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Clerical or grammatical errors may be corrected; 92 singular or plural language may be treated as if it were the other; 93 and other illustrations might be given of the same principle."4 Punctuation will be disregarded if the words of a contract indicate that it has been erroneously inserted or omitted; 95 but it may aid in determining the meaning of doubtful language. The freedom of construction permissible is, however, necessarily limited by the principle that unexpressed intention is of no legal effect. The reason for interpolating, omitting or disregarding specific words is that in the remainder of the writing an intention is expressed which makes it evident that particular words were erroneously used.

Therefore where there is a repugnancy between general clauses and specific ones, the latter will govern; 96 and even if

W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271, 36 L. R. A. 566. Cf. with Atlantic Terra Cotta Co. v. Masons' Supply Co., 180 Fed. 332, 103 C. C. A. 462; Bridgers v. Ormond, 153 N. C. 113, 68 S. E. 973.

92 Wood v. Coman, 56 Ala. 283; Cox v. Britt, 22 Ark. 567; Sprague v. Edwards, 48 Cal. 239; Kellogg v. Mix, 37 Conn. 243; Atlanta, etc., Railroad Co. v. Spear, 32 Ga. 550; Calumet, etc., Canal & Dock Co. v. Russell, 68 Ill. 426; Aulick v. Wallace, 12 Bush, 531; Marston v. Bigelow, 150 Mass. 45, 22 N. E. 71, 5 L. R. A. 43; King v. Merritt, 67 Mich. 194, 34 N. W. 689; Fowler v. Woodward, 26 Minn. 347, 4 N. W. 231; Brookman v. Kurzman, 94 N. Y. 272; Hoffman v. Riehl, 27 Mo. 554; Tenney v. Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343; Burr v. Broadway Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. 267; Dodd v. Bartholomew, 44 Ohio St. 171, 5 N. E. 866; Watters v. Bredin, 70 Pa. 235; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 148 Pa. 216, 23 Atl. 985; Eatherly v. Eatherly, 1 Coldw. 461, 78 Am. Dec. 495; Carnagy v. Woodcock, 2 Munf. 234, 5 Am. Dec. 470; Liston v. Jenkins, 2 W. Va. 62.

93 George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564, 26 L. Ed. 232; Cowles Electric, etc., Co. v. Lowrey, 79 Fed. 331, 24 C. C. A. 616,

47 U.S. App. 531; Leith v. Bush, 61 Pa. 395.

94 Boykin v. Bank of Mobile, 72 Ala. 262, 47 Am. Rep. 408; Irwin v. Nichols, 87 Ark. 97, 112 S. W. 209; Berry v. Kowalsky, 95 Cal. 134, 30 Pac. 202, 29 Am. St. Rep. 101; Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International M. E. Co., 140 Ill. 248, 28 N. E. 1044, 33 Am. St. Rep. 234; Schroeder v. Griggs, 80 Kans. 357, 102 Pac. 469; Way v. Greer, 196 Mass. 237, 81 N. E. 1002; Monmouth Park Ass'n v. Wallis Iron Works, 55 N. J. L. 132, 26 Atl. 140, 19 L. R. A. 456, 39 Am. St. Rep. 626.

95 Holmes v. Phenix Ins. Co., 98 Fed. 240, 39 C. C. A. 45, 47 L. R. A. 308; Cowles Electric Smelting Co. v. Lowrey, 79 Fed. 331, 24 Fed. 616; Allen v. United States Fidelity, etc., Co., 269 Ill. 234, 109 N. E. 1035; Burgess v. Badger, 124 Ill. 288, 14 N. E. 850; General Accident, etc., Co. v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S. W. 1031, L. R. A. 1917 D. 952; Perry v. J. L. Mott Iron Works Co., 207 Mass. 501, 93 N. E. 798; Rice v. Lincoln & N. W. R. Co., 88 Neb. 307, 129 N. W. 425.

* English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212, 172 S. W. 817.

there is no actual repugnancy if the words of the contract are taken literally, yet when from the whole instrument it appears that the purpose of the parties was solely directed towards the particular matter to which the special clause or words relate the general words will be restrained.97 Thus the recital of a bond may restrain the literal terms of the condition.98 It is also an accepted principle that "the general words in a release are limited always to that thing or those things which were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given;" 99 and indeed it has been laid down broadly that general words in any contract relating to a particular subject shall be construed as meaning things of the same kind as the particular matters referred to.994 But "general words following an enumeration of particular things may include other things not ejusdem generis, if such appears to have been the intention of the parties." 1

" Browning v. Wright, 2 B. & P. 13; Hesse v. Stevenson, 3 B. & P. 565, 574; Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 432, 438, 28 N. E. 780; Whalon v. Kauffman, 19 Johns. 97; Bricker v. Bricker, 11 Ohio St. 240. See also Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U. S. 165, 58 L. Ed. 898, 34 S. Ct. 553.

Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169, 183, 11 L. Ed. 89; Union Pacific Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365, 19 U. S. App. 612, 23 L. R. A. 581, 9 C. C. A. 14; Canton Inst. . Murphy, 156 Mass. 305, 31 N. E. 285; Kellogg v. Scott, 58 N. J. Eq. 344, 44 Atl. 190; National Mech. Bkg. Assn. v. Conkling, 90 N. Y. 116, 43 Am. Rep. 146. "If the recitals are clear and the operative part is ambiguous, the recitals govern the construction. If the recitals are ambiguous and the operative art is clear, the operative part must prevail. If both the recitals and the operative part are clear, but they are inconsistent with each other, the operative part is to be preferred." Ex parte Dawes, 17 Q. B. D. 275, 286; quoted with approval in Williams v. Barkley, 165 N. Y. 48, 57, 58 N. E. 765. "Directors, etc., of the S. W. Ry.

Co. v. Blackmore, L. R. 4 H. L. 610, 623; Fire Ins. Assoc. v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 564, 581, 35 L. Ed. 860, 12 S. Ct. 84; Lumley v. Wabash Railway Co., 76 Md. 66, 22 C. C. A. 60; French v. Arnett, 15 Ind. App. 674, 44 N. E. 551; Blair v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 89 Mo. 383, 1 S. W. 350; McIntyre v. Williamson, 1 Edw. Ch. 34; Jeffreys v. Southern Ry. Co., 127 N, C. 377, 37 S. E. 515; cp. Jackson v. Ely, 57 Ohio St. 450, 49 N. E. 792.

994 Agar v. Atheneum Life Assur. Soc., 3 C. B. (N. S.) 725; Hendricks v. Webster, 159 Fed. 927, 87 C. C. A. 107; Fisher Electric Co. v. Bath Iron Works, 116 Mich. 293, 74 N. W. 493; Meyers v. Wood, 173 Mo. App. 564, 158 S. W. 909; New York Metal Ceiling Co. v. New York, 133 N. Y. App. Div. 110, 117 N. Y. S. 632; Smith's Est., 210 Pa. 604, 60 Atl. 255; Daly v. Old, 35 Utah, 74, 99 Pac. 460, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 463; Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 532, 539, 91 S. E. 391, 394.

1 Lindeke v. Associates' Realty Co., 146 Fed. 630, 77 C. C. A. 56; Shaw v. Pope, 80 Conn. 206, 209, 67 Atl. 495.

§ 620. Secondary rules: The instrument will be construed if possible so that it shall be effective and reasonable. A construction which makes the contract lawful will be preferred over one which would make it unlawful; 2 a construction which renders the contract valid and its performance possible will be preferred to one which makes it void or its performance impossible or meaningless; a construction which

In Webb v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 134 Mo. App. 576, 115 S. W. 481, and in Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin &c. Light Co., 134 Wis. 603, 115 N. W. 383, the rule of ejusdem generis was not applied to the words "or otherwise."

2 "It is a general rule, that whensoever the words of a deed, or of the parties without deed, may have a double intendment, and the one standeth with law and right, and the other is wrongful and against law, the intendment that standeth with law shall be taken." Co. Lit. 42 a; Fussell v. Daniel, 10 Exch. 581, 597, by Martin, B.; Mills v. Dunham, [1891] 1 Ch. 576, 590; Manning v. Ellicott, 9 App. D. C. 71; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 6 S. Ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940; United States Fidelity Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 145 Fed. 144, 76 C. C. A. 114; Wiggin v. Federal Stock Co., 77 Conn. 507, 59 Atl. 607; Equitable Loan & Security Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 599, 44 S. E. 320, 62 L. R. A. 93, 96 Am. St. Rep. 177; Hunt v. Elliott, 80 Ind. 245, 41 Am. Rep. 794; Briody v. De Kimpe, 91 N. J. L. 206, 102 Atl. 688; Lorillard v. Clyde, 86 N. Y. 384; North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Spore, 44 Or. 462, 75 Pac. 890; Carolina Spruce Co. v. Black Mountain R. Co., 139 Tenn. 137, 201 S. W. 1034; McCoy v. Bankers' Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 200 S. W. 1138; Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N. W. 1058.

