land, and he then inserts in the mortgage a description of the wife's land, and borrows money thereon, the wife is bound by the acts of her husband and estopped to deny the validity of the mortgage: Nelson v. McDonald, 80 Wis. 605; 27 Am. St. Rep. 71. If a wife joins with her husband in a mortgage of his land to secure his debt and releases her right of dower and homestead therein; and, the husband then induces a third person to purchase the mortgage debt after maturity, upon his assurance that the price paid is due on the mortgage, the wife is estopped by his representations and cannot be allowed to redeem for a sum less than that for which her husband is liable on the mortgage debt: Casler v. Byers, 129 Ill. 657. If a wife joins her busband in the execution of a mortgage upon her land, knowing that the title thereto stands in her husband's name, and that the mortgagee relies upon his ownership and has no notice of the interest of the wife, and she does not notify him that she has any interest or ownership in the lands mortgaged, she is estopped to set up her title in an action to foreclose: Duckwall v. Kisner, 136 Ind. 99.

Under the laws of South Carolina, a married woman cannot pledge her estate by mortgage to secure the contract of another, having no reference to her separate estate, even though such other is her husband and though the mortgage purports in positive terms to bind her separate estate. Hence, she is not estopped to deny the validity of such a mortgage: American Mortgage Co. v. Owens, 72 Fed. Rep. 219. The mere recital in a mortgage upon the wife's property to secure the husband's antecedent debt that she and her husband are jointly and severally indebted to the mortgagee cannot estop the wife or forbid inquiry into the consideration of the mortgage: Chaffee ▼. Browne, 109 Cal. 211; Cole v. Temple, 142 Ind. 498. And a mere recital in a married woman's mortgage of her separate estate executed by her and her husband, that it is given to secure her indebtedness, does not estop her from showing that it was given for supplies furnished for a plantation, which her husband cultivated in his name and for his own benefit: Bank of America v. Banks, 101 U. S. 240. A married woman is not estopped to dispute the validity of a mortgage given by her upon her separate estate, but which is invalid for defective acknowledgment if it does not appear either that the debt to secure which the mortgage was given was for money advanced to her, or for anything of which she had the benefit, or that the mortgagee was deceived into allowing the debt to be contracted upon the faith of her executing a mortgage to secure it: Tolman v. Smith, 74 Cal. 345. And if a wife, to avoid a statute prohibiting her from becoming surety for her husband, and to enable him to mortgage her land, conveys her land through a third person to her husband, she is not estopped, the mortgagee having notice of all the facts, to deny the validity of the mortgage: Sohn v. Gantner, 134 Ind. 31. A married woman who, together with her husband, gives a mortgage on land owned by them as tenants by entireties, to secure a debt of her husband, is not estopped to deny the validity of the mortgage by the mere fact that she knew that it was invalid and failed to notify the mortgagee of the character of her interest in the

property: Coats v. Gordon, 144 Ind. 19. A married woman who assumes that her husband is dead from his long absence, and marries again, and, while, living with the latter man, joins him in a mortgage of her separate estate, may, upon the return of her lawful husband and the resumption of marital relations with him, avoid such mortgage on the ground that he did not join in its execution. In such case, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply: Cook v. Walling, 117 Ind. 9; 10 Am. St. Rep. 17. A married woman is not estopped to deny the validity of a mortgage on a stock of goods owned by her, executed by her husband without her knowledge or consent, by the fact that he is permitted to remain in possession, purchasing on credit and selling at retail, and that the mortgagee sold him the goods and took the mortgage, believing him to be the owner of the business: Kiefer v. Klinsick, 144 Ind. 46.

