeman's Appeal, 68 Pa. St. 151. 51. Kendall v. May, 92 Mass. (10 Allen), 59, 62; In re Perrse, 3 Molloy (Ir. Ch.) 94. In the case of an insane person, the word necessaries is liberally construed. Wilder v. Weakley, 34 Ind. 181, 184; Fahy v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 433; Abbott v. Creal, 56 Iowa, 175; Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133; Ballard v. McKenna, 4 Rich. (S. C. Eq.) 358. See, also, Alexander v. Haskins, 68 Iowa, 73; Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 652. 52. McCormick v. Littler, 85 Ill. 62; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541; Matthiessen v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L. 536; Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. St. 407; First Nat. Bank v. McGinty, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 539. 53. Hallett v. Oakes, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 296; Kendall v. May, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 59; McCrillis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569; Van Horn v. Hahn, 39 N. J. L. 207; Parker v. Davis, 53 N. C. (8 Jones) 460; Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. (1845) 625; 2 Page on Contracts, § 906. 54. Parker v. Davis, 53 N. C. (8 Jones) 460. 55. Brockway v. Jewell, 52 Ohio St. 187. 56. Hallett v. Oakes, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 296. 57. 1 Mechem on Sales, § 92; Manson v. Felton, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 206; Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508; Lynch v. Dodge, 130 Mass. 459; 1 Mechem on Sales, § 92. 58. Mackintosh V. Mitcheson (1849), 4 Exch, 175; Post v. Jones, 60 U. S. (19 How.) 150; The Amelie, 73 U. S. (6 Wall.) 26; Howland v. India Ins. Co., 131 Mass. 239, 255; Gates v. Thompson, 57 Me. 442; Myers v. Baymore, 10 Pa. St. 114. FORMALITIES OF THE CONTRACT. Section 3. Form of Contract or Sale.-Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any statute in that behalf, a contract to sell or a sale may be made in writing, either with or without seal, or by word of mouth, or partly in writing and partly by word of mouth, or may be inferred from the conduct of the parties. FORM. The provisions of this section apply to the contract to transfer the title, and not to the transfer of title itself. The contract results from negotiations in the nature of an offer of terms and an acceptance of the offer. The agreement (mutual assent or meeting of the minds) is the outcome of the communication of the offer and acceptance.1 These communications are not the agreement itself, but are, in the first instance, the procuring cause of the agreement, and afterward the evidence from which the contract which the parties intended to make may be inferred, unless the agreement or statutes require the contract to be in writing. These communications may be in any form by which intention can be expressed.3 1. Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29; Trounstine v. Sellers, 35 Kan. 447; Lancaster v. Woodboat Hardin, 28 Mo. 351; Cangas v. Mfg. Co., 37 Mo. App. 297; Haubelt v. Mill Co., 77 Mo. App. 672; Prescott v. Jones, 69 N. H. 305; Shaw v. Glass Works, 52 N. J. L. 7; Oakman v. Rogers, 120 Mass. 214. "It is essential that the minds of the parties shall meet-that they shall both assent to the same thing in the same sense." 1 Mechem on Sales, § 217. Agreement is an essential element of every genuine contract. 1 Page on Contracts, § 22. The addition of terms in answer to an offer of sale operates as a rejection of the offer and a new proposal which must be accepted before the contract is complete. Stock v. Towle, 97 Me. 408. 2. In Connecticut, the principal statutory provisions as to written contracts are: (a) The statute of frauds, Gen. Stat., § 1090, as amended by the Sales Act, § 4. (b) Contracts of conditional sale, Gen. Stat., §8 4864, 4868, as amended by Public Acts 1905, ch. 113. See contracts to sell entire stock, Gen. Stat., §§ 4868, 4870, as amended by Public Acts, 1905, ch. 211. 