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tated the wisdom of Fabius Maximus. But this is most certain (as the discourses upon Livy prove) that a general, who desires to keep the field, cannot avoid fighting, when the enemy presses, and makes it his business to engage him. For, in such a case, there is but one of three ways: The first is the way of Fabius, of standing upon your guard, and keeping your army in places of advantage; and this is laudable and good, when your army is so strong, that the enemy dares not at tack you, as it was in the case of Fabius and Hannibal; for, if Hannibal had advanced, Fabius would have kept his ground, and engaged him. The second way to avoid fighting, if your enemy will needs attack you, is flying, and fight or fly you must. Philip of Macedon, being invaded by the Romans, resolved not to come to a battle; and, to avoid it, he took the way of Fabius, incamped his army upon the top of a mountain, and intrenched himself so strongly, that he believed the Romans durst not have ventured to come at him. But, alas! the Romans were another kind of enemy; they not only adventured, but removed him from his mountain, and forced him to fly with the greatest part of his army; and, bad it not been for the unpassableness of the country, which hindered the pursuit, the Macedonians had all been cut off. The French were strongly incamped at St. Dennis, and did not at all believe that the Prince of Orange would attack them; and yet, for all their confidence, they could find no other remedy, than to betake themselves to their heels. And this was the greatest and most famous action of the whole war. The third way to avoid fighting is, to shut yourself up in some strong town, which is the most pernicious way of all, as making your ruin inevitable. Therefore (as Machiavel says) to keep the field, and avoid fighting, is to be done no way so securely, as by keeping fifty miles off, and sending out store of spies and scouts, that may give you notice of the enemy's approach, and opportunity to

retreat.

Nor is it necessary, to do all this, that your army should be very numerous. The Romans and the Greeks always carried on their wars with a few men, depending more upon their great order, and the excellence of their discipline, than great numbers; but the Eastern and Western nations did all by their multitudes. Alexander conquered the world with thirty-thousand men; Pyrrhus was wont to say, that with fifteen-thousand men he would go through the world; and yet Pyrrhus fought against the Romans, and beat them in two battles, and was, in the judgment of Hannibal himself, one of the greatest captains of the world, The ordinary Roman army consisted of about twenty-four thousand men, and, if they were, at any time, overpressed with num. bers, they exceeded not fifty-thousand; with which number, at one time, they opposed two-hundred thousand Gauls, or, if you will, call them Frenchmen.

There are two nations, whose genius resembles that of the ancient Romans, the Germans and the English, who are descended from them. But there are these, two differences between them: The Germans you shall never bring up to make a point-blank attack in the mouth of cannons, in such fashion as the English: nor again, after a rout, shall you hardly make them rally, as you may the English. From all these

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things I make this conclusion: That, if the French renew the war again, the best way will be to oppose them with an army of English, and, by all means, to force them to fight continually, till the field be too hot for them; and, when they can keep that no longer, their towns will be of little service to them. The English have fought many battles with the French, and always beaten them; and yet the French have exceeded them much in numbers, as in the memorable battle of Poictiers, when the English were but about eight-thousand, and the French were sixty-thousand,

And thus I come to the third and last part of my discourse, the office whereof is to dispose into method such arguments, as will be necessary to be used to the several parties, that is to say, the king, par. liament, and this state, to draw them on to such a league; and they are as follow:

TO THE KING.

1. It will serve to conciliate, and beget a better understanding between him and the parliament, and to remove some part of that jealousy, which the people travail with, of the king's administration, and which will never leave burning, till it burn to the foundations of the throne, if not prevented. And, if it attains not the end of introducing other co-operative acts of concord, it will, at least, avert the hastening on of greater evils. There be some of those things which the parliament would have, which the king would consent to, upon condition he might not be pressed in the rest, as the case of the Duke of York, &c. Therefore let them begin with some popular great thing, that may involve the interests and affections of all.

