In re APPLICANTS FOR LICENSE. Why require them to be filed with the Clerk of this Court if they are not for the information of the Court? Why should the Court be informed of the applicant's moral character if the Court is not to pass on it? If the Court is to pass on it, can the Legislature control the exercise of a judicial function by limiting the evidence to the certificates filed? The Legislature can no more do so than it can limit the Court in its investigation of the candidate's legal learning. Note the disastrous effect upon the profession of the law if the Court is bound by the certificate: Lawyers, on the average, are morally no better and no worse than other people. There are some black sheep in their ranks as in every calling. One black sheep who wishes to enter can apply to two black sheep who are already in to certify to his good moral character. Result: more black sheep to degrade our noble profession. "Why should a citizen, even if he has committed some offense in the past, be deprived of the privilege of turning his face the other way and making an honorable effort to gain his living by the practice of law?" asks the Court. I am one of the last of men to place an obstacle in the way of the penitent who has reformed. But I wish to know that he has in truth reformed, and, to be sure of it, I claim the right to investigate. A desire to enter the ranks of the law is no evidence of repentance of one's sins. I do not know a more profitable field for gifted rascals to exercise their talents in than in the practice of it. This makes it all the more important that the courts should be vigilant to keep them out. "It is not enough," says the Supreme Court of Connecticut, "for an attorney that he be honest. He must be that and more. He must be believed to be honest. It is absolutely essential to the usefulness of an attorney that he be entitled to the confidence of the community wherein he practises." County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn., 11. To prevent the admission to this honorable and important profession of any one not thus entitled to public confidence, In re APPLICANTS FOR LICENSE. this Court, and afterwards the Legislature, adopted these regulations. It is our duty to give them that broad and liberal construction which will effectuate the wise and beneficent purpose intended. It must not be understood from this opinion that I hold the applicants guilty of the charges preferred against them. We are precluded from passing on their guilt by the judgment of the Court. WALKER, J., dissenting: I concur with Mr. Justice Brown in dissenting from the opinion of the Court. It seems to me clear that the Legislature did not intend to deprive this Court of the power to determine who is a fit and proper person to be admitted to practise in the courts of the State, but only to require that the applicant for license should, "before being allowed to stand an examination," file with the Clerk a certificate of his good moral character to be signed by two attorneys who practise in this Court, and that this should be prima facie sufficient to entitle him to his license, if otherwise qualified; but it was not intended to make this certificate conclusive evidence. Such a construction would defeat the manifest intention of the Legislature, that no person should be admitted to the bar who was not of good repute. Suppose that after a certificate has been given by the two attorneys, the applicant should to our knowledge be convicted of a felony, or any infamous offense, or should commit some act of so grave a nature as to admittedly disqualify him for the position of an attorney at law, would this Court be bound to issue his license under such circumstances, and can it be imagined that the Legislature intended any such result? And yet under the decision of the Court in this matter, the filing of the certificate and the possession of a competent knowledge of the law would require us to admit an applicant in just such a case. A construction which could impose that duty upon us might so corrupt the administration of justice In re APPLICANTS FOR LICENSE. in the courts that it should not be presumed to be in accordance with the true meaning of the statute. The courts of this country have, therefore, held that statutes similarly worded merely provide that the applicant, as a condition precedent to his examination, shall furnish prima facie evidence of his good character, and they were not intended to restrict the power of the Court to finally determine whether or not he possessed the requisite character. The Court is therefore not limited in its inquiry as to the moral character of the applicant for an attorney's license to the certificate, but it will, and is bound by the obligation of the duty necessarily imposed by law, to look behind it in all proper cases. Attorney's License Application, 21 N. J. L., 345. The Legislatures of the several States have from time to time assumed to prescribe rules for the admission of attorneys to practise at the bar, and the courts have generally acted upon them when they have seemed reasonable, and in deference to the wishes of a coördinate department of the government; but the power to decide finally who possesses sufficient character for admission is a judicial function from the nature of the question, and is so regarded by all well-considered authorities. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333; Matter of Goodell, 39 Wis., 240. In Garland's case the Court says: "The order of admis sion is the judgment of the Court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the Court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judg ment of the Court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judi In re APPLICANTS FOR LICENSE. Attor cial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. neys and counsellors are not only officers of the Court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature. And hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the courts, and the latter in performing this duty may very justly be considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions," citing Matter of Cooper, 22 N. Y., 81. So in the case of Ex parte Secombe, 19 How., 9, the same Court said: "It has been well settled by the rules and practice of common-law courts that it rests exclusively with the Court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." 4 Cyc., p. 900, et seq., and notes. The solution of this question does not depend upon the jurisdiction of this Court, as supposed in the opinion of the majority, but upon its judicial power, there being a clearly marked difference between the two in respect to this matter. Art. IV, sec. 8, of the Constitution confers jurisdiction upon this Court to review matters of law and legal inference and of certain issues and questions of fact, with the power to issue any remedial writs necessary to give it a general supervision and control over proceedings of the inferior courts. It shall have jurisdiction, that is, the power to hear and determine all such matters; but a moment's reflection will suffice to show that this cannot be all the judicial power the Court has. This was merely intended to define and determine its appellate jurisdiction, but not even by implication to deprive it of any part of the broad judicial power given by sec. 2. There are matters of a judicial nature which this Court may hear and determine other than those which are specified in sec. 8. . Some of its powers are inherent, as being necessary for the preservation of its very existence, its dignity and the enforcement of obedience to its orders and decrees. There are still others which arise by implication, as being In re APPLICANTS FOR LICENSE. essential to the full and efficient exercise of the powers and jurisdiction which have been specifically granted. The two terms are not, therefore, exactly coextensive, although they may generally be considered as practically synonymous. But whether they are or not the same in meaning, it must be remembered that sec. 8 refers only to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and does not by its inclusive words deprive it of the jurisdiction or judicial power which must always reside in every court. Those powers which are implied, as being necessary to the exercise of those which are expressed, are as much given as if they had themselves been expressed. This is an unquestioned rule of construction, applicable alike to constitutions and statutes. I think, therefore, that no argument in favor of the conclusion of the majority can legitimately be drawn from the language of sec. 8 of Art. IV of the Constitution, as limiting the power of this Court. Nor do I think any insuperable difficulty is presented by the suggestion that if the power of the Court to pass upon the character of the applicants is inherent, it inheres in all the courts. It belongs, of course, to any court having the power to examine and admit applicants to the practice of law, and this Court has been designated for that purpose for nearly a hundred years. If an application could be made to any court, then the particular court to which it is made would have the same power that we have. The best statement of the principle governing a case like this one is perhaps to be found in Garland's case, namely, that the Legislature may prescribe the qualifications of an applicant, but the Court before which he is examined must determine whether he possesses them, that being a judicial and not a legislative function. The application of this simple rule excludes any discussion of the inherent power of the Court and places the decision of the question upon a sensible |