was perfectly blank, with the exception of the acceptance: there was a stamp on it, and he noticed a stain in the left hand upper corner. The prisoner afterwards produced the blank acceptance with the name C. Taylor as drawer, and C. Taylor as endorser. Nothing else was then written on it. Edwards then desired the prisoner to draw the body of the bill, which he did. It was proved that an acid had been used on that part of the paper where the stain was, and that an acid applied there would have the effect of discharging ink. The jury found the prisoner guilty, and they were of opinion that the figures denoting £200 were in the corner of the paper when taken away by the prisoner from Mr Jenner, and also that the authority to fill up the bill was confined to £200. Upon a case reserved, it was contended that the facts amounted only to a fraud, and did not constitute forgery, as the prisoner had authority to draw a bill, and a mere excess of authority was a fraud only, and not forgery; but the judges were unanimously of opinion that filling up the bill for £500, the prisoner having no authority beyond £200, was a false making of a bill for £500, and that the conviction was therefore right (1)

Filling in (without authority) the body of a blank check to which a signature is attached, is a forgery. The prisoners were indicted for uttering a forged check, and it appeared that one Townsend was in the habit of signing blank checks, and leaving them with his clerk when business called him away from home; one of these checks fell into the hands of the prisoners, who filled up the blank with the words" one hundred pounds," and dated it; it was objected that the signature being genuine, it could not be said that the prisoner had uttered a forged instrument; but Bayley, J. held that it was a forgery of the check. By filling in the body and dating it, it was made a perfect instrument, which it previously was not, and, a though it was not in point of fact made entirely by the prisoners, yet it had been held that the doing that, which is necessary to make an imperfect instrument a perfect one, is a forgery of the whole. (2)

If a person put the name of another on a bill of exchange as acceptor without the other's authority, expecting to be able to meet it when due, or expecting that such other person will overlook it, it is forgery. But if the person either had authority from such other person, or from the course of their dealings bond fide considered that he had such authority, it is not forgery. The prisoner was charged with forging, and with uttering a forged acceptance to the following bill of exchange :

«£25.

Cheltenham, July 16th, 1834.

Three months after date pay to my order twenty-five pounds, for value received.

JOHN FORBES.

WILLIAM, PROSSER, jun., Esq., Cheltenham.

Accepted, payable at Messrs. Esdaile & Co., bankers, London.

WILLIAM PROSSER, jun."

The prisoner had paid away this bill, with the acceptance upon it, to a butcher to pay a debt of £4, and had taken the difference. Mr. Prosser proved that the acceptance was not in his handwriting, and that he had never given the prisoner authority to put his name on any bill or security of any kind. The prisoner was an architect engaged in building houses for Mr. Prosser, who had recommended the prisoner to raise money, which, when raised, the prisoner was to draw upon, under Mr. Prosser's superintendence, and it was sought on the part of the defence to raise an inference that he considered he had a right to use Mr. Prosser's name.

(1) R. v. Minter Hart, Mood, C. C. 486; 7 C. & P. 652 : R. v. Wilson, 1 Den, 284; 2 C. & K. 527; See R. v. Richardson, 2 F, & F. 343.

(2) R. v. Wright, 1 Lew. 135.

Coleridge, J., said, "If the prisoner drew the bill mentioned in the indictment, and which he knew could not become due for some months after he did so, and then put Mr. Prosser's name on it, without his authority, either intending to meet it, or trusting that he should have money to do so, or trusting that Mr. Prosser would overlook it, the prisoner is guilty of forgery; but if you think that the state of affairs between the prisoner and Mr. Prosser was such that he had Mr. Prosser's authority to accept this bill, then it is not a forgery. If a person gives another leave to use his name on bills, and the person thus permitted writes the name of such person on a bill, this is, as it were, a signing by the person who gave the authority, although he had given no authority for the putting his name on that particular bill. The question which I shall leave to you is this, whether the name of Mr Prosser was put on the bill mentioned in the indictment without the authority of Mr. Prosser; or, was it written on the bill by the prisoner, under such circumstances that he might bona fide consider that he had Mr. Prosser's authority for so doing, as in the latter case you ought to acquit him." (1)

