authorized, under this evidence, to draw the inference that these payments were made after the institution of said suits against Peace & Son, in which said Wyatt was garnished, and the proof fails to show that Wyatt made any payments after the notice of the alleged insolvency or failing condition of Peace & Son, of which, it is contended, such proceedings gave notice to Wyatt. No personal judgment or decree can be rendered against Wyati on this evidence. 6. No personal decree is prayed against H. V. Peace, except for any payments that may have been made to him by Mrs. Wyatt on the notes transferred to him within the amount of complainants' debt. It is not shown that he ever received a dollar on the notes. The prayer as to these notes is, that "said notes to I. G. Wyatt be decreed to be void and for nothing held." 7. It may be added that the proofs submitted do not show that Peace & Son were insolvent at the date of the filing of the bill, nor when they sold out to Mrs. Wyatt. They sold, as has been seen, for between $S50 and $900, making no sale of their book accounts and choses in action, amounting to between $1,500 and $1,700. It is true the complainants offered in evidence several judgments which were recovered against them in 1892. It was agreed between the parties, in respect to the transcript of judgments offered in evidence, that they did not show they were valid or subsisting judgments or causes of action against the defendants, or 26 that such judgments had been paid in whole or in part. A judgment is conclusive evidence of the existence of a debt at the date of its rendition, but is not evidence against strangers that it existed at any time anterior thereto: Lawson v. Alabama Warehouse Co., 73 Ala. 289; Yeend v. Weeks, 104 Ala. 331; 53 Am. St. Rep. 50; Troy v. Smith, 33 Ala. 471. Outside of these judgments, the proofs do not satisfactorily establish the insolvency of said Peace & Son. 8. There was a receiver appointed in the case, and the decree dismisses the bill without requiring him to report and settle his account. The bill should not have been dismissed without requiring him to settle. The dismissal will be set aside, and the decree corrected to the extent of requiring the receiver to file his written report in the court below, within ten days after being notified of this order, showing what property or money he has received, in order that his receivership may be finally settled, and as thus corrected, the decree of the court below is affirmed. The clerk will cause a copy of this order to be served on the receiver. Corrected, affirmed in part, and remanded in part. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-NOTICE BY GRANTEE OF GRANTOR'S FRAUDULENT INTENT-BURDEN OF PROOF.A sale made to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is, as to them, absolutely void: Mason v. Vestal, 88 Cal. 396; 22 Am. St. Rep. 310; also, extended note to Hagerman v. Buchanan, 14 Am. St. Rep. 747. But it must be proven that the purchaser had notice of such facts tending to show a fraudulent purpose on the part of the grantor, as would put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry, and that the purchaser participated in such purpose: Edwards v. Reid, 39 Neb. 645; 42 Am. St. Rep. 607. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-GRANTOR'S INSOLVENCY -PREFERENCE OF CREDITORS.-When a preference is given by an insolvent debtor to one or more creditors who receive goods in satisfaction of bona fide debts, actual participation in the fraud is necessary to render the acceptance of the goods fraudulent: State v. Mason, 112 Mo. 374; 34 Am. St. Rep. 390, and extended note; Sabin v. Columbia Fuel Co., 25 Or. 15; 42 Am. St. Rep. 756, and note. As to what is sufficient notice to grantee of grantor's insolvency, see Bush v. Boutelle, 156 Mass. 167, 32 Am. St. Rep. 442, and note to State v. Mason, 34 Am. St. Rep. 390. JUDGMENTS AS EVIDENCE OF DEBT.-A judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the regular course of judicial proceedings, without fraud or collusion, is conclusive evidence of the amount and existence of a debt existing at the time of its rendition: Wooten v. Steele, 109 Ala. 563; 55 Am. St. Rep. 947; though it is not evidence of an indebtedness existing at any time anterior to its rendition: Yeend v. Weeks, 104 Ala. 331; 53 Am. St. Rep. 50, and note. CREDITORS' SUITS-APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER-RECEIVER'S DUTIES.-As to when a court of equity will appoint a receiver in creditor's suits, see Albany etc. Co. v. Southern etc. Works, 76 Ga. 135; 2 Am. St. Rep. 26. As to the duties of a receiver thus appointed, see Heffron v. Rice, 149 Ill. 216; 41 Am. St. Rep. 271, PEET V. HATCHER. [112 ALABAMA, 514.] CONTRACTS AS TO THEIR VALIDITY are governed by the laws of the state wherein they are to be performed. EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS.