the intervenor do so for he sues not in the interest of any one liable or sought to be made liable to the tax or whose property is sought to be made subject thereto, but in the interest of the county or such general taxpayers as are interested only in the use of county funds to enforce the tax. (1 High on Inj., 4th ed., Sec. 573; 2, Joyce on Inj., Secs. 1228, 1229; Board of Education v. Guy, Co. Auditor, 64 O. St. 434 (60 N. E. 573); State, ex rel. Ewing, et al., v. Board of Education, 72 Mo. 436; Village of Nunda v. Village of Chrystal Lake, 79 Ill. 310; Stiles v. City of Guthrie (3 Okla. 26), 41 Pac. 383; Center Township v. Hunt, 16 Kan. 430; State, ex rel. v. McLaughlin, Co. Treasurer, 15 Kan. 228, 22 Am. Rep. 264.)

In State v. McLaughlin, supra, a suit in the name of the state to restrain a county treasurer from collecting certain school district taxes, the Kansas Supreme Court, by Brewer, Justice, said:

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"It is obvious that the state as a state has no direct interest in this controversy, any more than in a controversy between individuals. The payment of these bonds may be illegal, but their payment works no greater wrong to the state than the payment by a single individual of an illegal debt. The single individual may, if he chooses, by appealing to the ordinary proceedings of the law, protect himself against such illegal payment. So may the many taxpayers. As private citizens, unless specially authorized, may not interfere to compel the performance of a mere public duty, or restrain the doing of a mere public wrong, so the state, having no direct interest, may not interfere to protect individuals from the illegal acts of a public officer where such individuals have, in the ordinary course of the law, ample and adequate means of protection." And in Center Township v. Hunt, supra, the same court said:

"Now suppose they (township bonds) are invalid, still the plaintiff (the township) has no right to enjoin the tax levied upon the taxable property of the various individuals of the township to pay the interest on them. If any tax should be assessed against the plaintiff, the plaintiff might

then perhaps maintain an action to enjoin the tax. But it cannot maintain an action to enjoin a tax assessed against the other taxpayers of the township. One taxpayer cannot enjoin a tax levied against another taxpayer. Each taxpayer must sue for himself, either in an action brought by himself alone, or in an action brought by himself and others with like interests." In the Oklahoma case of Stiles v. City of Guthrie, supra, the city joined with certain residents and taxpayers of the city in an action to enjoin the county treasurer from collecting an alleged illegal tax. The court said:

"The city of Guthrie had no interest whatever in the subject matter of this action. There is no allegation that it had any property which was subjected to this illegal tax, or against which it is claimed that the illegal tax was a lien, and was attempted to be enforced; nor do we know of any law in this territory under which this tax could be a lien against the property of a public corporation, such as a city devoted to public use. * * * The city of Guthrie has no more interest in the question as to whether or not a property owner shall pay an illegal county tax than some other city in the territory, or any of the states would have. The property owner may, in fact, be a resident and citizen of one of these other cities, and the city is under no moral or legal obligation to look after his private interests."

In the Ohio case cited, Board v. Guy, a township board of education sought to enjoin the collection of a tax, levied by the commissioners of the county for the purposes of a newly created joint subdistrict, on the ground that the proceedings for the creation of such district were irregular and void. It was held that the plaintiff board had no right to maintain the action. The court said:

"It is true that the board of education is made by statute a body corporate with capacity to sue and be sued; but capacity to sue is one thing, and right to maintain a particular action is another thing. The plaintiff has no right to maintain this action, and the second ground of demurrer is well taken; and might probably have been raised without

demurrer. * * * A board of education is not a taxpayer; taxes may be levied for its benefit, but it pays none. It has, then, no interest in the subject of the action, nor is it a part of its duty to prosecute it."

In School District v. Commissioners, 15 Wyo. 73, 86 Pac. 24, 11 Ann. Cas. 1058, this court held that a county board had no interest which would enable it, on the ground that a school district in the county was illegally organized, to maintain an action to enjoin the county treasurer from paying to such district moneys collected as taxes levied for the purposes of the district.

