indebtedness of a single member thereof against whom a writ is issued is contested, and the proceeding may result in his favor. There are cases holding, therefore, that under an attachment against one member of a firm, its assets cannot be seized and taken into the possession of the attaching officer: Morrison v. Blodgett, 8 N. H. 238; 29 Am. Dec. 653; Dow v. Sayward, 14 N. H. 1; Newman v. Bean, 21 N. H. 93; Treadwell v. Brown, 43 N. H. 290; and in the later of these cases it was held sufficient for the officer to do some significant act indicative of his purpose to attach the interest of the defendant In the firm property, but that the attachment could not be levied by merely summoning the other partner as a trustee. Notwithstanding the seizing of the property of the partnership under a writ of attachment against one of its members only must usually operate with greater hardship than a like seizing under a writ of execution, we have not been able to discover any case making a distinction in this respect between the two writs, and, in the absence of special statutes upon the subject, we must accept the rules applicable to the levy of writs of execution as equally applicable to the levy of writs of attachment: Cogswell v. Wilson, 17 Or. 31; Randall v. Johnson, 13 R. I. 338; Trafford v. Hubbard, 15 R. I. 326; Reed v. Shepardson, 2 Vt. 120; 19 Am. Dec. 697; Graden v. Turner, 15 Wash.

136.

Possession Which may be Taken Under the Writ.-The decided weight of authority, in the absence of any statutory enactment upon the subject, is to the effect that an officer seeking to levy a writ of attachment against a member of a firm may take exclusive possession of the chattels of the firm, and retain them, at least, until the day of the sale: Andrews v. Keith, 34 Ala. 722; Clark v. Cushing, 52 Cal. 617; Wright v. Ward, 65 Cal. 525; Davis v. White, 1 Houst. 228; Newhall v. Buckingham, 14 Ill. 405; White v. Jones, 38 Ill. 159; Branch v. Wiseman, 51 Ind. 3; Williams v. Lewis, 115 Ind. 45; 7 Am. St. Rep. 403; Hershfield v. Claflin, 25 Kan. 166; 37 Am. Rep. 237; Hacker v. Johnson, 66 Me. 21; Fogg v. Lowry, 68 Me. 78; 28 Am. Rep. 19; People's Bank v. Shryock, 48 Md. 427; 30 Am. Rep. 476; Barrett v. McKenzie, 24 Minn. 20; Atkins v. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 195; Smith v. Orser, 42 N. Y. 132; Nixon v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647; 80 Am. Dec 390; Place Sweetzer 18 Ohio, 142; Randall v. Johnson, 13 R. I. 338; Trafford v. Hubbard, 15 R. I. 326; Saunders v. Bartlett, 12 Heisk. 317; De Forest v. Miller, 42 Tex. 34; Reed v. Shepardson, 2 Vt. 120; 19 Am. Dec. 697; Graden v. Turner, 15 Wash. 136; United States v. Williams, 4 McLean, 236; Stewart v. Moore, 1 Handy, 22; Bachurst v. Clinkard, 1 Show. 173; Mayhew v. Herrick, 7 Com. B. 229; Parker v. Pistor, 3 Bos. & P. 288; Pope v. Haman, Comb. 217; Heydon v. Heydon, Salk. 392.

In a few of the states, though their statutes do not specially provide for the mode of levying a writ against a partner upon his interest in the firm, the courts have reached the conclusion that the pature of the interest was not such as to justify the officer in seek. ing and taking into his exclusive possession the assets of the partnership, or any part thereof: Russell v. Cole, 167 Mass. 6; ante, p. 432; Sanborn v. Royce, 132 Mass. 594; Gibson v. Stevens, 7 N. H.

