5

461, 464, 38 C. C. A. 473; Penn v. Smith, 104 Ala. 445; Tustin Fruit Ass'n v. Earle Fruit Co., 121 Cal. XVIII; Peterson Bros. V. Mineral King Fruit Co., 140 Cal. 624; Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553; McCord v. Laidley, 87 Ga. 221; Brunswick Grocery Co. v. Lamar, 116 Ga. 1; Osgood v. Skinner, 211 Ill. 229; Bell v. Offutt, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 632; Regester v. Regester, 104 Md. 1; Atwood v. Lucas, 53 Me. 508; McLane v. Richardson, 127 Mass. 339; Boston & L. Iron Works v. Montague, 135 Mass. 319; Williams v. Robb, 104 Mich. 242; Kellogg v. Froehlich, 139 Mich. 612; Van Horn v. Rucker, 33 Mo. 391; Gordon v. Norris, 49 N. H. 376; Tuthill v. Skidmore, 124 N. Y. 148; Weston v. Brown, 158 N. Y. 360; Hurlburt v. Simpson, 25 N. C. 233; Arnold v. Carpenter, 16 R. I. 560; Cole v. Zucarello, 104 Tenn. 64; Waples v. Overaker, 77 Tex. 7; Phelps v. Hubbard, 51 Vt. 489; American Hide & Leather Co. V. Chalkley, 101 Va. 458; Neis O'Brien, 12 Wash. 358; Gehl v. Milwaukee Produce Co., 105 Wis. 573; Pratt v. Freeman Mfg. Co., 115 Wis. 648; 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1622.

V.

Where the vendee of goods gives his promissory note for the price, and pledges the goods as collateral security, and, upon non-payment of the note, the vendor resells the goods at a loss and brings an action upon the note to recover the balance remaining unpaid, the vendee cannot urge in defense that the loss was caused by the vendor's misconduct on sale, but his remedy for such misconduct is a separate action against the vendor. Jones v. Kennedy, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 125.

"There is a dearth of authority as to what steps the vendor should take

to enforce his lien after stopping the goods, to be accounted for, no doubt, as was said in Newhall v. Vargas, 15 Me. 314, By supposing that the vendor usually obtaining all the goods sold finds he is fully paid, or, if not, that the object of pursuing the insolvent vendee is not worth the trouble and expense.' Shaw v. Lady Ensley Coal Co., 147 Ill. 526.

The resale of property by the seller for the buyer's non-acceptance must be for cash and he may refuse a larger offer of purchase on credit. Pratt v. Freeman Mfg. Co., 115 Wis. 648, 656, 658.

Where the buyer refuses to receive coal, the seller may resell in that market for the best price obtainable, and is not bound to carry it back to the place of shipment although the price is greater there. Ginn v. Coal Co., 143 Mich. 84.

5. Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553; Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 395, 411; Hunter v. Wetsell, 84 N. Y. 549; MacLean v. Dunn (1828), 4 Bing. 722; Bartholomew v. Freeman, 3 C. P. D. 316; Coddington v. Jacksonville, etc., Ry. Co., 39 L. T. 12; The Hercules, 11 P. D. 10; Benjamin on Sales, § 782, 784

6. Pratt v. Freeman Mfg. Co., 115 Wis. 648; Lamond v. Davall (1847), 9 Q. B. 1030; Mertens v. Adcock, 4 Esp. 251; Hagedorn v. Laing, 6 Taunt. 162; Benjamin on Sales, §§ 783, 794.

7. Benjamin on Sales, §§ 782, 794. What is a reasonable time for the performance of a contract is a question of fact; e. g., delay of seven months in removing wines is unreasonable, and justifies the vendor in selling to other parties. Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553, 557.

8. Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553. 9. See cases cited in note 10. Bridgford v. Crocker, 60 N. Y. 627; Hayden v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426; Quick v Wheeler, 78 N. Y. 300; Cullen v. Bimm, 37 Ohio St. 236, 239.

10. Hayes v. Nashville, 80 Fed. 641; Osgood v. Skinner, 211 Ill. 229; Kellogg v. Frohlich, 139 Mich. 612; Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 395; Puritan Coke Co. v. Clark, 204 Pa. St. 556; 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1643.

The sale, if properly made, is conclusive evidence of the value of the goods. McCord v. Laidley, 87 Ga. 221; Bagley v. Findlay, 82 Ill. 524; Roebling Son's Co. v. Lock Stitch Fence Co., 130 Ill. 660; Morris v. Wilbaux, 159 Ill. 627; Wrigley v. Cornelius, 162 Ill. 92; Ingram v.

