he thinks fit, to transfer the whole thereof to any person or company, or to sell the same in parcels : (7.) To give receipts for any money received by him, which receipt shall effectually discharge the person paying such monies from all responsibility in respect of the application thereof:

(8.) To prove, rank, claim, and draw a dividend in the matter of the bankruptcy or sequestration of any debtor of the bankrupt.

As the trustee after his appointment at the first meeting is empowered to administer an oath, persons swearing falsely will be liable to indictment for perjury. In addition, the Act for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 14, enacts as follows:-"If any creditor in any bankruptcy or liquidation by arrangement or composition with creditors in pursuance of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, makes any false claim, or any proof, declaration, or statement of account which is untrue in any material particular, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable with imprisonment not exceeding one year, with or without hard labour.

On the subject of proof of debts under a bankruptcy by the creditors of the bankrupt, the following remarks by Mr. Justice Buller are worthy of attention:

"If the creditor wish to prove a debt under a commission of bankrupt, it is necessary that he should be able to ascertain the amount of it without the intervention of a jury; and if it be so certain that he can swear to it, he is entitled to prove it under the commission. In some cases the form of the action is material, in others not. If money be levied by the sale of goods under an execution, and the execution be afterwards set aside, then if the party whose goods have been seized insist on contingent damages for keeping him out of his goods and selling them, it cannot be proved as a debt under the commission; but if he demand only the value of the goods, he may come in under the commission, because the debt is capable of being ascertained, and he may swear to the amount of it; so the case put at the bar, of an action for not delivering goods according to an agreement, admits of the same distinc

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tion; if the party has actually paid for the goods, then he may recover the precise value in case of non-delivery, and consequently may prove it as a debt under the commission; but if he will not be content with recovering the precise value of them, but goes for contingent damages, arising from the fluctuation of the market, he cannot come in under the commission, because those damages are uncertain. There is also another case, which shows that the form of the action is not the criterion. Suppose the money has been lent on interest, and the principal has been paid, and the only point in dispute be on the interest, indebitatus assumpsit will not lie for it eo nomine as interest, but the party must have recourse to a special action on the case to recover it; and yet, as the amount of the interest is a matter of computation, he may prove it as a debt under the commission. Besides which, I am also of opinion that this case falls within the principle and good sense of the statute 7 Geo. 1, c. 31, though not within the very words of it. The object of this Act was that all demands that existed prior to the time of the bankruptcy, though not payable till a future day, might be proved under a commission of bankrupt, provided they were capable of being ascertained." (Utterson v. Vernon, 3 T. R. 548.)

In tendering his proof the creditor must exhibit the bill, note, judgment, or other document or writing which is the foundation of his claim; and if he hold any title deeds or other securities for his debt he is required to set them all forth in his proof specifically. Any rights, however, which his securities may give him against third parties will be reserved, and he may enforce his remedies against them to the utmost of his security, but any sum he may recover in this way will go in satisfaction of his debt to the extent that he will not be permitted to receive more than twenty shillings in the pound.

Though, as a general rule, a power of attorney must be treated as revoked by an act of bankruptcy committed by the giver of it as against the trustee under a subsequent bankruptcy, still, if, after the act of bankruptcy, but before the adjudication, property is conveyed under the power to a bonâ fide purchaser who has not had notice of the act of bankruptcy, the purchaser may hold the property as against the trustee. (Ex p. Snowball, re Douglas, 7 L. R. Ch. App. 548.)

A power of attorney, executed before a notary public in a

British colony, and certified by him under his hand aud seal, does not require to be verified by affidavit. (Siddal v. Nicholson; re Goff's Estate, 14 L. T. R. N. S. 727.) But where the affidavit is sworn before a foreign notary, the signature of the notary must be proved by affidavit.

As to proof under second bankruptcy. In Ex p. Carlisle, re Sutherland, the debtor was adjudicated in 1868, and by a resolution under s. 110 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, the cre ditors agreed to accept a proposal of the debtor for the payment of his debts by certain instalments. The bankrupt ultimately obtained his discharge. He, however, failed to pay any one of the instalments, and was adjudicated bankrupt under the Act of 1869. The creditors under the first bankruptcy now sought to prove in respect of their original debts, and the County Court Judge had admitted their proof. The Chief Judge: "There can be no doubt that these creditors are entitled to prove. By the non-payment of the instalments a new debt was created, and the order of the County Court Judge is perfectly right. The appeal must be dismissed"(51 L. T. 86.)

A. had recovered judgment by default in an action upon certain bills of exchange, and the acceptor having subsequently become bankrupt, he sought to prove for the amount of the judgment against the bankrupt's estate:

Held, that the trustee under the bankruptcy could dispute the debt, notwithstanding judgment, and the proof was consequently disallowed. The evidence seemed to show that some of the bills had come improperly into the hands of the creditors, upon whom lay the burden of proof that the debt was valid notwithstanding the judgment. (Ex p. Chatteris, re Earl of Orkney, 26 L. T. N. S. 174.)

