have signed a petition for the improvement of a street, when
the power to make it depends upon the signatures to the
petition of a given number or proportion of the property-
holders to be affected, can be inquired into, and the want of
such number of signatures shown as a defense, in an action to
collect the assessment, if the statute governing the proceed-
ing does not provide that the determination of the proper
municipal board shall be conclusive on the subject. Auditor
General v. Fisher, 128.
9. A highway by user need not necessarily be of the statutory
width, but it becomes such to the width and extent used.
Wayne County Savings Bank v. Stockwell, 586.
10. A highway can be lost in whole or in part by non-user,
but the portion kept in use will not be affected by the non-
user of the remainder. Id.
A husband, who occupies land under a contract running to
himself and wife jointly, cannot be counted as a resident
property-holder under a statute which requires the signatures
of a majority of such property-holders to a petition for the
improvement of a highway upon which they reside, unless
the petition is also signed by the wife. Auditor General v.
Fisher, 128.
IMPROVEMENTS-See EJECTMENT (2).
INDIAN RESERVE-See PUBLIC LANDS.
1. An insurance company is bound by verbal statements made
to its agent, and upon which it issues a policy and receives
the premium; and it cannot repudiate in such policy the
authority of the agent, or responsibility for his act. Hoose
v. Prescott Insurance Co., 309.
2. A warranty in an insurance policy that any application or
statement connected with its procurement is true, and shall
be a part of the policy, makes an oral application. and the
accompanying statements made to the agent as to the con-
dition of the title, a part of the policy. Id.
3. The following propositions are summarized from the opinion
of Chief Justice CHAMPLIN:
a-In construing warranties in insurance policies, the prime
object to be reached is the intention of the parties, which,
when found, must control, and such warranties must be
interpreted by the rules applicable to the interpretation of
other mercantile contracts.
b-All written instruments, where the provisions are clear
and unambiguous, are entitled to a literal interpretation, and
wherever in a policy of insurance there is a clear breach of
a warranty contained therein, however immaterial it may be,
the policy will be avoided.
c-The reasons for such literal construction appear to be
that insurance is granted on the faith of the accuracy of the
statements made by the assured, the information concerning
which is generally, and often exclusively, within his
knowledge, and it is only just to an insurer, when he asks
for positive and accurate information, that it should be given
to him. It is in reliance upon the facts given that the con-
tract of insurance is made, and the purpose of requiring a
warranty is to dispense with inquiry, and cast upon the
assured the obligation that the facts shall be as he represents
them.
d-In arriving at the intention of the parties to an insur-
ance contract, the court must look at their situation, the
conditition of the thing insured, and what was said or done
at the time the insurance was effected. If the representations
of the assured are in writing, that is the evidence of what
they are; but if the application and representations are verbal,
oral proof is competent to establish the same. Id. 310.
See FIRE INSURANCE; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1); LIFE
INSURANCE.
JOINDER OF RESPONDENTS-See QUO WARRANTO (2).
JURISDICTION-See CONTEMPT.
1. Requests to charge which, in effect, treat the case as one to
be disposed of by the court, are properly refused where there
is some evidence to go to the jury in support of the theory
of the opposite party, and which, if sustained, entitles him
to a recovery. Towle v. Dunham, 268.
2. While separate items of testimony, standing alone, may not
warrant the court in submitting the claim of a party in sup-
port of which they are offered to the jury, the court may be
warranted in submitting all of the facts and circumstances
which the evidence tends to establish, and in leaving it to
the jury to determine, as a question of fact, whether all of
the facts proven, and the inferences properly deducible
therefrom, will, together with attendant circumstances, make
out such claim. Id.
3. The finding of the jury on a disputed question of fact is
conclusive. Wolf v. Irwin, 344.
4. In this case the judgment is reversed for the error of the
court in deciding that plaintiff had been defrauded, which
was a question for the jury. Davidson v. Bennett, 614.
5. Where exhibits have been fully proven and admitted in
evidence, and their authenticity is unquestioned, and there is
no testimony to impeach their contents, it is within the
discretion of the trial court to allow them to be taken to the
jury-room, although objection is made. Tubbs v. Dwelling-
house Insurance Co., 647.
See CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS; EVIDENCE (15);, LIFE INSUR-
ANCE (2, 3); NEGLIGENCE (1); PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURT;
PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT (3); SALE (6).
