to which jurisdiction he is ready and willing to submit himself for trial at any time for the offences alleged against him. He therefore most respectfully denies the jurisdiction herein of this tribunal, and asks that no further cognizance of the matters charged against him be here taken, but that the same may be hence remitted to the courts of the United States for the northern district of Illinois for trial according to law. T. W. BARTLEY, T. M. KEY, and ROBERT HERVEY, THE UNITED STATES VS. UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSION, BUCKNER S. MORRIS, impleaded, &c. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, SS: At Cincinnati, Ohio. Buckner S. Morris, the above named defendant, maketh oath and saith that the within plea is true, in substance and fact, as he verily believes. B. S. MORRIS. Subscribed and sworn before me at Cincinnati aforesaid, this 12th day of January, 1865. H. L. BURNETT, EXHIBIT F. Plea to the jurisdiction. Judge Advocate, &c. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSION, The defendant, R. T. Semmes, by way of plea, says, that he is not and never has been in the military or naval service of the United States, nor in any other position which renders him subject to the rules and articles of war, or the jurisdiction of a military tribunal, and that he was not within the lines of any military camp, nor within the sphere of the military operations of any army in the field, at the time of the alleged transactions in the charges and specifications mentioned, and that the offences charged are not infractions of any of the rules and articles of war. Wherefore he avers he is not amenable upon said charges to the jurisdiction of this tribunal. And this defendant further avers that he is a citizen of the United States, and a citizen and resident of the city of Chicago and State of Illinois, where the alleged transactions are charged to have taken place, and was so at the times in the charges and specifications set forth; and that the civil courts of the United States at said city of Chicago are open and wholly unobstructed, and that the administration of the laws of the United States within the northern district of Illinois was at the time of the alleged commission of the offences charged, and ever since has been, and now is, unimpaired in the said courts of the United States, and which courts have full jurisdiction, power, and authority to hear and determine the said matters charged against this defendant, and that he is amenable therefor solely to the authority and jurisdiction of the courts of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, within which district the alleged of fences are charged to have been committed, and where this defendant can have legal process to enforce the attendance of witnesses on his behalf, and to which jurisdiction he is ready and willing to submit himself for trial at any time for the offences alleged against him. He therefore most respectfully denies the jurisdiction herein of this tribunal, and asks no further cognizance of the matter charged against him be here taken, but that the same may be hence remitted to the courts of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, for trial according to law. R. T. SEMMES. Affidavit. THE UNITED STATES vs. R. T. SEMMEs. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, ss : The above named defendant, R. T. Semmes, makes oath and says that the matters and things set forth in the foregoing plea are true, in substance and in fact, as he verily believes. R. T. SEMMES. Sworn to and subscribed before me the day and year above mentioned. EXHIBIT G. Plea to the jurisdiction. H. L. BURNETT, Judge Advocate. THE UNITED STATES vs. G. E. CANTrill. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSION, The defendant, G. E. Cantrill, now comes in his own proper person and by way of plea says, that he is not now, and was not at the time of the transactions complained of in the charge and specifications, in the land or naval service of the United States, nor in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger, nor in any other position which renders him subject to the rules and articles of war or the jurisdiction of a military tribunal, and that the offences charged are not infractions of any of the rules and articles of war. Wherefore he avers he is not amenable upon said charges to the jurisdiction of this tribunal. And the defendant further avers that he is a citizen of the United States, and was temporarily residing in the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, at the time of the alleged commission of the acts charged against him. He says that the civil courts of that State and federal judicial district are open and wholly unobstructed; that the latter are vested with full jurisdiction of the matters complained of herein; that he is amenable to the process thereof, and ready to submit himself thereto, and is entitled to the compulsory process thereof in aid of his defence. Wherefore he most respectfully denies the jurisdiction of this tribunal in the premises, and requests that no further cognizance of the same be taken here, but that the same may be remitted to the courts of proper jurisdiction in the State of Illinois for such action as may be deemed proper by them. GEORGE E. CANTRILL. Sworn to and subscribed in my presence this 12th day of January, 1865. The defendant, Charles Travis Daniel, by way of plea to the several charges and specifications exhibited herein against him, says: That he is a soldier of the army of the Confederate States, so called, being a private of company C, fourteenth regiment Kentucky cavalry, in said army, and as such was captured and made a prisoner of war by the military forces of the United States, and that he has never been exchanged or otherwise discharged as a prisoner of war by the military authorities of the United States. Wherefore, this defendant claims the right of a prisoner of war, and insists that, as such, he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this tribunal upon the several charges and specifications exhibited against him. And this defendant further avers that the civil courts of the United States in the northern district of Illinois, within which district the alleged offences are charged to have been committed, are and have heretofore uniformly been open and unobstructed, and the administration of the laws of the United States therein unimpaired. Wherefore the defendant insists that if he is amenable to any tribunal for the said transactions charged against him, it is to said courts of the United States, and not to this military commission, to whose jurisdiction to hear and determine his guilt or innocence on the said charges and specifications, he respectfully alleges his objection. By T. M. KEY and T. W. BARTLEY, The defendant in the above-entitled case, Charles Travis Daniel, makes oath and says that the several matters and things set forth in the foregoing plea are true, in substance and in fact, as he verily believes. CHARES TRAVIS DANIEL. Sworn and subscribed before me this 15th day of January, 1865, H. L. BURNETT, Judge Advocate. COURT-ROOM, CINCINNATI, OHIO, January 13, 1865-11 o'clock a. m. The commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present; also the judge advocate, the accused, and their counsel. The proceedings were read and approved. The