Martin v. Robson. couraged him as one who had no separate interests, and freely gave to him her time, industry and skill. As a means of paying her debts, and damages for her torts, her counsel and earnings might be as important as her accumulated property. The distinction between the liability of the husband for the contracts of the wife before marriage, and for her torts during marriage, as for slander uttered by her alone,-is too dim to be easily. seen. He was made liable for her debts at the period of marriage, because the law gave to him all her personal estate in possession, and the power to recover her personal property in action. Bright's Husb. and Wife, 2d Vol., p. 2. He was bound to pay her indebtedness, because he adopted her and her circumstances together. Black., B. 1, p. 443. The law made him liable to the debts to which he took her subject, because he acquired an absolute interest in her personal property, had the receipt of the rents and profits of her real estate during coverture, and was entitled to whatever accrued to her, by her industry or otherwise, during the same period. Steph. Nisi Prius, Vol. 1, p. 726. The reason for the liability, according to some authorities, is that, by the marriage, the wife was deprived of the use and disposal of her property, and could acquire none by her industry, as her person and earnings belonged to the husband. Tyler on Inf. and Cov., § 216. The same author, after declaring the husband's liability for the debts and torts of the wife, says: "The reason assigned for such liabilities at common law is, that he was entitled to the rents and profits of the wife's real estate during coverture, and to the absolute dominion over her personal property in possession." § 233. The common law was never guilty of the absurdity of imposing obligations so onerous without conferring corresponding rights. Hence, besides the rights of property, the legal pre-eminence was exclusively vested in the husband. He was answerable for her misbehavior, and hence had the right of restraint over her person. Black., B. 1, p. 444. Lord KAIMES, in his sketches, says: "The man bears rule over his wife's person and conduct; she bears rule over his inclinations; he governs by law, she by persuasion." In the matter of Cochrane, 8 Dowl. P. C. 632, the wife was, upon tae hearing or a writ of habeas corpus, restored to her husband upon Martin v. Robson. the principle that she was under his guardianship, and that the law entitled him, "for the sake of both, to danger of unrestrained intercourse with the cohabitation and a common residence." protect her from the world, by enforcing So long as the husband was entitled to the property of the wife and to her industry, so long as he had power to direct and control aer, and thus prevent her from the commission of torts, there was some reason for his liability. The reason has ceased. The ancient iandmarks are gone. The maxims and authorities and adjudications of the past have faded away. The foundations hitherto deemed so essential. for the preservation of the nuptial contract, and the maintenance of the marriage relation, are crumbling. The unity of husband and wife has been severed. They are now distinct persons, and may have separate legal estates, contracts, debts and injuries. To this conclusion have all the decisions of this court tended. So far as the separate personal property of the wife is concerned, she is now the same as feme sole. She need not join her husband with her in a suit to recover it, or for the trespass to it, as her rights only are affected, and she must sue alone for any invasion of them. She may even prosecute a suit against her husband for any rnlawful interference with her property, contrary to her wishes. Emerson v. Clayton, 32 Ill. 493. C. The right of action for personal injuries to the wife is property. She may sue alone for the recovery of damages for such injuries, and the husband cannot, without her consent, release them. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260; S. C., 4 Am. Rep. 606. In the same case it is said that she can maintain, in her own name, an action for slander of her character. If she alone is entitled to receive, and appropriate to her own use, damages recovered for slander of herself, she should answer for her slander of others. Until the law of 1869, this court adhered to the common-law rule, that the husband was responsible for the debts of the wife contracted before marriage. It was repeatedly declared that the liability rested, not only upon the fact that the husband, upon the marriage, became the owner of the wife's personal property, when reduced to possession, and of a life estate in her reality, but upon the ground that he was entitled to the entire proceeds of her time and her labor, and that, notwithstanding the law of 1861, he was VOL. XVI. — 74 Martin v. Robson. still entitled to her earnings. Conner v. Berry, 46 Ill. 371; McMurtry v. Webster, 48 id. 123. The last decision was made in 1868. Then followed the law of 1869. I the first adjudication made under it, it was held that, as she now owned separate property, and enjoyed her own earnings, she must pay the costs incurred in attempting to maintain her rights. Musgrove v. Musgrove, 54 Ill. 186. In Howarth v. Warmser, 55 Ill. 48, the husband was declared to be discharged from his former liability to pay the debts of the wife contracted before marriage, by force of the legislation under consideration. A