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for here both parties do not adhere to the tenets, doctrines, or discipline of the original organization. Smith v. Swormstedt, 16

How. 288.

I is well settled, that members who secede from a church organization or a religious society thereby forfeit all right to any part of the church property; and whether there has been a secession or not, within this rule, "is a mixed question of law and fact, to be decided upon the evidence with a view to all the circumstances, including the acts of the parties and the motives which have prompted such acts. Wiswell v. First Cong. Church, 14 Ohio St. 32. In Baptist Church v. Rouse, 21 Conn. 160, it was held to be a question of fact for the jury whether there was a secession. Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172, and cases cited; The Dublin case, 38 N. H. 459.

We find that, in this State, in The Dublin case, 38 N. H. 459, it is settled, that the individual religious opinions of the donor cannot be received to enlarge or contract the meaning of general terms used in the instrument by which he established the charity.

But it is also held that "courts will resort to the original and long-continued application of a religious charity by the trustees, for aid in giving construction to doubtful terms in the instrument which establishes the charity," and that "where the original trustees, appointed by the founder of a religious charity, applied the fund to the support of certain religious doctrines, and that application has been long continued and acquiesced in, a court of equity will not interfere with the application," nnless such interference was called for by the plainly expressed intention of the donor.

It would seem, then, that the proper principles to be applied in this case upon the weight of authority (not taking into consideration those authorities which are based upon the peculiar provisions of the statute of New York, and which can, therefore, have no application here) are, in substance, as follows: That the denominational name of a religious society to which or to whose use a donation or grant is made, and the doctrines actually taught therein at the time of the gift or grant and immediately after, and the length of time they continue to be thus taught without interruption, may be resorted to, to limit and define the trust in respect to docrines deemed fundamental; that where the conveyance is merely o the religious corporation by name, with no other designation of ts purposes or trusts (as in this case), the denominational nane, in

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connection with the contemporaneous acts of the corporators, may be a sufficient guide as to the nature of the trust; that where there is no specific designation in the deed as to the particular religious tenets or doctrines, which it is to be used to advance or support, the denominational name may indicate the nature of the trust, so far as respects doctrines admitted to be fundamental; and that, if a society of one religious sect or denomination becomes incorporated with a strict denominational name, descriptive of the fundamental doctrines of the sect to which it belongs, it will be presumed that it was constituted for the purpose of advancing the vital doctrines of such sect or denomination, and that the society or those having control of property held in trust for the benefit of such religious society, should be restrained from applying the property or the use of it to the promotion of tenets or doctrines clearly opposed and adverse to the fundamental principles of the faith and doctrines of such sect or denomination at the time and immediately after the trust was created.

Now, that the terms Unitarian and Christian, when assumed as a denominational name, are both expressive of the most fundamental and essential doctrines and tenets will not probably be questioned. It was settled, in Inhabitants of Princeton v. Adams, 10 Cush. 129, 132, that the two systems of belief (Unitarian and Trinitarian) are essentially different in their doctrines and principles of faith; and METCALF, J., in the opinion, says: "We know of no school, either of theology or of jurisprudence, in which these two systems of faith were ever considered essentially the same. From the early days of Christianity they have always been deemed, as they have been in our day, antagonistic systems; and courts have decided that funds given to support the teaching of one of them are misemployed and perverted when applied to support the teaching of the other, and have redressed such misemployment," citing Attorney-General v. Pearson, 3 Meriv. 353; 7 Sim. 290; Shore v. Wilson 9 Clark & Fin. 355; Attorney-General v. Shore, 11 Sim. 592; 16 id. 210; Attorney-General v. Drummond, 1 Con. & Lawson, 210; 1 Dru. & Warren, 353; Attorney-General v. Hutton, 7 Irish Eq. 612, 614; Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio, 492, 548; Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches, etc., 1 Sandf. Ch. 439; 2 Story on Eq., § 1191, a.

And if the term Unitarian be thus expressive of a doctrine so fundamental and essential, what shall be said of the term Chris

tian? If the distinction is so great between two sects, both of which are admitted to be only different denominations of the same religion, what must the difference be between whole systems of religion between Christianity and other systems of religion, as the Mohammedan or pagan, or between Christianity and infidelitya disbelief in and denial of all the fundamental and essential doctrines of the whole system?

