between a landlord and his tenant, and it is also a principle that a tenant cannot derogate from his landlord's title, the admission of a tenant is no evidence against his landlord. Therefore, a declaration by a tenant that he was not entitled to a right of common in respect of his farm, has been held to be no evidence that such a right did not belong to the reversioner (k). It seems, however, that an identity of interest may be constituted by any amount of legal or equitable privity. Thus, the admissions of a party to a record are receivable to defeat the interest of a third person, although the former is only a nominal party and trustee for the latter; for the court will not look on any party to a record as a cipher (1). But it is doubtful how far the admission of a cestui que trust can be received to defeat the claim of the trustee on the record (m). On the general principle a verdict and conviction for nonrepair of a highway estops the convicted party or parish from disputing subsequently their liability to repair the highway (n). But a conviction for obstructing a highway does not estop the convicted person from maintaining trespass against a prosecutor in respect of the same highway; for the proceedings are not between the same parties in respect of the same right (o).

The rule that parties and privies are estopped by a judgment on identical issues, extends to judgments

(k) Papendick v. Bridgwater, 24 L. J. Q. B. 289.

(1) Bauerman v. Radenius, 1 T. R. 663; 2 Smith, L. C. 362. (m) Doe v. Wainwright, 8 A. & E. 691.

(n) R. v. Haughton, 1 E. & B. 501.

(0) Petrie v. Nuttall, 11 Ex. 569.

pronounced by foreign courts of competent jurisdiction on such issues (p).

The judgment of a Court of Domicile is binding on the Courts of Nationality as to any question of nationality arising between the same parties (q).

2. The next species of estoppel is by instruments under seal; and this kind of estoppel, as in the case of estoppel by record, is equally binding on the parties to the deed and those who claim under them (r). "The principle is that where a man has entered into a solemn engagement by deed under his hand and seal, as to certain facts, he shall not be permitted to deny any facts which he has so asserted" (s). Thus, a lease is evidence for and against a lessee of the terms on which he holds, and also for an assignee who claims under him (t). So, a recital in a deed is evidence against him who executed the deed, and against every person claiming under him (u). So, the sub

stance of a recital carries with it the context; and, in a record, is conclusive evidence of collateral matter which was necessary to support the groundwork of the judgment (v). In construing recitals in deeds, and determining how far they operate as estoppels on the parties, the effect must be gathered from the apparent intention of the instrument (w). The recital in a deed

(p) Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith, L. C. 679; Riccardo v. Garcias, 12 Cl. & Fin. 368.

(q) Doglioni v. Crispin, L. R. 1 App. 301; 35 L. J. P. & M. 129. (r) With a few exceptions estoppel by deed does not apply in India.

(s) Per Taunton, J., Bowman v. Taylor, 2 A. & E. 291.

(t) Houghton v. Koenig, 18 C. B. 235.

(u) Com. Dig. Evid. (B. 5).

(v) R. v. Hartington, 4 E. & B. 780.

(w) Stronghill v. Buck, 19 L. J. Q. B. 209.

of a former deed between the same parties proves, as between such parties, so much of the former deed as is recited, and no more (x).

A recital is conclusive evidence against parties only where it is distinctly antecedent to, and related to, the substance of the deed. The law on this point is thus laid down by Parke, B., in Carpenter v. Buller (y). "If a distinct statement of a particular fact is made in the recital of an instrument under seal, and a contract is made with reference to that recital, it is clear that as between the parties to such instrument and in an action upon it, it is not competent for the party bound to deny the recital." The same learned judge also lays down that a recital, even in an instrument not under seal, may be conclusive to the same extent. In other cases recitals are treated as primâ facie evidence which may be rebutted.

It is held that a party's own statements are evidence against himself, whether they corroborate the contents of a deed, or other written instrument, or not (z). In such a case it has been decided that an abstract or

affidavit used by a person on a reference before a Master to prove title in himself may be received against him in a subsequent litigation (a). But in such a case the statement must be distinctly a statement of fact, and not merely an opinion or inference of law by the deponent; for in the latter case he will not be estopped (b). This doctrine seems to have been

(x) Gillett v. Abbott, 7 A. & E. 783.

(y) 8 M. & W. 212; cf. Lainson v. Tremere, 1 A. & E. 792. (z) Slatterie v. Pooley, 6 M. & W.664. (a) Pritchard v. Bagshawe, 11 C. B. 457. (b) Morgan v. Couchman, 14 C. B. 100.

slightly extended in the case of Richards v. Morgan (c), in which a question was raised relative to the admissibility of certain depositions, which the defendant had used in a Chancery suit, wherein the same facts were in issue. Crompton, J., said, "A document knowingly used as true, by a party in a court of justice, is evidence against him as an admission even for a stranger to the prior proceedings, at all events, when it appears to have been used for the very purpose of proving the very fact, for the proving of which it is offered in evidence in the subsequent suit." But a party is not estopped from avoiding his deed by showing that it is void from fraud or illegality, or that it was executed by him while under duress, or while a minor.

3. Estoppels by matter of pais. In Lyon v. Reed (d), Parke, B., says of such estoppels :-"They are all acts which anciently really were, and in contemplation of law have always continued to be, acts of notoriety, not less formal and solemn than the execution of a deed, such as livery of seizin, entry, acceptance of an estate, and the like. Whether a party had or had not concurred in an act of this sort, was deemed a matter which there could be no difficulty in ascertaining, and then the legal consequences followed." Thus a tenant, during his possession of the premises, cannot deny that the landlord under whom he has entered, or to whom he has paid rent, had title at the time of his admission, and this extends to the case of lodgers. "The security of landlords would be infinitely endan

(c) 4 B. & S. 641.
(d) 13 M. & W. 309.

gered if such a proceeding were allowed "(e). But although a tenant cannot be permitted to prove that his landlord had no title, at the time of entry, he may show that his title has expired (f). It may be here. observed, that a landlord who has granted a lease is estopped from alleging his want of title, and thiswhether the lease is by deed or not.

The courts, both of law and equity, have extended this doctrine by analogy to cases where the notoriety is less formal and solemn. Hence the doctrine, that "when one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his previous position, the former is concluded. from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time "(g). Thus, when the defendant accepted a bill of exchange, which by agreement was both drawn and indorsed in the name of a deceased person, it was held that he was estopped from denying the indorsement (h). Where a party, having an interest in property, stands by and permits another to deal with such property, as if he were the absolute owner, and as if there were no such secret equity, he will not be permitted to assert such secret equity against those with whom the apparent owner has dealt. This doctrine was discussed at length, in the recent case of Ramsden v. Dyson (i) in the House

(e) Per Lord Ellenborough, Balls v. Westwood, 2 Camp. 12. (f) England v. Slade, 4 T. R. 682; cf. Langford v. Selmes, 3 Kay & J. 220.

(g) Per Lord Denman, Pichard v. Sears, 6 A. & E. 474; cf. Attorney-General v. Stephens, 1 Kay & J. 724.

(h) Ashpitel v. Bryan, 3 B. & S. 474; and 5 B. & S. 723. (i) 1 L. R. (Appel. Ser.) 129.