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"In this connection I ought to add some more specific observations concerning the relations of insanity, or kindred states, to testamentary capacity. It goes without saying, of course, that one who is insane or imbecile cannot make a valid will; and that a will which is the product of insane delusions entertained by the testator cannot stand. The law, however, recognizes, what are matters of common knowledge, that insanity, mental aberration, and mental incapacity, assume quite different phases in different persons, or under different conditions; that not infrequently it is a permanent or incurable condition; as, for instance, in the case of imbeciles and confirmed lunatics; that in other instances it is a temporary and transient state of mind, produced by sickness, injury, the use of intoxicants, noxious drugs, and other causes, apparent or unapparent; that sometimes the individual has alternating periods of mental soundness and unsoundness, the periods of unsoundness being more or less frequent, and more or less 439 lengthy; that sometimes a person generally insane has lucid intervals, when the mind becomes clear, and there is a temporary reversion to mental capacity. The rule is, that when the mind is sound, when the insane or impaired condition has passed away, when the person is enjoying a lucid interval, the power to make a will exists, assuming, of course, that in other respects the testator has the degree of mental capacity which I have described to you.

"One who is not insane generally may have insane delusions or hallucinations; he may have a delusion, or delusions, as to one or more subjects, and be sane and wholly rational as to others. Such delusions entertained by a testator might be such as not to affect in any way his capacity to make a will, or to transact ordinary business and the affairs of life. They might be such that they would in no way influence the testamentary act, or have any bearing upon, or affect, the provisions of the will attempted to be made. In such case, if the testator possessed testamentary capacity in all other respects, the will would be valid, notwithstanding the existence of the delusions.

"On the other hand, if the insane delusion or delusions entertained were such that they would in any way enter into or affect the testator's act in making his will, or in any way influence its provisions so that the instrument would be in any respect the product of the insane delusion or delusions, and not of the testator's sound mind, the will thus produced would not be a good will.

"But after all has been said upon this subject, there is no rule,

I fancy, more clear, more intelligible, more easy of practicable application to all manner of cases, and no explanation more enlightening than is contained in the simple test I first gave to you, to wit, that one who, at the very time he undertakes to make a will, is possessed of sufficient intelligence and memory to fairly and rationally know and comprehend the effect of what he is doing, the nature and condition of his property, who are or should be the natural objects of his bounty, and his relations to them, the manner in which he wishes to distribute his estate among, or withhold it from 440 them, and the scope and bearing of the will he is making, has testamentary capacity, that is, the power to make a will.

"So, gentlemen, if Dr. Hoadley, at the time he sat down to execute the instrument before you, possessed this degree and kind of mental capacity, he was competent to make a will, and he was thus competent no matter what his mental condition may have been at times previous or times subsequent. His mental conditions both before and after, the character of any attacks of mental unsoundness, their durations or frequency, the nearness of any to the date of the will, the appearance of his recoveries, the existence of any insane delusions, and all such facts, are to be considered in so far as they may throw light on his then condition, and they may be important subjects for consideration; and they are to be considered in the light of any presumption of a continuance or recurrence of insane conditions which may reasonably be drawn from the case and its history. But the ultimate, the controlling question is as to his condition when he executed this instrument which purports to be his will, at that very time and none other. So where the claim is made of incapacity or mental unsoundness arising from the existence of insane delusions, the question is, Did the delusion or delusions exist with the testator at the very time of the execution of the will, and, thus existing, affect or influence his action so that the will was the product of them, and therefore different from what it would otherwise have been?"

The appellants' final reason of appeal is thus stated: "The court further erred in its presentation of the case to the jury in the following particular, because the charge of the court, taken as a whole, is not a full and fair presentation of their claims made on the trial of the cause, nor of the questions of law involved therein."