Nothing short of bona fide belief that the defendant had authority and a fair ground for that belief, from the acts of the party whose name is used, is sufficient. Thus where A. was indicted for forging and uttering an acceptance on a bill of exchange in the name of B., and B. admitted that he had had money transactions with A and had been connected with him as a partner in a hat manufactory and that they had had many bill transactions and had trusted each other largely, and that a mutual accomodation existed between them, Coleridge, J., in his summing up, said, "We now come to B's statement that he has been for the last eight years in habits of great intimacy with the prisoner and in partnership with him. Now, I put the question whether, though he had not authorized the signing of his name on that particular bill, he had ever given the prisoner a general authority. If he had said to the prisoner, You may use my name whenever you like,' it would be idle to say that the acceptance was a forgery. It is not merely writing another man's name, but writing it, without authority and with intend to defraud. But I go further: I think that if a person had reasonable ground for believing, from the acts of the party, that he had authority to accept and did in point of fact act on that, it would not be forgery. Let me suppose one or two cases: -Suppose the prisoner to have meant to raise £200 for two or three months, and trusted that at the end of that time he should be able to repay it, if he used another person's name, without authority and not believing that he had authority, that would be a distinct forgery. No man has a right to use another's name, trusting that he may be able to take up the bill. So, if a person having no authority were to say, I want to raise a sum of money, and I am sure my father is so fond of me that he will not proceed against me criminally,' and were to write his father's name to an acceptance, that would be forgery. No man has a right to trust to the kindness of another man. If you are of opinion that the prisoner acted in either of those ways, knowing that he had no authority but meaning to repay the bill or trusting that the prosecutor would not prosecute, in either of those cases, this would be forgery. There can be nothing short of the person believing that he had authority and having a fair ground for that belief from the other party. The authority need not be express; it may be implied from acts I put the question to see whether the prisoner had any reason for thinking that he had authority to use Mr. Woodman's name. Now, you are to judge whether you have any reason to believe, looking at the circumstances fairly between the crown and the prisoner, not stretching on one side or on the other, that the prisoner believed that he had authority, and from the circumstances had reasonable grounds for so believing. There was great intimacy between these parties: and there had been a great many dealings between them. All which is to be taken into account. You certainly find that, the moment Mr. Woodman is called upon, he does not pay the bill, and he does not in the least adopt the

(1) R. v. Forbes, 7 C. & P. 224. See R. v. Hill, 8 C & P. 274; R, v. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 582.

act that was done by the prisoner: that is really the only point in the case." (1)

It was at one time, considered that where the document was imperfect or such as would if genuine have no legal effect it would be no forgery; as, for instance. where a document was imperfect as a bill,-writing a name across it to be used as an acceptance, was held not to be a forgery of an acceptance; (2) and where a defendant was indicted for forging a will of lands, and the will was not one which purported to be attested by the legal number of witnesses, it was held that the defendant could not be convicted. (3) The same ruling was upheld in regard to a country bank note or bill of exchange, which, for want of a signature, was incomplete, and also in regard to a navy-bill payable in blank. (4) But there are decisions which seem to be in a different sense from the foregoing. For instance, it was held that a forgery might be committed of an instrument made on unstamped paper, notwithstanding that the particular instrument was subject to some law requiring it to be stamped; it being held in reference, for example to a bill of exchange, which under the English stamp acts required to be stamped, that such Acts declaring that a bill without a stamp should not be pleaded or given in evidence or be available in law or in equity, signified cnly that it should not be made use of to recover the debt. (5) And it was held that a man might be convicted of forging and uttering a bill of exchange although the name of the payee was not endorsed on it. (6) A man was also held indictable for forging a deed, though not made in pursuance of the provisions of particular statutes requiring it to be in a particular form. (7) And where a man forged an instrument which if genuine could not have been made available by reason of some circumstance not appearing upon the face of the instrument, but to be made out by some extrinsic evidence, he was held indictable for the forgery. (8)

It has been adjudged that the forgery of a protection in the name of A. B., as being a member of parliament, who in truth at the time was not a member, is as much an offence at common law, as if he were so. (9)

64

In a case where the defendant was convicted upon an indictment which stated that one Garbut and his wife were seized in fee of certain messuages, lands, and tenements, called Jawick, in the parish of Clacton, in Essex, and that the defendant intending to molest them, and their interest in the premises, forged a lease and release as from Garbut and his wife, whereby they were supposed for a valuable consideration to convey to him all that park called Jawick, in the parish of Clacton, in Essex, containing eight acres in circumference, with all the deer, wood, &c., thereto belonging," it was moved in arrest of judgment, that the premises supposed to be conveyed were so materially different from those really belonging to Garbut and his wife, that it was impossible this conveyance could ever molest or disturb them. But the court held that it was not necessary, that there should be a charge, or a possibility of a charge, and that it was sufficient if it were done with such intent, and that the jury had found that it was done with intent to molest Garbut and his wife in the possession of their land. (10)

(1) R. v. Beard, 8 C & P. 143.

(2) R. v. Cooke, 8 C. & P 582; R. v. Butterwick, 2 M. & R. 196.

(3) R. v. Wall, 2 East, P. C. 953. See also, R. v. Moffatt, 1 Leach, 431.

(4) R. v. Richards, R. & R. 193; R. v. Randall, R. & R. 195; R. v. Pateman, R. & R. 455; R. v. Burke, R. & R. 496; R. v. Turpin, 2 C. & K. 820; R. v. Harper, 7 Q. B. D. 78; 50 L. J. (M. C.) 90.

(5) R. v. Hawkeswood, 2 T. R. 606; 1 Leach, 257; 2 East, P. C. 955; See R. V. Lee, 1 Leach, 258, and R. v. Lyons, R. & R. 255; R. v. Froud, R. & R. 389; R. v. Morton, 2 East, P. C. 955; R. v. Pike, 2 Moo. C. C. R. 70; R. v. Reculist, 2 Leach, 703.

(6) R. v. Wickes, R. & R. 149.

(7) R. v. Lyon, R. & R. 255.