852; Garvin v. Paul, 47 N. H. 158; Morrison v. Blodgett, 8 N. H. 238; 29 Am. Dec. 653, and note; Treadwell v. Brown, 43 N. H. 290: Richard v. Allen, 117 Pa. St. 199; 2 Am. St. Rep. 652; White ▼. Rech, 171 Pa. St. 82. This is the conclusion probably intended to be affirmed by the supreme court of Michigan, though the utmost which has been stated in the opinion of the court is, that a levy cannot be maintained upon any specific chattel (Hutchinson v. Dubols, 45 Mich. 143; Haynes v. Knowles, 36 Mich. 407; Sirrine v. Briggs, 31 Mich. 443), a position which we shall hereafter show is admitted by some courts, which, nevertheless, hold that the officer has the right to take and maintain exclusive possession of all the chattels of the partnership under a writ against one member only. In several other states, the seizing of the property of the partnership is no longer permitted, but the rule as there maintained is the result of special statutes upon the subject prescribing the mode in which the levy may be made and exonerating the officer from taking possession of the property: Willis v. Hen. derson, 43 Ga. 325; Anderson v. Chenney, 51 Ga. 372; Richards v. Haines, 30 Iowa, 574; Iowa Code, sec. 3291; Blumenfield v. Seward, 71 Miss. 342; Middlebrook v. Zapp, 79 Tex. 321; Weir etc. Co. v. Armentrout, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 117.

May the Levy be upon Specific Chattels ?-The next question is, as suming it to be proper for an officer under a writ against one member of the partnership to seize its personal property, May such seiz ure be of a specific chattel or chattels, or must it extend to all the personal assets of the partnership? Upon this question the authorities are the more evenly divided. Some of them assert that the levy may be upon any of the personal property, and that if followed by a sale thereof under a writ, it will transfer the legal title to the moiety of the defendant, and confer upon the purchaser a right to take and hold the property, leaving the other partners without any other means of enforcing the rights of the partnership than by proceedings in chancery: Hershfield v. Claflin, 25 Kan. 166; 37 Am. Rep. 237; Fogg v. Lawry, 68 Me. 78; 28 Am. Rep. 19; Wiles v. Maddox, 26 Mo. 77; Walsh v. Adams, 3 Denio, 125; Phillips v. Cook, 24 Wend. 389; Randall v. Johnson, 13 R. I. 338; Haskins v. Everett, 4 Sneed, 531. Others maintain that the only interest which can be acquired by the purchaser is a right to an accounting, that this accounting must necessarily embrace all the affairs of the partnership, and therefore that no levy can be made upon any specific chattel, but that the whole of the personal property of the partnership must be seized and sold: Gerard v. Bates, 124 Ill. 150; 7 Am. St. Rep. 350; Stumph v. Bauer, 76 Ind. 157; Williams v. Lewis, 115 Ind. 45; 7 Am. St. Rep. 403, and citations; Thomas v. Lusk, 13 La. Ann. 277; Levy v. Cowan, 27 La. Ann. 556; Sanborn v. Royce, 132 Mass. 594; Atwood v. Meredith, 37 Miss. 635; Blumfield v. Seward, 71 Miss. 342. The results of this rule, if rigidly applied, must be somewhat startling. Though the debt were trifling in amount, it would require the entire property of a great partnership to be seized and the interest of the defendant therein sold, and in cases where the personal property of the part nership was located in different places, though widely distant from

2

one another, it would seem to require a levy and seizure everywhere to give validity to a seizure or sale anywhere.

Levy must be Restricted to Defendant's Interest.-Though, by the laws of the state in which the officer acts, he may take exclusive possession of the property under a writ against one of its owners, he must confine his levy and sale to the interest of the defendant. If he assumes to levy upon or to sell the whole property, his act, as against the partners not named in the writ, is wrongful. They may regard him as a trespasser upon their rights or as guilty of an unlawful conversion of their property, and may, therefore, maintain an action against him to recover damages sustained by them from such conversion: Smyth v. Tankersley, 20 Ala. 212; 56 Am. Dec. 193; Sheppard v. Shelton, 34 Ala. 652; Daniel v. Owens, 70 Ala. 297; Neary v. Cahill, 20 Ill. 214; Edgar v. Caldwell, Morris, 434; Melville v. Brown, 15 Mass. 82; Mussey v. Cummings, 34 Me. 74; Atkins v. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 195; Flero v. Betts, 2 Barb. 633; Walsh v. Adams, 8 Denio, 125; Waddell v. Cook, 2 Hill, 48; 37 Am. Dec. 372; Snell v. Crowe, 3 Utah, 26; Frisbie v. Langworthy, 11 Wis. 375; Dean v. Whittaker, 1 Car & P. 347; Bates v. James, 3 Duer, 45; Moulton v. Robinson, 7 Fost. 550; Paine v. Middlesex, Russ. & M. 99; Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, sec. 214.