accused, Buckner S. Morris, Charles Travis Daniel, R. T. Semmes, and Benjamin M. Anderson, through their counsel, then submitted the following. argument in support of their pleas to the jurisdiction of the commission, said argument, marked I, hereto attached and made part of this record. The accused, Charles Walsh and G. St. Leger Grenfel, through their counsel, then submitted the following argument in support of their pleas to the jurisdiction of the commission, said argument, marked J, hereto attached and made part of this record. The commission then adjourned to meet on Monday, January 16, 1865, at two o'clock p. m. EXHIBIT I. HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, On charges preferred by the judge advocate, of a conspiracy against the authority of the United States, and to set on foot an insurrection at and about the city of Chicago, Illinois The defendant, appearing by his counsel, objects to the authority and jurisdiction of this court, and asks that his case may be turned over to the United States courts of the northern district of Illinois for investigation and adjudication, according to the forms of the Constitution and laws of the country. And in support of his plea to the jurisdiction of this tribunal, the defendant assigns the following grounds, to wit: 1st. That the civil courts of the United States in the northern district of Illinois are now, and heretofore have uniformly been open, and wholly unobstructed in the administration of justice, and their loyalty and fidelity in administering the laws and upholding the authority of the United States unquestioned and unquestionable. And this defendant, not being nor having been in the military or naval service of the United States, nor in any other position which subjected him to the rules and articles of war, or the authority of a military tribunal, is amenable solely, if amenable at all, on the charges and specifications herein preferred, to the authority and jurisdiction of the United States courts of the northern district of Illinois, where justice can be administered impartially, and according to the laws of the land, and where the accused can, by legal authority, require the attendance of witnesses on his behalf, and have an opportunity of testing the veracity and credibility of the witnesses against him, by a fair crossexamination. 2d. That the offences set out in the charges and specifications being admitted not to be infractions of any of the rules and articles of war, and clearly and un questionably falling within the provisions of the act of Congress of July, 1861, providing for the punishment of seditions and piracies against the authority of the United States in the civil courts alone, this tribunal cannot have a concurrent or conflicting jurisdiction to hear and determine the same. And as it is admitted that this tribunal cannot try the accused for any violations of either the rules or articles of war, or any criminal statute; and as the charges preferred come distinctly within the provisions of the law of Congress mentioned, this tribunal cannot legally take cognizance of the case. 3d. That the second section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1863, authorizing arrests by the military authorities, has expressly and imperatively required, that, in all such cases of arrest as that of this defendant by the military power, in States where the administration of the laws of the United States in the federal courts is unimpaired, the persons arrested shall be turned over to the civil courts of the United States for prosecution by indictment and trial according to law. And the proceeding before this tribunal in this case is directly and palpably in derogation of this law of Congress. 4th. It is conceded that this military commission is not authorized or provided for by the Constitution or any law of Congress, or by the rules or articles of war, and that it has no authority to try any case cognizable by a court-martial, or which can be tried in the civil courts of the country, nor is there any law, usage or custom prescribing what punishment, if any, shall be inflicted by this court, but this tribunal is claimed to be an incident of the war power, and to be founded in the usage and custom of war. It is confidently asserted, however, on behalf of the defendant, that the authority of this tribunal, which has never had the sanction of the laws of this country, is wholly unwarranted by any usage or custom of war, except with the army in the field, when removed far beyond the sphere and jurisdiction of the civil tribunals. Benét, a recent author on military law, says, on pages 15 and 16 of his work, "civil offences cognizable by civil courts, whenever such legal courts exist, will not be tried by a military commission. It should, therefore, be stated in every application for a commission, whether or not there is any loyal civil court to which the civil offence charged can be referred for trial." It cannot be claimed that a military commission is a matter of necessity where civil courts, whose loyalty and fidelity are unquestionable, are in full operation and wholly unimpeded. It will not do to say, in this case, that the military authority of the United States is not the authority of the United States, and that, therefore, a conspiracy to resist the military authority, in a place where the civil courts are loyal and unobstructed, would not be a conspiracy to resist the authority of the United States, within the plain language and intent of the act of Congress first above mentioned. And it will not do to supersede the civil courts of the country by military commissions on the alleged inefficiency of the civil tribunals. The civil authorities can bring to their aid all the military power of the country; and after the interposition of the military power of its own accord, and the suppression of a riot or insurrection the law of Congress requires that the persons arrested should be turned over to the civil courts for trial and punishment. 5th. That this tribunal, from the nature of its organization and its peculiar mode of proceeding, is in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution and laws of this country, which guarantee to every man a fair and impartial trial. Without intending the slighest disrespect or want of due courtesy to the learned and able judge advocate, acting in this case, or to any member of this court, the defendant begs leave to state his objections to the nature of the constitution of this tribunal itself. The judge advocate stands as the accuser, the public prosecutor, and the judge to advise and instruct the court on all questions of law, to conduct the trial, prescribe the manner in which the defendant's counsel shall interrogate witnesses, and be allowed to argue the case, having himself the right of reply, and then retiring with the court to advise and instruct in the making of the decision. Before he prefers the charge, he must be presumed to have made up his mind as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is, therefore, substantially a trial not only at the instance of, and before the accusee, but before a judge who has prejudged the case. Far better let the judge who presides on the trial of a criminal case before a jury act the part of the public prosecutor, and accompany the jury in their retirement to advise with and instruct them in |