turn it into gold, or sell it for a small price, would turn to no account, as he had always hoped it would by augmentation, and thereby to gain an inexhaustible treasure.

But, on the one hand, his want and necessity was such, and, on the other, the sollicitings of those, who would buy of his powder, were so importunate, that he could not resist so great temptations: and therefore, between both, he resolved upon a dishonest shift, which was, to sell for great rates powdered cinnabar, red lead, and the caput mortuum of aqua fortis boiled, and such other ingredients, instead of the true powder, mixing also therewith some few filings of copper, that foolish ignorant people might mistake the same for a gold-making powder. To some he sold it without any such cozening addition as copper: and, if they were not able to tinge with it, he would lay the blame on their impatience and unskilfulness in making the projection. To others, he pawned some of his counterfeit tincture for a great sum of money, which he pretended he had a present use for; but he was loath to spend his tincture in projecting, because he hoped to augment it with a thousand fold advantage: and, that they might see the tincture was genuine and true, he took some of it and wrapped it up in a little wax, with which he mingled a little of his right tincture, which he called his crocus, or powder of reduction, and so tinged therewith.

By this means, he got very many thousands of crowns, and, over and above, he got P. C. de L. and C. L. to be his assistants and partners in these mysteries. But the imprudent sort, amongst which, A. C. P. and his cousin C. B. are to be reckoned, he gave them whole ingots which he had cast, consisting of equal parts of gold and silver; then filing some of them, and dissolving it into common aqua fortis, which he brought with him, he affirmed, that now his tincture was exalted into a menstruum, which would presently change silver into gold; and that, as soon as ever the price or value, which was to be paid for its purchase, should be put thereto, it would be converted into gold. It hath been also further related to me, that he grew to that degree of impudence, as, to tinge some sort of coins, after this manner, into gold, before the empress dowager and the emperor himself. Yea, this fellow was so arrogant, as to cause his own effigies to be drawn on some of those false coins which he did attempt deceitfully to put off.

Yet this matter could not be kept so secret, but the more prudent began to smell the cheat, and to mutter something about it; which was very ill taken in the emperor's court. For he was in such credit there, that it was not safe to impeach him, as being received into the emperor's protection, both against the clergy and the secular power, and even against the skilful in the same art. For great men are loth to acknowledge their error, but think themselves, though under a mistake, to be as infallible as the pope himself.

Those, who were not much concerned in the matter, suffered it so to pass, as taking little notice of it; but some true philosophers were very much aggrieved, that so infamous an impostor, after so many vows and protestations made by him to the contrary, and after such evident proofs of his former debauched life; after so many villainous crimes commit

ted, and his base prostitution openly of so noble an art of chymistry; should yet, notwithstanding that he ranted it up and down in his coach in masquerades, before the emperor's court, be maintained and protected by him. But others, who had been cousened by him of great sums of money, even to many thousand ducats, with his adulterate tincture, could not so rest satisfied, but brought in their actions against him at common law: where, after some time and much expence, they obtained judgment against him, but it was never put in execution, though all other means were tried.

Now the emperor, unless he would have left his favourite Wenceslaus to the jurisdiction and power of his judges, and rigour of the law, must needs interpose; for the complaints, made against him for his insolent and abusive practices, were so many, and the fame of them was spread so far abroad in the world, that his imperial majesty thought it more convenient to have the noise of it altogether suppressed.

To be short, the emperor paid all his debts, and, that he might prevent his farther opportunity of cousenage, he got from him the rest of his tincture, and then advanced him to the most ancient order of barony in Bohemia, by the title of Baron Seyler of Seylerburgh, and after. wards made him hereditary master of the mint of Bohemia. And, hav. ing thus preferred him, he sent him away from his court to Prague, where he now lives very gallantly, and hath made Friar Francis the steward of his house having married a second wife, called Waldes Kir. cheriana, a handsome woman, and of a noble family.

In the mean time, a rumour was spread all over Germany, That the devil had carried him away soul and body.' Which report, though it might have some good grounds, yet, for this time, it was not true. But he hath very great reason to fear that it may prove true, at last, if he doth not amend his life; and the event thereof we must expect.