3. Summers v. Hibbard, 153 Ill. 102; Pittsburg, etc., Co. v. Racer, 10 Ind. App. 503; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend, (N. Y.) 103; 1 Mechem on Sales, § 247. An offer may be withdrawn or an order countermanded at any time before its acceptance. Durkee V. Schultz, 122 Ia. 410; Mueller Furnace Co. v. Meiklejohn, 121 Wis. 605; Kansas Thresher Co. v. Lesueur, 75 Kan. 150. EXPRESS CONTRACT.-The offer and acceptance may be communicated by letter sent by mail, or by messenger, or delivered personally, or by telegraphic dispatch, or cable message. The provisions of a charter of a water company giving a town an option 4. Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411; Manier v. Appling, 112 Ala. 663; McCullough v. Armstrong, 118 Ga. 424; Phenizy v. Bush, 129 Ga. 479; Anglo-American Co. v. Prentiss, 157 Ill. 506; Scott v. Fowler, 227 Ill. 104; Jobst-Bethard Co. v. Canning Co., 129 Ia. 117; Trounstine v. Sellers, 35 Kan. 447; Smith v. Faulkner, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 251, 254; Wilcox v. Cline, 70 Mich. 517; Hubbell v. Palmer, 76 Mich. 441; Scully v. Detroit Furnace Co., 132 Mich. 333; Kibler v. Caplis, 140 Mich. 28; Tristate Milling Co. v. Breisch, 145 Mich. 232; Floyd v. Mann, 146 Mich. 356; Fruit Despatch Co. v. Le Seno, 147 Mich. 149; McCaskey Register Co. v. Truettner, 149 Mich. 241; Morse v. Johnson, 86 Minn. 9; Bonds v. Lipton Co., 85 Miss. 209; Shores Lumber Co. v. Patterson, 98 Miss. 534; Heyworth v. Miller Grain & Elevator Co., 174 Mo. 171; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 103; Bosshardt & Wilson Co. v. Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. St. 109; Haines v. Dearborn, 199 Pa. St. 474; Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 439; 1 Mechem on Sales, § 247. An offer of sale made by mail must be accepted within a reasonable time to bind the offerer. The time of acceptance is when it is deposited in the mail beyond the acceptor's control; e. g., an offer of sale of iron made March 2, renewed March 16, received March 18, at 2 p. m., accepted by letter dated March 19, put in the mail March 20, Sunday, reaching its destination March 23, after the iron had been resold, was not an acceptance within a reasonable time. Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424, 433. An offer to sell must be accepted within a reasonable time, and if the 8 article is of fluctuating value must be accepted promptly. McCracken v. Harned, 66 N. J. L. (37 Vroom) 37. The vendee sent fourteen separate orders for goods and the vendor accepted the same by letter. Held, that the vendor's letter was an acceptance of all orders as a matter of law. Jordan, Marsh & Co. v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473. Acknowledgment of receipt of order for goods and a promise that "the same shall have prompt attention" is not an acceptance. Manier v. Appling, 112 Ala, 663. But we are in receipt of the following contracts, for which we thank you" is an acceptance. Jordan, Marsh & Co. v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473. 5. Eliason v. Henshaw, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 225; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 103. 6. Wilcox v. Cline, 70 Mich. 517. 7. Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29; Phenizy v. Bush, 129 Ga. 479; Bennett v. Cummings, 73 Kan. 647; Fairmount Glass Works v. Wooden Ware Co., 106 Ky. 659; Stock v. Towle, 97 Me. 408; Curtiss v. Gibney, 59 Md. 131; Brauer v. Shaw, 168 Mass. 198; Kibler v. Caplis, 140 Mich. 28; Tristate Milling Co. v. Breisch, 145 Mich. 232; Floyd v. Mann, 146 Mich. 356; Fruit Despatch Co. v. LeSeno, 147 Mich. 149; Heyworth v. Miller Grain & Elevator Co., 174 Mo. 171; James v. Bottle Co., 69 Mo. App. 207; Bonds v. Lipton Co., 85 Miss. 209; King v. Dahl, 82 Minn. 307; Perry v. Iron Works, 15 R. I. 380; Harvey v. Facey, App. Cas. (1893), 552; 1 Mechem on Sales, § 247. 8. Shady Hill Nursery Co. V. Waterer, 179 Mass. 318; Runyon v. Wilkinson, etc., Co., 57 N. J. L. 420. |