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Constitutional law.

court of the first judicial district.Sess. L., 1852, ch. 374, $ 7.)

(Id.) 3. So far as this act authorizes, or was intended to authorize, the

board of supervisors to raise by tax and pay an additional annual compensation to the justices of the first judicial district, in office at the time of its passage, it is unconstitutional and void. (People

er rel. Mitchell agt. Havos, Ante, 29.) 4. The constitutional provision, which prohibits such an application

of the act, is as follows: “The judges of the court of appeals, and justices of the supreme court, shall severally receive, at stated times, for their services, a compensation to be established by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during their

continuance in office." (Const., 1846, art. 6, $ 7.) (Id.) 5. The act of April 17, 1860, prohibiting certain exhibitions and

plays within the city and county of New York, on Sunday, held to be constitutional and valid, as a lawful exercise of legislative

authority. (People agt. Hoym, Ante, 76.) 6. Consequently, the defendants, by exhibiting on Sunday, a play

called “One of our People,” or the “Brave Isaac,” in the building Nos. 37 and 39 Bowery, known as the “New York Stadt Theatre," incurred the penalty prescribed by this act, to wit: guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment therefor provided by law, subjected to a penalty of $500, with a

forfeiture of license. (Id.) 7. The act of the legislature of 1860, authorizing the defendants

(named as grantees) to construct a railroad in the city of New York, running through Green street, University Place, Broadway and other streets, on a route commonly known as the “ Broadway Parallel,” is unconstitutional and void, as taking private property for public use without just compensation therefor.

(People agt. Kerr, Ante, 130.) 8. The fee of the streets of the city of New York is in the city cor

poration, which fact authorizes them to demand compensation for this (private) property, which is authorized to be taken by the act, but which, by its terms, virtually enjoins the corporation

from claiming. (Id.) 9. The legislature have no authority to establish the price to be

paid for corporate franchises or private interests to be taken for public use. Therefore, the provision in section two of the act

Constitutional law.

subjecting the railroad to the payment, to the corporation, of the same annual license fee as is now paid by other city railroads ($20 per car,) amounts to nothing, saying nothing of the gross

inadequacy of the price to the privilege. (Id.) 10. Although the plaintiffs, who are the owners of the land abut

ting on the streets to be occupied by the contemplated railroad, cannot complain of the construction of the road on the ground that they are injured as tax payers of the city (see Doolittle agt. Supervisors, 18 N. Y. R., 162; S.C., 16 How. Pr. R., 512,) nor upon the ground that they are the owners of the fee of such lands, (the fee being in the corporation by purchase,) yet they can complain of the construction of the road as specially injurious to them, for the reason that it would be an indictable nuisance, after having been declared unconstitutional as against the corpo

ration. (Id.) 11. It seems that the fee of the streets of the city of New York is

vested in the corporation of the city, in trust for the use of the

public as highways. (People agt. Mayor &c., New York, Ante, 144.) 12. In an action brought by the people of the state, with certain

individuals named, claiming to be owners in fee of the property affected, for the purpose of declaring unconstitutional and invalid, an act of the legislature granting to certain individuals the right to lay down rails for a railroad in the city of New York, and for an injunction restraining the grantees named in the act, and the corporation of the city, from proceeding under the act, held, on demurrer, that the common council of the city was not a neces

sary party. (Id.) 13. The statutes relative to the taxation of bank capital are not, in

so far as they provide by state authority, for the taxation of any part of their capital invested in U. S. stocks, unconstitutional.

(People agt. Commissioners of Taxes, Ante, 182.) 14. The stock of a moneyed corporation, when paid in, becomes as

stock, liable to taxation, irrespective of the property in which the

money so paid in may be invested. (Id.) 15. If such investment is made in U. S. stocks, such investment

cannot affect the taxation. (This decision affirms that of Judge SUTHERLAND at special term, reported 18 How. Pr. R., 245.) (Id.)

See APPEAL. (Joyce agt. Mayor, &c., of New York, Ante, 439.) 16. The constitution of 1846 (art. 8, $ 7,) which subjects stock


holders of banking corporations to personal liability, applies as well to those then existing as to those formed subsequently.

(Matter of Oliver Lee and Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. R., 9.) 17. A special act for the incorporation of a gas-light company in

the city of New York is not unconstitutional by reason of the existence of a general law (1848) authorizing any city, village or town, to organize such companies. (People agt. Bowen, 21

N. Y. R., 517.) 18. The power of the governor to approve and sign a bill presented

to him, within ten days prior to the adjournment of the legisla

ture, does not cease at the adjournment. (Id.) 19. The fifth section of the statute (Laws of 1859, p. 1123,) enti

tled "An act to enable the supervisors of the city and county of New York to raise money by tax," and providing for opening judgments against the city, on application of the comptroller, which he has reason to believe are obtained by collusion and fraud, is not unconstitutional. (Sharp agt. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb., 572; S. C., 18 How., 97.)