I have described the series of this story, both to vindicate the truth, and also to satisfy so many curious, who have despicable thoughts of chymistry. If I have mistaken in any passage, Friar Wenceslaus is yet alive, and I earnestly desire him to amend and rectify my mistakes, and to vindicate himself, by giving the world a more exact account thereof, that he may no longer lie under any unjust re. flexion.

For a conclusion; I heartily wish, that, if God should bless any lover of this noble art, with such-like treasure, he would use it better than Wenceslaus hath done; for the glory of God, the benefit and advantage of his neighbour, and the furtherance of his own everlasting salvation.

THE INCONVENIENCIES OF

A LONG CONTINUANCE

OF THE SAME PARLIAMENT.

PRINTED IN 1680. FOLIO, CONTAINING FOUR PAGES.

THAT

HAT there is a necessity of a government among mankind, is ad. mitted by all wise men; but to convince mad men and fools of this, is too great a task. Johannes Woolebius, in his Compendium, Theolo. Christ. says, "That it is unworthy in a Christian so much to seem to mistrust the divine authority of the scripture, as to make any question of it: it being a principle, so necessary to be believed, that it ought not to be brought into doubt, by disputes.' To the like purpose, it may be said, that it is unworthy, in an English commonwealth'sman, to bring it into debate, whether, or no, the sovereignty of this realm be in the king alone, disjoined from any other persons? And true it is, there are as yet but few, if any, that dare be so hardy, as positively to say otherwise, whatever their thoughts be, and though their actions seem to look that way. And forasmuch as the word, commonwealth, hath been of late years, for the most part, applied to the go. vernment, when it is in the hands of many: it might not be impertinent to insert here, what a commonwealth is. A commonwealth, there. fore, is a lawful government of many families, and that which unto them, in common, belongeth; and the end and design thereof is, "That the wicked be punished, and the good and just protected.' So that it is as much, nay, rather more a commonwealth, and tends more to common good, when the government is in the hand of one man, than in the hands of many; and, for this, we have the general consent of all great politicians, in past ages, who, after the trial of all sorts of governments, and comparing the conveniencies and inconveniencies of each, have concluded that government best for the generality of the people, when he sovereign power to command was in one man, and not in many. For oftentimes, even where a tyrant hath reigned, and he removed, and the commonwealth changed into a popular state, the people have been soon sensible, that the change hath been much for the worse, and that, instead of one tyrant, they had a multitude of tyrants, to oppress them. Yet the dissolution, or prorogation of a parliament, hath been of late looked upon to be so high a violation of right, and so great a point of misgovernment, as if thereby our liberties were lost, and our lives and estates subjugated to the arbitrary power and pleasure of our king; or else we falsly conclude it impossible, that the king can be so wise, as to govern without their counsels. To remove which mistakes, and to quiet the minds of men misled, these following considerations and collections

out of English history are offered to publick view, whereby it will be most apparent, That not only the proroguing, but the frequent dissolving of parliaments, is absolutely necessary for the preservation of monarchy, our now established government, and the best sort of government for the people of England, and most suitable to their temper, in preservation whereof, our own preservation consists. But the long continuance of one and the same parliament, or the same members in parliament, which are both alike, is the most pernicious thing imaginable both to king and people.

It is necessary for the preservation of monarchy that parliaments be often dissolved, because nothing makes it more manifest, in whom the sovereign power resides; for it puts them in mind, by what authority, they have their being; whereas, by a long continuance, they are apt to plead prescription to their seats, and think themselves disseized, if re moved thence, though by the same power that placed them there.