"All contracts should if possible be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat." Byles, J., in Shoreditch Ves

try v. Hughes, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 137, 162; Broom v. Batchelor, 1 H. & N. 255; Columbus Construction Co. v. Crane Co., 98 Fed. 946, 40 C. C. A. 35; Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 Fed. 280, 142 C. C. A. 572; American Tie & Timber Co. v. Naylor Lumber Co., 190 Ala. 319, 67 So. 246; Sinclair v. National Surety Co., 132 Iowa, 549, 107 N. W. 184; Berry v. Frisbie, 120 Ky. 337, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 724, 86 S. W. 558; North River Ins. Co. v. Dyche, 163 Ky. 271, 173 S. W. 784; McEvoy v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 110 Md. 275, 73 Atl. 157, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 964, 132 Am. St. Rep. 428; Black v. Bachelder, 120 Mass. 171; Scripps v. Sweeney, 160 Mich. 148, 125 N. W. 72; Millen v. Potter, 190 Mich. 262, 157 N. W. 101; National Bank of Commerce v. Flanagan Mills &c. Co., 268 Mo. 547, 188 S. W. 117; Horton v. Rohlff, 69 Neb. 95, 95 N. W. 36; Vickers v. Electrozone Co., 67 N. J. L. 665, 52 Atl. 467; Griffey v. New York Central Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. 417, 3 N. E. 309, 53 Am. Rep. 202; Rice v. Miner, 151 N. Y. S. 983, 89 N. Y. Misc. 395; Johnson v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124; Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper Co., 157 Wis. 604, 147 N. W. 1058. Thus a writing which recited that it was an agreement between the parties, which was signed by both parties, and by which one party agreed to sell to the other its make of butter for a certain period at a certain price, is a binding agreement for the sale, although it contains no express prom

makes the contract fair and reasonable will be preferred to one which leads to harsh or unreasonable results. Therefore, construction of a contract which would lead to a forfeiture will not be favored. For the same reason, a restriction in a deed on the use of property will be construed in favor of the grantee; and when contracts are optional in respect to one party, they are strictly construed in favor of the party bound and against the party that is not bound." But the mere fact that parties have made an improvident bargain will not lead a court to make unnatural implications or artificial constructions, 8

§ 621. Secondary rules. Language will be construed most strongly against the party using it.

Since one who speaks or writes, can by exactness of expression more easily prevent mistakes in meaning, than one with whom he is dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity of language

ise by the buyer to pay. Roundy & McMurray Co. v. Nicholson Produce Co., 166 La. 39, 147 N. W. 305.

'A. Leschen & Sons Co. v. Mayflower, etc., Min. Co., 173 Fed. 855, 97 C. C. A. 465; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Eastern Ry. Co., 121 Fed. 609, 57 C. C. A. 635; Little Cahaba Coal Co. v. Etna L. Ins. Co., 192 Ala. 42, 68 So. 317, Ann. Cas. 1917 D. 863; Letchworth v. Vaughan, 77 Ark. 305, 90 S. W. 1001; Stein v. Archibald, 151 Cal. 220, 90 Pac. 536; Savage v. Smith, 170 Cal. 472, 150 Pac. 353; MacDonald v. Ætna Indemnity Co., 90 Conn. 226, 96 Atl. 926; Harz v. Peterson, 80 Ill. App. 21; R. F. Conway Co. v. Chicago, 274 Ill. 369, 113 N. E. 703; Blitz v. Union Steamboat Co., 51 Mich. 558, 17 N. W. 55; B. Siegel Co. v. Codd, 183 Mich. 145, 149 N. W. 1015; Mecartney v. Guardian Trust Co., 274 Mo. 224, 202 S. W. 1131; Gillet v. Bank of. America, 160 N. Y. 549, 55 N. E. 292; Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222 N. Y. 272, 118 N. E. 618; Fleischman v. Furgueson, 223

N. Y. 235, 119 N. E. 400; Bingell v.
Royal Ins. Co., 240 Pa. 412, 87 Atl.955;
Bank of Old Dominion v. McVeigh,
32 Gratt. 530; Allemong v. Augusta
Nat. Bank, 103 Va. 243, 48 S. E. 897.

Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 113 Ark. 174, 167 S. W. 845; Dumphy v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 107 Tex. 107, 174 S. W. 814; Sparkman v. Davenport (Tex. Civ. App.), 160 S. W. 410; Adams v. Fidelity Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 201 S. W. 1034; Pagel v. United States Casualty Co., 158 Wis. 278, 148 N. W. 878. In Hunt v. Held, 90 Ohio, 280, 107 N. E. 765, it was held that where a right to enforce a restrictive covenant in a conveyance is doubtful, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the free use of the property for lawful purposes by the owner of the fee.