Title Passing by Execution Sale. -Whatsoever be the mode of levy and sale authorized by the statutes or decisions of the state in which it takes place, there can be no doubt that the interest subject to the writ is, at least in equity, in no respect any greater than that held by the defendant, that it is subject to the paramount claims against the partnership, and is, in fact, nothing beyond the right to demand an accounting and to share in the surplus that may remain after all the partnership obligations have been discharged: Farley v. Moog, 79 Ala. 148; 58 Am. Rep. 585; Tait v. Murphy, 80 Ala. 440; Robinson v. Tevis, 38 Cal. 611; Barber v. Bank, 9 Conn. 407; Filley V. Phelps, 18 Conn. 294; Chandler v. Lincoln, 52 Ill. 74; State v. Emmons, 99 Ind. 452; Marston v. Dewberry, 21 La. Ann. 518; Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 242; Barrett v. McKenzie, 24 Minn. 20; Lane v. Lenfest, 40 Minn. 375; Bowman v. O'Reilly, 31 Miss. 261; Jarvis v. Hyer, 4 Dev. 367; Price v. Hunt, 11 Ired. 42; Atwood v. Impson, 20 N. J. Eq. 150; Eighth Nat. Bank v. Fitch, 49 N. Y. 539; Deal v. Bogue, 20 Pa. St. 228; 57 Am. Dec. 702; Whigham's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 199; Durburrow's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 404; Knox v. Schepler, 2 Hill (S. C.), 595; Boro v. Harris, 13 Lea, 36; United States v. Hack, 8 Pet. 271; Bank v. Carrollton R. R., 11 Wall. 624; Osborn v. McBride, 3 Saw. 590; 16 Nat. Bank Reg. 22; Clagett v. Kilbourne, 1 Black, 346; Lyndon v. Gorham, 1 Gall. 367; Dutton v. Morrison, 17 Ves. 193; Garbett v. Veale, 5 Q. B. 408; 8 Jur. 335; Skipp v. Harwood, 2 Swanst. 586; In re Wait, 1 Jacob & W. 605; Taylor v. Fields, 4 Ves. 396; Hankey v. Garrett, 1 Ves. Jr. 239.

Possession, Right to Deliver to Purchaser.-Of course, in those states in which an officer is not entitled to seize and take into his possession property of a partnership under a writ against one of its members, it must necessarily follow that the purchaser at an execution sale does not acquire any right to such possession. In those

states, however, in which the officer has the right to take and hold possession of the property until he can make a sale thereof under execution, it is generally conceded that he may deliver such possession to the purchaser, who, in a qualified sense, becomes a cotenant with the copartners who are not parties to the writ: Clark v. Cushing, 52 Cal. 617; Wright v. Ward, 65 Cal. 525; Hershfield v. Claflin, 25 Kan. 166; 37 Am. Rep. 237; Fogg v. Lowry, 68 Me. 78; 28 Am. Rep. 19; Moore v. Pennell, 52 Me. 162; 83 Am. Dec. 500; People's Bank v. Shryock, 48 Md. 427; 30 Am. Rep. 476; Atkins v. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 195; Randall v. Johnson, 13 R. I. 338; Saunders v. Bartlett, 12 Heisk. 316. Whether the latter are entitled to resume possession In the event that the property is needed in liquidating the partnership liabilities or for other partnership purposes, and, if so, by what remedies their rights may be enforced, are unsolved judicial prob lems, unless they may be regarded as solved by the decision of the supreme court of Minnesota, which, in one of its opinions, has said that if the purchaser "take possession, the remaining partners have the right to use the firm name to recover the property or its value": Lane v. Lenfest, 40 Minn. 375.