1. Although a corporation cannot be attached for contempt, as in

the case of natural persons, it may be punished nevertheless, by a fine, or the sequestration of its property. (This seems to be adverse to the views expressed by Judge Duer, in Davis agt. The Mayor, &c., 1 Duer, 484.) (People agt. Albany and Vermont

R. R. Co., Ante, 358.) 2. An injunction is never retroactive. To convict a party of con

tempt in disobeying an injunction, it must satisfactorily appear either that the party through himself or his agents have, since knowledge of the injunction, violated its provisions, or had before the injunction, authorized the act prohibited by it to be done, and omitted to interfere to prevent a subsequent violation by a party who stood to him in the relation of an agent or subordi

nate, whose movements he could legally control. (Id.) 3. It seems that the absence of a judge from his office, at the time

appointed in an order made by him for the examination of a judg. ment debtor in supplementary proceedings, does not render the order inoperative, where the judge within a reasonable time, say


within an hour, attends at his office to execute the order, although the judgment debtor appeared at the time appointed and waited

some time before leaving. (Reynolds agt. McElhone, Ante, 454.) 4. Therefore, any money paid over by the judgment debtor subse

quently, on the same day, in violation of such order, would be a contempt, and subject him to a fine or punishment; especially where, as in this case, he had subsequently appeared before a referee in pursuance of an order made by the judge on the day

first named. (Id.) 5. What recitals in a final order of a judge requiring a judgment

debtor to pay over certain moneys, &c., or stand committed to jail, &c., considered sufficient, although informal. (ld.)


1. Where a contractor by his proposal, affidavits, certificates, bond,

penalty, sureties, justification, and all the preliminary conditions required by the contracting board in their published notice to contractors for proposals to do certain work, has fully complied therewith, and is the lowest bidder, no combination with other bidders appearing, the board are bound by the statute to award him the contract. (People agt. The Contracting Board, Ante,

206.) 2. Where an ordinance of the common council of the city of New

York, under which work is to be done, provides that the work is to be done under the directions of the street commissioner and one of the city surveyors, it confers no authority on these officers, or either of them, to change or modify in any essential particular, the provisions of the contract, made and entered into for the performance of the work. (Bonesteel agt. the Mayor, &c., of the

city of New York, Ante, 237; court of appeals.) 3. When the specification issued by the street commissioner is made

part of the estimate of the contractor, and which is incorporated into the contract, the common council thereby authorize the street commissioner to contract only for the work thus specified, and the street commissioner has no authority to make any

other contract with the contractor, or to change or modify any of the provisions of the proposal after the same has been ratified and confirmed by the common council. (Id.)


See MARRIED WOMEN. 4. Every deed of conveyance, whether for a pew or vault, or a

house, is a contract between the parties to be interpreted according to their actual or fairly to be presumed intent; and this intent is to be collected from the whole instrument, including its scope, object, and subject matter. (Richards agt. North West

Protestant Dutch Church, Ante, 317.) 5. It seems that a seller of an article of merchandize, which is re

turned to him by the purchaser on account of a breach of the warranty, unless he makes a specific objection to receiving it back, rescinds the (executed) contract, and is liable for the price.

(Collins agt. Brooks, Ante, 327.) 6. Where the public printing of the city of New York involves the

expenditure of more than $250, it should be done by contract founded on sealed þids, &c., in pursuance of the 12th section of the act of 1853 (Sess. L., 1853); and this is the law, whether the printing is required for the legislative or the executive depart

ment. (McSpedon agt. Mayor, &c., New York, Ante, 395.) 7. Therefore, where the work done by the plaintiffs, and for which

- action was brought, was work which should have been contracted for in the manner and with all the formalities prescribed in the 12th section of the act of 1853; and as the contract for it was not made in that manner,

Held, that it was null and void, and could not be enforced against the defendants. (ld.) 8. Also held, that the plaintiffs could not recover for such work

under a former contract made with the defendants in 1848, (for one year only) for similar work, although one board of the common council in 1854 passed a resolution recommending that the

old contract be continued. (Id.) 9. Nor could the plaintiffs recover on an implied assumpsit, that the

defendants, having accepted the work, were bound to pay what it was reasonably worth, notwithstanding the express contract under which it was done, was null and void. The defendants can make no contract or promise, express or implied, cxcept in the manner and with all the formalities prescribed by statute. (Id.)

See SUBSTITUTION. (Lund agt. Seaman's Bank, Ante, 461.) 10. Where a proposition for a contract to be in writing and execu

ted by the parties, has been made by one party and accepted by

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