Estoppel as against Husband's Creditors. — Generally, if a wife permits her husband to use her money or property, real or personal, as his own for a considerable period of time, incurring obligations and obtaining credit upon the faith of others that the property belongs to him, she is estopped to set up her title as against her husband's crelItors: Swartz v. McClelland, 31 Neb. 646-649; Hopkins v. Joyce, 18 Wis. 443; Leete v. State Bank, 115 Mo. 184-204. A wife who allows stock purchased with her money to stand for several years in her husband's name, in order to give him credit, is estopped to assert her ownership as against his creditors: Hamlen v. Bennett, 52 N. J. Eq. 70. If a husband collects his wife's money, and, without objection on her part, uses it as his own for a number of years, obtaining credit on the faith of its being his own, she is estopped to assert her claim to it or its proceeds as against his creditors: Driggs etc. Bank v. Norwood, 50 Ark. 42; 7 Am. St. Rep. 78. If a married woman voluntarily permits her husband to use her money as his own by investing it in property in his own name, and thereby obtains credit on the faith of his being the owner, the wife is estopped to interpose a claim to the property to the detriment of his creditors: Warner v. Watson, 85 Fla. 402. If a wife permits her husband to invest her money in his own name and obtain credit upon the strength of his apparent ownership, she cannot assert her claim to the money or its proceeds, as against her husband's creditors: Taylor etc. Co. v. Bell, 62 Ark. 26. A married woman who is the equitable owner of a tract of land, the title to which she knows to be in her husband, is estopped to assert her ownership as against creditors of the husband who have given credit on the faith of his ownership: Pierce v. Hower, 142 Ind. 626; Hopkins v. Joyce, 78 Wis. 443. If a husband purchases land, taking the deed in his own name, and the wife furnishes part or all of the purchase money, with knowledge that the deed is made to her husband, and she suffers the title to remain in him while he receives credit on the faith of his ownership in the land, she is estopped to assert her title thereto as against those who have no notice or knowl edge of any claim of ownership on her part, and who have acquired an interest in the land on the faith of the husband's ownership: Minnich v. Shaffer, 135 Ind. 634; Le Coil v. Armstrong etc. Co., 140 Ind. 256. The fact that the wife's land stands in her husband's nam●

does not estop her to claim the property as hers, if the creditor, when he gave credit to the husband, had such notice or information as to the actual ownership as would have put a man of ordinary business prudence upon inquiry as to the fact: Chadbourne v. Williams, 45 Minn. 294; and it has been held that though the record title to the wife's property is allowed to remain in the name of her husband while he contracts debts in carrying on business, she is not estopped to assert her title to such separate estate, in the absence of bad faith and fraudulent intent on her part, and when she has treated her husband as her creditor and repeatedly demanded a conveyance from him: Kemp v. Folsom, 14 Wash. 16. Where the title deeds stand in the wife's name, this is constructive notice of her ownership, and if she does not represent that the title is in her husband, and does not know that he claims the ownership when he has a building erected on her land, claiming it as his own, the wife is not estopped to assert her title and to resist a mechanic's lien arising out of the erection of such building: Campbell v. Jacobson, 145 Ill. 389; Huntley v. Holt, 58 Conn. 445. If land is purchased with a wife's money, and the deed therefor taken and recorded in her husband's name, who, without the knowledge of his wife and entirely out of the course of his ordinary business, becomes liable as surety on a note, she is not estopped to deny her husband's title to the land, although the creditor of the husband loaned the money for which the note was given on the faith of the latter's ownership of the land: De Berry v. Wheeler, 128 Mo. 84; 49 Am. St. Rep. 538. If property is purchased with a wife's money and the title taken in her husband's name, who subsequently, and while he is solvent, conveys the property to her, she is not estopped to assert her title as against her husband's creditors who have extended him credit on the faith of his apparent ownership, but without either the husband or wife making any representation as to the ownership, or knowing that credit had been given on the faith of his ownership, and when the title had not been put in his name for the purpose of gaining credit for him: Marston v. Dresen, 85 Wis. 530. A married woman is not estopped from claiming, as against her husband's creditors, a resulting trust in land paid for by another and intended to be hers, but deeded to her husband through collusion with the grantor, although she fails to take positive action for a number of years, not knowing how the title stood, but does assert her title before it is assailed: Steagall v. Steagall, 90 Va. 73. If goods are bought by a wife for the use of the family, while credit is given to the husband as is customary, the wife is not estopped, by a judginent against her husband for the price of such goods, from claiming as her own land standing in his name, she not having knowingly concealed her title and the creditor not having extended credit on faith of the husband's apparent ownership of the land: Scrutchfield v. Sauter, 119 Mo. 615. Agency of Husband.- If a married woman holds her husband out to the world as her agent, or allows him to act with reference to her property so as to induce the belief that he acts as her agent with reference thereto, she is estopped to deny his authority to act as her agent: McNichols v. Kettner, 22 Ill. App. 493; American Mortgage Co. v. Owens, 64 Fed. Rep. 249-252. Thus if, during two years, a

