PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Continued.
the scope and course of the servant's employment and in
furtherance of the master's interests," and committed no errot
in refusing plaintiff's prayer that if the assault was com-
mitted by the servant while engaged in the performance of his
duties, the company was, in any event, responsible. Roberts
v. Railroad, 176.
Plaintiff's services, consisting in looking after mining property,
paying the taxes and listing it and keeping trespassers off,
constitute no lien on the property which followed it into a
purchaser's hands, and where plaintiff had no personal claim
against such purchaser, who acquired his interest after the
suit had been commenced, the motion of nonsuit as to the
latter should have been allowed. Morrison v. Mining Co., 250.
In an action to recover the value of services rendered, where it
was admitted that plaintiff was defendant's agent in caring
for his property, and there being proof of services performed
and knowingly received, and of their value, the law implies
a promise by defendant to pay a fair and reasonable com-
pensation therefor, and it was not necessary for plaintiff to
allege or prove a special contract for the payment of his
services. Ibid.
When one deals with an agent, it behooves him to ascertain cor-
rectly the scope and extent of his authority to contract for
and in behalf of his alleged principal. Bank v. Hay, 326.
The principal is liable upon a contract duly made by his agent with
a third person: (1) When the agent acts within the scope of
his actual authority; (2) when the contract, although un-
authorized, has been ratified; (3) when the agent acts within
the scope of his apparent authority, unless the third person
has notice that the agent is exceeding his authority. Ibid.
The principal may also, in certain cases, be estopped to deny that
a person is his agent and clothed with competent authority or
that his agent has acted within the scope of the authority
which the nature of the particular transaction makes it
necessary for him to have. Ibid.
The authority to draw, accept or endorse bills, notes and checks
will not readily be implied as an incident to the express
authority of an agent. It must ordinarily be conferred ex-
pressly, but it may be implied if the execution of the paper is
a necessary incident to the business, that is, if the purpose of
the agency cannot otherwise be accomplished. Ibid.
Where the letters, upon which the plaintiff bank relied as author-
ity to an agent to make the draft which it cashed, show that
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Continued.
the alleged authority to draw was nothing more than private
instructions by the principal to his agent as to how he should
conduct this part of the business, and were not to be used
as a basis of credit to the agent, the Court properly nonsuited
the plaintiff. Ibid.
The principle that knowledge of the agent will be imputed to the
principal does not apply where the question is as to the re-
sponsibility for instituting a criminal prosecution, dependent
in part on what the principal understood the trade to be which
the agent had made, from information reasonably relied on by
him, nor does the principle of imputed knowledge apply when
it would be against the interest of the agent to make the dis-
closure. Stanford v. Grocery Co., 419.
While a corporation may contract under an assumed and fictitious
name and be bound on the contract, the president or other
managing officer, without any authority whatever, cannot bind
the corporation by endorsing, in his own name, or the name
of some firm of which he may be a member, a note payable
to himself for which the corporation received no benefit or con-
sideration. Bank v. Hollingsworth, 520.
PROBABLE CAUSE. See "Questions for Jury"; "Attachment"; "Evi-
dence."
When owing to the illness of the trial Judge the cause could not
proceed to judgment, and when, without default or laches on
the part of the defendant, she had her motion continued and
moved for a new trial upon exceptions reserved at the next
term, when judgment was pronounced against her, from which
she appealed, the appeal was lost under Revisal, sec. 534;
but a new trial will be granted, as the loss resulted from an
act of God, which she could not foresee, and the consequences
of which she could not avoid. State v. Robinson, 620.
A notice by Township Trustees to a land-owner that they had con-
demned a strip of his land to widen the public highway was
not the beginning of legal proceedings, under Laws 1901,
ch. 50, sec. 5, as amended by Laws 1905, ch. 770, sec. 1 (2),
where the taking was under the right of eminent domain and
was not contested. In re Wittkowsky's Land, 247.
In a proceeding by a land-owner under Laws 1901, ch. 50, sec. 5,
as amended by Laws 1905, ch. 770, sec. 1 (2), to assess dam-
ages for land taken for highway purposes, notice of the pro-
ceeding is required to be given to the Township Trustees and
County Commissioners under the "law of the land." Ibid.
Laws 1901, ch. 50, sec. 5, as amended by Laws 1905, ch. 770,
sec. 1 (2), providing that any person aggrieved may within
six months after a change of road, or a new road has been
opened and completed, apply for a jury to assess damages,
means that the proceeding shall be begun "within," i. e.,
"not later than" six months after the road has been changed
or the new road opened and completed. Ibid.
An exception to the Court's refusal to dismiss an action against a
foreign insurance company because the summons was not
served on the State Insurance Commissioner as required by
Revisal, sec. 4750, cannot be sustained, where the trial Judge
found no facts and it does not appear affirmatively that the
company is licensed to do business in this State. Parker v.
Insurance Co., 339.
Upon a motion to dismiss an action because the summons had not
been properly served, the defendant had the right to have the
facts stated by the Judge, but in the absence of any request
to the Judge so to do, his failure to state them was not error.
