there has been a clerical error (p), or a mistake in a name (q), or a mistake as to fact, or when any important matter has come subsequently to the knowledge of the defendant (r), the answer has been allowed to be amended, or a supplemental one put in. IV. INDIAN PROCEDURE AS TO AMENDMENTS. In civil cases the provision is as follows:-" At any time before the decision of the case, the court may amend the issues, or frame additional issues, on such terms as to it shall seem fit, and all such amendments as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question or controversy between the parties shall be so made" (s). The extent of the power of the court to amend is discussed in the case of Hiramání Dahi, App. v. Kunj Beharí Haldar and another, Resp. (t), where it was held not to extend to converting a suit of one character into another. In criminal cases it is provided that "it shall be competent to any court before which a trial is held, at any stage of the trial, to amend or alter the charge; (p) Gainsborough v. Gifford, 2 P. Wms. 424. (q) Bell v. Dunmore, 7 Beav. 283. (r) Fuller v. Gilmore, 1 Phill. 322. (s) Act viii. of 1859, s. 141. (t) 2 W. R. Civil Rulings, 207; cf. Allen v. Spring, 22 Beav. and that if the amendment or alteration is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the court, to prejudice the accused person in his defence, it shall be at the discretion of the court, after making the amendment or alteration, to proceed with the trial as if the amended charge had been the original charge" (u). (u) Act xxv. of 1861, s. 244. CHAPTER XXI. ON THE RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE. As it is the object of pleading to reduce the case of each litigating party to one or more substantial issues which involve the merits of the question; and as for this purpose none but material allegations which tend to the raising of such issues are admissible; so it is the object of evidence to provide that, when such allegations have been made, and such issues selected, they shall be supported by strictly relevant proof. The rule is that The evidence must correspond with the allegations, and be confined to the points in issue. It is a fundamental principle that no credible presumption as to the conduct, intention, or course of dealing between two parties can be derived from proof of the conduct, intention, or course of dealing between one of them and a third party. Such evidence is said to be res inter alios acta, and will be rejected as irrelevant to the issue, unless, indeed, it is part of the res gestæ, and so tends to throw any light upon the question at issue (a). The fact that A. contracted, or dealt in a particular manner with B., is no evidence that he meant to contract, or deal in the same manner, (a) Milne v. Leisler, 7 H. & N. 786. with C. Thus in an action for goods sold and delivered, in which the defence is that the plaintiff sold them to the defendant on certain terms, the defendant cannot show that the plaintiff has sold the same quality of goods to other persons on the same terms, for the fact that a man has once or more acted in a particular way does not make it probable that he so acted on a given occasion. The admission of such evidence would be fraught with the greatest inconvenience. Where, indeed, the question is one of guilty knowledge or intent, as in cases of uttering forged documents or base coin, such evidence is admissible as tending to establish a necessary ingredient of the crime (b). Thus, in an action by a brewer against a publican, where the issue was as to the quality of beer supplied by the former to the latter, Lord Ellenborough refused to let the plaintiff call witnesses to show that he supplied them, at the time in question, with good beer. His lordship said :-"This is res inter alios acta. We cannot here inquire into the quality of different beer furnished to different persons. The plaintiff might deal well with one, and not with the others (c)." Hence, where the issue was whether the plaintiff, a tradesman, had given credit to A.'s father, evidence that other tradesmen had given credit to the father was rejected (d). So, evidence of the treatment of scholars at one school is no evidence of the quality of their treatment at another school (e); and where the (b) Hollingham v. Head, 4 C. B. N. S. 388; cf. Howard v. Sheward, 36 L. J. C. P. 42; L. R. 2 C. P. 148. (c) Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391. P. action was for withdrawing scholars without a quarter's notice, according to a prospectus of terms, which the defendant was proved to have received, it was held, that a witness might state that she had never received any prospectus while her children had been at the school, because this evidence bore on the usual course of the plaintiff's dealing, but that she could not prove that she had taken her children away without notice, and without being called on to pay a quarter's salary; apparently because this might have been merely a matter of peculiar arrangement (f). So, the terms on which one tenant holds are no evidence of the terms on which another tenant holds under the same landlord (g); and an award in favour of a party to a former action is not evidence for a party to a subsequent action, claiming by paramount title, as against a party claiming through the person against whom the award was made (h). So, on the trial of an indictment for carrying on a noxious trade, a previous summary conviction for a similar offence is inadmissible (i). But where the extraneous transaction contains the principle of a reasonable and credible inference as to the motive or conduct of the party, the judge, in his discretion, will admit evidence of it. Thus, where a letter from the defendant, in answer to a letter written on the plaintiff's behalf, was proved to have been seen by the plaintiff, it was admitted in evidence against the latter (k). So, in false imprisonment on a charge (f) Delamotte v. Lane, 9 C. & P. 261. (h) Lady Wenman v. Mackenzie, 5 E. & B. 447. (k) Carne v. Steer, 5 H. & N. 628. |