Bishop's definition is as follows:-" Conspiracy is the corrupt agreeing to gether of two or more persons to do, by concerted action, something unlawful either as a means or an end; (1) and he remarks, as the gist of the offence,namely, the combination,-that, "In many circumstances, if two or more combine to do a wrong,—whether, as the means to something else, or, as the contemplated end,—such mere combining more endangers or disturbs the community than would the executed wrong accomplished by a single will. This is the central idea in the law of conspiracy." It is, doubtless, on account of the dangerous nature of the offence, as affecting the community at large, that the legislature has considered it expedient, in many instances, to deal more severely with a conspiracy to commit an offence than with the offence itself when committed, independently of any conspiracy. We thus find a challenge to fight a duel punishable by three years imprisonment, (Art. 91, anle); that either, to spread false news injurious to the public, (Art. 126 ante), or to publish a blasphemous libel, (Art. 170 ante), is punishable by one year's imprisonment, and that an assault occasioning bodily harm is punishable by three years imprisonment, (article 262, ante); but a conspiracy to commit any one of these offences would be punishable by seven years imprisonment. (See art. 527, posl.) The following are examples of conspiracies to defraud, punishable under the present article, 394. A conspiracy to impose pretended wine upon a man as and for true and good Portugal wine in exchange for goods (2); A conspiracy to defraud the public by means of a mock auction, that is, an auction with sham bidders, who pretend to be real bidders, for the purpose of selling goods at prices grossly above their worth; (3) A conspiracy by a female servant and a man whom she got to marry her, to impersonate her master in order to defraud her master's relations of a part of his property after his death; (4) A conspiracy to injure a man in his trade or profession; (5) A conspiracy to shew by false and fraudulent representations that a horse bought by one of the defendants from the prosecutor was unsound, in order to induce him to accept less for it than the agreed price; (6) A conspiracy to raise by false rumors the price of public funds; (7) A conspiracy, by the promoters of a joint stock company, to cheat and defraud, means of false pretences, those who might buy shares in the company; (8) A conspiracy by persons to cause themselves to be reputed men of property, in order to defraud tradesmen; (9) A conspiracy to defraud by means of false representations of the solvency of a bank or other mercantile establishment; (10) A conspiracy to defraud the public by issuing and negociating bills in the name of a fictitious and pretended banking firm; (11) (1) 2 Bish. New Cr. L. Com. s. 171. (2) R. v. Macarty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1179. (3) R. v. Lewis, 11 Cox, 404. (4) R. v. Taylor, 1 Leach, 47. (5) R. v. Eceles, 1 Leach, 274. (6) R. v. Carlile, Dears, 337; 23 L. J. (M. C.) 109. (7) R. v. Aspinall 2 Q. B. D. 59; 46 L. J. (M. C.) 150; R. v. DeBeranger 3 M. & Sel. 67. (8) R. v. Aspinall, 1 Q. B. D. 730; 45 L. J. (M. C.) 129; 2 Q. B. D. 48; 46 L. J. (M. C.) 145. (9) R. v. Roberts, 1 Camp. 399. (10) R. v. Esdaile, 1 F. & F. 213. A conspiracy by traders to dispose of their goods in contemplation of bankruptcy, with intent to defraud their creditors; (1) A conspiracy between A., one of two partners in a partnership concern and B. a third party to enable A. to cheat C., his partner, with regard to the division of the partnership property on a contemplated dissolution of the partnership (2) A. and B. agreed together that A. should purchase, and that B. should aid him in purchasing goods on credit, apparently as an ordinary purchaser, A, not intending to pay for them, and B. knowing that he did not intend to pay. Held, a conspiracy to defraud. (3) If the parties conspire to obtain money by false pretences of existing facts it seems to be no objection to the indictment for conspiracy that the money was to be obtained through the medium of a contract (4) See articles 613 and 616, post, as to requisites of indictment. An indictment charging a conspiracy" by divers false pretences and indirect means to cheat and defraud A. of his monies," was held good. (5) But au indictment charging a conspiracy to defraud the creditor of W. E. (not saying of what), was held too general. (6) The conspiracy itself is the offence, that is to say the offence is completed by the combination and agreement; (7) and, therefore, it is not necessary, although it is usual, to set out, in the indictment, the overt acts, that is, those acts which may have been done by any of the conspirators, in order to effect the common purpose of the conspiracy. (8) A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more, to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such design rests in intention, only, it is not indic table. A conspiracy must, from its nature, be by two persons, or more; one man alone cannot be tried and convicted of it, unless he be indicted for conspiring with other persons to the jurors unknown; (9) or unless he be charged with having conspired with others who have not appeared, (10) or who are since dead. (11) And where two persons are indicted for conspiring together, and they are tried together, both must be convicted or both acquitted. (12) Where A. B. and C. were charged in an indictment for having conspired together and with divers other persons to the jurors unknown, etc., and the jury found that A. had conspired with either B., or C., but they could not say which, and there was no evidence against any other persons than the three defendants, A. was held entitled to an acquittal. (13) A count in an indictment charged eight defendants with one conspiracy to effect certain objects; and a finding that three of them were guilty generally, (1) R. v. Hall, 1 F. & F. 33. (2) R. v. Warburton, L. R., I C.C.R., 274 ; 40 L. J. (M. C.) 22. (3) R. v. Orman, 14 Cox, 381. (4) R. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 49; Dan. & M. 208; 12 L. J. (M. C) 135. (5) R. v. Gompertz, 9 Q. B. 824. (6) R. v. Fowle, 4 C & P. 592. (7) R. v. Thayer., 5 L. N. 162. (8) R. v. Gill, 2 B. & Ald. 204: R, v, Seward, 1. A & E. 70; 3 L. J. (M. C.) 103 R. v. Richardson, I M. & Rob. 402; 19 | Hawk c. 72, s. 8. (10) R. v. Kinnersley, I Str. 193. (1) R. v. Nicholls, 2 Str 1227. (12) R. v. Manning 12 Q. B. D. 241; 53 L. J. (M. C.) 85. (13) R. v. Thompson, 16 Q. B., 852: 20 L. J. M. C.) 183. and that the other five were guilty of conspiracy to effect some of the objects, and not guilty as to the residue, was held bad and repugnant, the principle underlying the decision in that case being this, that where there are two or more persons charged with conspiracy in the same count, the count is a single and complete count, and cannot be separated into parts. (1) With reference to the proof of a conspiracy, the commission of the offence is generally a matter of inference to be deduced from. certain acts of the parties accused done in common between them in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose (2) General evidence of the nature of the conspiracy may be gone into before adducing evidence to connect the different defendants with it. (3) The acts and declarations of any of the conspirators in furtherance of the common design may be given in evidence against all of them. But before evidence of the acts of one conspirator can be given against the others, the existence of the conspiracy must be proved, and that the act in question was an act done in furtherance of the common design (4) See, as to treasonable conspiracies, article 66, as to seditions conspiracies, articles 123, and 124, as to conspiracies to intimidate a legislature, article 79, as to conspiracies to bring false accusations, article 152, as to conspiracies to defile women, article 188, and as to conspiracies to murder, article 234; and see, also, article 527, post. 395. Cheating at play.-Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to three years' imprisonment who, with intent to defraud any person, cheats in playing at any game, or in holding the stakes, or in betting on any event. R.S.C., c. 164, s 80. The Imperial statute 8 & 9, Vict. c. 109, s. 17, treats and punishes cheating at play as an obtaining by false pretences. Where the offence is committed by two or more persons, and there is any doubt whether the facts are such as to bring the case within this article, a count should be added charging a conspiracy to cheat or a conspiracy to defraud. As to gaming houses, betting houses, etc., see articles 196, 197 and 199, p.p. 117, 118 and 121, ante; and as to gambling in public conveyances, poolselling, and lotteries see articles 203, 204, and 205, p.p. 122 and 123, ante 896. Witchcraft, Fortune-Telling &c.—Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to one year's imprisonment who pretends to exercise or use any kind of witchcraft, sorcery, enchantment or conjuration, or undertakes to tell fortunes, or pretends from his skill or knowledge in any occult or crafty science, to discover where or in what manner any goods or chattels supposed to have been stolen or lost may be found. The English Commissionners have opposite to this section a marginal note referring to 9 Geo. 2, c. 5, s. 4. It is not long since the Montreat Star had the following article on the law relating to fortune-telling: "Toronto lawyers are at present considering the question as to whether for tune-telling is an indictable offence. A diligent search into the precedents has (1) O'Connell v R 11 Cl. & J. 155; See R. v. Manning, supra. (2) R v Brisac, 4 East. 171. (3) R. v. Hammond, 2 Esp. 718. (4) R. v. Shellard, 9 C & P. 277; R. v. Blake, 6 Q. B. 126; 13 L. J. (M. C.) 131; Arch. Cr. Pl. & Ev. 21 Ed. 1106. resulted in the disinterment of an English statute which affixed the death penalty to the committal of any such act. When we remember that a similar heroic treatment was applied in the case of sheep stealing, we are inclined to look for authority elsewhere than in obsolete statutes. Probably when the diligent investigators return to the light of the present day, after their explorations in the catacombs of precedent, they will perceive that obtaining money or goods under pretext of foretelling is punishable at common law, as presumably so doing under false pretences. This principle is plainly recognized by the Vagrant Act, which was hardly more than a consolidation of the common law on the subject, with a view to its presentment in a clearly-defined form. By this act all rogues and vagabonds' are considered as beggars, and are punishable under the statute as such. Rogues and vagabonds' comprehend all exposers