A Writ may be against All the Members of the Partnership, though not based upon a partnership obligation. In one case, it was held that a levy and sale under such a writ did not confer upon the purchaser any title paramount to the rights of the firm creditors, and that he could not take any interest in the property as against an assignee in bankruptcy of the firm: Osborn v. McBride, 3 Saw. 590. A conclusion directly the reverse of this has been reached in New York. It is there held that the preference which a firm creditor has over creditors of the individual members of a firm in the payment of their debts out of the assets of the firm is a derivative one and practically a subrogation to the equity of each individual partner to have the firm assets applied primarily to the payment of its debts; that where an execution or other writ is against all the members of the firm, none of them has any equity of this character, and therefore such writ may be levied and enforced by the sale of the firm property, though not based upon a firm obligation; and that neither the creditors nor the members of the firm have any right to object to, or any power to assail, the title of the purchaser: Saunders v. Riley, 105 N. Y. 12; 59 Am. Rep. 472; Davis v. Delaware etc. Co., 109 N. Y. 47; 4 Am. St. Rep. 418.

Garnishment. If a debt is due to a partnership, the interest of one of the partners therein cannot be reached by garnishment. To permit such garnishment would necessarily be to allow the partner's creditor to collect the debt, or some part thereof, from one whose obligation was not to the partner alone, but to the firm. This would result either in dividing the obligation or in withdrawing the firm asset, so that it might not be recovered by the firm, and .neither result will be permitted: Winston v. Ewing, 1 Ala. 129; 34 Am. Dec. 768; People's Bank v. Shryock, 48 Md. 427: 30 Am. Rep. 476; Warner ▼. Perkins, 8*Cush. 518; Wellover v. Soule, 30 Mich. 481; Hirth v. Pfeifle, 42 Mich. 31; Sheedy v. Second Nat. Bank, 62 Mo. 18; 21 Am. Rep. 407; Atkins v. Prescott, 10 N. H. 120; Myers v. Smith, 29

Ohio St. 120; Pettes v. Spaulding, 21 Vt. 66; Bates on Partnership, sec. 1103.

Priority of Writs against the Partnership. The levy of a writ against a partner upon his interest in its personal property cannot prejudice the creditors of the firm. The property still remains answerable for the partnership debts, and a writ of attachment or execution for a partnership debt takes precedence over any previous levies or sales under writs against one member of the partnership only; and a purchaser under the former writ acquires title paramount to that of the purchaser of the latter writ, irrespective of the dates of the respective levies and sales: Conroy v. Woods, 13 Cal. 626; 73 Am. Dec. 605; Switzer v. Smith, 35 Iowa, 269; Cox v. Russell, 44 Iowa, 556; Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 242; First Nat. Bank v. Brenneisen, 97 Mo. 145; Williams v. Gage, 49 Miss. 777; Roop v. Herron, 15 Neb. 73; Watt v. Johnson, 4 Jones, 190; Coover's Appeal, 29 Pa. St. 9; 70 Am. Dec. 149; Washburn v. Bank of Bellows Falls, 19 Vt. 278; Powers v. Large, 69 Wis. 621; 2 Am. St. Rep. 767.

VEGELAHN V. GUNTNER.

[167 MASSACHUSETTS, 92]

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYE.-NO ONE CAN LAWFULLY INTERFERE by force or intimidation to prevent employers or persons employed, or wishing to be employed, from the exercise of the right of employing or seeking, or remaining in, employment at such prices as may be mutually agreed upon.

EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYES-NUISANCE IN PATROL LING EMPLOYER'S PREMISES.-An injunction will issue against the maintenance in front of complainant's place of business of a patrol to prevent the carrying on of the business unless and until he shall adopt a certain scale of prices to be paid to his employés, where the patrol is employed as one of the means of carrying out a plan to coerce the complainant, and is used in addition with social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful harm, and persuasion to break existing contracts.

INJUNCTION AGAINST CRIMINAL ACTS.-The fact that the defendants' acts may subject them to indictment does not prevent a court of equity from issuing an injunction.

EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYES ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT PERSONS FROM ACCEPTING EMPLOYMENT.-A conspiracy to prevent persons from entering the complainant's employment and to prevent persons in such employment from continuing therein is unlawful, though such persons are not bound by contract to enter into, or continue in, such employment; and acts in furtherance of such conspiracy and by maintaining a patrol in front of his premises may be enjoined.

Suit in equity against two trades rions and several members thereof to prevent them from maintaining a patrol in front of the complainants' place of business and seeking to prevent persons from entering into his employment or remaining therein