were subject to the liabilities of carriers at common law. At the trial, there was contradictory evidence as to whether a ticket, by which the Company sought to limit their liability, had been delivered to the son of the plaintiff, and the learned Judge left it to the jury to say whether it was delivered to him or not :-Held, that it was no misdirection in his not telling them to find whether it was not read over and explained to him. Palmer v. The Grand Junction Railway Company, 749 REWARD. For Discovery of Thief, Action for. A party who had been robbed of bank notes put forth a hand-bill, wherein it was stated, that "whosoever would give information whereby the same might be traced, should, on conviction of the parties, receive a reward of 201.":-Held, that the only persons entitled to the reward was he who first gave information by which the notes were traced to the robbers, so as to ensure their conviction: and that it was not necessary that such information should be communicated to the party robbed, if it was given to a person authorized to receive it, and to act upon it in the apprehension of the offenders; as to a constable. Lancaster v. Walsh, 16 SEAMAN'S WAGES. Where a seaman who has signed the articles of agreement required by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 19, absolutely quits the ship, without any animus revertendi, after her arrival and being moored at her port of delivery, but before her cargo has been discharged, he does not thereby incur a total forfeiture of his wages within the 9th section of that statute, but only of a month's wages under the 7th section. M'Donald v. Jopling, 285 SET-OFF. See BANKRUPTCY. PLEADING, II. 5. SHERIFF. See ARREST, 3. Fees of. The sheriff's right to poundage is not affected by the stat. 1 Vict. c. 55, or the table of fees made under it. Davies v. Griffiths, 377 STAMP. See LIMITATIONS, STAT. OF, 2. (1). Admissibility of unstamped Instru ment. A petition having been presented to the House of Commons against the return of a member, on the ground of bribery, the petitioner entered into an agreement, in consideration of a sum of money, and upon other terms, to proceed no further with the petition: Held, that this agreement was illegal.-Held, also, that the written agreement was admissible in evidence, for the purpose of insisting on the illegality of the transaction, in answer to an action for the sum so agreed to be paid, without its being stamped. Coppock v. Bower, (2). Several Stamps. 361 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. (1). Appropriation to Purchaser. B., a builder, contracted with A. and others, trustees of a new hotel about to be erected by a company of proprietors, to build the hotel, except as to the ironmonger's, plumber's, and glazier's work, for a specified sum, and covenanted to complete certain portions of the work within certain specified periods, being paid by instalments at corresponding dates; and that if he should neglect to complete any portion within the time limited, he should forfeit and pay the sum of 250l. as liquidated damages. The agreement then contained a clause empowering the trustees, in case (inter alia) B. should become bankrupt, to take possession of the work already done by him, and to put an end to the agreement, which should be altogether null and void; and that the trustees, in such case, should pay B. or his assignees only so much money as the architect of the Company should adjudge to be the value of the work actually done and fixed by B., as compared with the whole work to be done. The course of business during the progress of the work was for the clerk of the works to inspect every article which came in under the contract, and none were received except on his approval. After the works had proceeded some time, B. became bankrupt. Before his bankruptcy, certain wooden sash-frames had been delivered by him on the premises of the Company, approved by the clerk of the works, and returned to B. for the purpose of having iron pulleys, belonging to the trustees, affixed to them; and at the time of the bankruptcy, these frames, with the pulleys attached to them, were at B.'s shop. He afterwards, but before the issuing of the fiat, re-delivered them to the trustees; and the sash-frames being afterwards demanded of them by B.'s assignees, they gave an unqualified refusal to deliver them up. Held, 1st, that the property in the wooden sash-frames had not passed to the trustees at the time of the bankruptcy. 2ndly, That they were not entitled to retain them under the agreement, as being work already done, they not having been fixed to the hotel; but that even if they were within that clause of the agreement, it could not bind the assignees, inasmuch as their right accrued on the bankruptcy, whereas the option of the trustees was not to be exercised until after the bankruptcy. 