KENT COUNTY CIRCUIT JUDGE-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(4-6).
The vendor in a land contract took the note of the vendee,
which was signed by a surety, as security for the payment of
the first installment due on the contract, after which he con-
veyed the land and delivered the note to his grantee, who
paid him the full purchase price named in the contract. The
grantee then purchased from the vendee his interest in the
land, and the contract was surrendered to him, after which
he conveyed the land by warranty deed, and sold the note,
then past due, and the purchaser sued the maker and surety.
And it is held that on the surrender of the contract the
entire interest in the land merged in the vendor's grantee,
who conveyed the land by warranty deed, and could not
thereafter maintain any action against the vendee to recover
any portion of the purchase price under the contract, nor
against the vendee and the surety upon the note, and the
plaintiff, having purchased the note after maturity, stands in
no better position than said grantee. Ashoff v. Van Brunt,
575.
LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7–9).
LIABILITY OF MARRIED WOMEN-See MARRIED WOMAN.
LIABILITY OF STATE-See COSTS (1).
1. The fact that an article is libelous per se does not render
evidence of special damages, or of specific acts of others
towards the plaintiff in consequence of its publication,
admissible, unless alleged in the declaration. McDuff v.
Detroit Evening Journal Co., 1.
2. Under an allegation of general damages in a libel suit, the
issue is, what damages has the plaintiff sustained generally in
the community where he is known, by the publication of the
libelous article? and not what he has suffered in individual
instances where those who have known him have treated him
differently from what they did before. In the latter case, if
he wishes to recover damages, he must allege them. Id.
3. A son was made trustee of his father's estate, and changed
his residence to accept the trust. He brought a libel suit for
an alleged false publication charging him with having "got
away with the property," and with leaving his parents in a
starving condition, and on the trial one of his witnesses was
asked if he did not send for plaintiff to come and take charge
of the estate, and answered, under objection, that he did, the
communication being made by letter; which testimony is held
irrelevant, it being of no consequence how he came to take
charge of the estate, but, if material, the letter was the only
competent evidence of the fact. Id.
4. An editorial in a newspaper published in another state,
referring to the subject-matter of an article for the publica-
tion of which a libel suit is brought, but which is not shown
to have been based upon such publication, is inadmissible as
evidence in said suit, and if admitted the error is not cured
by striking it out of the case. Id.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-Continued.
5. Prior to the passage of Act No. 192, Laws of 1879 (How.
Stat. § 9315), the statutes contained no express provision for
the punishment of libel and slander, but they were punish-
able as misdemeanors at the common law, under How. Stat.
§ 9261. Glassmire v. Circuit Judge, 447.
6. It was the evident intention of the Legislature in enacting
Act No. 192, Laws of 1879 (How. Stat. § 9315), to exclude
from its operation non-enumerated cases of libel and slander
known to the common law, namely, where one is held up to
contempt and ridicule, and possibly where one may be
charged with having a loathsome disease.
LIEN-See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT (2); CHATTEL MORTGAGE (1, 3).
LIFE-ESTATE-See CONDITION SUBSEQUENT.
LIFE EXPECTANCY-See DAMAGES (7).
1. The acceptance of a policy of insurance which expressly
negatives the right of the agent to waive or alter any of its
conditions estops the assured from setting up or relying upon
any action on the part of the agent in opposition to such
prohibition. Cook v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance
Co., 12.
2. Whether proofs of death comply with the requirements of
an insurance policy is a question for the court, and if that
issue is tendered by the defendant the proofs furnished may
be put in evidence and read to the court, but they are mat-
ters in which the jury are in no way concerned. Id. 13.
3. In such a case, where there is no contention on the part of
the company but that preliminary proofs were furnished in
full compliance with the terms of the policy, it is error to
permit the plaintiff to read such proofs in full to the jury,
including an affidavit of an eye-witness of the accident
causing death, the physician's statement, and the certificate
of the coroner, which may have had their influence upon
the jury, and have been taken by them as proof of the facts
therein contained. Id.
4. A railroad switchman applied for insurance to an agent of
a life insurance company whose powers were in no way
restricted by the printed application, which the agent filled
out, and a copy of which was delivered to the applicant
with his policy. The applicant correctly stated to the agent
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