it not a wretched foolish Part in us to be bufy about fmall Matters, to be earnest and unwearied in the Purfuit of little Designs, fuch as a little Wealth, or Pleasure, or the like, which, after a few Years, will fignify nothing at all to us, nor fhall we be one Jot the better for them, and to be altogether carelefs and negligent of that Affair, by which we must be concluded either the most happy, or the moft miferable, of all Creatures for ever? To fhew the extreme Folly of this kind of Temper, put the Cafe that you had nothing in the World to concern yourfelves about but only your Body, would not every one count you mad, if they saw you taking mighty Care for the cloathing or adorning fome fingle Limb, as for Inftance, your Hand or your Foot, and yet fo regardless of the reft, as to leave them quite naked and expofed to all the Inconveniencies of Wind and Weather? Or if they faw you extremely follicitous about a Scratch in your Finger, and yet altoge ther unconcerned at a deep Wound in your Side, which, without fpeedy Succour, might prove mortal to you? Why, in good earneft, every whit as foolishly and as unrea fonably do you act, when, having an im mortal Soul to provide for as well as a Body, you spend all your Care upon this, and take no Thought for the other; when you think no Pains too much for the preventing or getting rid of fome fmall temporal In

con

conveniency, that may affect your Bodies, and yet will hardly employ a Thought how you may escape the everlasting Damnation both of your Souls and Bodies in Hell-fire.

Ay, but, you will fay, there is a great deal of Difference between this Life and that other, which you talk of The one is prefent, and we are fure we must provide for the Conveniencies of it, or else we are miferable; but the other Life we know little or nothing of: however, it is at a great Distance, and therefore we cannot be prefumed to be fo immediately concerned about it, especially when fuch a Concernment will contribute nothing to our prefent Enjoyments, but will rather difturb them. Give us the prefent, and let those that will take Care of what is future.

Ay, but, my Brethren, do we act thus in other Cafes? Have we not in all the Purchases we make, in all the Cofts we lay out, nay, in all the Projects we drive on in the World; have we not, I fay, some Regard to the Time to come, as well as to the prefent? Certainly every wife Man will confider his future Condition, as well as that he is now in; and efpecially when it is fuch a Condition as he must live in for ever, and that either extremely happily, or extremely miferably; whereas the Life he now leads will be gone in a very few Years at moft: That which is now future,

will fome time be prefent, and shall we not have other Thoughts when it comes to be fo? Shall we not be of another Mind when we come to die? Shall we not then fadly reflect upon our paft Carelessnefs of Eternity, because, forfooth, it was then in Futurity? Shall we not then wish we had been lefs follicitous about our Bodies and the Affairs of this World, and more minded the Concernments of our Souls? But neither indeed is the Care of fecuring our future Happiness fo impertinent, or fo infignificant to our prefent Life, as we make it. On the contrary, it hath a mighty great Influence upon the comfortable enjoying of ourselves in this World. He that hath taken all prudent Care to fecure his eternal Eftate, muft needs lead an infinitely more eafy, peaceful, and happy Life, than they who do not. All the crofs Accidents and Misfortunes that happen to him (and God knows, no Condition of Life is free from them) are hereby fweetned and made more fupportable. He goes to his Work, and minds his worldly Bufinefs more chearfully; his Enjoyments are more fincere, and undifturbed, and free from the Allays of Bitternefs, and Grief, and Vexation: Whereas the Man that hath this great Work ftill lying upon his Hands, the very Fears and Apprehenfions of what will come upon him hereafter, (which he cannot for his Life rid himself of) will frequently difquiet

him,

him, and render his Condition, in the best of outward Circumftances, very troublefome and uneafy.

But what if this Talk of Salvation and Damnation in another World be but a mere Fable? What if there be no fuch Things, but they are only the Dreams and Fancies of melancholy People, or the Fictions of crafty Statelinen and Priefts, the better to bring People under their Government? Why should we then be at any Pains to deny ourselves any prefent Satiffaction for the Sake of them? Pray let us firft fee fome Demonftration of the Truth of thefe Things.

Tho', I hope, there are no Perfons profeffing Chriftianity, that will talk at this rate; yet it is to be feared, that there are fome, who in their Hearts do much doubt of the Truth of thofe Things we are speaking of. But to fuch Perfons, instead of offering them Demonftrations to convince them (as indeed Matters of this Nature are not capable of being demonstrated in a ftrict Senfe, tho' yet, I doubt not, there is fuch Evidence to be given for them, as, in a confidering Man, will create as full and ftrong an Affent, as if they were really demonftrable. I fay, inftead of offering them Demonstrations) I fhall only propofe a Question or two, to be feriously confidered by them, before they abandon them→

felves to a total Neglect and Unconcernednefs about their fpiritual Condition.

First, I would ask, Whether there be not fome Probability that thefe Doctrines are true, viz. that there is another Life after this; that there is a God, who will bring every Man to account for his Actions paft, and reward him, or punish him, according to his good or evil Life? Whether all the Teftimonies, drawn from the holy Scriptures, the folemn Declarations made by our Lord Jefus, who came down from Heaven to ascertain us of thefe Things, and the many Miracles he wrought for the Confirmation of them, his own vifible Refurrection from the Dead, and Afcenfion into Heaven; as likewife the many Arguments that may be drawn from the Notions of our own Minds, the Juftice of God's Providence, and the Confent of all Nations, in all Ages, and of all Religions, Jews, Turks, Pagans, as well as Chriftians: I fay, whether all thefe do not at leaft amount to a Probability that thefe Things are true? Now, if it be confeffed that thefe Things are probable, will any Man in his Wits think it reasonable to live as if he was certain there was no fuch Thing? Muft he not rather conclude, that it is really his wifeft Way to do his Endeavours to fecure his own Share of that future Happiness, and to avoid the Punishments that fhall then come upon wicked Men, fince he acknowledgeth