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Religious corporations.

4. Consequently, no order of the court is necessary on a sale of

such premises by the church corporation to the grantee, although such order is necessary in an absolute conveyance of the soil.

(Id.) 5. Every deed of conveyance, whether for a pew or vault, or a

house, is a contract between the parties, to be interpreted according to their actual or fairly to be presumed intent; and this intent is to be collected from the whole instrument, including its

scope, object, and subject matter. (Id.) 6. By the general act incorporating religious societies, the trustees

of the society have the power to remove their house of worship from one lot to another, or from one village to another, without any application to the court. (In Matter of Second Baptist So

ciety, Ante, 324.) 7. It is necessary to apply to the court only in case of a sale of the

real estate of the society; and on such application it is not necessary to give notice to the pew-holders. (Id.)

See AMENDMENT. (Trustees of First Baptist Society agt. Robinson, 21 N. Y. R., 234.) 8. Corporations formed under $ 3 of the act for the incorporation

of religious societies (1813) have no denominational character, and none can be engrafted upon them. (Petty agt. Tooker, 21

N. Y. R., 267.) 9. Persons otherwise qualified do not lose their right as corporators

to vote at elections by reason of their having individually, or collectively, renounced the doctrine and ecclesiastical government professed and recognized by the religious body in whose worship and services the corporate property had always been

employed. (Id.) 10. The title of trustees to office, and to the control of the corpo

rate property, is not impaired by any aberration in doctrine or church government on their part, or on that of those by whom

they are elected. (Id.) 11. An injunction will not be granted by a court of equity to re

strain a minister of the gospel from preaching in a house of public worship, where it appears he is in office, placed there originally by the act of the parish, claiming to be rightfully there, and no other person claiming the office, or with whose rights as a minister of the parish he is interfering, but the object being in effect

Reports of referees.

to eject the defendant from his possession of the church, and to

forbid his preaching in it. (Youngs agt. Ransom, 32 Barb., 49.) 12. There can be no doubt that, if a vestry possess the power to

settle a minister, and fix his salary, a call made by such a body, though not made by a formal vote of the vestry, as a body, but by a writing, signed by the wardens and a majority of the vestry, fixing the salary, and accepted in writing by the minister, followed by mutual action and acknowledgment of its validity, and of the relation thus created, cannot afterwards be disregarded or denied. (Id.).

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1. A report of a referee, like the verdict of a jury, is, as a general

rule, conclusive in a case of conflict of evidence, and only to be set aside when the finding is clearly against the weight of evidence, or where upon the trial, some rule of evidence or principle

of law has been violated. (Hoogland agt. Wight, Ante, 70.) 2. Where, on appeal, the findings of a referee of fact and law are

not made and inserted in the case, according to the rule and the Code, and especially where, in consequence, an attempt to review any decision the general term might make, would be attended with much embarrassment, the general term will refuse to review

it. (Rogers agt. Beard, Ante, 98.) 3. The general term of the supreme court, in reviewing a judgment

rendered upon report of a referee, or upon a trial before a judge without a jury, acts purely as an appellate court, and a case containing the findings upon the law and fact, with the exceptions inserted therein in due form, ($ 268,) must be made in the precise shape required by the court of appeals. (Rogers agt. Beard,

Ante, 282.) 4. The report of a referee, and the exceptions are necessarily sep

arate instruments originally, but the case is to be single, and is to be made up as though the findings and exceptions were had on the trial of the cause, the exceptions in their proper order following the findings. The case is not properly made, by inserting the evidence, the report of the referee and that to be followed

by the exceptions. (Id.) 5. Where the review is upon the facts alone, it is equally essential


that the findings of the referee upon the facts be explicit and

cover all the material facts in the case. (ld.) 6. An action of ejectment, or for possession of real property, against

a sole defendant, who dies before a report of referees is made, or verdict rendered, abates, absolutely, and no judgment upon such report or verdict can be entered nunc pro tunc, because such report or verdict is null and void. (Kissam agt. Hamilton,

Ante, 369.) 7. A report of referees is not considered made nor the case decided

until, the report is signed. The delay by referees in making and delivering their report, that is, while the case remains with them sub-judice, is not to be deemed the delay of the court. (Id.)

