he be in fuch a Condition, that all his Senfes may be gratified; that he may eat and drink well; that he may have Variety of fenfual Pleafures; and that he may be free from the Fears of Want, both as to himself and his Children. And do not the Brutes enjoy themselves as much as fuch a Man in all these Respects? Have not they all these Satisfactions? There is no Doubt of it. If there be any Queftion about this, it is, whether they have not thefe Enjoyments in greater Perfection, than worldly, vicious Men have. For the Beafts are free from all thofe Anxieties, and Fears, and uncomfortable Reflexions, which oftentimes grate upon the Minds of fuch Men, even in the midst of their best and highest animal Gratifications. But now thefe Goods that are of a fpiritual Nature, do gratify the intellectual Appetites of Mankind. They are the proper Objects of thofe Powers and Faculties whereby Mankind are distinguished from Brutes. They are fuch kind of Goods, as Men (as they are Men) can only be pleased with.

What is it that we have above Brutes, but these two Things, the Power of Reafon, and the Senfe of Religion? Now how are these two Faculties perfected? What are the adequate Objects of them? Doth not the Perfection of our Reafon confift in employing our Understandings about the best Objects, and ufing our Liberty in X 3 the

the best Way? Do we not then act most reasonably, when we propose to ourselves the worthieft Ends, and fteadily pursue thofe Means which lead to thofe Ends, and when we keep all our inferior Appetites, common to us with the Brutes, under due Regulation and Government? But what is all this but another Name for Virtue? And further, What is it that that Sense of Religion, which Nature hath endowed us with above brute Creatures, doth put us upon In what way is that to be exercised? Doth it not confift in performing Acts of Worfhip, and Praife, and Adoration to the Supreme Being, in acknowledging, in loving, in depending upon him, who gives us whatever we enjoy, and having a conftant Senfe of his Prefence, and Power, and Goodnefs? So that to employ ourselves in these kinds of Things, to study them, to be daily converfant in them, to make them the Business of our Lives, is the only Evidence we can give that we live like Men: That we look upon ourselves as placed in a higher Rank of Beings, than the Beafts: That we put our rational Natures to that Ufe, that by their very Make and Conftitution they were defigned to be

put to.

And however it be, that the Pleafure and Satisfaction which arife from these Things, viz. Virtue and Religion, do not make fo great a Noife, nay, perhaps, may feem very flat and infipid to those who are

unac

unacquainted with them; yet, I am certain, there is none, who hath ever made Tryal of them, but is abundantly convinced that they far tranfcend all the Gratifications of Senfe in the World. That to ferve God, and to keep a good Confcience, and to govern our Paffions, and to live foberly, and righteously, and godly, yields infinitely more Peace, and Pleasure, and Satisfaction to a Man's Mind, than the happieft outward Condition, the moft profperous Succeffes of our worldly Defigns. And indeed, in the Reason of the Thing, it must be thus: Forafmuch as the higher and nobler the Faculties are, so much the more exquifitely delightful must be their Satisfaction. So many Degrees therefore as Reafon and Understanding are above Senfe, fo many Degrees proportionably must Virtue and Goodnefs, which are their proper Objects, exceed all fenfible Enjoyments.

And thus much of the fifth Confideration. The Sum of what I have hitherto

faid, comes to this, that if either you will chufe a Certainty, before an Uncertainty; or that which is eafy to be come by, before that which is difficult; or that which is really and indifputably good, good at all Times, and in all Circumftances, before that which it is doubtful whether it be good or no; or that Good which you can call your own, before that which is at the Mercy of a thoufand Accidents every Day; or, laftly,

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laftly, that Good, which is the highest and nobleft which our Natures are capable of, before that which is mean and low, and which the Beafts of the Field have as much a Share in as Mankind: I fay, if you will proceed in your Choice by any of thefe Measures, then we muft certainly prevail upon you to follow St. Paul's Advice in the Text, you must fet your Affection on the Things above, and not on the Things on the Earth.

But to convince you further of the absolute Neceffity of fo doing, if you have any Regard to your own Interefts, there are two Confiderations more to be laid before you, which are of greater Weight than all that has been hitherto reprefented; tho' I can but juft name them to you, not haveing now Time left to inlarge upon them.

VI. When the Competition lies between two Things, which of them we fhould afford the uppermoft Place in our Efteem and Affection, and the greateft Share of our Care and Pains for the Acquifition of them, and it is made apparent to us that the one of them is fo abfolutely neceffary to our Happiness in this World, that, if we have it not, we fhall neceffarily be miserable; but the other doth fo little contribute to our Happiness, that we may do very well without it, at leaft we may do very well with fuch a Share of it, as we may certainly promife

promise to ourselves, if we do take Care to fecure the other: I fay, in this Cafe, who can avoid the preferring the former, and pitching upon it for our main End, rather than the latter. And yet truly thus ftands the Cafe between the Things of the Earth, and the Things above. Spiritual Things, viz. Virtue and Piety, and the like, are fuch Goods, that without them it is impoffible for a Man to be tolerably happy in this World, let his other Circumstances be never fo profperous. Tho' a Man had Succefs in all his temporal Defigns, even according to his own Heart's Defire; tho' he was poffeffed of every Good that this World can afford him; yet fuch is the Frame of human Nature, and fuch likewife is the Constitution of Things in this World, that for all this the Man would not be eafy; nay, as to many Periods of his Life, he would be very miferable, if devoid of Virtue and Goodness, and the Fear of God: Whereas on the other fide, whoever is poffeffed of thefe, whoever is truly good, and makes it his main Business to ferve and to please God, fuch a Man, for the most part, enjoys as much Happiness as the World can give: However, he can never be miferable, let Things happen to him as they will. If it please God to bestow upon him the commom outward Comforts and Conveniencies of Life (as of all others

fuch a

Man