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The COURT having directed the case to stand over till this day, the Chief Justice now said, the Court thought it would not be safe to establish the precedent of altering a fiat, which was matter of record, without something to guide them in making the amendment. Whereupon Mr. Richards took the order directing a new fiat to issue.

1832.

Ex parte

TODD.

Ex parte PAGE.--In the matter of HILL. MR. Montagu applied, on behalf of the petitioner, a married woman, for leave to substitute a new trustee in

March 12.

Substitution of

a new trustee,

where the former

one becomes

the place of the former one, who had become bankrupt. bankrupt.
The facts were, that the bankrupt was trustee for his
wife of a fund to which she only was entitled; and it
was proposed to substitute the bankrupt's son, with
liberty for him to prove under the commission, and
receive the dividends, without any reference to the
Master, the fund being too small to bear the expense
of such a proceeding; and he cited Ex parte Inker-
sole (a).

The COURT, on referring to the 6 Geo. 4. c. 16. s. 79. granted the order as prayed (b).

(a) 2 G. & J. 230.

(b) And see post, Ex parte Vine.

VOL. I.

1832.

Southampton
Buildings,
March 12.

Where an assig

nee, on being

chosen, accepts

the office, he can only retire, on payment of

the costs occa

sioned by his removal.

Ex parte WATTS.-In the matter of HENFREY. THE petitioner in this case had been appointed, and had accepted the office of, assignee of the bankrupt's estate; and he now prayed, that he might be permitted to retire from that office, and that a new choice might be directed to take place; and that it might be left in the discretion of the Commissioner, whether the petitioner should pay the costs of this application, and of the new choice; or, if the Court thought he ought to pay the costs of this application, then that the costs occasioned by the new choice might in like manner be left to the discretion of the Commissioner.

The COURT held, that an assignee, having taken upon himself the office, could only retire, on paying all the costs occasioned by his removal; and that there was no reason in this case, why the estate should be burthened with any part of this expense.

The petition was consequently dismissed (a).

(a) See Ex parte James, ante, 273, n. (a).

Southampton
Buildings,
March 13.

Though the ap-
pearance of a

party is wholly

unnecessary, yet if he is served with notice of an intended application to the

Ex parte REID.-In the matter of MILLS.

THE question of costs in the matter of this petition (b) had been directed to stand over. One of the parties,

who was not concerned in that question, had been served with notice of its coming on this day to be heard,

(b) See ante, 249.

Court, he is entitled to his costs of appearance. But if he makes affidavits which are unnecessary, he must pay the costs occasioned thereby.

and had filed very long affidavits,-which, as he was not liable to the costs of the petition, were therefore wholly unnecessary. The party, however, who had served him, had taken office copies of the affidavits; and the question now arose, who was to pay the costs of these affidavits.

The COURT determined that, though his appearance was altogether unnecessary, yet having been served with notice, he was entitled to his costs of appearance. But with regard to the affidavits,-inasmuch as the other side could not know whether they were material or not, without taking office copies of them, they were therefore justified in taking such copies; and the affidavits proving wholly unnecessary, the Court directed the party filing them to pay the costs occasioned thereby.

1832.

Ex parte REID.

Ex parte GODING and MORRIS.-In the matter of
JAMES CROW EASLING.

THIS was a petition by assignees, stating, that the
bankrupt, who had kept a public-house called "The
Black Prince," had deposited the lease of the house
with Messrs. Calvert & Co., as a security for 14007.

advanced by them to him. The lease, goods, and fixtures had been valued by an appraiser at 8007., which the petitioners considered the full value, and more by 1007. than the same would fetch if put up to sale by public auction. Messrs. Calvert & Co. had offered to take the lease at 7007., and the goods and fixtures at 2007. more; the adoption of which offer, the

Southampton
Buildings,
March 14.

The Court will

not sanction a

sale of the bankrupt's pro

perty by private contract, with

out a previous

reference to the

Commissioners.

1832.

Ex parte
GODING

and another.

petitioners conceived, would be most beneficial to the general estate of the bankrupt. The petitioners therefore prayed, that they might be authorized to accept this offer of Messrs. Calvert & Co.

Mr. Blunt for the petition.

The COURT held, that it could not sanction a sale by private contract, without a reference to the Commissioners, to ascertain if such a mode of disposing of the bankrupt's property would be beneficial; and therefore directed the usual reference, to inquire whether it would be for the benefit of the bankrupt's estate, to dispose of the lease to Messrs. Calvert & Co., upon the terms proposed in the petition.

Lincoln's Inn
Hall, coram

Lord Chancellor

Ex parte BENSON.

In the matter

Exparte LANCASTER CANAL COMPANY. Sof DILWORTH. and Ex parte LANGSTON.--In the matter of HARDY. Vice-Chancellor, February 18. Ex parte ELSEE.-In the matter of JOYNER.

The Court of Review has no jurisdiction to

THESE petitions were brought on for argument hear a petition together, by the direction of the Lord Chancellor; a of appeal to the preliminary question having arisen in the discussion of each of them, with respect to the continuance of the Vice-Chancel Lord Chancellor's jurisdiction in bankruptcy subselor; nor a peti

Lord Chancel

lor from an

order of the

tion for the rehearing of a petition of appeal already heard by the Lord Chancellor; nor a cross petition of appeal to the Lord Chancellor, complaining of a particular part of the order of the Vice-Chancellor.

But it has jurisdiction to hear a petition to the Lord Chancellor for confirming the Master's report, where the Lord Chancellor had made an order on a previous petition, referring the matters therein to the Master;-or a supplemental petition of appeal to the Lord Chancellor from an order of the Vice-Chancellor, where such petition is upon new grounds, which were not brought forward by the original petition, or by the petition of appeal ;;---or a petition to the Lord Chancellor, praying only consequential directions on one part of an order made by the Vice-Chancellor, against which no petition of appeal had been presented.

quently to the 11th January 1882, the day on which the new Bankruptcy Court Act (1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 56.) came into operation. The circumstances under which these several petitions came before the Court were different, raising the point of jurisdiction somewhat differently in each particular case. They are, however, so minutely and accurately detailed in the judgment of his Honor the Vice-Chancellor, that it is unnecessary here to specify them. His Honor was on this occasion called in to the assistance of the Lord Chancellor, when the question of jurisdiction was elaborately discussed before them by

Sir William Horne, S. G., Sir Edward Sugden, Mr. Montagu, Mr. Duckworth, Mr. Jacob, Mr. Geldart, and Mr. Booth, who were heard at great length for the various parties interested. The general line of argument adopted by the counsel was similar to that which was resorted to in the Court of Review, where the same subject came under discussion in the case of Ex parte Lowe, in the matter of Aaron (a), which is reported in the first number of the present volume.

At the close of the argument the Lord Chancellor said, that as the question was one of some nicety, and also of great importance, in regard to a number of petitions of appeal from the Vice-Chancellor, which were now pending, and waiting for a hearing till the decision upon these petitions should be known,-and as it was highly desirable that all doubts upon the point should be finally set at rest,-the Court would take time to consider its judgment.

(a) See ante, p. 79.

1832.

Ex parte BENSON and others.

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