married woman may now be sued at law upon her contracts as to her separate property. Cookson v. Toole, 59 Ill. 515. She may now execute a valid lease of her separate real estate without joining her husband, and without his consent. Parent v. Callerand, 64 Ill. 97. So diverse are the rights and interests, the duties, obligations and disabilities of husband and wife now that it would be most unreasonable to hold him still liable for the torts committed without his presence and without his consent or approbation. If he is not bound to pay her debts, why should he be responsible for her torts? When the ground-work is gone as to one, it is gone as to the other, and the structure of the past must fall before the innovations of the present. She is now, to a very great extent, independent of him, and is clothed with rights and powers ample for her own protection; and, so far as her separate property is concerned, is responsible for her debts and contracts, with reference to it. They are not one, as heretofore. They are one in name, and are bound by solemn contract, sanctioned by both divine and human law, to mutual respect; should be of the same household, and one in love and affection. But a line has been drawn between them, distinct and ineffaceable, except by legislative power. His legal supremacy is gone, and the sceptre has departed from him. She, on the contrary, can have her separate estate; can contract with reference to it; can sue and be sued, at law, upon the contracts thus made; can sue, in her own name, for injury to her per son and slander of her character, and can enjoy the fruits of her time and labor free from the control or interference of her husband. Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Sage. The chains of the past have been broken by the progression of the present, and she may now enter upon the stern conflicts of life untrammeled. She no longer clings to and depends upon man, bnt has the legal right and aspires to battle with him in the contests of the forum; to outvie him in the healing art; to climb with him the steps of fame, and to share with him in every occupation. Her brain and hands and tongue are her own, and she should alone be responsible for slanders uttered by herself. Our opinion is, that the necessary operation of the statutes is to discharge the husband from his liability for the torts of the wife, during coverture, which he neither aided, advised nor countenanced. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Judgment reversed. SHELDEN, BREESE and SCOTT, JJ., dissented. ROCKFORD, ROCK ISLAND AND ST. LOUIS R. R. Co., appellant, v. SAGE. (65 [11.828.) Corporation — when not liable to pay for services of director. The law does not imply a promise on the part of a railroad company to pay its directors, for services as such. Directors of a railroad company agreed to allow themselves $1,000 each, for services and expenses, but no formal resolution to that effect was adopted by the board of directors. Held, that the company was not liable to a director for his services and expenses. A corporation is not liable for services performed or expenses incurred prior to its organization. A CTION by a railroad director for services rendered the company, The facts appear in the opinion. Charles M. Osborn and Henry & Johnson, for appellant. Sackett & Bennett, for appellee. Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Sage. SHELDEN, J. This was an action of assumpsit, by Sage, against the railroad company, to recover for money paid for surveying done before the company was organized or its charter granted, and for services and expenses as director of the company, and for $1,000 due on an account stated. A recovery was had for $1,000, which, under the evidence, must have been upon what was found to be an account stated. The defendant appeals. On the trial below, the plaintiff offered in evidence the following: "Rockford, Rock Island and St. Louis Railroad Company, "To Ralph Sage, Dr. "To money expended and services rendered, "STERLING, June 3, 1868. "(Indorsed.) Approved by the executive committee. $1,000 “ WM. PRATT, With proof that Pratt and Thomas were members of the executive committee of the company. The company was organized some time in the year 1865, the charter having been obtained in the winter of 1865. Plaintiff acted as director about two years. After he had ceased to be director, he presented this bill for services and expenses as director, during all the time he was such, and as commissioner to receive subscriptions for stock. Plaintiff testified to having paid $50 for surveying in the fall of 1864. It was in evidence that while Greene, Irwin & Co. were negotiating for the road, and as it was about to pass into their hands, the directors of the road talked the matter over among themselves, and they agreed to allow themselves (Sage among the rest) $1,000 each, for services and expenses. There was evidence tending to show that Sage's claim was talked over in the board of directors as an organized board, and that it was agreed Sage should have $1,000. The following was one of the by-laws of the company : "ARTICLE 6. Whenever any bill against the company shall have been certified correct by a majority of the executive committee, it ahall be the duty of the president or vice-president to draw an order on the treasurer for the amount thereof, and of the secretary to countersign the same, which order shall constitute a duly author |