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SESSIONS.-See POOR. INCLOSURE, 3.

1. The application by the overseers against the father of a bastard, must be at the next practicable sessions after the child first becomes chargeable. The King v. The Justices of Oxfordshire, 110.

2. It is a question for the justices what circum. stances shall entitle the overseers to make the application at a subsequent sessions. Id.

3. In order to make an application at a subsequent sessions, it is not necessary to enter and respite at the first sessions. ld.

4. Where a bastard child becomes chargeable to the parish, the overseers ought to apply, under the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 72, to the next General Quarter Sessions of the Peace, for an order on the putative father; or, at all events, if the application is deferred to a subsequent sessions, the overseers must shew that they made diligent inquiry to discover the father, and that they did not discover him in time to give him, before the next sessions, under the 73d section of the statute, fourteen days' notice of the intended application. Rex v. Heath, 143.

5. Semble, that in such a case the overseers should make the application to the sessions, and get the order for the hearing respited. Id.

6. Where a statute gives a party the right of appealing to the sessions, on notice being given, that Court must not impose on him any new condition of appeal not imposed by statute. The King v. The Justices of Staffordshire, 48.

7. On an appeal to the sessions against a churchrate, under 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, s. 7, notice of the appeal was given to one only of the two magistrates who had acted together in making the order appealed

against:-Held, that the sessions were wrong in refusing to hear an appeal on that ground. Id.

8. A party was convicted before two magistrates under the 17 Geo. 3, c. 56, and gave notice of appeal, but did not enter into recognizances to prosecute the appeal and abide the judgment, and was therefore committed for want of entering into such recognizances. When the sessions arrived, he did not proceed with the appeal, and the prosecutor did not move to affirm the conviction. At the end of the sessions he was discharged, the commitment, for want of entering into the required recognizances, being then satisfied: Held, that this Court would not grant a mandamus to the convicting magistrates to issue their warrant against the defendant upon the conviction, it being at best doubtful whether, under these circumstances, their jurisdiction was not altogether at an end. The King v. The Justices of Middlesex, 222.

9. It seems that when the defendant did not proceed with the appeal, the prosecutor ought to have moved the sessions to affirm the conviction. Id.

10. If the Court of Quarter Sessions sends up a case for the opinion of the Court of K. B., and desire to have their order confirmed or quashed, according as the Court shall think their construction of a written instrument right or wrong, but omit to set out sufficient to shew whether their order is on the whole correct or not, the Court of K. B. will nevertheless confirm or quash the order, as they think the construction right or wrong. The King v. The Inhabitants of Billinghay, 419.

11. A case sent by the sessions for the opinion of the Court of K. B., stated, that at the hearing of an appeal touching the settlement of a pauper, it was proposed to give in evidence conversations between the parties to a written agreement, but did not state what those conversations were; also that it was proposed to give in evidence an indorsement upon the agreement, but that it was not proved that the indorsement was in existence when the agreement was signed. The question stated for the opinion of the Court was the construction of the agreement. The Court refused to send the case to be restated. Id.

SETTLEMENT.-See PoOOR.

SEWERS.

Where a collector for the Commissioners of Sewers receives from them a warrant directing him to distrain and afterwards sell the goods of A., he cannot, if he distrain the goods of A.'s tenant, justify the distress on the ground of his general authority of collector. Whatever that general authority may be, it is taken away in the particular case by the warrant directing him to do a specific thing. Sabourin v. Neale, 103.

SEXTON.-See MANDAMUS, 5, 6, 7.

SHERIFF.

See ATTORNEY, 15. PRACTICE, IV, 79, 81. RULES OF COURT, 2.

1. If a sheriff applies for relief under the Interpleader Act, and on hearing the case his rule is discharged, he has afterwards a reasonable time to make his return; and therefore an attachment obtained against him the same day for not making a return, is irregular. The King v. The Sheriff of Hertfordshire, 122.

2. A replevin clerk is bound to make reasonable and cautious inquiry into the apparent responsibility of persons who, being unknown to him, tender themselves to him as replevin sureties. Jeffery v. Bastard, 60.