Wackernagle, 83 Ia. 82; Cook v. Brandeis, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 555; Bell v. Offut, 73 Ky. (10 Bush.) 632; Atwood v. Lucas, 53 Me. 508; Young v. Mertens, 27 Md. 114; Regester v. Regester, 104 Md. 1; Whitney v. Boardman, 118 Mass. 242; Van Horn v. Rucker, 33 Mo. 391; Anderson v. Frank, 45 Mo. App. 482; Haines v. Tucker, 50 N. H. 307; Crooks v. Moore, 1 Sand. (N. Y.) 297; Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 395; Pollen v. LeRoy, 30 N. Y. 549; Dustan v. McAndrew, 44 N. Y. 72; Lewis v. Greider, 51 N. Y. 231; Hayden v.

Demets, 53 N. Y. 426; Rue v. Manley, 60 N. Y. 82; Smith v. Pettee, 70 N. Y. 13; Sawyer v Dean, 114 N. Y. 469; Van Brocklen v. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70; Ackerman v. Rubens, 167 N. Y. 405; General Elec. Co. v. Nat. Contracting Co., 178 N. Y. 369; McCombs v. McKennan, 2 W. & S. (Pa.) 216; Girard v. Taggart, 5 S. & R. (Pa.) 19; Andrews v. Hoover, 8 Watts (Pa.), 239; Woods v. Cramer, 34 S. C. 508; Phelps v. Hubbard, 51 Vt. 489; Page v. Cowasjee, L. R. 1 C. P. 145; Lord v. Price (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 55; Ex parte Stapleton (1879), 10 Ch. App. 586 C. A.

11. Arnold v. Carpenter, 16 R. I. 560; Milgate v. Kebble (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 100; Lord v. Price, L. R. 9 Ex. 54; 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1644; Benjamin on Sales, § 795.

12. 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1632.

When notice is given no particular form is necessary. 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1636; Ingram v. Wackernagle, 83 Ia. 82; Holland v. Rea, 48 Mich. 218.

13. Ark. & Tex. Grain Co. V. Young & Fresch Grain Co., 79 Ark. 603; Magnes v. Sioux City Nursery Co., 14 Colo. App. 219; Sanders v. Allen, 124 Ga. 684; Ullman v. Kent, 60 Ill. 270; Rice v. Glass Co., 88 Ill. App. 407; Maulding v. Steele, 105 Ill. 644; Plumb v. Campbell, 129 Ill. 101; Roebling Sons v. Lock Stitch

Fence Co., 130 II. 660; Morris v. Wibaux, 159 Ill. 627; Wrigley v. Cornelius, 162 Ill. 92; Clore v. Robinson, 100 Ky. 402; Regester v. Regester, 104 Md. 1; Holland v. Rea, 48 Mich. 218; Kellogg v. Froehlich, 139 Mich. 612; Arnold v. Carpenter, 16 R. I. 560; Waples v. Overaker, 77 Tex. 7; Rosenbaum v. Weeden, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 785; American Hide & Leather Co. v. Chalkley, 101 Va. 458; 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1633. Contra: Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v. Atlantic Guano Co., 109 Ga. 607; Ridgely v. Mooney, 16 Ind. 363; Dill v. Mumford, 19 Ind. App. 609; Pittsburg, etc., Co. v. Heck, 50 Ind. 303; Fell v. Muller, 78 Ind. 507; Dwiggins v. Clark, 94 Ind. 49; Redmond v. Smock, 28 Md. 365; Haines v. Tucker, 50 N. H. 307; Van Brocklen v. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70; Pratt v. Freeman Mfg. Co., 115 Wis. 648.

Mr. Mechem says that "The rule, however, which, it is believed, is sustained by the weight of authority, is that unless the goods are perishable, or other special circumstances would render notice impracticable or unavailing, notice of the seller's intention to resell must be given, if the seller intends to make the price realized upon the resale the basis of his recovery against the buyer." 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1634. Citing Penn v. Smith, 98 Ala. 560; Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v. Atlanta Guano Co., 109 Ga. 607; Green v. Ansley, 92 Ga. 647; Holland v. Rea, 48 Mich. 218; Leonard v. Portier (1890, Tex. App.), 15 S. W. 414; Winslow v. Harriman Iron Co. (1897, Tenn Ch.), 42 S. W. 698.

The sale in such circumstances (resale for non-acceptance) is but a method, as before indicated, of enforcing the right to damages for breach of contract, and of making evidence of the precise amount of such damages. The sale, when properly con

ducted, the executory vendee having been so notified of the intention to make it as to give him reasonable opportunity to prevent it by paying his debt, constitutes a basis, binding on him, for computing the damages for which he is liable. The rule governing the subject was laid down in Scott Lumber Co. v. Hafner-Lotham Mfg. Co., 91 Wis. 667, in these words:

If a resale is made and the evidence shows that all reasonable efforts were made to secure the best price obtainable, or that the price obtained was a fair one, it settles the question of the market value.'