The court's refusal to find as a fact that the advertisement of the lands for delinquent taxes was futile and a waste of money is not assigned as error, and does not seem to be insisted upon, for, although referred to as an averment of the petition, it is not discussed in the brief of plaintiffs in error. But the failure to sell the lands offered at former sales for taxes of preceding years, owing to a lack of bidders, if alleged as an independent ground for injunction, would have but little, if any, force. It would not necessarily follow from that fact that there would be no bidders at the sale proposed to be advertised or any future sale under a like notice. And we do not think the court could assume that there would be none. But if such fact could be assumed, or if established by proof, which would obviously be difficult, if not impossible, the court would not, in our opinion, be justified in enjoining on any such ground an act of the tax collector required by statute as one of the steps provided for the enforcement of a tax. The remedy for such a condition, if not already provided by the statute, is for the legislature to prescribe. Notwithstanding a similar condition in Colorado, viz: a lack of purchasers for lands offered at tax sales, and an increasing number of delinquent tax payers from year to year, it was held that bondholders were entitled to mandamus to compel a levy against the lands of an irrigation district to satisfy a judgment upon interest coupons. (Norris v. Montezuma Valley Irr. Dist., 248 Fed. 369.)

Although the injunction is prayed for in a conditional form, its effect, if granted in that form, viz: restraining the publication at the expense of the county, or unless other means should be provided for paying the cost of the publication, might be to prevent the collection of the delinquent district taxes. That was the effect of the restraining order issued at the commencement of the action for it was unqualified, and also directed the treasurer to withdraw from publication any advertisement that may have been handed to a newspaper for that purpose. And unless the statute provides for meeting the expense prior to its collection from taxpayers or upon tax sales, without the use of county funds, the effect of an injunction restraining publication at the expense of the county would probably be the same as an injunction absolute in form. In view, therefore, of the possible effect of the injunction applied for and the confusion it would cause in the collection of the delinquent taxes, the action in that respect should be considered, we think, as an attempt by aid of injunction to prevent the enforcement of such taxes, and as within the rule above stated denying to one in the position of the county or the intervenor the right to an injunction for that purpose.

The statute provides that bonds of an irrigation district and the interest thereon shall be paid by revenue derived from an annual assessment upon the real property of the district, and that such property shall be and remain liable to be assessed for such payments in the manner therein provided. It provides for an assessment and levy in each year as above stated for the purpose of raising such revenue, and for the collection of the taxes by the county treasurer, and declares that for such purposes the revenue laws of the state for the assessment, levying and collection of taxes on real estate for county purposes, except as therein modified, shall be applicable, including the enforcement of penalties and forfeitures for delinquent taxes. Having levied the taxes which the treasurer was proceeding to enforce, the county board should not be heard to question his right to proceed in the manner provided by the statute. Certainly

not, on the ground alone that the county might be required to pay the expense or that it might lay the foundation for a claim and suit against the county therefor. If the county is legally liable for such expense it is because the obligation is created by the law, as a result of a proceeding provided for and commanded by the statute, rather than by the treasurer, who is given no discretion as to whether the lands shall or shall not be advertised for sale. If the county would not be liable for the expense, the fact that a claim might be presented against it therefor, or that it might be sued thereon, would not cause a multiplicity of suits giving a court of equity jurisdiction. Indeed, a single suit would dispose of the matter.

Leaving out the question of the propriety of granting an injunction affecting the collection of taxes levied for the benefit and protection of bondholders in an action where no bondholder is a party, which might well be considered if necessary, we fail to find upon the allegations or the facts any ground for injunction, or, as between the plaintiff or the intervenor and the defendant treasurer, any ground for equity jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs in error are not in any better situation upon their demand for relief against the irrigation district, with respect to this question of jurisdiction. If the district is indebted to the county for the money voluntarily paid upon claims alleged to have been erroneously allowed for publishing the delinquent district tax list with the tax sale notices of previous years, the amount is recoverable at law, and as conveniently as in equity. An accounting is prayed for, but the facts do not present a case for an accounting in equity. as the only relief to be granted. It is not a case of mutual and complicated accounts. The account, if any, is all on one side and consists of four items of money paid. No discovery is sought and there is nothing to show that a discovery is required. Nor is the demand for an accounting aided by any other equitable relief in the cause. There seems to be nothing inherent in the situation, and nothing is disclosed, that would prevent the matter from being as fully