of wounds, loiterers and fortunetellers. If it is advisable to suppress this practice, the foregoing enactment seems better calculated to subserve the interests of justice than the revival of the old statutes against witchcraft, against which both humanity and enlightenment revolt." There is no doubt that the old English statutes treated the offence of witchcraft or sorcery with the greatest severity, the crime being ranked in the same class with heresy and those found guilty of practicing being consigned to the flames. In the reign of Henry VIII a statute was passed enacting, that all witchcraft and sorcery should be deemed felony, without benefit of clergy, which punishment, in the reign of James I, was awarded to any one invoking any evil spirit, or consulting, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feeding or rewarding any such spirit, or exhuming dead bodies to be used in any witchcraft, sorcery, charm or enchantment, or killing or hunting any person by such infernal arts. And if any person should attempt by sorcery to discover hidden treasures, or to restore stolen goods, or to provoke unlawful love, or to hurt any man or beast, though not consummated, he should suffer imprisonment and the pillory for the first offence, and death for the second. Under these and similar acts many poor wretches were sacrificed to the prejudices of their neighbors, and their own illusions, not a few having confessed the fact at the gallows. By the statute of Geo. II, above referred to, the old acts were repealed, and the punishment was made one year's imprisonment and the pillory for pretending to exercise witchcraft or sorcery; or to tell or pretend to tell fortunes or discover stolen goods by skill in the occult sciences. (1) PART XXIX. ROBBERY AND EXTORTION. 397. Robbery.-Robbery is theft accompanied with violence or threats of violence to any person or property used to extort the property stolen, or to prevent or overcome resistance to its being stolen. 398. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life and to be whipped who (a) robs any person and at the time of, or immediately before, or (1) 2 Russ. Cr. 3 Ed. 316. immediately after such robbery wounds, beats, strikes, or uses personal violence to such person; or (b.) being together with any other person or persons robs, or assaults with intent to rob, any person; or (c.) being armed with an offensive weapon or instrument robs, or assaults with intent to rob, any person. R.S.C., c. 164, s. 34. 399. Every one who commits robbery is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment. R.S.C., c. 164, s. 32. 400. Every one who assaults any person with intent to rob him is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to three years' imprisonment. R.S.C., c. 164, s. 33. Robbery is a stealing from the person aggravated by circumstances either of actual force and violence or of threats of violence; a threat of violence being ooked upon by the law as constructive violence. (1) When robbery is committed in an open street, road, or square it is called highway robbery. If there be any actual wounding or beating of the person robbed, it will be an aggravated robbery, punishable under article 398; if not, it will be a robbery, punishable under article 399. If the complete offence be not proved the jury may, according to the actual facts, find a verdict of guilty of an attempt (See article 711 post), or of an assault with intent to rob, or of stealing from the person, or of a common assault, etc. (See article 713, post.) The difference between robbery and stealing from the person is that the former is open and violent, while the latter may be and generally is done clandestinely. In robbery, force is a necessary ingredient; in simple stealing from the person, it is not. For instance, merely snatching property from a person, unawares and running off with it, is not robbery. The rule appears to be well established that no such sudden taking or snatching is sufficient to constitute robbery, unless at the same time some injury be done to the person, or there be a previous struggle for the possession of the property, or some violence, or threats of violence, used to obtain it. (2) Thus, where a boy was carrying a bundle along the street in his hand, after it was dark, and the prisoner ran past him, and snatched it suddenly away, it was holden that the act was not done with the degree of force and terror necessary to constitute robbery. (3) And the same was holden in a case where it appeared that as two little boys were carrying a parcel of cloth to one of the inns at Bath, for the purpose of its being carried by a stage-coach to London, the prisoner came up suddenly, snatched the cloth from the head of one of them, and ran off with it. (4) The same doctrine has been held in three other cases; in one of which the hat and wig of a gentleman were snatched from his head in the street; (5) in another, an umbrella was snatched suddenly out of the hand of a woman, as she was walking along the street; (6) and in a third, a watch was jerked, with considerable force, out of a watch-pocket. (7) (1) Donolly's case, 1 Leach, 196, 197. (2) Reg. v. Baker, 1 Leach 290; R. v. Walls, 2 C. & K. 214; R. v. Moore, 1 Leach, C. C. 325; Reg. v. Walton, L. & C. 288; 4 Bl. Com. 243; R. v. Macauley, 1 Leach, 287. R. v. Steward, 2 East, P. C. 702. (3) R. v. Macauley, supra. (6) R. v. Horner, 5 East, P. C. 703. |