-THE COMMON LAW is not presumed to exist in the state of Louisiana. EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS-COMMON LAW.-In states having a common origin or populated by citizens coming from states having a common origin, the common law is presumed to exist. EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION-COMMON LAW.-If there is no proof of the law of another state nor judicial knowledge of the origin of such state, such as raises the presumption that. the common law prevails there, it is presumed that the law of the forum in which the issue is being tried is the law of that state on the question under consideration. CONFLICT OF LAWS.-If a contract made in a state or country wherein the common law is not presumed to exist is sought to be enforced in the courts of another state, and the lex loci is not produced, the law of the latter state must be applied. CONTRACTS-BY WHAT LAW GOVERNED.-A contract made and to be performed in the same state is governed by the law of that state as to its nature, obligation, and Interpretation. CONFLICT OF LAWS-LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE WHEN NOT CONSIDERED.-The supreme court of one state will not look into the codes and opinions of the supreme court of another state to ascertain what the law of that state is, unless such opinions and code provisions are set out in the bill of exceptions or properly presented by the transcript on appeal. CONTRACTS-VALIDITY-DEALING IN FUTURES.-At common law, contracts founded on dealings in "futures" are void; but if such a contract is made by a broker who has no interest therein except to realize his commissions, which are payable in any event, the principal is bound to reimburse the broker for advances made by him, if he subsequently executes his note or bill therefor, or makes a promise to pay them, or, with full knowledge of the facts, without objection, permits the transaction to proceed, unless a stat ute makes such contracts absolutely void. CONTRACTS-VALIDITY-DEALING IN FUTURES-CONFLICT OF LAWS.-A contract of dealing in "futures" made and to be performed in another state, where it is valid, may be enforced in a state where it is forbidden by statute and contrary to its public policy. JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA—EVIDENCE OF CONSID ERATION.-If a note is given to close an account which is subse quently sued on, a recovery on the account establishes the validity of its consideration and of the consideration of the note, and if a subsequent suit is brought in equity to foreclose a mortgage given to secure such note, the validity of its consideration is res judicata, and no other or further defenses as to the validity of the debt are open than could be made if the action were one at law upon the debt. JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA-VALIDITY OF CONSIDERATION.-A judgment and recovery upon a gambling contract establishes the validity of the consideration as between the parties to the action, and precludes inquiry into such consideration by a court of equity, although no reason is shown why the defense was not made at law. JUDGMENTS OF OTHER STATES-CONCLUSIVENESS.A judgment rendered in one state has the same effect and is as conclusive in any other state where brought into controversy as it has or is in the state where rendered. JUDGMENTS OF OTHER STATES-WHEN CONCLUSIVE If a judgment obtained in one state has the same effect and is afterward sued and recovered upon in another in a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, the latter judgment is conclusive of the validity of the consideration of the former judgment, and is enforceable in the latter state, although by the statute of the former state judgments obtained upon such contracts are void, and may, in any proceeding seeking their enforcement, be annulled by proof of the nature of the consideration. Norman & Son, for the appellants. Thornton & Chilton, Peabody, Brannon & Hatcher, and J. W. Foster, for the appellee. 