Difference in creed or belief of the Christian doctrines makes the different Christian sects; difference in name makes the different denominations, and the name in some way usually indicates or describes the sect; so it is the belief in the Christian religion, and in Jesus Christ as its author and as the true Messiah, that makes a Christian; and belief in the religion of Mohammed, and in Mohammed as a true prophet, makes a Mohammedan. It is a man's belief, his creed, that decides what religion and what sect he belongs to. The idea that any man, however good, can properly be called a Christian, who does not believe or assent to the truths and doctrines of Christianity and, first and foremost of all, to the doctrine that Jesus was the Christ, the true Messiah, "the Christ of God," is simply preposterous. A man's belief alone decides his religion and his sect. A man may be a Christian, in the political or conventional sense in which we use the word, if he assents to the truths of the Christian system. If he lives an upright life, it makes him a good or, as might be said, a consistent Christian. So a man believing the Mohammedan faith may be a good man. If his life is pure and correct, it makes him a good Mohammedan; but any amount of good living will not make a pagan a Christian, until he believes the Christian faith. An infidel may be a good citizen and a good man; a good infidel, but not a good Christian; because, while an infidel, he cannot be a Christian at all. There is and can be no doubt as to what the word Christian means, in its common use and acceptation, and as it is generally understood. All Christians believe in Jesus Christ as the true Messiah and the Saviour of men; in other words, that Jesus Christ was just what he claimed to be the Christ of God." It is to be presumed that the framers of our constitution, when they used the words in Article VI in the bill of rights, and also that the founders of this society in Dover, when they applied this name to their religious society as descriptive of the faith of the sect which formed it, used this word in its common and ordinary sense; such is the ordinary

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and universal rule, unless something appears to restrict or qualify such ordinary meaning. "We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language." They must "be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and no room is left for construction." People v. Prudy, 2 Hill, 35; S. C., 4 id. 384; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 399; Cooley's Const. Lim. 55; Robinson V. Tuttle, 37 N. H. 248; Burnstead v. Alton, 32 id. 250; Mailard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 261.

Let us then examine the records of this society in Dover, and the other evidence in the case, and see whether this society was, or was not, in fact, all that its name indicated, to wit: "A Unitarian society of Christians." They must be first Christian and next Unitarian. We shall also see, in that way, how the trust in this case has been administered. In Congregational organizations there is presumed to be a church, which is a constituent part of the congregation. Unitarians are Congregationalists, at least in this country. The Dublin Case, 38 N. H. The society embraces the church and all those who worship with the church. "Churches

act

in the call of a minister to be their pastor separately from and generally prior to the society or parish which embraces both the church and those who worship with them. The call of the church, however, is not valid unless the parish assents to it. The contract of settlement is made wholly between the parish and minister, and is obligatory on them only." Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge, "Congregationalist;" Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 507, 508, and seq.; Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 520; Baird's Religion in America, 453, 454.

To find what are the religious opinions of any Congregational society, you must look to the creed or doctrines of the church which constitute its center and basis. A Congregational society is generally made up first of the church, and next of those who worship with the church and favor the same views, and who assist in supporting the preaching and public worship of that church. The society, as such, often, perhaps generally, has no creed or published religious opinions distinct from the church; the church is the basis or foundation of the whole. This is true in the Congregational societies in this country generally, whether orthodox or Unitarian. The ministers are generally settled by the society, as in this case, but they become pastors of the church as well as of the

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society; and the creed or belief of the society is not to be sought in its constitution or by-laws, but in the creed or belief of the church with which said society is connected.

In this case, we find that all the ministers who were present at the ordination of Mr. Abbott are spoken of and described as pastors of the several churches from which they came; but they were all settled, no doubt, by their respective societies. "A church can subsist and perpetuate itself only by an organic connection with a society. The society is the soil for the roots of a Christian vine, supplying the new material to repair waste by death. A church not connected with a society would die out." Ellis' Half Century of the Unitarian Controversy, 424, 425, 429-431; Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172. A Congregational church is described by SHAW, C. J., as an "aggregate body or association - not a corporation or quasi corporation-formed within the religious society or parish; set apart from the rest of the society for peculiar religious observances, for the celebration of the Lord's supper, and for mutual edification." Weld v. May, 9 Cush. 181; Buck's Eccl. Law, 67.

This society in Dover, being formed as we have seen, and having erected their meeting-house and sold their pews subject to conditions above specified, made arrangements to dedicate their house to the worship of God. This was done by Christian ministers of Unitarian Congregational churches in the usual form. Their first minister was ordained by the same council of ministers that dedicated the house of worship.

But before the house was dedicated or any minister ordained, it was thought proper, and perhaps necessary, that a Christian church should first be formed and organized, as the body which was especially to occupy the house and direct in its public worship, and to which the pastor was to minister, by virtue of his connection with the society as its pastor and minister.

Therefore a church was formed, which was made up of members of the society who expressed "their earnest desire and solemn intention of forming themselves into a Christian church, for the purpose of observing Christian ordinances, obeying the precepts of Jesus Christ, and aiding each others' advancement in a holy life," and who, having solemnly declared their belief in the gospel of Jesus Christ," etc., were declared and pronounced to be "a regular Christian church.” And, "now that their house was about to be