of felony, where the defence is a bonâ fide belief that the defendant had committed felony, the defendant may show that he had previously done acts which go to establish the presumption of bona fides (1). So, on a charge of uttering counterfeit coin, a guilty knowledge may be proved by evidence either of a previous or subsequent uttering of another description of counterfeit coin (m); and on an indictment for knowingly and unlawfully having possession of coining instruments, proof is admissible that the prisoner had previously uttered counterfeit coin (n). The customs of one manor are not evidence of the customs of another manor (o), unless a connection between them be first established, as by showing that they belong to the same lord, that the same description of tenants has existed in each, and that their leases have been granted in the same terms. In such a case, the usage which has prevailed in one part, and which is therefore evidence to explain the meaning of a grant there, is evidence to explain a grant expressed in similar terms as to any other part of the district (p). But the unity or original identity of the manors must be clearly shown; and the mere fact of their being in the same leet, or parish, is not sufficient (q). A custom of trade may be proved by showing what is the custom of the same trade in a different place. Thus, evidence of the custom of fisheries off Newfoundland, is evidence of the custom of similar fisheries (1) Thomas v Russell, 9 Ex. 764. (m) Reg. v. Foster, 1 Dears. 456. (n) R. v. Weeks, L. & C. 18. (0) Marquis of Anglesea v. Lord Hatherton, 10 M. & W. 233. (p) Per Bayley, J., Rowe v. Brenton, 8 B. & C. 764. (9) Per Lord Abinger, 10 M. & W. 236. off the coast of Labrador (r). So, parish books were held to be evidence against a member of the vestry of the practice of the parish, although they related to proceedings of the vestry before he became a member (s). When the issue involves a question of manorial right as between a lord and an adverse claimant, evidence of the exercise of such right over part of a waste has been held to be evidence of title to other parts which, from their local situation, may be deemed to belong to it. Thus, in the Exchequer Chamber, on a question whether a piece of waste land, between a highway and the plaintiff's inclosure, belonged to the plaintiff, or to the lord of the manor, it was held that the latter might support his claim by evidence of grants of similar pieces between the same road and the inclosure of other persons. Lord Denman said: "If the lord has a right to one piece of waste, it affords no inference, even the most remote, that he has a right to another in the same manor, although both may similarly situated with respect to the highway. Assuming that all were originally the property of the same person, as lord of the manor, which is all that the fact of their being in the same manor proves, no presumption arises, from his retaining one part in his hands, that he retained another; nor, if in one part of the manor the lord has dedicated a portion of the waste to the use of the public, and granted out the adjoining land to individuals, does it by any means follow, nor does it raise any probability, that in another part he may not have granted the whole out to private indi (r) Noble v. Kennaway, 2 Doug. 510. be viduals, and they afterwards have dedicated part as a public road. But the case is very different with regard to those parcels which, from their local situation, may be deemed part of one waste or common; acts of ownership, in one part of the same field, are evidence of title to the whole; and the like may be said of similar acts on part of one large waste or common" (t). In all these cases it will be observed, that the act between third parties, which has, nevertheless, been received, has been either connected presumptively with the party who is to be affected by it, or has been invested with a prima facie credibility by evidence of an original unity of nature or title. In short, it seems to be a safe general rule in these cases, that transactions with third parties are inadmissible, unless their privity or connection with the party against whom they are tendered be first proved extrinsically, so as to make such intermediate transactions operate in the nature of an admission or estoppel (u). Unless this be done, it will be the duty of the judge to reject the evidence, or to strike it from his notes. Evidence of good or bad character is generally irrelevant and inadmissible in civil cases, unless character be of the substance of the issue (x). In actions for seduction, evidence of the real plaintiff's bad character is admitted in reduction of damages; but the evidence must refer to a time prior to that when the seduction took place. The Divorce Court will receive evidence (t) Doe v. Kemp, 2 Bing. N. C. 102; cf. Dendy v. Simpson, 18 C. B. 831. (u) See Maule and Bosanquet, JJ., Taylor v. Parry, 1 M. & G. 614; Petrie v. Nuttal, 11 Ex. 569. (x) Elsam v. Faucett, 2 Esp. 563. of adultery committed after the latest act charged in the petition to show the character and tendency of the earlier acts of familiarity (y). In actions for defamation, evidence of the plaintiff's general good character is held irrelevant, even on a plea of justification (z). But in such cases, the plaintiff may give in evidence any words, as well as any act, of the defendant, to show the malice or animus of the words which are the subject of the action (a). But the mere abandonment of a plea of justification ought not to weigh with a jury, where the actual defence sets up only a privileged communication (b). And where the libel charged the plaintiff with incompetency as a surveyor, he was not allowed to travel out of the record by showing that he had, at other times, acted competently in that capacity (c). In criminal cases the rule is observed with the utmost strictness, that no evidence shall be admitted which does not tend directly to the proof, or disproof, of the matter in issue (d). Thus, evidence that a prisoner has committed a similar crime before, or that he has a disposition to commit such crimes, is inadmissible (e). On a charge of burglary and larceny on a particular day, evidence of a larceny in the same house on a previous day was rejected (f). So on a charge of obtaining money under false pretences, evidence (y) Boddy v. Boddy, 30 L. J. P. M. & A. 23. (b) Wilson v. Robinson, 7 Q. B. 68. (c) Brine v. Razalgetti, 3 Exch. 692. (d) Wels. Crim. Prac. 183. (e) R. v. Cole, 1 Phill. Ev. 508. (f) R. v. Vandercomb, 2 Lea. C. C. 816. that the prisoner had within a week previously obtained another sum of money under the same false pretence was rejected (g). But when the animus of an act has to be shown, previous and subsequent conduct will be evidence of it. Thus, the animus in uttering counterfeit coin may be proved by evidence of previous utterings; and the possession alone of several pieces of counterfeit coin is evidence of guilty knowledge (h). So, when several felonies are so connected as to form one transaction, evidence of all may be given in order to convict of one. Thus, where the indictment charged stealing from the prosecutor's till; and the evidence showed different takings, by which the whole deficit was caused; it was held that the fact might be shown by proof of the results of different inspections of the till (i). So, in conspiracies, since the act of one is in law the act of all, when complicity has been proved, the act of one conspirator is evidence on an indictment against another. In larceny, to prove the identity of the prisoner, it may be shown that other goods not included in the indictment, which were stolen at the same time, were found in his possession (k). On the trial of Hunt (1) for riot and conspiracy, resolutions passed at a meeting, prior and avowedly preliminary to that named in the indictment, were held to be relevant evidence to show the objects of the second meeting. So, the general conduct of the (g) R. v. Holt, Bell, 280. |