Stone v. Pillsbury, 167 Mass. 332, 45 N. E. 768; Grubb v. Grubb, 101 Pa. 11.

7 Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas & Oil Co., 29 Okl. 719, 119 Pac. 260.

8 In re P. J. Sullivan Co., 247 Fed.

9

are resolved in favor of the latter; and as he will ordinarily be the promisee of the promise in question, it is sometimes stated that the contract, if ambiguous, will be construed in favor of the promisee. 10 This rule finds frequent application to policies of insurance which are ordinarily prepared solely by the insurance company and the words, therefore, are construed most strongly against it. This has been so held even in case of standard policies the terms of which are fixed by statute; 12 but it seems rather that the reason of the rule ceasing, the rule also should cease in such a case; and this view has been taken by some courts, 13 though doubtless a construction already

139; Kanaskat Lumber Co. v. Cascade Timber Co., 80 Wash. 561, 142 Pac. 15.

'Bacon's Maxims, Tracts, 42; Sheppard's Touchstone, 87, 88; Mayer v. Isaac, 6 M. & W. 605; Wilson v. Cooper, 95 Fed. 625; Marx v. American Malting Co., 169 Fed. 582, 95 C. C. A. 80; Bijur Motor Lighting Co. v. Eclipse Mach. Co., 237 Fed. 89; Denson v. Caddell (Ala.), 77 So. 720; Allen-West Commission Co. v. People's Bank, 74 Ark. 41, 84 S. W. 1041; Clark v. J. R. Watkins Medical Co., 115 Ark. 166, 171 S. W. 136; Asmussen v. Post Printing Co., 26 Colo. App. 416, 143 Pac. 396; Mueller v. Northwestern University, 95 Ill. App. 258, affd. 195 Ill. 236, 63 N. E. 110, 88 Am. St. Rep. 194; Maney Milling Co. v. BakerWignall & Co., 186 Ill. App. 390; St. Landry State Bank v. Meyers, 52 La. Ann. 1769, 28 So. 136; Wier v. American Locomotive Co., 215 Mass. 303, 102 N. E. 481; Wetmore v. Patison, 45 Mich. 439, 8 N. W. 67; Ardis v. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co., 200 Mich. 400, 167 N. W. 5; Belch v. Schott, 171 Mo. App. 357, 157 S. W. 658; Flory v. Supreme Tribe, 98 Neb. 160, 152 N. W. 295; Marshall v. Sackett & Wilhelms Co., 166 N. Y. App. Div. 141, 151 N. Y. S. 1045; Hyland v. Oregon Hassam Pav. Co., 74 Oreg. 1, 144 Pac. 1160, L. R. A. 1915 C. 823, Ann. Cas. 1916

E. 941; In re Eighth Ave., 82 Wash. 398, 144 Pac. 533.

102 Bl. Comm. 380; Cal. Civ. Code, § 1654; Byron v. First Nat. Bank, 75 Or. 296, 146 Pac. 516.

11 Notman v. Anchor Ass. Co., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 476; Fowkes v. Manchester & London Association, 3 B. & S. 917; Joel v. Law Union & Crown Ins. Co., [1908] 2 K. B. 863, 890; Philadelphia Casualty Co. v. Fechheimer, 220 Fed. 401, 136 C. C. A. 25; Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Draper, 187 Ala. 103, 65 So. 923; Petello v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 89 Conn. 175, 93 Atl. 137, L. R. A. 1915 D. 812; McEachern v. New York Life Ins. Co., 15 Ga. App. 222, 82 S. E. 820; American Surety Co. v. Pangburn, 182 Ind. 116, 105 N. E. 967, Ann. Cas. 1916 E. 1126; Sinclair v. National Surety Co., 132 Ia. 549, 107 N. W. 184; Paskusz v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 213 N. Y. 22, 106 N. E. 749; Moore v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 75 Or. 47, 146 Pac. 151.

12 Cottingham v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 168 N. C. 259, L. R. A. 1915 D. 344, Ann. Cas. 1917 B. 1237, 84 S. E. 274; Gazzam v. German Union F. Ins. Co., 155 N. C. 330, 71 S. E. 434.

13 Mick v. Royal Exchange Assur., 87 N. J. L. 607, 91 Atl. 102; Nelson v. Traders' Ins. Co., 181 N. Y. 472, 475, 74 N. E. 421.

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