As to proof in respect of breach of trust.-In Ex p. Cadwallader, in re James, an executor and trustee of a will was declared bankrupt. Under the will he took both real and personal estate, in trust for the testator's widow, E. C., for her life, with remainder to her infant children. He fraudulently misapplied the trust property, and under his bankruptcy, E. C. was admitted to prove against his estate. On the choice of assignee, E. C. (the widow) applied for leave to vote, but her application was refused by the registrar, and also by the commissioner; but on appeal the Lords Justices held that she was sufficiently interested to be entitled to vote. (31 L. J. Rep.

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N. S. Bank. 66.) Also as to proof in consequence of a breach of trust made through mistake, see Exp. Norris, in re Biddulph, 38 L. J. Bank. 5.

As to proof in respect of agreement to repair, &c.—In Ex p. Tusker, in re Whiteley, the question was whether a landlord of a mill held under an agreement in writing for a lease which contained a clause binding the tenant to repair, could prove, under the tenant's bankruptcy, for the damage sustained through a fire by which the mill had been burned down. It was afterwards verbally agreed that an insurance should be effected by the landlord, the tenant paying the premiums. After the fire, the landlord compounded his claim with the insurance office, and rebuilt the premises, and alleged that such rebuilding cost much more than the sum recovered from the insurance office. The tenant afterwards became bankrupt, and the landlord attempted to prove his claim under the agreement to repair. The commissioner, however rejected the proof. The Lords Justices, on appeal held, that at the time of the bankruptcy the appellant had a clear claim upon the estate, and that there must be an assessment of the damage sustained by him. (2 L. J. Rep., notes of cases, 79.) As to damages for breach of covenant, &c., see Betteley v. Stainsby (31 L. J. C. P. 337).

As to proof under the Act to amend the Law of Partnership, 28 & 29 Vict. cap. 86, which authorises loans to be made to persons engaged in trade upon a written contract that the lender shall receive a rate of interest varying with the profits, or shall receive a share of such profits arising from such trade, without being a partner, &c., sect. 5 enacts as follows: "In the event of any such trader as aforesaid being adjudged a bankrupt, or taking the benefit of any Act for the relief of insolvent debtors, or entering into an arrangement to pay his creditors less than twenty shillings in the pound, or dying in insolvent circumstances, the lender of any such loan as aforesaid shall not be entitled to recover any portion of his principal, or of the profits or interest payable in respect of such loan, nor shall any such vendor of a goodwill as aforesaid be entitled to recover any such profits as aforesaid, until the claims of the other creditors of the said trader for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied."

As to Holders of Bills as Endorsees for Value.-In Ex p. Petrie, in re Petrie, there would not have been the statutory

majority of assents to a deed, under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, sect. 192, but for the computation of Messrs. Swire and Son among the assenting creditors, in respect of acceptances which they had discounted with a bank at Liverpool, not returned as creditors at all, and which, at the date of registration of the deed, held the bills as endorsees for value. Upon the application of a non-assenting creditor, Petrie was adjudicated bankrupt. Petrie applied to the commissioner to have the adjudication annulled on the ground of the prior execution of an inspectorship deed, which application was refused. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the commissioner, holding that there was no statutory majority of the creditors, on the ground that the Bank, the holders of 7000l. worth of the bills for value, were the only persons entitled to be treated as creditors. Lord Cairns said: "The deed is in my opinion vicious in the first place, because it does not describe the Bank as one of the creditors of Mr. Petrie, whether assenting or dissenting creditors. But it is vicious beyond that, because it does describe, as the proprietors of this debt, Messrs. Swire and Son. Messrs. Swire and Son were clearly not, at that time, the owners of these bills, nor could they, whatever might have been their dealings with Mr. Petrie, have sued him in respect of the debt represented by the bills, as long as the bills were outstanding, and current in the hands of third parties." Lord Justice Selwyn added that: "At the time of the registration. of the deed, the bills were at the Bank under discount, or in other words the Bank were then the holders of these bills, and consequently they were the creditors entitled to assent or dissent in respect of them." (37 L. J. Bank. 13.)

As to actions by trustees in bankruptcy.-The following principles are adopted from Mr. J. D. Mayne's valuable treatise on the Law of Damages, 2nd ed., edited by Mr. Lumley Smith, pp. 406, et seq.

"Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, the property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors is now administered by a trustee appointed by the creditors and acting under their direction. The property vests in him on appointment, and comprises all property belonging to or vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy, or acquired by or devolving on him during its continuance. It does not comprise property held by the bankrupt in trust for other persons (Bankruptcy Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 15.) It would

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