STATE v. HICKS.

worded written statement with the secretary of the board. The statute states clearly what the statement shall contain, and it was easy for him to have complied with it. But he did not do so, or attempt to do so. The authorities are to the effect that he had no right to practise simply because the officers had not performed their duty, as they could have been compelled by mandamus to do so. Their failure to comply with the law, in the language of Brickell, C. J., "affords to the appellant no excuse or justification for continuing to do business without the license." Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, 118 Ala., 143-154. The principle has been recognized as sound in its application to mere police regulations having no connection with the fiscal affairs of the government, in the celebrated case of Royall v. Virginia, 116 U. S., 572, especially at pages 579, 580, and 582. Lord v. Jones, 24 Me., 439. Our case is stronger against the defendant than any of those we have cited, as here the defendant could have substantially complied with the law, as we have said, by filing. his own statement in writing with the secretary.

A case which seems to be directly in point is Gosnell v. State, 52 Ark., 228. The statute therein construed related to the practice of dentistry, and was much like our act in its phraseology, except as to the furnishing of blanks; but under our construction of the Act of 1889 that is not a material difference. That case also affirms the constitutionality of the legislation. The opinion of hte Court closes as follows: "It is competent for the Legislature to regulate the practice of dentistry and dental surgery in such way as will not deprive the citizens of the right to follow a lawful avocation. While it was and is unlawful to practise dentistry or dental surgery after the lapse of three months from the passage of the act, without the requisite certificate, the appellant may make his application and proof that he was practising at the date of the passage of the act, and thereupon he will be entitled

STATE v. HICKS.

to a certificate authorizing him to practise." Following the suggestion there made, and as it appears to us, that the time of filing the necessary statement with the secretary of the dental board is not of the essence of the statutory requirement, but is, in its nature, directory, if the defendant shall file a statement conforming to the directions of section 4470 of the Revisal, he will be entitled to a certificate to be registered as required by section 4468, and upon thus complying with the law he will be lawfully qualified to continue the practice of his profession. That the provision as to the time was not regarded by the Legislature as vital to the protection of the people from quacks and empirics, or of any great importance in determining the right to practise, appears from the fact that from March, 1879, to March, 1887eighteen years no such certificate or registration was required, but the exemption was general and unconditional as to those who had practised before 7 March, 1879, for The Code, sec. 3156, provided that it should be. We must hold that time is not of the essence of the enactment, for if it was the law would oppressive, if not unconstitutional, as depriving the defendant of all right to practise.

The defendant, having admitted that he had not passed the requisite examination and received a certificate from the State Board of Dental Examiners, was guilty, unless he came within the exemption, and of this there was no evidence, as we have shown.

No Error.

CASES DISPOSED OF WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION.

CASES DISPOSED OF WITHOUT WRITTEN
OPINION AT FALL TERM, 1906.

GOODEN v. LUMBER CO. From Currituck. W. M. Bond for plaintiff; Pruden & Pruden and Shepherd & Shepherd for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

DAVIS V. RAILROAD Co. From Tyrrell. Aydlett & Ehringhaus and Meekins & Leigh for plaintiff, appellant; Pruden & Pruden and Shepherd & Shepherd for defendant. Affirmed.

JENNINGS V. WHITE. From Pasquotank. Aydlett & Ehringhaus for plaintiff; W. M. Bond and C. E. Thompson for defendant, appellant. Affirmed. (Two cases by this title, both affirmed).

BROWN V. RAILWAY. From Bertie. Winston for plaintiff; Day, Bell & Allen for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

STATE V. JOHNSON. From Pitt. Attorney-General for State; J. L. Fleming and F. G. James for defendant, appellant. Dismissed for failure to perfect appeal.

STATE v. RIVES. From Pitt. Attorney-General for State; Skinner & Whedbee for defendant, appellant. Dismissed for failure to perfect appeal.

