ART. III. Insecto-Theology: or, A Demonstration of the Being and Perfections of God, from a Consideration of the Structure and Economy of Insects. Illustrated with a Copper-plate. By M. Lesser; with Notes, by P. Lyonet. 8vo. pp. 450. 6s. Boards. Cadell, jun. and Davies. 1799.

IN

N the advertisement prefixed to this work, are given the lives of the two authors; or rather one of M. Lyonet, for of M. Lesser nothing is mentioned except the place of his birth, and the date of a publication entitled a Lithology.-The life of Lyonet is extracted from the Gentleman's Magazine; and, if we be allowed a critical retrospect, we shall observe that his biographer is not sufficiently sedate and temperate in his encomiums. The elegant and high compliment bestowed by Fontenelle on Leibnitz," that of many Herculeses antiquity made only one, but of a single Leibnitz we may make many learned men," loses more than half of its grace and propriety when applied to M. Lyonet.

The following are the reasons assigned by the translator for the present work not having before appeared in English:

That this work has not till now appeared in English is owing probably to the following reasons. When it was first published, the study of insects was little cultivated in Britain; the system of Lin næus, which reduced the chaos into order, was not yet perfected, and our language had not yet formed and adopted a number of words and terms which it was necessary should be current before a translation could be attempted. Even at this day the want of terms is probably the reason why the excellent publications of Reaumur, De Geer, and many others, are still only known in this country in their original language. In this respect the translator of the work now submitted to the public, must likewise throw himself on the indulgence of the reader. For many terms he has been obliged to make use either of the Latin or the French word; but he hopes never except when these words are perfectly well understood, and have become, through use, inoffensive to the English ear. But what no doubt chiefly tended to obstruct the translation of the book into English was, the difficulty of ascertaining the identical insects which the authors mention by local names without sufficient descriptions. It is not a mere knowledge of the languages in which the book was originally written, nor a mere acquaintance with the subject, that can enable a translator to overcome this difficulty. He must have an opportunity of consulting a variety of books, seldom to be met with in private libraries, and some of them rare even in the best public collections in this kingdom. The chief value of the present performance to naturalists will therefore consist in its identifying the greater part of the insects by the Linnæan name, an advantage which they well know how to appreciate,

It must be mentioned that as the original work was published before the accurate definition of an insect was given by Linnæus, the

word

word is used much more loosely than at present. By Lesser all the animals that compose Linnæus's class of Vermes are called insects; and even Lyonet, who defines an insect to be an animal with an external skeleton, gives the same name to snails. The naturalist, accustomed to the strict acceptation of the term, will revolt at this inaccuracy; but it was thought better to retain the expression, than to sacrifice the observations and reflections it serves to introduce.'

Some part of the introduction is employed in proving that which scarcely needs a proof, viz. that the study of insects is a rational occupation. There is, indeed, no part of nature which may not be investigated with improvement and delight: "Indagatio ipsarum rerum, tum maximarum tum occultissimarum, habet delectationem." Although moral and prudential wisdom be the great and prime concern of intelligent beings, there is not wanting time for speculations on nature. The motion of stars, the growth of plants, the organization of animals, the modifications of brute matter, all present themselves as worthy objects of study and contemplation. Each has its peculiar advantages and title to regard: if one study tends to enlarge and elevate our conceptions, another may be better suited to the endowments of life, and to the "bettering of man's estate." Yet there is abroad an opinion, engendered by presumption and ignorance, that those who busy themselves in the knowlege of plants, or of insects, are at best, but laborious triflers; philosophers with minds as groveling and minute as the objects of their research. Is astronomy then a sublime science, only because the stars are placed high in the heavens; and is it a proof of a more enlarged understanding, to comprehend the anatomy of an elephant than that of a mouse? Some objections, however, are of such a nature, that to refute them seriously and elaborately is a disgrace; yet the zeal of M. Lesser, not contented with vindicating his favourite study from undeserved neglect, transports him to assign to it a superiority over other pursuits. His arguments on this head cannot deserve more than the praise of ingenuity:

What would one think of an artist who should be able to reduce all the wheels and movements of a watch into so small a compass, that the whole might be set in a ring like a diamond? One would admire it without doubt; and indeed such a masterpiece would be worthy of admiration, and would be prized far above a watch of the common size. The same thing may be said of animals. The power and wisdom of the Creator seem particularly conspicuous in the formation of the most minute. Can we, then, justly neglect such a call upon our worship and adoration! However small these creatures are, even those which are with difficulty discovered by the aid of the microscope, they have all the parts that are necessary for them; they have all articulations, muscles, and nerves; and all are covered with a skin suited to their condition,

• Galen

Galen supports with much sound sense the reasoning I here use, and perfectly justifies the conclusion. That great man says, that the smaller things are, the greater is their value, and that workman is the most to be prized, who can make in small compass what others cannot make but in large. He relates to this purpose, the instance of a sculptor of his time who represented, on a ring, the figure of Phaeton in a chariot drawn by four horses. The work was executed with so much delicacy, that the very reins of the horses were to be seen, and although their limbs were not larger than those of a flea, the teeth in their mouths were visible. From this Galen takes occasion to remark the infinite distance between the power of the creature, and that of the Creator, between the wisdom of the Being who formed the fica, and the skill of the sculptor, who had represented horses so very minute.'

"Philo

To the merely physical philosopher, the notes of M. Lyonet will be more valuable than the text. The author (Lesser) undoubtedly possessed much knowlege, sound sense, and great piety: but his reasonings are not strict and logical. sophatur laxé et per rationes fluctuantes, que non constringunt animum, neque ad assensum impellunt." We do not mean to say that fervent piety and sound philosophy are incompatible, but that this author has not exhibited their union.

In p. 28, M. Lesser mentions that, if animals lose a limb, they cannot repair it; M. Lyonet, in a note, mentions as exceptions, that sea-stars, crabs, and lobsters, are able to replace their limbs: but (says he) this does not affect Lesser's reasoning, because it is not the star, crab, or lobster that repairs the limb, but Nature.' M. Lyonet, with all his great endowments, possessed a share of sophistry; this defence of Lesser is a very lame one; and an error lies somewhere between the two philosophers, of which we cannot easily get rid.

We will give an extract concerning a luminous insect in Surinam :

Shine like burning coals.-Besides the insects which shine in the night, such as the glow worm, &c. there is one found in Surinam which deserves to be known on account of its singularity. Accord ing to the description which Mad. Merian gives of it, this animal, in its creeping state, seems to have a form approaching that of our small grasshoppers, but is much larger; like them it has a long proboscis by which it sucks the juice from the flowers of the pomegra nate, and this proboscis remains with it all its life. After having quitted one skin, it changes its form, and appears under that of a large green fly like our Cicada. Its flight is then very rapid, and the noise it makes with its wings is like the sound of a cymbal. Although according to the ordinary course of nature, an insect, after having acquired wings, undergoes no farther change, yet this one, by the concurring testimony of the Indians which Mad. Merian says she had in part verified by her own experience, undergoes still a last transformation which renders it luminous, and which then procures

it the name of the lantern fly. (Fulgora Laternaria Lin.) In this last transformation, besides other inconsiderable changes which happen to its body and wings, there issues, from the forepart of its head, a very long transparent bladder, coloured with reddish and greenish streaks, and which diffuses a light sufficient to enable a person to read pretty small print. This animal, by the description she gives of it, is then about four inches long, and the bladder occupies about a fourth of its whole length. Before Mad. Merian was acquainted with the luminous quality of this insect, the Indians brought her many of them which she shut up in a large box. Being alarmed one night with a singular noise which she heard in the house, she got up, lighted a candle, and went to see what it was. The noise came from the box; she opened it, and immediately there issued a flame, which increased her emotion, and made her throw down the box, whence there was now dispersed a new beam of light, as each animal got out of it. We may believe her fear did not long continue, but soon gave place to admiration, and she immediately set herself to regain animals so extraordinary, which had taken advantage of the fear they had occasioned to make their escape.'