518 HEAD, J. This is a bill filed by the appellants to foreclose a mortgage executed by the appellee, B. T. 519 Hatcher, and his wife, to one C. P. Ellis, on the twenty-sixth day of June, 1885, on certain lands therein described, situate in Russell county, Alabama, to secure a note executed by him to the said Ellis, in the sum of ten thousand dollars, payable on the first day of November, 1885. In the fall of 1883, the complainants, Peet & Co., were cotton brokers in the city of New Orleans, engaged in buying and selling cotton futures, for customers, on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, of which they were members. They operated for stipulated commissions of so much per bale, and made advances for their customers, to keep up their contracts, when so agreed upon. Said C. P. Ellis was then the agent of Peet & Co. Respondent, B. T. Hatcher, was a cotton warehouseman, residing and doing business in the city of Columbus, Georgia. At the time mentioned, fall of 1883, Ellis and Hatcher met in Columbus and an arrangement was made between them, by which Peet & Co. were to buy cotton futures for Hatcher in New Orleans, and make advances for him when necessary to keep up his contracts. Accordingly, the purchases began, and continued until the latter part of 1885. When the note and mortgage in controversy were executed, June 26, 1885, if the then existing contracts had been closed, Hatcher was largely in arrears to Peet & Co., for commissions and advances; and he being about to depart for Europe, on an extended business trip, Peet & Co. desired security for the present arrearages, and to cover future losses which might develop during his absence in Europe-a continuation of the business of buying being contemplated. Ellis visited Columbus to attend to the matter, and thereupon this note and mortgage were executed to afford the desired security. The note was at once indorsed by Ellis, and, with the mortgage, was delivered by him to Peet & Co., on his return to New Orleans. The business relations between the parties continued, as we have said, until the latter part of the year 1885, when it was ascertained that Hatcher's indebtedness amounted to over $17,000. It is attempted to be maintained, as a defense to the present bill, that the execution of the note and mortgage was a private transaction between Hatcher and Ellis, had upon consideration. of a personal loan of $10,000 then made by Ellis to the former, in 520 the shape of a check for that sum drawn by Ellis in Hatcher's favor, on Peet & Co., which it was agreed by Ellis that Peet & Co. would honor and place the amount to his, Hatcher's, credit on their books; that the check was given and forwarded to Peet & Co., who failed to give credit for the amount; wherefore, it is contended that the consideration of the note and mortgage failed. This defense finds no satisfactory sup port in the evidence. It is shown to our entire satisfaction that the use of Ellis' name in the papers, and the drawing of the check by him, were suggested either by Ellis or Hatcher (whose respective accounts of the matter are given in their depositions), and were observed as a mere form. Hatcher's account is, substantially, that Ellis suggested it to conceal the gambling nature of the transaction. Ellis says Hatcher suggested it to prevent injury to his credit, he supposing that such injury might follow a general public knowledge that he was dealing so largely in cotton speculations, which fact would be indicated by the use of the names of New Orleans cotton brokers. It is immaterial to determine which of these versions is the correct one, for the result is the same under either. The evidence leaves no reasonable doubt that there was, at the time, no thought or intention, on the part of either, of a personal loan of $10,000, or any other sum, by Ellis to Hatcher, but that the securities were executed for the sole use and benefit of Peet & Co., upon the consideration we have stated. We would reach this conclusion upon the answers to the bill and testimony of Hatcher alone. The defense mainly relied on is that the dealings between Hatcher and Peet & Co. were gambling transactions, such as the courts will not enforce. It is pleaded and insisted that those transactions were governed by the laws of Georgia, where the arrangement under which they were had was entered into by Hatcher and Ellis, the latter acting for Peet & Co., by force of which laws the contracts made in the purchase of cotton were wagers and void. It is settled by the decision of this court in Hawley v. Bibb, 69 Ala. 52, in a case precisely like the present, except that the dealings were on the New York instead of the New Orleans Exchange, that the contract under which the cotton dealings were to be had, as to its validity, was governed by the laws of the 521 state wherein it was to be performed-in that case, the state of New York; and as the statutes of that state were not pleaded and introduced, it was held that the validity of the contract was to be determined by the principles of the common law, which were presumed to obtain in the state of New York. But we do not presume the existence of the common law in the state of Louisiana. It is only those states having a common origin with our own, or populated by citizens coming from states having such common origin, that the presumption of the existence of the common law therein obtains here: 1 Brickell's Digest, sec. 9, p. 349; 3 Brickell's Digest, sec. 1, p. 122; Drake v. Glover, |