2. As to that point of the confirmation by the parliament, I have shewed the precedents of former times.

3. The ratification here, by the general estates, will be equipollent to the ratification, in England, by the parliament, which saves the king's honour. For, thus, the parties rather conspire in one, how to render this league illustrious and great, than, on their respective parts, to be forced to any thing.

TO THE PARLIAMENT.

1. Let it move from themselves, that is, let some of those in the house of commons, who are of unquestionable reputation for wisdom, honesty, and integrity, be engaged; let them engage others, and let them communicate their counsels with my Lord Shaftsbury, and that party in the house of lords. Then let the scheme and project be proposed in the house of commons; then the commons seek the lords concurrence; and then let it be offered to the king, as the advice of the whole kingdom; for every man is there in person, or by representation. 2. This will shut up those avenues, those back-doors, by which the French have had accesses to our councils, and have influenced them; and, consequently, will render the sitting of parliaments more calm and secure, when that mighty trade of theirs, of buying prorogations, shall be spoiled, and their factors rendered less malignant.

3. This is an infallible argument, As the end of a thing is, so is the thing. The two general ends of this league are, to preserve the protestant religion, and to preserve and restore the balance of Europe, by lessening the power of France. And those are the two greatest ends in Christendom; therefore that thing, that has those for its ends, is the greatest thing; and the minds of gallant men are ex. ceedingly moved with great things, and strongly carried to the pursuit of them.

TO THIS STATE.

1. The first argument is prudential. Prudence is that virtue, by which, when several things are offered, we are directed which to chuse, and which to refuse; what to do, and what not to do. Hol. land then must either make a league with France, or with England, or remain neuter.

To make a league with France is utterly imprudent, for these two

reasons:

1. Because France aiming at, and designing an universal monarchy, would only secure himself of them, till their own turn come, that is, till he hath swallowed up the Spanish Netherlands and Germany, when he would turn his force upon them.

2. By such means they would lose the best and surest friend they have had from their foundation of their state, and that is England. And where a state is not sufficient by its own proper force, in respect of the weakness of the one, or the mightiness of its neighbours, to defend it. self, it must of necessity rely some where else for protection.

To remain in a neutral condition cannot be; for so, instead of making one friend, they would make three enemies. And, in case France should renew the war upon them, England would be won, upon such terms as France would offer, either to join with them, or to stand still, and see Holland ruined. Besides, how impolitick a thing neutrality is, any man may see that will consider the observations made thereMach. Prince, cap. 21.

on.

It remains then, and I know nothing else that remains, to make a league with England. For that will have one of two effects: Either France will be wholly deterred from attempting upon their state; or, if he does, they will be able, with the assistance of England, to defend themselves. This is the first argument.

2. The authority and reputation of the proposers; it is a league pro posed by the parliament of England, to be entered into with the king and kingdom of England. The parliament represents the whole people of England, and commands both the parts and persons of a great, rich, and valiant nation, from whom neither money nor soldiers will be wanting to beat down the power of that proud and insulting nation of France. But these people here are afraid of France, why then let them make a league with those of whom France itself is afraid. And withal, let them remember this league is to be made with a people, from whom they have received the greatest benefits, as I have shewed before. And this argument alone will beat down the most, if not all the objections that would arise against such a league, proposed in any other manner.

3. The great reputation and security such a league will give to this state, which will cover them as with wings of protection against France, and whosoever else would prey upon them.

If I have not expressed these things so as I would, I have done it as well as I can in a short time. And so, submitting it with all decent humility to the grave considerations of those excellent personages whom it may concern, I leave it to its fate.

Hague, May 24, 1680.

ADVICE TO A SOLDIER,

IN TWO LETTERS,

WRITTEN TO AN OFFICEr in the enGLISH ARMY,

PROPER TO BE EXPOSED AT THE PRESENT TIME,

While the Peace of Christendom (if not the Liberty of it,) seems to be very short-lived.

From a quarto, containing fourteen pages, printed at London, by John Shadd, 1680.