(8) R. v. McIntosh, 2 Leach, 833; 2 East, P. C. 942.

(9) R. v. Deakin, | Sid., 142; 2 East, P. C. 948.

(10) R. v. Crooke, 2 Str. 901; 2 East, P. C. 921.

Where an indictment was for forgery at common law of a surrender of the lands of J. S., and it was not shown in the indictment that J. S. had any lands, it was holden upon motion in arrest of judgment that the indictment was good, upon the principle that it was not necessary to show that the party was prejudiced, the intent to prejudice being sufficient. (1)

It was held, in several cases, that forgery might be committed by the false making of an instrnment, purporting to be the will of a person still living; notwithstanding the objection, that during the life of a party his will is ambulatory, and can have no validity as a will until his death. Thus, a prisoner was convicted for forging the will of a seaman, who it appeared was still alive, and had returned to England two years after the prize money had been received by the prisoner, under the forged will. (2) In a subsequent case, where the prisoner was indicted and convicted for forging the last will and testament of a woman who was still living, and was a witness on the trial, the judgment was respited upon a doubt, whether as the supposed testatrix was living, the prisoner was legally convicted of having forged her last will and testament; there being no such instrument as a last will and testament in contemplation of law, until after the death of the person making it; but the judges were unanimously of opinion, that an instrument may be the subject of forgery, although in fact it should appear impossible for such an instrument as the instrument forged to exist, provided it purports on the face of it to be good and valid, as to the purposes for which it was intended to be made. (3) The point was again referred to the consideration of the judges, in a case where the prisoner was indicted and convicted for knowingly uttering and publishing as true, a certain false and forged will of one J. G., late a seaman belonging to a merchant vessel, and it appeared, that the said J. G. was living. All the judges held the conviction right. It was observed by the learned judge, who delivered their opinion, that every will must be made in the lifetime of the party, whose will it was; that it existed as a will in his lifetime, though not to take effect till his death; that the making a false instrument importing on the face of it to be a will was equally forgery, whether the person whose will it purported to be were dead or alive, at the time of making it; that a contrary doctrine would operate as a repeal of the law; for if the act of making the will were not forgery at the time, a publication afterwards would not make it so. Buller, J., thought the very definition of forgery decided the doubt, for it was the making a false instrument with intent to deceive; and that here the intention to deceive had been established by the jury, and the instrument purporting to be a will was clearly false. (4)

On an indictment for forging a will the probate of that will unrevoked is not conclusive evidence of its validity so as to be a bar to the prosecution. (5)

A prisoner was convicted of forging a will of a non-existing person. He was indicted for forging the will of Jane Warner, and it appeared that there was no such person; on which it was objected that the forgery of the will of a nonexisting person was no forgery. Patterson, J., "There is nothing to limit the offence to the forgery only of the wills of persons that have existed.” (6)

There can, no longer, be any doubt that imperfections and defects in a forged document will not enable the forger to escape punishment; for clause 4 of article 422 expressly declares that the forgery is complete, although the false document may be incomplete or may not purport to be such a document as would be binding in law, if it be so made as to be acted on as genuine, and is such as to indicate that it was intended to be acted on as genuine.

423. Punishment of forgery.—Every one who commits forgery of the documents hereinafter mentioned is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to the following punishment :

(4.) To imprisonment for life,-if the document forged purports to be, or was intended by the offender to be understood to be or to be used as

(a) any document having impressed thereon or affixed thereto any public seal of the United Kingdom or any part thereof, or of Canada or any part thereof, or of any dominion, possession or colony of Her Majesty; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 4; or

(b.) any document bearing the signature of the Governor General, or of any administrator, or of any deputy of the Governor, or of any Lieutenant-Governor or any one at any time administering the government of any province of Canada; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 5; or

(c.) any document containing evidence of, or forming the title or any part of the title to, any land or hereditament, or to any interest in or to any charge upon any land or hereditament, or evidence of the creation, transfer or extinction of any such interest or charge; or

(d) any entry in any register or book, or any memorial or other document made, issued, kept or lodged under any Act for or relating to the registering of deeds or other instruments respecting or concerning the title to or any claim upon any land or the recording or declaring of titles to land; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 38; or

(e.) any document required for the purpose of procuring the registering of any such deed or instrument or the recording or declaring of any such title; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 38; or

(f.) any document which is made, under any Act, evidence of the registering or recording or declaring of any such deed, instrument or title; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 38; or

(g.) any document which is made by any Act evidence affecting the title to land; or

(h) any notarial act or document or authenticated copy or any procès-verbal of a surveyor or authenticated copy thereof; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 38; or

(i) any register of births, baptisms, marriages, deaths or burials authorized or required by law to be kept, or any certified copy of any entry in or extract from any such register ; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 43; or

(j) any copy of any such register required by law to be transmitted by or to any registrar or other officer; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 44; or

(k.) any will, codicil or other testamentary document, either of a dead or living person, or any probate or letters of administration, whether with or without the will annexed; R.S.C., c. 165, s. 27; or

(1) any transfer or assignment of any share or interest in any stock, annuity or public fund of the United Kingdom or any part thereof, or of Canada or any part thereof, or of any dominion,