The present work conspicuously displays the piety of the author, and the extensive knowlege of his annotator; and it seems well calculated to answer the end for which the editor designed it.

ART. IV. The Credibility of Christianity vindicated, in answer to Mr. Hume's Objections; in two Discourses preached before the University of Cambridge. By the Rev. S. Vince, A. M. F. R.S. Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy. 8vo. 1s. Wingrave, &c.

TH

HE Essay on Miracles, by David Hume, has called forth a great variety of answers in the form of treatises, sermons, &c. and the opinions of the sceptical philosopher have been 'honored in their refutation by Bishops, Heads of Colleges, Professors, Doctors, &c. * In one point, all Mr. Hume's opponents agree, viz. that his argument against miracles has no stability in truth. Is it not then desirable, instead of so many and differently conducted refutations, to have one that shall be clear, precise, and decisive, to end the controversy ?

The present refutation may be so denominated, on principles assumed by its framer: but it is no refutation on those principles by which Hume meant that the question should be judged. In these discourses, the argument is made to depend on new grounds of determination: but, to shew previously that such grounds are proper, and to be admitted, would lead to very intricate and contentious discussion. What is

* Douglas, Adams, Campbell, Price, &c.

14

here

here advanced concerning the moral motives and ends of miracles, the necessity that they should be wrought, and the power of effecting them, Hume would undoubtedly controvert; as must be evident to every one who has read his essays, and his dialogues concerning natural religion.-It may be proper to state, in Mr. Vince's own words, part of the principles on which he grounds his refutation:

What we mean by the laws of nature, are those laws which are deduced from that series of events, which, by divine appointment, follow each other in the moral and physical world; the former of which we shall here have occasion principally to consider, the present question altogether respecting the moral government of God-a consideration which our author has entirely neglected, in his estimation of the credibility of miracles. Examining the question therefore upon this principle, it is manifest, that the extraordinary nature of the fact is no ground for disbelief, provided such a fact, in a moral point of view, was, from the condition of man, become necessary; for in that case, the Deity, by dispensing his assistance in proportion to our wants, acted upon the same principle as in his more ordinary operations. For however opposite the physical effects may be, if their moral tendency be the same, they form a part of the moral law. Now in those actions which are called miracles, the Deity is directed by the same moral principle as in his usual dispensations; and therefore being influenced by the same motive to accomplish the same end, the laws of God's moral government are not violated, such laws being established by the motives and the ends produced, and not by the means employed. To prove therefore the moral laws to be the same in those actions called miraculous, as in common events, it is not the actions themselves which are to be considered, but the principles by which they were directed, and their consequences, for if these be the same, the Deity acts by the same laws. And here, moral analogy will be found to confirm the truth of the miracles recorded in scripture. But as the moral government of God is directed by motives which lie beyond the reach of human investigation, we have no principles by which we can judge concerning the probability of the happening of any new event which respects the moral world; we cannot therefore pronounce any extraordinary event of that nature to be a violation of the moral law of God's dispensations; but we can nevertheless judge of its agreement with that law, so far as it has fallen under our observation. But our author leaves out the consideration of God's moral government, and reasons simply on the facts which are said to have happened, without any reference to an end; we will therefore examine how far his conclusions are just upon this principle.

He defines miracles to be " a violation of the laws of nature;" he undoubtedly means the physical laws, as no part of his reasoning has any reference to them in a moral point of view. Now these laws must be deduced, either from his own view of events only, or from that, and testimony jointly; and if testimony be allowed on one part, it ought also to be admitted on the other, granting that there is no impossibility