DUFFY v. LIFE INS. Co. From Craven. W. D. McIver and O. H Guion for plaintiff; Hinsdale & Son and W. W. Clark for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

MEREDITH V. RAILWAY. From Craven. W. D. McIver for plaintiff; Simmons & Ward for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

THOMAS V. TEL. Co. From Craven. D. L. Ward for plaintiff; W. W. Clark and F. H. Busbee & Son for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

GAY V. RAILROAD AND LUMBER CO. From Greene. Aycock & Murrell and Wooten & Wooten for plaintiff; Gal

CASES DISPOSED OF WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION.

loway & Albritton and L. I. Moore for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

HARRISON V. STICKNEY. From Wilson. Connor & Connor and F. A. Woodard for plaintiff, appellant; Pou & Finch and Murray Allen for defendant. The Court being evenly divided. (CONNOR, J., not sitting), judgment below affirmed. HEARTT v. POOL, appellant. From Wake. Dismissed for failure to print the record.

JONES v. TEL. Co. From Harnett. W. A. Stewart for plaintiff; R. C. Strong and Shepherd & Shepherd for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

JACKSON V. NEUSE RIVER MILLS. From Wake. J. N. Holding and S. G. Ryan for plaintiff, appellant; R. H. Battle for defendant. Affirmed.

ELLIS. MITCHELL, appellant. From Wake. R. H. Battle and W. J. Peele for plaintiff; S. G. Ryan and J. N. Holding for defendant. Affirmed.

SMITH V. MARSH. From Cumberland. T. H. Sutton for plaintiff, appellant; Robinson & Shaw and N. A. Sinclair for defendant. Affirmed.

HOWELL v. BARFIELD. From Robeson. Wishart & Shaw and D. J. Lewis for plaintiff, appellant; McLean & McCormick and McIntyre & Lawrence for defendant. Affirmed.

HALL V. RAILROAD. From Robeson. McIntyre & Lawrence for plaintiff; McLean & McCormick for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

STATE v. HOUGH. From Anson. Attorney-General and Walter Clark, Jr., for the State; H. H. McLendon for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

STATE V. LITTLE (appeal by State). From Anson. Attorney-General and Waller Clark, Jr., for the State; H. H. McLendon for defendant. Affirmed.

1

CASES DISPOSED OF WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION,

STATE v. SCOTT. From Union. Walter Clark, Jr., acting Attorney-General, for the State; Williams & Lemmond for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

STATE V. ALSO BROOKS. From Union. Walter Clark, Jr., for the State; A. M. Stack for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

CARTER V. TEL. Co. From Chatham. H. A. London & Son for plaintiff; Busbee & Son, W. A. Montgomery for defendant, petitioner. Petition of defendant to rehear dismissed.

LEDBETTER v. DELINTING Co. From Richmond. J. D. Shaw and Morrison & Whitlock for plaintiff, appellant; Busbee & Busbee for defendant. Affirmed.

ROWELL V. LITTLE. From Union. A. M. Stack for plaintiff, appellant; Adams, Jerome & Armfield, J. C. Sikes and Robinson & Caudle for defendant. Affirmed.

TURNER V. LAWs. From Orange. Frank Nash for plaintiff, appellant; J. W. Graham and S. M. Gattis for defendants. Affirmed.

GUNTER V. TOBACCO Co. From Durham. Boone, Giles & Boone for plaintiff; Winston & Bryant for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

ROBERSON V. RAILWAY. From Guilford. J. A. Barringer for plaintiff; King & Kimball for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

STATE v. GARNER. From Davidson.

Attorney-General

for State; E. E. Raper for defendant, appellant. Affirmed. STATE v. ADAMS. From Davidson. Attorney-General for State; Walser & Walser and E. E. Raper for defendant, appellant. Affirmed.

TYSINGER, appellant, v. FURNITURE Co. From Davidson. Brooks & Thompson and Taylor & Scales for defendant Affirmed.