3. It is not sufficient to take the statements of the

need not necessarily be construed in its larger and legal sense, but when found with other words may be construed with them as a word ejusdem generis. Therefore, where a local act imposed a rate on every person "who should inhabit, hold, occupy, possess, or enjoy any land, house, shop, warehouse, or other that the word "hereditament" meant only such as were capable of corporeal enjoyment, and did not extend to make liable to be rated a money payment in lieu of tolls. Colebrooke v. Tickell, 23.

parties themselves, the replevin clerk must inquire building, tenement, or hereditament:" it was held, from other persons. Id.

4. Semble, that he is not bound to travel out of his own office for the purpose of making inquiries, but he may require vouchers to be brought to him. Id.

5. A writ of attachment against B. issued from the Court of Chancery at the suit of A. The sheriff attached B. by his body. B. was discharged from custody as privileged from arrest. In an action upon the case by A. against the sheriff for a negligent discharge of his duty, A. must state precisely the nature of the privilege which prevented the ordinary duty of the sheriff from attaching with regard to B., and for want of such statement the declaration will be bad on general demurrer. Lloyd v. Wood, 158.

6. Quære, whether an action can be maintained at all by A. against the sheriff, under such circumstances. Id.

SLANDER.

1. Words spoken by one member of a charitable association to another, respecting the conduct of a medical man employed by the association, are not a privileged communication. Martin v. Strong, 336.

2. Semble, if they had been spoken at a meeting of the association, held for the consideration of the medical man's conduct, it would be otherwise. Id.

SMALL DEBTS ACT.

See PRACTICE, 49. PRISONER.

STAMP.

See LIMITATION OF ACTION, 2. MANDAMUS, 1. 1. The proper stamp for a lease, demising a messuage and lands at a rent ascertained by the instrument, and also certain other lands at the rent then paid for them by A., but not mentioning the amount of that rent, is an ad valorem stamp, calculated upon the whole amount of the rent to be paid for all the lands. Parry v. Deere, 395.

2. An attornment where the tenant merely puts one person in the place of another as his landlord, but continues to hold under the same terms and conditions as before, is a mere acknowledgment that the person making it is tenant, and it requires no stamp. Doe d. Linsey v. Edwards, 139.

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1. The words "owner or proprietor of land," used in a compensation clause in a local act of parliament, to indicate the persons to whom compensation is to be made for injuries arising out of the prosecution of the act, have not necessarily any technical meaning confined to the owner of the inheritance, but must be construed with reference to the general object of the act, and mean any person who has any estate or interest-as, for instance, a tenant-in the land, who sustains loss or damage. Lister v. Lobby, 12.

2. The word "hereditament," when used as a description of property liable to be rated in a statute

3. The burden of proving that a party is liable to be rated, by the operation of a local act of parliament, for property for which he was never before liable to be rated, lies on the party seeking to impose it. Id.

4. Per Coleridge, J. The words of a local act of parliament, imposing a charge upon those who were never before liable to it, should be so clear and express, that the Court should be able to see that the persons to be charged have had due warning of the intention to charge them. Id.

5. Where an Inclosure Act directs that a corn rent shall be awarded to the rector in lieu of tithes, and that, in making the valuation, "the tithes of all ancient and inclosed lands shall be taken as equal in value to one-fifth part of the net value of the said lands :"-The rector was held to be rateable in respect of the corn rent so awarded to him. The King v. The Churchwardens of Wistow, 95.

6. Semble, that when the legislature thus speaks of "the tithes" generally, and then of the "net value of the lands as the equivalent for them," it must be presumed to mean that one-fifth of the net annual value of the land is equal to the gross value of the tithes, and the rector is liable to be rated for the payment substituted, as he originally was for the tithes themselves. Id.

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21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 7, Limitation of action. Piggott v. Rush, 28.