3rdly, That the refusal of the trustees not having been limited to the pulleys, the demand and refusal were sufficient evidence of a conversion by them of the wooden sash-frames, so as to entitle B.'s assignees to recover them in trover. Tripp v. Armitage, 687 II. Of Real Estate. (1). Recovery of Deposit Money. In an action for money had and received to recover back the deposit money paid by the plaintiff on the purchase of an estate, a special case stated, that by the will of the defendant's father, the estate in question was devised to him after the death of his mother, and to his issue in tail, subject to a payment of 21. a year to his sister M. C., with remainder to the testator's own right heirs. In the year 1817, and during the lifetime of his mother, the defendant, by lease and release, assigned the estate for his own life to his sister M. C., and R. W., upon trust to receive the rents and apply them to keep the tenements in repair, to pay to M. C. her annuity of 21., and to pay the residue to the defendant. After the mother's death, M. C.(R.W. being dead) received one quarter's rent, since which the rents had been received by the defendant. In February, 1836, the defendant advertised the estate for sale, and on the 25th of that month the plaintiff purchased it upon a contract stated in the conditions of sale.Amongst other conditions were the following:-"That the premises are to be sold subject to a yearly rent of 21., payable during the life of M. C., the sister of the defendant, and which said M. C. having given notice that in consequence of a certain alleged indenture, bearing date August 19, 1817, whereby she alleges the defendant conveyed all his estate and interest in the premises unto R. W., (now deceased), and the said M. C. for the term of his the said defendant's life, upon certain trusts in the alleged indenture contained, and that no conveyance of the premises could be made without the concurrence of her the said M. C., and who thereby declared she should refuse to execute any such conveyance, the said defendant declared that the said alleged indenture is a fabrication, and has made a solemn affidavit that he never executed any such indenture, and that such indenture, as far as concerns any supposed signature or mark of him, the defendant, is a forgery; and the opinion of Sir J. C., his Majesty's Attorney-General, and Mr. K., have been taken as to the necessity of the said M. C.'s concurring in the sale, and were in favor of the defendant's being able, by virtue of the recent act for abolishing fines and recoveries, to make a good title to the premises without the sanction and concurrence of the said M. C.; and the vendor is also prepared to prove that on the trial of an action of replevin of S. v. the said M. C., the presiding Judge expressed himself favorably to the right of the defendant to convey without the concurrence of the said M. C.; the purchaser therefore shall not make any objection on account of the said alleged indenture, nor be entitled to call for any sanction, concurrence, &c. &c., by or from the said M. C.; but if the purchaser shall think fit, in order to indemnify him or her against all action, suits, and other proceedings, claims and demands by the said M. C., a portion of the purchase-money (not exceeding 2001.) may remain as a charge by way of mortgage on the premises, at interest after the rent of 4 per cent., and that such charge, at the option of the purchaser, shall remain on such security during the life of the said M. C., and for a period not exceeding twelve months after her decease." The plaintiff paid the deposit now sought to be recovered. The jury, at the trial, found a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of the deposit, and that the deed of the 19th August, 1817, was the deed of the defendant:-Held, 1st, that whether the representation of the deed being a forgery were a warranty upon which the plaintiff might maintain an action or not, the plaintiff had no right to rescind the contract because it turned out to have been untrue. 2ndly, that by the stipulation "that the purchaser should not make any objection on account of the alleged indenture," every species of objection to the title on the part of the purchaser arising out of the alleged deed was interdicted, and he was precluded from insisting either upon the existence of the deed, or upon its legal effect and operation, as a defect in the title which he had agreed to take. Corrall v. Cattell, 734 VENUE. See PRACTICE, 1. WARRANTY. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1. By Manufacturer and Seller of Goods. The defendant sent to the plaintiff, the patentee of an invention known as "Chanter's smoke-consuming furnace," the following written order :-" Send me your patent hopper and apparatus, to fit up my brewing copper with your smoke-consuming furnace. Patent right 15l. 15s.; ironwork not to exceed 51. 