Concerning this "reason," the proponents say, and truly, that it is in violation of the rules of this court, being a mere general

assignment of alleged error which does not purport to review any specific action of, or question made in, or decided by, the court below. But, notwithstanding this, we have carefully examined the charge in the light of the real 441 criticism made upon it by the appellants, as defined and shown in their brief, and the oral arguments in its support, which is that it is partial and strongly argumentative for the appellees. But we cannot think this is so. On the other hand, it has impressed us as singularly able and entirely fair. We detect nothing to indicate that the court did not do full and equal justice to the claims of both parties, and certainly nothing to show that it exceeded the limits of its power, as declared by this court in such cases as First Baptist Church v. Rouse, 21 Conn. 167; Morehouse v. Remson, 59 Conn. 392; Setchel v. Keigwin, 57 Conn. 473, 478; State v. Rome, 64 Conn. 329; State v. Smith, 65 Conn. 283.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

WITNESSES - EXAMINATION OF NONEXPERTS AS TO MENTAL CONDITION OF TESTATOR.-If a witness has had such a long and intimate acquaintance with a testator as to enable him to form a correct judgment as to the testator's mental condition, he may give his opinion that the testator is of sound mind, provided he also states the facts upon which such opinion is based: Burney v. Torrey, 100 Ala. 157; 46 Am. St. Rep. 33; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324; 50 Am. Dec. 329; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; 44 Am. Dec. 349; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 Serg. & R. 90; 10 Am. Dec. 444; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. St. 342; 8 Am. Rep. 181, and extended note thereto; but his examination must be limited to his own conclusions from the specific facts he discloses: Clapp v. Fullerton. 34 N. Y. 190; 90 Am. Dec. 681.

WILLS-INSANE DELUSIONS-QUESTION OF LAW.-A will is invalidated by a delusion, when it is the result of the delusion, but not otherwise: Notes to In re Cline's Will, 41 Am. St. Rep. 854; Haines v. Hayden, 35 Am. St. Rep. 579. A delusion sufficient to avoid a will is a creation purely of the imagination such as no sane man could believe a belief in the existence of something that does not exist: Taylor v. Trich, 165 Pa. St. 586; 44 Am. St. Rep. 679; but if there were facts or circumstances which would reasonably lead the testator to entertain a belief he possessed, such belief is not an insane delusion: In re Cline's Will, 24 Or. 175; 41 Am. St. Rep. 851. A man may be of sound mind in regard to his dealings in general while he is under an insane delusion, and whenever it appears that his will was the direct offspring of his partial insanity or monomania, which was the cause of the disposition made by him of his property, and that, without it, such disposition would not have been made, it should be disregarded: Thomas v. Carter, 170 Pa. St. 272; 50 Am. St. Rep. 770. Mental capacity to make a will, or what, in any case, shall be the standard of legal capacity, is a question of law: Hall v. Perry, 87 Me. 569; 47 Am. St. Rep. 352.

APPEAL-SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.-An appellate court will decline to consider an uncertain and indefinite assignment

of error. An assignment of error should specify the particular error complained of: National Fertilizer Co. v. Holland, 107 Ala.412; 54 Am. St. Rep. 101, and note; Tousey v. Roberts, 114 N. Y. 312; 11 Am. St. Rep. 655. An exception to the entire charge of the court as set out in the record, without specifying the errors therein, or the grounds of exception, is too indefinite, and cannot be considered: Newby v. Harrell, 99 N. C. 149; 6 Am. St. Rep. 503.

FREEMAN'S APPEAL

[68 CONNECTICUT, 533.]

STATUTES AS TO CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMENRETROSPECTIVE OPERATION.-A statute changing the rule that a married woman cannot make any contract as surety or guarantor for her husband does not enlarge the rights of women married before the passage of the act, and the disability still applies to them, unless it is removed in the manner indicated by such statute.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-STATUS CREATED BY COVERTURE. Whenever a peculiar status is assigned by law to the members of any particular class of persons, affecting their general position in, or with, regard to the rest of the community, no one belonging to such class can vary, by any contract, the rights and liabilities incident to this status. Coverture creates such a status, and a married woman's rights and liabilities cannot, therefore, be varied or changed by any contract she may make.

