1839. NELSON v. SERLE. [Bosanquet, J.-In Ridout v. Bristow there was a primâ Exch. Chamber, facie right to take out administration.] The consideration here is a debt from the deceased Joseph Waterworth; and unless the plea exclude every case in which there may be a good consideration, that is sufficient. The defendant was bound to exclude every consideration whatever. There was nothing to shew she was not executrix, or might not become so. The defendant was bound to shew that the promissory note, which imports a consideration, had in reality no value: if it might be for good consideration, it is sufficient. The Court below say that the defendant has not shewn those circumstances which prove that there could be no consideration. A person who gives a promissory note, by so doing, primâ facie admits that he has had value for it. Addison, in reply.-In Ridout v. Bristow, the note was proved (under non assumpsit) to have been given by the widow "for value received by her late husband;" here it does not appear that the defendant was at all connected with the deceased. Alderson, B. said, in this case, in the Court below, that the question in Ridout v. Bristow was "whether, it being expressed on the face of the note that it was given for the debt of her late husband, that necessarily shewed a want of consideration, and the Court held that it did not, because the plaintiff's remedy might be delayed against the executor or administrator; but here there is a distinct averment that no person was liable for the debt." The doctrine contended for on the other side is extravagant. Lord DENMAN, C. J.-It appears to me, that in reversing this judgment, we do not interfere with the law pronounced by the Judges of the Exchequer, because they acted on Ridout v. Bristow, and it turns out that the facts of that case do not apply. It appears that there the defend Exch. Chamber, ant was the wife of the intestate, and his administratrix, 1839. and the question there arose on non assumpsit; and so it must have been in Popplewell v. Wilson. NELSON บ. SERLE. Judgment reversed. MEMORANDA. IN Hilary Term, Mr. Baron Bolland resigned his seat in this Court, on account of continued indisposition, and in the vacation following, William Henry Maule, Esq., one of her Majesty's counsel, was appointed to succeed him, and having been first called to the degree of the coif, gave rings with the motto "Suum cuique." He took his seat in this Court on the first day of Easter Term. In Hilary Vacation, William Goodenough Hayter, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, received a patent of precedence; and John Stuart, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Samuel Girdlestone, Esq., of the Middle Temple, and Robert Vaughan Richards, Esq., and Griffith Richards, Esq., of the Inner Temple, were appointed her Majesty's Counsel. AN INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. ACCOUNT STATED. See PLEADING, I. 1. The acceptor of a bill, on applica- ACTION ON THE CASE. By whom maintainable. In case, the declaration stated that self and his sons, for 24l., whereas in AMENDMENT. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2. PRACTICE, IV. ANNUITY. Lands were enfeoffed to R. H. and the defendant, to the use, intent, and purpose that the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns for ever, should receive and take out of the lands a yearly rent of 631. payable half-yearly; and the defendant covenanted with the plaintiff that R. H. and the defendant, their executors, &c., or some or one of them, would pay or cause to be paid to the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, the said yearly rent at the terms appointed for payment thereof:-Held, that the plaintiff could not sue the defendant in debt for arrears of the annuity. Randall v. Rigby, APPRENTICE. 130 (1). When sufficiently final. Where an action of debt, in which the defendant had pleaded the general issue and a set-off, was, by consent, referred to arbitration, "the costs of the reference and award to abide the event," and the arbitrators found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in the action, and had not any cause of action against the defendant, but said nothing as to the set-off:-Held, that the award was final, and that the defendant was entitled to maintain an action for the costs of the reference and award. Duckworth v. Harrison, 432 Where, on a reference of a cause to arbitration, the costs to abide the event, the arbitrator finds in favor of the defendant upon a plea which covers the whole cause of action, it is no objection to the award that on other issues the arbitrator has found for the plaintiff without damages. Savage v. Ashwin, 530 (2). By Arbitrators without Umpire. By agreement of reference, a cause was referred to two arbitrators, with power to appoint an umpire, the costs of the cause to abide the event; and the said parties thereby bound themselves to stand to, obey, and keep the award" of the said two arbitrators and their umpire, so as the award of the said arbitrators and their umpire was made before a certain day." An award was made by the two arbitrators only, and they found two issues for the plaintiff and one for the defendant, and directed that "the costs of the said cause, and of the several issues found therein, shall be paid to the plaintiff, or to the party entitled thereto :"-Held, on motion for an attachment, that the validity of the award, being made by the two arbitrators only, was too doubtful to grant an attachment upon it; and 2ndly, that it was void as to the adjudication of the costs of the cause. Hetherington v. Robinson, 608 (3). Setting aside. Where an arbitrator, to whom a cause was referred by order of Nisi Prius, directed that the verdict should be entered for the plaintiff for 2541.; and then set forth certain facts raising a question for the opinion of the Court, and awarded that if, upon such facts, the Court should be of opinion that the verdict should be for 125l. only, then the damages should be reduced to that sum:-Held, that a motion to enter the verdict for the latter sum, upon the facts so stated by the arbitrator, was in effect a motion to set aside the award, and must be made within the term next following that in which the award was made. Anderson v. Fuller, III. Second Trial after abortive Reference. 470 Where a verdict was taken at Nisi Prius, and entered in the associate's book (but not on the record), subject to a reference, and the time limited for making the award expired before the order of reference was delivered to the arbitrator, when the defendant refused to proceed with the reference; whereupon the plaintiff, without making any application to the Court, took the cause down again to trial, and obtained a second verdict:Held, that the latter trial and verdict were irregular. Held, also, that the irregularity was not waived by the defendant's attorney attending and cross-examining a witness, under an order obtained by the plaintiff's attorney (after the other party had refused to go on with the reference) for the examination of the witness on interrogatories, under the 1 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 4. Hall v. Rouse, 24 ARREST. (1). Privilege from. A page of the presence in ordinary to the Queen is privileged from arrest. Reynolds v. Pocock, 371 (2). Under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3. The principle by which the Judges will be guided in allowing an arrest under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3, is to consider whether the defendant is about to leave the country for such a time that he is not likely to be forthcoming to satisfy the plaintiff's execution at the period when he will be entitled to it in the ordinary case of law proceedings. It was therefore held to be a sufficient ground for issuing the writ, that the defendant, an officer in the army, was about to join his regiment stationed abroad. Larchin v. Willan, 351 (3). Discharge under 1 & 2 Vict. c. |