12 Car. 2, c. 24, ss. 8, 9. Guardian. The King v. Isley, 196.

29 Car. 2, c. 3, ss. 1, 2, 4. Parol demise. Lord Bolton v. Tomlin, 369.

1 Jac. 2, c. 22, (local). Vestry. The King v. St. James, Westminster, 253.

4 & 5 W. & M. c. 20. Docketing a judgment. Doe d. Barron v. Purchas, 50.

2 Geo. 2. c. 23, s. 23. Bill of costs. Pepper v. Yeatman, 116.

5 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 2. Recognizance. The King v. The Inhabitants of Abergele, 375.

7 Geo. 2, c. 20. Mortgage. Doe d. Hurst v. Clifton. Doe d. Orchard v. Stubbs, 285.

13 Geo. 2, c. 18, s. 5. Certiorari. The King v. The Inhabitants of Abergele, 375. The King v. The Jus tices of Middlesex, 407.

14 Geo. 2, c. 17. Judgment as in case of a non. suit. Ward v. Turner, 90. Brough v. Scarby,

139.

17 Geo. 2, c. 3. Inspection of rate books. The King v. The Vestrymen of St. Marylebone, 261. 17 Geo. 2, c. 38. Inspection of rate books. The King v. The Vestrymen of St. Marylebone, 261. 22 Geo. 2, c. 46, s. 14. Clerk of the peace. Faulkner v. Chevell, 183.

23 Geo. 2, c. 33. Court of Requests. Wills v. Lang-
ridge, 309.

13 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 48. Surveyor of highways.
Harrison v. Round, 18.

17 Geo. 3, c. 56, s. 20. Embezzling silk. The King
v. The Justices of Middlesex, 222.

19 Geo. 3, c. 70, s. 6. Recognizance. Brady v.
Veeres, 320.

35 Geo. 3, c. 101, s. 2. Suspending order of re-
moval. The King v. The Inhabitants of Oldland, 4.
41 Geo. 3, U. K. c. 109, s. 3. Inclosure. The King
v. Marsh, 255.

43 Geo. 3, c. 46. Vexatious arrest. Jones v. Jehu,

119.

46 Geo. 3, c. lxxxix. s. 53, (local). Rateability.
Colebrooke v. Tickell, 23.

Clay v. Bow-

48 Geo. 3, c. 123. Small Debts Act.
ler, 283. Smith v. Preston, 93.
49 Geo. 3, c. 125, s. 3. Friendly Society.
King, 178.

Day v.

51 Geo. 3, c. xxv. s. 46, (local). Inclosure. Estate.
Doe d. Harris v. Saunder, 350.

53 Geo. 3, c. 127, s. 7. Notice of appeal. The King
v. The Justices of Staffordshire, 48.

55 Geo. 3, c. 68. Stopping highway. The King v.
The Inhabitants of Milverton, 434. Footpath. The
King v. The Justices of Middlesex, 407.

55 Geo. 3, c. 194, s. 21. Apothecary. Shearwood v.
Hau, 249. Willis v. Langridge, 250.

56 Geo. 3, c. 139. Parish apprentice. The King v.
Inhabitants of Maidstone, 198. The King v. The
Inhabitants of Witney, 150.

58 Geo. 3, c. 69, s. 6. Surveyor of highways. Har-
rison v. Round, 18.
-- s. 8.

Election of churchwarden.
Campbell (clerk) v. Maund, 457.

59 Geo. 3, c. 134, s. 14. Repairs of a church. Rate.
The King v. The Churchwardens of Dursley, 9.
s. 40. Rebuilding church, The
King v. The Churchwardens of St. Michael, Pem-
broke, 344.

59 Geo. 3, c. cxviii. (local). Action against com-
missioners. Cane v. Chapman, 355.

3 Geo. 4, c. 113. Pension. The King v. The Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury, 67.

3 Geo. 4, c. 126, s. 51. Rate. The King v. The Trus-
tees of the Great Dover Street Road, 423.

s. 85. Inquisition. The King v. The
Trustees of the Norwich and Watton Turnpike Road,

385.
4 Geo. 4, c. 95, s. 31. Rate. The King v. The Trus-
tees of the Great Dover Street Road, 423.

s. 87. Certiorari. The King v. The
Trustees of the Norwich and Watton Turnpike Road,

385.

