LEASE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT. LEGACY. See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS. LEGAL QUESTIONS. See PRACTICE. LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES. See CONTRACTS; ESTATES OF DECEDENTS. LEGAL TENDER. See MONEY: PAYMENT. LEGATEES. See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS. LEGISLATURES. See STATES. LEGITIMACY. See DOMESTIC RELATIONS. LETTER OF ATTORNEY. See AGENCY. LETTER OF CREDIT. See CONTRACTS. LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION. See FRAUD. LETTERS. See CONTRACTS; EVIDENCE. LETTERS PATENT. See PATENTS. LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS. LEX FORI. See COURTS. LEX LOCI. See CONTRACTS; INTEREST. LIBEL. See TORTS. LIBEL IN ADMIRALTY. See PLEADING. LICENSES. § 1. Revocable-Death of licensee.— A license to enter lands, not coupled with an interest, is a personal privilege, and conveys no estate or interest, and is revocable at the pleasure of the party giving it. It ceases with the death of either party, and cannot be transferred or alienated by the licensee. The Mexican governor of the province of California granted provisionally to certain parties the occupation of a certain portion of the common lands, subject to the mensuration to be made of such common lands. The document by which the grant was made contained a provision against alienation, as well as other prohibitions, and a provision for forfeiture in case of condition broken. After the death of the grantees, their heirs granted the lands to other parties, who presented their claim for confirmation. Held, that the right conferred by the document was a mere license to occupy the premises until the common lands should be measured; but that being a license and not a grant, it terminated upon the death of the licensees in accordance with the above principles. De Haro v. United States, 5 Wall., 599. § 2. A license is an authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon the land of another without possessing an estate therein. When executed, it will prevent the owner of the land from maintaining an action for the acts done under it; but it is revocable at pleasure, and will not be a defense for an act done after revocation. A consideration may have been given for it, or expenditures made strictly on the faith of it, yet the owner of the land may re voke it when he will (unless it be coupled with an interest) without paying back the money, or making compensation for the expenditure. Morgan v. United States,* 14 Ct. Cl., 319. § 3. Irrevocable.- Where by legislative enactment a lottery company is incorporated for twenty-five years, at the end of which period it is to be dissolved and liquidated, such company being required to collect a large amount of capital within a limited time, and to make and secure quarterly payments to the state auditor for all that time, held, that the faculties and privileges of such company are vested for a term of twenty-five years and the license is irrevocable. Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Woods, 222. § 4. A license to use property for specific purposes, not specially restricted, and coupled with an interest which is necessary to the enjoyment of the rights granted by such license, is not revocable by the grantor while the interest exists. The fee in such case remains in the original owner, but the right of the licensee to the use is paramount to the title of the owner of the fee, and does not require the fee for its protection. Thus where the secretary of war, by authority derived from an act of congress, granted permission to a railroad company to run its road through, and over, lands belonging to the United States at Harper's Ferry, the written license containing an agreement to the effect that "the said company shall allow the United States to construct and keep up forever a depot, with suitable tracks, switches and turnabouts, to be connected with said road," and the company built and constructed its railroad under this authority, held, that the license was irrevocable, and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 1 Hughes, 138. § 5. Removal of buildings from rented premises.— A lot was leased to the United States, the term to "continue from month to month during the pleasure of the United States." A few days before the termination of a current month the government gave notice that the property would be vacated at the end of the month, the rent to cease from that date, reserving the right to sell or otherwise dispose of the buildings erected on the premises (seventeen in number). Most of the buildings remained upon the premises for eight months after this notice, and watchmen were left to look after them. No claim for rent or demand for possession was made by the lessors until about five months after the notice. Held, that the said notice, followed by the silence of the lessors, did not constitute a license to the United States to leave their buildings upon the premises after vacating them, and to remove them after the termination of the lease. Morgan v. United States,* 14 Ct. Cl., 319. § 6. To use water- Revocation.- The proviso in the Pennsylvania and New Jersey act of 1771, section 7, by which those states, in declaring the Delaware river a common highway, and authorizing the improvement of it by commissioners, provided that no power given by the act should give power "to remove, throw down, lower or impair, or in any manner to alter," certain mill-dams, nor to obstruct or "in any manner hinder" the owners of them, or their "heirs and assigns," from taking water out of the said river for the use of the said mills, is not a grant of the water, but the toleration of a nuisance, and a mere license, revocable at pleasure, to use the water. Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal, 1 Wall. Jr., 275. § 7. The Pennsylvania and New Jersey act of 1771 declared the Delaware river a common highway, and authorized commissioners to improve the river, but restricted them from interfering with the dams of mill owners, or hindering such mill owners from taking water out of said river for the use of their mills. Subsequently the legislature of the state of Pennsylvania granted a license to a canal company to divert a portion of the water of said river into its canal. In an action by a mill owner against the canal company, held, that, by the laws of Pennsylvania, the Delaware river is a public navigable river, held by its joint sovereigns in trust for the public; that riparian owners of land have no title to the river or any right to divert its waters, unless by license from the state; that such license is revocable, and in subjection to the superior right of the state to divert the water for public improvements. Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 14 How., 80. § 8. A license, in writing, to dig a canal through the grantor's land does not convey to the grantee, as an incident, the proprietary interest in the soil dug up in constructing the canal. Lyman v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 195. 9. Tenancy at will.- A permission to occupy and enjoy premises for an indefinite period free from rent is properly a tenancy at will, and not a license. Morgan v. United States,* 14 Ct. Cl., 319. § 10. Limiting right to use of machine.— A license to run a planing machine contained a restriction that the licensee should not dress plank or other material for other persons, to be carried out of a specified territory and resold as an article of merchandise. The restriction was both a covenant by the licensee and a condition of the grant. Held, that under no circumstances could the planed article, with the privity or consent of the licensee, be sold out of the territory as an article of merchandise, or, with his privity or consent, be sold within the territory to be carried out and resold as such article. A provisional injunction would be granted against such licensee, to restrain his use of the machine, if applied for during his violation of such restriction; but such injunction was refused where it appeared that the licensee had vio lated the restriction under a misapprehension of his rights, and had discontinued the violation. Wilson v. Sherman, 1 Blatch., 536. § 11. A mere license to cross premises does not create any obligation to guard against injury or accident to the licensee. Thus where M., while crossing defendants tracks at a dangerous place, instead of at a place provided by the defendant, fell into an unprotected pit and was injured, held, that as there was at most a naked license to cross there, the defendant was not liable. Morgan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 Fed. R., 78; 11 Rep., 767; 19 Blatch., 259. § 12. Right of way. Where the owner of two adjoining houses sold one of thenf, and afterwards gave the purchaser a license to use an alley way between the two houses, upon a subsequent conveyance by the purchaser of the house sold, such license does not pass to his grantee. McPherson v. Acker,* 21 Alb. L. J., 52. § 13. To cut timber - Reserving title.- A conditional license to cut timber contained the following: "Said grantor reserves full control and ownership of all logs and lumber which shall be cut under this permit, wherever and however situated, until all matters and things appertaining to or connected with this license shall be settled and adjusted, and the sum or sums due, or to become due, for stumpage or otherwise shall be fully paid." Held, that a purchaser of logs cut under the license, although bona fide, could only acquire the title possessed by the grantee under the license. Homans v. Newton, 4 Fed. R., 880. §14. It was further provided in the license, that, in case of default by the licensee, the grantor should have full power to sell all or any of the logs cut, and after deducting the amount then due, expenses and commissions, pay the balance to the licensee. Held, that in trover the grantor could only recover of a bona fide purchaser the amount his due, and not the whole value of the logs. Ibid. § 15. To dig ore. Where one owning a large tract of land grants, bargains and sells part of it, and for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, covenants with the grantee, his heirs and assigns, that he and they may dig, take and carry away all iron ore to be found within the ungranted part of the tract, paying so much per ton, held, 1st, that this is not a grant of the ore, but a license to dig and carry away ore to be found; 2d, that no property accrues in the ore until the privilege has been exercised; 3d, that the license is without stint, but is not exclusive of the owner of the soil; 4th, that the right acquired under it is indivisible, and an assignee, unless clothed with the whole right, has nothing, and can support no suit as against the owner of the soil. Grubb v. Bayard, 2 Wall. Jr., 81. LICENSE TAX. See REVENUE. LIENS. [Of Factors, see AGENCY, XV, 3. Of Attorneys, see ATTORNEYS, IV. Of Banks, see BANKS, VII. As to Railroad Mortgages, see CONVEYANCES, C, XIV. In Bankruptcy, see DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, XIII. Judgment Liens, see JUDGMENTS, V. Of Landlords, see LANDLORD AND TENANT, IV. Maritime Liens, see MARITIME LAW. For Taxes, etc., see REVENUE. Vendor's Lien, see LAND.] I. IN GENERAL, SS 1-86. II. MECHANICS' LIENS. $$ 87-194. III. IN EQUITY, §§ 195-210. I. IN GENERAL. SUMMARY - Contract among property owners to improve their property, § 1.— Possession of thing on which lien is claimed must be just, § 2. § 1. In a suit in equity, it appeared that on the 15th day of April, 1837, articles of agreement, under seal, were entered into by certain mill-owners, who had associated themselves together for the purpose of creating reservoirs of water, etc., to render the stream by which their mills were driven more constant and full, by which they agreed that there should be a lien on their respective estates to pay their proportions of all debts incurred in creating and managing this water-power. It was declared that the articles created a lien on the real estate |