against thofe Rules that he himself in all other Cafes proceeds by, who fets his Affections on the Things of the Earth, and doth not make it the main Bufinefs of his Life to ferve God, to get virtuous Habits, and by that means to fecure his fpiritual and eternal Interefts. Now for the makeing this good, there needs no more than to lay thefe following Things before you.

I. First of all: When two Things are proposed to our Choice, we use to confider which of them we have moft in our Power, which of them we are in the likelieft Way to attain to if we fet about it. Now fuppofing thofe Things to be equally good, and equally defirable, yet, if we can certainly fay of one of them, this Good I am fure to make mine own, if I will ufe my Endeavour for the obtaining it, but cannot fay the fame of the other Thing, this alone is enough to determine a confidering Man to which of thofe two Goods he is to give the Preference in his Choice. There is no Doubt, but, all other Things equal, every wife Man will reject that which he is uncertain whether he fhall obtain or no, and apply himself to that which he is certain he may obtain if he pleases.

Let this now be applied to our present Cafe. Here are, on one hand, the Things of the World, viz. Wealth, Honours, Pleafures, and abundance of other fuch Things,

as

as tend to make our outward Condition easy, and happy, and profperous; and these do tempt us to lay out ourselves upon them. Here are, on the other hand, Virtue and Piety, and the eternal Happiness that is confequent upon them; and thefe do likewife invite us to make them our principal Aim. We will fuppofe at this Time both thefe Things to be equally good, and equally to recommend themselves to our Choice (and thus much at least we may be allowed to fuppofe.) The Question therefore is, to which of thefe Two we will chiefly direct our Sudy and Purfuit? I fay, if we will be governed by the foregoing Rule, we shall of Neceffity refolve upon these latter, because they are certainly in our Power; but the former are not. No Man can fay before-hand, I am fure Ifball compass fuch an Eftate that I aim at, or attain to fuch Preferments which are in my Eye, or be fuccessful in this or the other Defign of Pleafure that I propofe to myself. But every Man in the World may fay, I am certain I may be good, if I have a Mind. I am certain that I may live righteously, and foberly, and religiously, if I pleafe. And if I do fo, I am equally certain that God will take me to his Mercy and Favour both here and hereafter. And the Reason is clear ; the former Things depend upon a hundred accidental Circumftances, none of which are at our Command. Abundance of Things,

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Things, which we never dream'd of, come between us and our Designs of that Nature; nay, tho' thofe Defigns were as well laid, and as carefully managed, as the Wit of Man can devife; and this the Experience of the World doth every Day make good. But now the other fort of Things; to be temperate, and charitable, and chafte, and devout, to furnish our Souls with all the virtuous Habits that will recommend us to God's Favour, these are not subject to such Contingencies; they depend only upon ourfelves and the Grace of God. No outward Agent, no cross Pofture of Circumftances, can defeat our Labours and Endeavours after them. We may undoubtedly, if we pleafe, intend them fincerely, and pursue them induftrioufly; and if we do fo, we may undoubtedly expect the Grace of God to further and affift us; (for he hath folemnly promised it) and if fo, what Thing is there in the World that can render our Designs ineffectual?

II. But fuppofing the Things above and the Things on Earth were equally in our Power, (which you fee they are not :) Suppofing that every Man may be as certain of fucceeding in all his worldly Defigns, as in thofe relating to his Soul; yet which of thefe will require the greater Pains? Which of thefe Ends can be ferv'd with moft Eafe, and with the leaft Difficulty?

culty? This is another Thing, which, when two Defigns, different from each other, are proposed to us, we ufually enquire after, before we fix upon either. And furely, if the Difference between them lies in nothing elfe but this, all the World will agree, that that Good, which is moft eafily come by, is to be preferr'd before that which cannot be had without more Pains and Difficulty. Now let us examine, whether upon this Account, as well as the former, the Goods of our Souls do not much more recommend themselves to our Choice and Pursuit, than thofe of the Body. And for the adjufting of this, we need only ask thefe Questions. Which of the Two will require more Skill and Application of Mind? Which of the Two will engage us in more Labour and Toil of Body? And which of the Two will take up more of our Time for the compaffing of them?

1. Now as to the Degree of Skill required to the fuccefsful Profecution of the one or the other, there is no Comparison between them. Virtue and Goodness, every body knows, are fimple Things, and the Way to them lies plain and even before

us.

There needs no great Depth of Parts, no Shrewdness and Subtlety of Understanding, no curious Plots and Contrivances for the attaining of them. Every one hath Skill enough to be virtuous, if he bring but a good Will to it: nor is any Man ever

at

at a Lofs what Course to take, what Methods to follow, for the bringing about his Purpose. In this Cafe, Honefty and Sincerity of Heart is all that is required. But it is quite otherwise with our Worldly Defigns; for the compaffing them there is need of a great deal of Art. Every Man is not presently fit to go about them. Abundance of Cunning is required to the dextrous Management of them. A Man muft bend his Brains to them, as well as his Inclinations. He muft ftudy, and think, and contrive, and tofs Things in his Head a hundred Ways, and all this little enough for the putting his Business into any Forwardnefs. Nay, and oftentimes when he hath done all this, he will still stick in the Briers, and be at a Lofs which Way to go on. Nor is it thus only with the greater and more difficult Defigns of human Life, fuch as the Attainment of Power, and Dignity, and Riches, but almoft every petty Project that a Man bufies himself about. As the Things of the World go, the ma naging of a very trivial Bufinefs, or the profecuting fome very inconfiderable Defign, doth fufficiently exercife a Man's Wit and Invention, and he finds Difficulty enough in going thro' it. So that in this refpect the Things above have certainly the Advantage of the Things on the Earth, viz. in Point of Eafinefs of Acquifition.