"The idea is that when the executory vendee of the property breaks his agreement to take and pay for the property, the measure of damages is the difference between the market value thereof and the contract price; but the vendor must necessarily establish that as a basis for his claim. If he sues for his damages without selling the property, or without selling the same with proper regard to the rights of the executory vendee, he takes upon himself the burden of establishing the fair market value of the goods at the time of the breach and the vendor's intention to make the sale, and the sale, with proper regard to the interests of the former, merely create definite and conclusive evidence of such market value. Scott Lumber Co. v. HafnerLotham Mfg. Co., 91 Wis. 667; Gehl v. Milwaukee Mfg. Co., 105 Wis. 573; Davis, etc., Co. v. Atlanta, 109 Ga. 607." Pratt v. Freeman Mfg. Co., 115 Wis. 648, 655, 656.

.

14. West v. Cunningham, 9 Port. (Ala.), 104; Ullman v. Kent, 60 Ill. 271; Pollen v. LeRoy, 30 N. Y. 549; Van Brocklen v. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70; Rosenbaum v. Weeden, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 785; Lindon v. Eldred, 49 Wis. 305; 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1637.

The seller may select the time of

resale, using good judgment and acting in good faith. Hill v. McKay, 94 Cal. 5; Tustin Fruit Ass'n V. Earle Fruit Co., 121 Cal. XVIII; Camp v. Hamlin, 55 Ga. 259; Saladin v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 79, 85; Rickey v. Ten Broeck, 63 Mo. 563, 567; Tripp v. Forsaith Mach. Co., 69 N. H. 233; Smith v. Pettee, 70 N. Y. 13; Pickering v. Bardwell, 21 Wis. 562; Stewart v. Cauty, 8 M. & W. 160; Phillpotts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475. See Moore v. Potter, 155 N. Y. 481.

The seller may also choose the place of sale, acting in good faith and with reasonable prudence. Johnson v. Listman Mill Co., 79 Ill. App. 435; Ingram v. Wackernagle, 83 Ia. 82; Cook v. Brandeis, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 555, 556; Anderson v. Frank, 45 Mo. App. 482; Rickey v. Ten Broeck, 63 Mo. 563, 567; Lewis v. Greider, 51 N. Y. 231; Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N. Y. 469; Guillon v. Earnshaw, 169 Pa. St. 463; Chapman v. Ingram, 30 Wis. 290.

66

Where the title is changed (by sale), and the vendor retains the possession as security for the purchase money, and where the vendor sells to other parties for a less price, and seeks to recover the difference from the first purchaser, in these and like cases it is undoubtedly true that specific notice of the time and place of sale should be given to the purchaser. But where the contract is executory, the plaintiff's title incomplete, and the right to complete it lost by his own fault, and no claim made on him for damages for not completing it, no such notice is required." This rule is now modified by the act. Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553, 558.

15. Hayes v. Nashville, 80 Fed. 641, 47 U. S. App. 713; Penn v. Smith, 98 Ala. 560; Regester v. Regester, 104 Md. 1; Whitney v. Boardman, 118 Mass. 242; Haines V. Tucker, 50 N. H. 307; Rosenbaum v. Weeden, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 785.

The seller himself may buy the goods if done in good faith. Straus v. Labsap, 59 Mo. App. 260; Ackerman v. Rubens, 167 N. Y. 405; Lindon v. Eldred, 45 Wis. 305.

16. Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461, 38 C. C. A. 473; Penn v. Smith, 98 Ala. 560; Hewes v. Germain Fruit Co., 106 Cal. 441; Magnes v. Sioux City Nursery Co., 14 Colo. App. 219; Camp v. Hamlin, 55 Ga. 259; Bagley v. Findlay, 82 Ill. 524; Morris v. Wibaux, 159 Ill. 627; Regester v. Regester, 104 Md. 1; Rickey v. Ten Broeck, 63 Mo. 563, 567; Crooks v. Moore, 1 Sand. (N. Y.) 297; Pollen v. LeRoy, 30 N. Y. 549; Smith v. Pettee, 70 N. Y. 13; Ackerman v. Rubens, 167 N. Y. 405, 407; 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1640.

"The vendor's right of resale must be exercised in good faith and in such time and manner and under such circumstances and by such methods as will be best calculated to produce the fair value of the property." Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218.

"Generally he ought to sell them at auction, because generally they will sell to the most advantage in that way, but he need not always sell them in that way, and it would be improper for him to do so if it happened that they would sell to greater advantage in some other way." Rosenbaum v. Weeden, 59 Va. (18 Grat.) 785.