the crown, or a charity; and he may also prosecute an information for the king, though not if it is to procure any benefit for himself. One difficulty has struck my mind, which I do not know well how to reconcile, and it is this, that though an outlaw in a civil suit may be examined as a witness, he is prevented from acting as a juror (a). I have before observed, that this is a case of considerable doubt; but when we contrast the personal liberty of the subject on the one hand, and the doubt as to the application of a severe law on the other, I think the latter should certainly give way, and I therefore agree that the petitioner ought to be discharged. His Honor Sir J. CROSS.-As the Chief Justice has delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court, I have only to say, that I entirely agree in the opinion he has expressed. His Honor Sir G. Rose. also concurred. Mr. Koe then urged,-in regard to the question of costs that the Court had decided that the petitioner had been wrongfully arrested, and was entitled to be discharged, and yet had ordered him to pay the costs himself; for such might be the effect of the order, as it was possible that his estate might yield a surplus. He submitted, that the officer who arrested him, and the solicitor who directed the arrest, should pay the costs; or, at any rate, that the matter should stand over, without prejudice, till they could be heard. (a) The reason why an outlaw is deemed incapable of serving on a jury, with great deference to the learned Judge, appears to be sufficiently obvious. A man must be possessed of certain property in order to qualify him as a juror ; but an outlaw can have no property whatever, until his outlawry is reversed. 1832. Ex parte 1832. Ex parte His Honor the CHIEF JUDGE.-We have relieved the officer from the liability of costs without hearing him, and have thrown the charge of them on the estate, as it was for the benefit of the assignees and creditors that the petitioner was in attendance. We consider this application as if made by them, for if it were for the benefit of the party himself, he would have no locus standi in Curiâ. Order made accordingly for the discharge of the petitioner, and that the costs (a) of the petition should be paid out of the estate, the bankrupt undertaking to bring no action. (a) With respect to the question of costs, it was held by Lord Eldon, in Ex parte Woods, 1 Rose, 46, 18 Ves. 1, which was a similar case of a sheriff's officer arresting a bankrupt during his protection, that the costs must be paid by the officer. In every case of privilege," his Lordship says, " and more particularly in that of a bankrupt, parties guilty of a violation of it must abide by the consequences: the bankrupt must, at the costs of the officer, be put in the situation he was in before the arrest." Westminster Hall. January 20. cellor has no jurisdiction to hear an original 1 & 2 W. 4. c. 56. Coram Lord Chancellor. Ex parte LowE, in the matter of AARON. The Lord Chan- A PETITION for a supersedeas had been heard before the Vice-Chancellor, and dismissed upon a prepetition in bank- liminary objection. A petition of appeal was then ruptcy since the presented to the Lord Chancellor, praying him to rehear the matter, and that the order of the ViceChancellor might be discharged; which last petition had been answered in the usual way by the Lord Chancellor, before whom the parties were directed to attend on the next day of petitions, which was on the 10th January, 1832, the day previous to that in which the new Bankruptcy Court Act came into operation. Before the petition of appeal could be brought on for hearing, the new Judges of the Court of Bankruptcy had begun to exercise their functions; and the parties being desirous to know whether they were to hear this petition before his Lordship, or the new Judges, Mr. Twiss accordingly requested to have his Lordship's directions as to the tribunal before which the matter was to be brought on. Lord BROUGHAM, C.-I have no doubt whatever upon the question. The authority of the new Judges is exclusive. I have no control or authority whatever over them, except what the act of parliament gives me, namely, to hear appeals from their decisions in the precise manner pointed out by the act. I have come to this conclusion, not without due deliberation, nor without competent advice. The new Judges have the authority out and out, and I have good reason to believe it was intended by the legislature that they should have that authority. It is therefore clear, in my opinion, that the petition alluded to must be removed to the Court of Review, and heard by the Judges there. I shall make, however, no order upon the subject. All that I state decisively is, that I have no jurisdiction in the matter now submitted to me. The parties, therefore, must look into the act of parliament, and be guided by its provisions (a). (a) The same point as to the jurisdiction was shortly after this decision argued more fully before the Lord Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor, by the Solicitor General, Sir Edward Sugden, and Mr. Montagu, in Ex parte Langston, re Gardner, Ex parte Benson, re Dilworth, and Ex parte Ward, re Austin, in Lincoln's Inn Hall, on February 18th, 1832, when an order was made directly the reverse of the opinion above expressed. 1832. Ex parte 1832. January 21. Ex parte SAY, in the matter of THORNTON. Costs of applica- THIS was a petition by a mortgagee of premises mort tion of mort gagee to bid at gaged by the bankrupt, and which had been ordered the sale, ordered to be paid out of to be sold, praying for leave to bid at the sale, and that the proceeds. the costs of the application might be ordered to be paid out of the proceeds of such sale. Mr. Wood appeared in support of the petition, and cited the case of Ex parte Marsh, 1 Madd. 148, in support of the application. He admitted, however, that in Ex parte Robinson, Mont. & M.261, the application for costs was refused (a). Mr. Patteson appeared for the assignees to consent that the mortgagee might bid at the sale; and as he did not oppose the application for costs, The Court, after some hesitation as to the costs, granted the order as prayed, observing, that it was evidently for the interest of the bankrupt's estate that there should be as many bidders as possible. The Court desired also it might be understood, that in all cases coming before them the Judges would endeavour to adhere to the present practice in bankruptcy. (a) See also Ex parte Hammond, Buck, 464. January 23. Where an as signee is re Ex parte FALAR, in the matter of ANDREWS. THIS was a petition of the petitioning creditor for the moved, and ano- removal of one of the assignees under the commission, ther appointed, there is no need on the ground of his having absconded and become insolvent. It stated that he had left his residence in Catherine Street in the Strand, without paying rent or taxes, and that he had ceased to occupy the premises since April, 1830; that he had never been heard of since, but it was believed he was in Ireland. The petition therefore prayed, that the creditors might proceed to elect another assignee in his stead. Mr. Jacob, in support of the petition, observed that the only difficulty was, as to whether it was necessary to vacate the old assignment, and execute a new assignment to the remaining assignee and the one to be so chosen; or whether the new act of 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 56, s. 25 rendered such a proceeding unnecessary (a), and vested the estate in the new assignee, without any fresh assignment. The Court were of opinion, that there was no necessity for any fresh assignment, and that the intention of the act was to save the expense of an assignment in all cases. The order was made accordingly for the choice of a new assignee, and for the payment of the costs of the application out of the estate. (a) The words of the 25th section are," When any person hath been adjudged a bankrupt, all his personal estate and effects, present and future, which by the laws now in force may be assigned by commissioners acting in the execution of a commission against such bankrupt, shall become absolutely vested in and transferred to the assignees or assiguee for the time being, by virtue of their appointment, without any deed of assignment for that purpose, as fully to all intents as if such estate and effects were assigned by deed to such assignees and the survivor of them and as often as any such assignee shall die, or be lawfully removed, and a new assignee duly appointed, all such personal estate as was then vested in such deceased or removed assignee, shall by virtue of such appointment vest in the new assignee, either alone or jointly with the existing assignees, as the case may require, without any deed of assignment for that purpose." : 1832. Ex parte |