In former times, parliaments, in this kingdom, consisted only of some of the nobility, and wise men of the nation, such as the king pleased to call; and the first time, that ever the commons of England were admit. I ted to parliament, was, in the sixteenth year of Henry the First; which parliament was assembled at Salisbury, and it was so assembled of the king's own pleasure, not of any obligation, that, by law, lay upon him so to do. And certain it is, the kings of England were no ways obliged to assemble parliaments, or being assembled, to permit them to sit, during their own pleasure, till of late years, that such vapours corrupt1ed our region, with a destructive contagion. By the ancient statutes of Edward the Third, whereby parliaments were to be holden once a year, and oftener, if need were, cannot, by any reasonable construction, be #intended, so much to oblige the king to call a parliament, as to oblige the subject to attend, being called; and this seems the rather to be so, for that, those statutes being but briefly penned, by a subsequent statute of Richard the Second, as an act explanatory of the former acts, a penalty is imposed upon every person, having summons to parliament, that should not come accordingly. But now, by an act of the sixteenth, of his now majesty's reign, he was prevailed upon to pass it into a law, That parliaments should not be intermitted or discontinued above three years. However, God be thanked, it is yet in the king's power, that, if, when they are called, they behave themselves not well, his majesty may, without violation of any law, send them whence they came; and, I hope, it will never more be otherwise, lest that, if they had a grant of not being dissolved, without their own consent, they would do, as those did, that had the like power. And, sure it is no solecism, that the like cause may have the like effect.

A parliament of the modern constitution is, without controversy, very necessary and useful, if they intend that, which properly belongs to them; the business of both houses being to consult with, and advise the king, in such things, as he shall require their advice in, and to re. present to him publick grievances, such as are real grievances, and not such as every whimble pated fellow esteems so. But they are not to think to compel the king, under the plausible term of address, to exer cise any point of government, or to make any new laws, that he likes

not of. And it is proper and peculiar to himself only to judge, what advice is fit to be followed, and what to be rejected; for there may be some private reason of state, for his so doing, which might be incon. venient to be publickly known. This hath been the ancient settled practice, and under which this kingdom hath long flourished; and it is not safe to alter it, for, it being now the declining age of the world, most changes, violent ones especially, are from good to bad, and from bad to worst, and from worst to stark naught.

Is not the advantage of monarchy, above the government of many, apparent, at this time, to any seeing man? For, if his majesty, like the main-mast of a ship, had not been the stay of all, and had not, as it were, parted the fray, by the late dissolution of the parliament, all the aristocratical rigging and tackle of both houses, if it deserves to be so called, had been torn in pieces by faction, amongst themselves, and this poor kingdom thereby, before this, might have been a second time, in our memory, blown up by her own inbred divisions; and it is not without precedent, that parliaments are alike infallible as the pope, or his college of cardinals, and have given as ill advice, and done as ill things, and of late have been more troublesome than ever.

If it should be so, that the advice of either, or both houses of par liament, must of necessity be followed by the king, then would it not be properly an advice but a command in effect; and where, in a commonwealth, the sovereign power or command is in more than in one, that commonwealth is no longer a monarchy, but is degenerated, at best, into an aristocracy, the sovereignty being thereby divided amongst many; and, if we judge impartially, it must be acknowledged, that they that endeavour after that, viz. That the votes and ordinances of the house of commons might have the force of laws, are no less enemies to the state, than they that would introduce popery, for in both cases, it is but endeavouring to alter the government: to prevent which fond and dangerous attempt, the frequent dissolving of parliaments is very

necessary.

Divers other inconveniencies will be prevented by frequent prorogu ing and dissolving of parliaments; for, by that means, the privilege of parliaments will not over long protect the members thereof, to delay and defraud their fellow subjects of their just and due debts; which sort of practice, for many years past, hath been a killing oppression, when not only the members themselves made ill use of that privilege, but many of them gave their clerks liberty to sell blank protections by the dozens, as the pope doth his indulgences. And moreover, if any such, or other like vicious men, should, by flattery and bribery, get into the parliament, a dissolution gives opportunity of discharging such, from having hand in so high a trust; and great reason, such should be discharged; for, how can it be expected, that men, unjust in their pri vate concerns, should be otherwise in publick administration, which they will always strive to make subservient to their by-interests?

By the long continuance of one and the same parliament, it hath happened, that the members thereof, having long beheld the tempting, though forbidden fruit of supremacy, they have not scrupled to grapple with the king, for a share of the sovereignty; and most commonly,