AGENCY-CONFLICT OF LAWS-DELIVERY OF INSTRUMENT IN ANOTHER STATE.-It is the law of this state which must determine the authority of an agent, as well as the va. lidity of an obligation which the agent, as such, seeks to impose upon his principal by the delivery, in another state, of an instrument signed by his principal in this state. If the agent has no power to deliver it here, he has no power to deliver it there.

HUSBAND AND WIFE - CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN-CONFLICT OF LAWS.-Contracts which coverture prevents a woman from making herself she cannot make through the interposition of an agent. Hence, if a woman, married and domiciled in this state, has no legal capacity here to make a contract as surety or guarantor for her husband, she cannot become a guarantor or surety for her husband's debt in another state, by acting through the interposition of an agent, whom she appoints, in this state, to execute such a contract, or to deliver it after it has been signed by her.

Appeal from the action of commissioners in allowing a claim of twenty-eight thousand and seventy dollars against the estate of an insolvent debtor. It appeared that H. Drusilla Mitchell was a resident of Bristol, state of Connecticut, and had always reBidea there. She married George H. Mitchell, in that place, in 1857, and they continued to reside there until his death in 1896. Mrs. Mitchell resided there afterward. George H. Mitchell was a member of the mercantile firm of Morse, Mitchell & Williams, located at Chicago, where the other two partners lived. On February 20, 1891, the firm was indebted to the First National Bank

of Chicago upon notes aggregating over twenty thousand dollars, and the bank agreed to extend further credit to the firm in consideration of a written guaranty to it, in the sum of thirty thousand dollars, to be signed by the firm, by its individual members, and by Mrs. Mitchell. The firm and its individual members did sign the guaranty. George H. Mitchell then took the paper and procured his wife's signature, after which he mailed the instrument to Morse, his partner at Chicago, who there delivered it to the bank. This paper was prepared by the bank, was dated at Chicago, and was signed by Mrs. Mitchell at her residence in Connecticut. The bank continued to extend credit to Morse, Mitchell & Williams, until the firm became insolvent and made an assignment for the benefit of its creditors on July 30, 1893. The firm then owed the bank sixteen thousand five hundred dollars, on unpaid notes, and was an indorser on sundry notes of third parties, all payable at Chicago. On December 26, 1893, the bank prepared an order from Mrs. Mitchell on the executor of her father's will, directing him to pay over to the bank whatever might be coming to her as part of the estate in his hands. This paper was sent by the bank to George H. Mitchell, at his residence in Connecticut, for the purpose of procuring his wife's signature. It was dated at Chicago, and was signed by Mrs. Mitchell at her home in Bristol. On January 23, 1894, George H. Mitchell transmitted the paper to the bank at Chicago, after having procured the executor's written acceptance of the order and agreement to comply with its terms. The bank acknowledged the receipt of the order, which assigned all of Mrs. Mitchell's right, title, and interest in the undistributed estate of her late father, as security upon her guaranty of certain notes made or indorsed by Morse, Mitchell & Williams, of Chicago, amounting to twenty-six thousand dollars, more or less; and agreed to surrender and reassign so much of said security as should not be applied upon the indebtedness to the bank. This receipt, and the agreement therein contained, was never delivered by George H. Mitchell to his wife, or its existence made known to her until after his death. Mrs. Mitchell was adjudged an insolvent debtor in 1896, and Edward A. Freeman was appointed the trustee in insolvency. The bank's claim was presented to the commissioners on her insolvent estate, and was allowed by them at the sum of twenty-eight thousand and seventy dollars and thirty cents, and they found the security to be equal in value to said amount. The trustee appealed from the doings of the commissioners to the superior court, and the case was reserved for the consideration and advice of the supreme court.

AM. ST. REP., VOL. LVII.-8

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