The first of these letters endeavours to convince every candidate for a field-commission, that he is petitioning, not for a small and trivial matter, but for a preferment, on the due execution of which depends his own and his king's and nation's welfare; and that therefore the author adviseth every one first to engage a voluntier in some action in the wars, before that he accepts of the post of the meanest officer; because the military arts of battles and sieges are as little to be learned by reading and theory, as any other worldly employment; and they that have the commission, and must be beholden to the instruction and direction of a subaltern in the execution of their duty, lie subject to this dilemma, To lose the credit of their success when fortune favours, or to bear the blame when it happens otherwise.'

The second letter contains the moral part of military discipline; and that not only in regard to the soldiers in general, but to the officers in particular. And they are both not only now, but at all times, worthy the perusal of the gentlemen, who serve their king and country with their hearts and swords.

The first Letter to a young gentleman, who, by the mediation of great friends, had obtained the grant of a considerable command in the English army, against the prevailing power of France, in the year

1678.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

DO highly approve, the resolution you have taken to serve his majesty in the wars, if any happen, it being a duty which every good subject owes him, especially the gentry, who derive all their streams of honour from that original fountain. But it may possibly seem strange, that, while all the rest of your friends are congratulating your good fortune, in the preferment proferred you, I only shew myself dissatisfied;

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I will assure you I am so far from envying your promotion, that no man living does more heartily desire it than myself; it is the reality of my friendship makes me jealous, that preferment is arrived at your port, before you are ready, before you are fit for it. It is no small or trivial matter which he undertakes who receives a commission from the king, how light soever you and other young gentlemen think of it; and I should not be worthy any place in your esteem, if I did not deal very candidly and plainly with you. And in the first place I will tell you, 'He cannot be a fit man to command, who knows not the duty of those that are to obey him.'

I doubt not but you have read books relating to war, and may understand something of the theory of it; but all the reading in the universe will not enable a man to perform well the meanest of the mechanick arts. We usually allow seven years experience for attaining the skill to make shoes, &c. and do you believe that the military science (upon the success whereof depends the safety or the ruin, the standing or falling of towns and citadels, kingdoms and empires) is to be learned amidst the softnesses and ease of courts, and rich cities, and reposing on the laps of ladies? or by the imperfect ideas of a battle, and a siege represented in a play? or at best by a little superficial reading of commentaries ? No, the art of war is to be attained by other methods and means more studious, more laborious, more manly; and, if you accept of a command at this time, it is odds that you neither efficaciously serve the king, nor yourself; not the king, for the obtaining preferments by favour, without merit, is the greatest discouragement in the world, to men of low fortunes and high spirits, and such, in times of danger, are the usefullest men to a commonwealth;' who, having served many years in the wars, and made themselves capable of the greatest offices, shall on the sudden find themselves defeated, by such young gentlemen as you; although, if you come to speedy action, you must necessarily be baffled, and disappoint his majesty's service, or else owe your success wholly to chance, for which none but fools will commend you. You cannot serve yourself, because the main thing you aim at is honour. Now you must know, they lie under a vulgar error, who think that to have a great office, or great title, is sufficient to make a man honour. able. True honour does not so much consist in possessing great offices, or great titles, as in the using those great titles, and in discharging those great offices so, as the prince may be well and faithfully served, and the publick good advanced and promoted.'

of

Which can never be done by one who wants experience, unless, as I said before, it be by chance, or by the discreeter menage of the underofficers. I will add further, that what miscarriage soever happens under you, will be imputed, right or wrong, to your want of conduct, and the credit of all good service you do, shall be carried away by those your officers who have more skill, even then when they do not deserve it. Wherefore my advice is, if you would serve your prince and your country, as becomes a good subject and a gentleman; if you would bring an addition of honour to yourself and family; 'let your advancement be the reward, rather than the obligation of your merit.' Content yourself, for a time, to serve as a private gentleman, a voluntier, and

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