1. A memorandum of sale which does not satisfy the statute
of frauds, is inadmissible in evidence in an action for
breach of a sales contract. Pottery Co. v. Onken Bros.
Co., 287.
2. A memorandum of sale in order to satisfy the statute of
frauds, must contain the substantial terms of the contract,
expressed with such certainty that they may be understood
from the contract itself, or some other writing to which it
refers, without resorting to parol evidence, and when
STATUTE OF FRAUDS—Continued.
reference is made in the memorandum to another writing,
it must be so clear as to prevent the possibility of one
paper being substituted for another. Id.
3. A sales order describing the subject matter of the contract
as "1 car stoneware as per orders shown for same" is too
indefinite to fulfill the requirements of the statute of
frauds, and was properly excluded from evidence. Id.
287-288.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
1. A construction of a statute by the legislature as indicated
by the language of a subsequent enactment is entitled to
great weight. Peterson v. Town of Guernsey, 272.
2. To justify the presumption of an intent to repeal one
statute by the enactment of another, either the two
statutes must be irreconcilable, or the intent to effect a
repeal must be otherwise clearly expressed. State v. Carey,
300.
3. Where two legislative acts are repugnant to, or in conflict
with each other, the one last passed, being the latest ex-
pression of the legislative will, must govern although it
contains no repealing clause. Id.
STOCKHOLDERS.
See Banks and Banking, 6-8.
SUPREME COURT.
1. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred
by the constitution, and it has only such power in cases
originally brought before it, as is directly conferred by that
instrument, or necessary to a full exercise of the powers
conferred. State v. True, 314.
2. The Supreme Court has only such jurisdiction to issue the
writ of prohibition and other writs as is directly con-
ferred by the constitution, or necessary to a full exercise
of the powers conferred. Id.
3. A district judge called in to hear a case in the Supreme
Court under Const. art. 5, sec. 6, and as amended (see
Laws 1917, c. 115) is a "justice" of the Supreme Court
within the meaning of Const. art. 5, secs. 4, 5, providing
that the justices of such court shall be elected, and that a
majority shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. Phelan
v. Cheyenne Brick Co., 496.
TAXATION. See Action, 1-4; Injunction, 1.
1. Where tender of payment of notes is refused for reasons
other than that it does not constitute an offer of lawful
money, or is not the kind of money or property in which
payment is to be made by the terms of the contract, the
creditor waives that objection. H. E. Wright Co. v.
Douglas, 306.
See Pleadings, 4; Attorneys' Fees, 5.
TRESPASS. See Animals, 1-3.
UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES. See Interest, 1, 2.
VARIANCE. See Mechanics' Liens, 8.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
1. Where vendors agreed to convey all lands to which it se-
cured good title during a two-year period and at the ex-
piration of the period to submit muniments of title to
named arbiters for determination as to sufficiency of its
title to lands not theretofore conveyed, they were not re-
quired, upon expiration of the period, to tender the deed
to land for which they had only such muniments of title
possessed at date of contract, and were not bound to sub-
mit such muniments of title to arbiters; purchasers having
been dissatisfied therewith at date of contract. Merrill v.
Cattle Co., 219.
2. Where a corporation, having arranged to distribute the
assets to its stockholders according to their respective
interests, agreed to convey to certain stockholders such
lands as it could perfect its title to during two-year period,
and gave the stockholders possession thereof during such
period, time was of the essence of the contract. Id.
3. Vendor being owner of forest lieu scrip in the name of
another, giving it the right to select, enter, and patent in
the name of such other party, vacant public lands, and
having agreed to convey such lands to which it is able to
obtain title during a certain period, was not bound to con-
vey land patented during period, where the land was not
conveyed to vendor by grantee named in patent within
period. Id.
4. Title passes to grantee named in patent to United States
vacant public land on date that patent is issued and re-
corded in proper office at Washington. Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Continued.
5. A contract, requiring vendor to convey lands to which it
obtains title during certain period and to submit to arbiters
at expiration of period such "muniments of title as it or
its agents or trustees then possess or possesses," construed
to provide for submission to arbiters of documentary evi-
dence of title in actual possession and control of vendor,
as distinguished from constructive possession, at the ex-
piration of period. Id.
6. If a land contract be construed as obligating vendors to sell
after a certain date and does not obligate purchasers to
accept land after such date, it is lacking in mutuality and
will not be specifically enforced. Id. 220.
7. Where purchasers, knowing that vendors had obtained title
to land they had agreed to convey upon obtaining title
within a certain period, and knowing of prospective in-
crease in value because of discovery of oil wells on other
lands, did not sue for specific performance until after
tests had been made and the land found to produce oil,
they will be estopped from asserting their right to specific
performance at such time. Id.
8. Specific performance of a land contract is not decreed as a
matter of course, but is granted or withheld according as
equity and justice seem to demand in view of all the cir-
cumstance of the case. Id.
1. A defendant's failure to raise the statute of limitations
either by demurrer or answer constitutes a waiver of the
defense. Watts v. Lawrence, 368.
See Appeal and Error, 36.
WATER RIGHTS.
1. There is no statute requiring that the State Board of Control
be made a party to proceedings on appeal, from its de-
cision to the District Court, notwithstanding that Comp.
Stat., 1910, Section 733, provides that the Attorney General
shall represent the Board of Control in such cases. Hunt
v. City of Laramie, 160.
2. The city which appeared before the State Board of Control
and contested an application to appropriate waters claimed
by the city, was an "aggrieved party" upon the appropria-
tion being granted and could appeal to the District Court
under the provisions of Comp. Stat., 1910, Section 733.
Id.
3. Percolating waters developed artificially by excavations and
other artificial means belong to the owner of the land upon
WATER RIGHTS—Continued.
which they are developed, and cannot be appropriated as
waters of the State under Const., Art. VIII, Sections I
and II. Id. 161.
4. A contract for the sale of water rights for irrigation pro-
viding for delivery at a point to be selected by plaintiff
within three miles of the land, but silent as to the time of
delivery, under which plaintiff indicated the point where
water should be delivered, and defendant commenced to
make delivery in the spring, but failed to make delivery
thereafter during the irrigation season, held sufficient to
support an action for damages, though the first of six
annual installments for payment for the water rights was
not due until after such irrigation season. Irr. Co. v.
La Porte, 249-250.
WILLS. See Deeds, 1, 2, 3.
WORDS AND PHRASES. See Appeal and Error, 39; Oil Leases,
1; Criminal Law, 12.
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