Ibid.
Where the complaint endeavors to set up two causes of action-
one for malicious prosecution and the other for malicious
abuse of process-but the evidence shows that the plaintiff's
entire grievance arises from a criminal prosecution for em-
bezzlement, in which he was arrested and bound over to
Court, and there is no evidence that the defendant did or
attempted to do any act in the criminal proceedings which
was contrary to the orderly and regular prosecution of the
case, an issue addressed to the cause of action for malicious
abuse of process should not be submitted. Stanford v.
Grocery Co., 419.
PROCESS, ABUSE OF. See "Evidence."
In a processioning proceeding under Revisal, secs. 325-326, to
establish a boundary-line, where the defendant denied the
plaintiff's title and pleaded both the twenty years' and seven
years' statutes as a defense, the Clerk, under Revisal, sec. 717,
should "transfer the cause to the civil-issue docket for trial
during the term upon all issues raised by the pleadings"-in
this case, both the issues of boundary and title. Woody v.
Fountain, 66.
In a processioning proceeding, the provision in Revisal, sec. 326,
that occupation of land constitutes ownership for the purpose
of establishing boundary, applies only where the answer does
not deny the boundary, or denies only the boundary; but
where the denial extends to the plaintiff's title also, and the
case is transferred to the term of Court for "trial on all the
issues raised" (Rev., sec. 717), the action becomes substan-
tially a civil action to quiet title, and it devolves upon the
plaintiff to make out his title as well as his boundary, and
possession ceases to be sufficient proof of ownership. Ibid.
In a processioning proceeding, where the cause has been transferred
to the Court at term, an instruction to the jury that "if they
should find from the greater weight of evidence that the orig-
inal and true line between the plaintiff and defendant is as
claimed by defendant, then you will answer this issue (as to
boundary) in his favor," was erroneous, as the burden of
proof was on the plaintiff to establish the line. Ibid.
PROPERTY, RIGHT TO FOLLOW. See "Fraud."
PROXIMATE CAUSE. See "Negligence."
PUBLIC POLICY. See "Statutes"; "Contracts."
PUBLIC ROADS. See "Roads and Highways."
PURCHASER FOR VALUE. See "Contracts"; "Questions for Courts."
QUESTIONS FOR COURT. See "Court, Power of."
The doctrine of specific performance with compensation for de-
fects, when the vendor cannot convey exactly what his contract
calls for, is usually applied to cases where the defects urged
as a ground for compensation existed when the contract was
made, but when the circumstances required, it is extended to
cases in which the defects arose afterwards, as when the
property was destroyed by fire subsequently to the execution
of the contract, its application resting in the sound legal
discretion of the Court. Sutton v. Davis, 474.
In an action for injuries received in coupling cars without auto-
matic couplers by an employee of a large manufacturing com-
pany which in connection therewith and as part of the same
owns twelve to fourteen miles of railroad track on which it
operates, with its own crew, engine and cars belonging to it,
and the cars of other roads, the Court was correct in charging
QUESTIONS FOR COURT-Continued.
the jury that the failure of the defendant to equip its cars
with automatic couplers was negligence, and that if such
failure was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, they
would answer the issue as to negligence "Yes." Hairston v.
Leather Co., 512.
The exceptions to the charge of the Court on the issues directed
to the question whether the defendant R. was a purchaser for
value and without notice of D.'s fraudulent purpose in
making certain transfers, are without merit, there being no
evidence that R. had notice of facts sufficient to put him on
inquiry. Bank v. Hollingsworth, 520.
In an action for damages for alleged wrongful and malicious
attachment of plaintiff's property, where the general man-
ager of defendant testified that the party who bought the
goods told him that they were for the use of and bought for
the account of plaintiff; that he had no reason to disbelieve
this statement; that the former action was instituted in good
faith, believing the present plaintiff owed the debt for which
the property was attached; that he submitted all the facts
to his counsel and acted upon his advice, and that he had no
idea what property the Sheriff had attached: Held, that the
Court erred in charging the jury that if they believed the
evidence they would find that the attachment was issued
without probable cause. Railroad Co., v. Hardware Co., 51.
In an action for injuries caused by the falling of a bed-plate of a
cloth press, weighing several thousand pounds, it was a
question for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff
placed himself in a place of obvious danger, such as no pru-
dent person would occupy, in standing immediately behind
and looking over the bed-plate as it stood on its edge, and
directing a battering-ram which was being propelled against
it from the opposite side. Shaw v. Manufacturing Co., 131.
There is no presumption of mental anguish growing out of the
relation of stepmother and son, but it is a fact that the
plaintiff may prove, if she can, to the satisfaction of the
jury. Harrison v. Telegraph Co., 147.
In an action against a Register of Deeds to recover the penalty
under Revisal, sec. 2090, for issuing a marriage license con-
trary to its provisions, where the uncontradicted evidence
showed that the Register took the word of the prospective
bridegroom and his friend, neither of whom he knew, as to
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