5s.; engineer's time fixing, 7s. 6d. per day." The plaintiff accordingly put up on the defendant's premises one of his patent furnaces, but it was found not to be of any use for the purposes of a brewery, and was returned to the plaintiff:-Held, (no fraud being imputed to the plaintiff), that there was not an implied warranty on his part that the furnace supplied should be fit for the purposes of a brewery; but that, the defendant having defined by the order the particular machine to be supplied, the plaintiff performed his part of the contract by supplying that machine, and was entitled to recover the whole 157. 15s., the price of the patent right. Chanter v. Hopkins, 399 WAY. 1. Trespass qu. cl. fr. Plea, under 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, a right of way for the occupiers of a close, for twenty years, for horses, carts, waggons, and carriages, at their free will and pleasure. Replication, traversing such right-Held, first, that under this issue the plaintiff might shew that the defendant had a right of way for horses, carts, waggons, and carriages for certain purposes only, and not for all, and was not compelled to new assign; and might shew that the purpose for which the defendant had used the road, and in respect of which the action was brought, was not one of those to which his right extended. Secondly, that evidence of user of a road with horses, carts, and carriages, for certain purposes, does not necessarily prove a right of road for all purposes, but that the extent of the right is a question for the jury, under all the circumstances of the case. Cowling v. Higginson, 245 2. To a declaration in trespass, the defendant pleaded that he and the former occupiers of a house and land had for twenty years used and enjoyed as of right, a certain way on foot and with horses, &c., from and out of a common highway towards, into, through, and over the plaintiff's close to the defendant's house and lands, and back, at all times of the year, at their free will and pleasure. The replication averred that the defendant, &c., used and enjoyed the right of way mentioned in the plea, but that they did so under the plaintiff's leave and license. At the trial, it appeared that the defendant and the former occupiers of his house and land had an admitted right of way from thence over the locus in quo to the highway, and across the highway, to a close called Ruddocks, and that for the last twenty years they had a license from the plaintiff to use, whenever they pleased, a way from the defendant's house and lands over the locus in quo to the highway and back, when they had not any intention of going to Ruddocks :-Held, that the replication was not supported by this evidence, and that the plaintiff was bound to shew a license co-extensive with a right claimed in the plea, and admitted by the replication. Colchester v. Roberts, 769 WITNESS. (1). Incompetency from Interest. The proper time to object to the incompetency of a witness on the ground of interest is on his being called, on the voir dire, and evidence cannot afterwards be adduced to shew his incompetency. Dewdney v. Palmer, 664 (2). Liability for Disobedience to Declaration in case against a witness, for disobedience to a subpoena, alleged that a certain issue came on to be tried before the Justices of Assize, at Taunton, on the 31st March, 1838; that the plaintiff before then sued out a writ of subpoena duces tecum, directed to the defendant, commanding him to appear before the Justices of Assize, at Taunton, on Saturday, the 31st of March then instant, and so from day to day until that cause should be tried, and produce, at the time and place aforesaid, certain documents therein specified; which writ the plaintiff, before the trial of the said issue, to wit, on the 2nd of April, 1838, served on the defendant; and that, although the appearance of the defendant was necessary and material on the said trial of the said issue, and although the defendant could and might have appeared at the trial of the said issue, and produced the documents, and although they were material evidence for the plaintiff, yet the defendant did not appear, &c.; by reason whereof the plaintiff was forced to become nonsuited-Held, on general demurrer, 1st, that it sufficiently appeared that the trial had at the Assizes was the same as that mentioned in the subpœna; and, 2ndly, that it was sufficiently shewn that the plaintiff had a good cause of action in the original suit. Held, also, that as the subpoena required the defendant's attendance on the first day of the Assizes, (the 31st of March), and so from day to day until the cause should be tried, an action might be maintained for disobedience to it, although it was not served until the 2nd of April, the cause not |