See EXCEPTIONS. (Lawrence agt. Fowler, Ante, 407.) 8. A referee, in all cases, should have a certified copy of the order

appointing him, before he proceeds at all in the cause. This is his power to administer a judicial oath. A memorandum "referred to L. K. M.,” made by the judge on his calendar at the circuit, is insufficient to constitute an order of reference; an entry in the minutes of the court, or some action of the court shown by its records is necessary. (Bonner agt. McPhail,

32 Barb., 106.) 9. An order of reference entered, nunc pro tunc, by consent of

both parties, after the report of the referee is filed, cannot relate back so as to give to an extra-judicial oath, the effect of an oath legally administered, on which a charge of perjury may be sustained. The power of a referee to administer a judicial oath can

only be derived from an order of the court appointing him. (Id.) 10. A referee appointed by the city court of Brooklyn has no

power to try a cause in the city of New York. That court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction. (Id.)

See ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS. (Sharp agt. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb., 578 ; S.C., 19 How., 193.)

SALARIES. 1. “It shall be lawful for the board of supervisors to raise by tax

upon said county, and pay to the justices of the supreme court, resident in the first district, such additional annual compensation as they may deem proper.” (An act in relation to the


supreme court of the first judicial district,"' Sess. Laws, 1852,

ch. 374, $ 7.) (People ex rel. Milchell agt. Haws, Ante, 29.) 2. So far as this act authorizes, or was intended to authorize, the

board of supervisors to raise by tax and pay an additional annual compensation to justices of the first judicial district, in office at

the time of its passage, it is unconstitutional and void. (Id.) 3. The constitutional provision which prohibits such an application

of the act, is as follows : “The judges of the court of appeals, and justices of the supreme court, shall severally receive, at stated times, for their services, a compensation to be established by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during their continuance in office.' (Const. 1846, Art. 6, 7.) (Id.)

See RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS. (Youngs agt. Ransom, 32 Barb., 49.)


1. A sale and transfer by the directors of a corporation, of the

entire property of the corporation, (except its real estate,) and which transfers to the purchasers the whole business of the corporation, is void as against any of the stockholders of the corpo

ration not consenting to such sale. (Abbot agt. Judson, Ante, 199.) 2. The principle that a majority must govern and control, (in the

absence of any special provisions in the charter,) applies to corporations, and the minority are bound by the acts of the majority when those acts are within and according to the charter, and not inconsistent with the object and purpose with which it was organ

ized. (Id.) 3. Purchasers on such a sale cannot be considered as bona fide pur

chasers for value without notice, where they pay no money, but give their promissory notes, and where it must be assumed from the facts that they knew the purpose and object for which the corporation was organized, and the only business which it had

prosecuted; and they must also be presumed to know the law. (Id.) 4. The purchaser of premises at a sale in a suit where publication

has been ordered, must be deemed to know that he purchases subject to the power of the court to relieve parties, against whom publication is ordered, upon good cause shown, both before and after judgment, within seven years after the rendition thereof. (Van Wyck agt. Hardy, Ante, 222.)


5. Where the plaintiffs were purchasers of premises at sheriff's

sale, by assignment of the sheriff's certificate, and also held the title to the same by a conveyance subject to a mortgage given by the grantor, which was junior in lien to the judgment upon which the premises were sold, and were in possession,

Held, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction to restrain and stay the foreclosure and sale of the premises under the mortgage, before the expiration of the time of redemption upon the sale under the judgment. (New York Shot and Lead

Co. agt. Cary, Ante, 444.) 6. That is, whatever estate or interest remained intermediate the

judgment of foreclosure and the time when the purchase under the judgment at sheriff's sale, would become perfect, belonged to the mortgagee, and he had a right to require that the premi

ses should be sold for the purpose of discharging his lien. (Id.) 7. On a sale of real estate upon execution, it is a sufficient notice

of the sale, to post it as required by the statute, forty-two days previous to the sale, and publish a copy of such notice in six successive numbers of a weekly newspaper, although the first publication may be less than six weeks prior to the sale. (Olcott

agt. Robinson, 21 N. Y. R., 150.) 8. If a contract for the sale and purchase of property has been

executed by a delivery of the property to the purchaser, the latter becomes vested with the title to it, so far as an agent of the latter, to sell it on commission, is concerned; and the agent is bound by the legal restrictions and regulations imposed by the purchaser in reference to the sale thereof; and his liability is not affected by the question whether the original vendor acquired it under an illegal contract or not. (Alvord agt. Latham, 32

Barb., 294.) 9. Held, that the partnership agreement in this case contemplated

a friendly dissolution, and a sale at auction of the trade mark, &c., by mutual consent, and that the parties should bid therefor among themselves; but that no authority was given to either party to fix the time or place of sale, or to select an agent to make it; and a sale made at auction, where one of the partners refused to concur in the sale, gave the plaintiffs no title. Held, also, that a court of equity could enforce a performance of that part of the contract and compel a sale, and, if necessary, order

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