husband and wife lived together on a farm held by her as dower from the estate of a former husband, and during that time her present husband acted as general agent in connection with the farm, and made purchases as such agent, and during the third year remained in possession of the farm conducting the entire business and making similar purchases purporting to be her agent, from persons who had known of his agency, and had no notice of its termination, while the wife with knowledge failed to put the parties on notice, she is estopped to deny the agency of her husband during the third year, although he may not in fact have obtained the purchases for her but for himself and his own benefit: Foster v. Jones, 78 Ga. 150. If a married woman, through her husband as her agent, makes applica tion for a loan of money, and the lender is without notice that the money is not for her use, it becomes a part of her separate estate, and she is estopped to deny the validity of a bond given by her for the repayment of the loan, although the money is received and used by her husband for his own purposes: Building etc. Assn. v. Jones, 32 S. C. 308. The husband of a married woman may be by her constituted her agent for the management of her separate estate, and If he, being such agent, purchases articles for her or her separate estate, or supplies for her tenants thereon, she is estopped to deny liability therefor: Brown v. Thomson, 31 S. C. 436; 17 Am. St. Rep. 40. If a wife makes her husband her agent for the purchase of land which becomes her separate property, and he takes the contract for the land in his own name, borrowing money to apply in payment therefor, and depositing the contract as security for its repayment, the wife is estopped to deny the equitable lien created by the deposit of the contract, if the husband and wife obtain possession of the contract by fraud and procure a deed to the land in her name: Curtis V. Janzen, 7 Wash. 58. Where a husband, as agent for his wife, while in possession of a note and mortgage given to her, induces her to indorse them, and subsequently while so in possession, he assigns them by indorsing them to himself and wrongfully appropriates the proceeds to his own use, the wife is estopped to deny the validity of the transfer and such misappropriation by the husband is no ground for annulling the transfer, unless she can show fraud both on the part of her husband and the assignee of the note and mortgage: First Nat. Bank v. Nelson, 106 Ala. 535.

Estoppel by Note. By signing a joint note with her husband a wife clothes the holder with evidence of her intention to charge her separate estate, and is estopped to deny such intention when an innocent holder has advanced money upon the faith of such intention: Nelson V. McDonald, 80 Wis. 606; 27 Am. St. Rep. 71. If a married woman Makes her note in terms referring to her separate estate,: an innocent indorsee for value before maturity has a right to rely upon the statement made in the note and the maker is estopped to deny such statement unless she can prove that the holder of the note knew them to be untrue: Nott v. Thomson, 35 S. C. 461. If a wife makes her note to her husband's order and delivers it to him to enable him to procure Its discount, and with the proceeds pay his own debt, and the husband applies for its discount at a bank having notice that the note AM. ST. REP., VOL LVII.-12

is without consideration and for discount, but not that the proceeds are to be applied for the husband's benefit, and the bank discounts it by check to the wife's order, which the wife indorses and delivers to her husband, knowing that it is the proceeds of the discount of her note, she is estopped from setting up against the bank that she was a mere surety on the note: Hackettstown Nat. Bank v. Ming, 52 N. J. Eq. 156. Where a wife, being the owner of a note, indorses it in blank and delivers it to a creditor of her husband as collateral security for the debt of the latter and such creditor assigns the note for value to an innocent purchaser, the wife is estopped to assert that her assignment is different from what it appears to be on its face: Shirk v. North, 138 Ind. 210. When suits for large sums have been commenced against a married woman, and she has answered therein failing to plead that the debts were her husband's or marital coercion or other like defense, and has compromised the suits, given notes for the amount of the compromise, and thereby obtained remission of a large amount of the indebtedness due, she is estopped, in a subsequent suit upon the compromise notes, to set up the above defenses to avoid payment of the notes: Sentell v. Stark, 37 La. Ann. 679. If a husband contracts for machinery to be erected upon a farm which is the separate property of his wife, and such contract is made without her knowledge or consent, and she, together with her husband, subsequently signs a note to pay for such machinery, she is not estopped, in an action on the note, to deny her liability thereon: Gossard v. Lea, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 3.

If a note is signed by a married woman payable to the order of her husband, and is indorsed and presented by him, with no implication, representation, or presumption that she is to be benefited in her estate or her business to be drawn from the form of the note or from the fact that she gave it to her husband to be discounted, she is not estopped to deny liability on the note, in the absence of evidence that she intended to be bound thereby, and the fact that she is possessed of a separate estate is not sufficient to estop her: Saratoga County Bank v. Pruyn, 90 N. Y. 250.

Representations, Silence, or Conduct. -In order to estop a married woman by matter in pais, it must appear that there has been a false representation or a concealment of material facts by her, and that the party to whom such representation was made, or from whom such facts were concealed must have been ignorant of the existence of the facts concealed or of the falsity of the representation and must have relied upon its truth. Hence, a married woman is not estopped by act in pais, unless her conduct has been intentionally wrong and fraudulent: Steed v. Petty, 65 Tex. 490. And to estop a feme covert by an act in pais from asserting her right to her land, she must be guilty of some positive fraud or of some act of concealment or suppression which in law is equivalent to fraud: Johnson v. Bryan, 62 Tex. 623; Munk v. Weidner, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 491; Smith v. Powell, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 373; Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Stephens, 96 Ky. 401; 49 Am. St. Rep. 303. A married woman cannot profit by her own fraud to the prejudice of a bona fide purchaser from her. Therefore, If she has received and invested the proceeds of a sale of her lands