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1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, s. 1. Interpleader. Lawrence
v. Matthews, 123.

s. 6. Interpleader. Inland v.
Bushell, 118. Lashmar v. Claringbold, 87. Mat-
thews v. Sims, 298.

1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 60, s. 32. Inspection of rate books.
The King v. The Vestrymen of St. Marylebone, 261.
2 & 3 Will, 4, c. 39, ss. 1, 4. Capias. Margetson
v. Tugghe, 85. Wickens v. Parker, 137.

3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 15. Limitation of action.
Doe d. Jones v. Williams, 213. Doe d. Burgess v.
Thompson, 451.

3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 1. Pleading the general is-
sue. Haine v. Davey, 30.

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s. 23. Amendment. Serjeant
Guest v. Elwes, 34.

s. 39. Arbitration. The King

3 & 4 Will 4, c. 52, s. 50. Customs. The King v.
The Commissioners of Customs, 247.
s. 108. Customs. Alcock v.

Taylor, 58.

4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 72. Order of bastardy. The
King v. The Justices of Oxfordshire, 110.
King v. Heath, 143.

The
s. 81. Appeal. The King v.
The Inhabitants of Holbeach, 414. The King v.
The Inhabitants of Kelvedon, 415. Notice of ap-
peal. The King v. The Justices of Cornwall, 157.
5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 59, s. 9. Cruelty to animals. Hop-
kins v. Crowe, 21.

5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76. Municipal Corporation. The
King v. White, 403. The King v. The Mayor and
Assessors of Hythe, 455. The King v. Chitty, 399.
The King v. Williams, 275.

5 & 6 Will. 4, c. xxxvi, (local).
Road Act. Lister v. Lobley, 12.

Construction of

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

1. Two parties entered into a written agreement,
by which one was to take a farm of the other, and to
take the straw, chaff, &c. at a valuation to be made
by such competent persons as the two parties should
respectively appoint. Such agreement is entire-the
two parts cannot be separated from each other; and
if one person only is, by parol agreement, afterwards
appointed to make the valuation, the landlord cannot
maintain an action upon the parol agreement thus
substituted, even though the straw and chaff, &c.
have been taken and used by the tenant. Harvey v.
Grabham, 146.

2. The defendant's testator agreed by parol with
the plaintiff's steward to hire some land from year
to year, upon the special terms mentioned in some
printed rules, and to commence occupation at a future
day; the plaintiff's attorney then signed a memoran-
dum of the hiring at the back of the printed rules:
-Held, that after a tenancy was actually created by
entry and payment of rent, that this copy of the
printed rules, and the memorandum indorsed, might be

L L

read by the attorney who signed it, in order to refresh his memory as to the special terms under which the land was hired, although there might perhaps have been, in the first instance, merely an agreement for a lease, which was not to be performed within a year, and was therefore bad by the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds. Lord Bolton v. Tomlin, 369.

3. A parol lease for a term not exceeding three years, warranted by the second section of the Statute of Frauds, may be as special in its terms as a written Id.

one.

SURGEON-See PLEADING, 4, 5.

TITHES.-See STATUTES, 5, 6.

TRESPASS.

See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. WARRANT OF JUSTICES.

A person who is not the owner of an animal cannot, under 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 59, s. 9, direct a police officer to take into custody a person who has illtreated it, unless such person saw the ill-treatment inflicted. In such a case the bona fides of the intention of the person giving the charge affords him no protection under the statute in an action of trespass. Hopkins v. Crowe, 21.

TROVER.-See OVERSEER, 1.

A barn of wood, and thatched, was erected by a tenant on staddles, or blocks of stone with caps, some of which stood on the surface of the soil, some a few inches in the ground, and others on a foundation of brick and mortar, rendered necessary by the unevenness of the ground. The whole of the timber-work rested entirely on the staddles by its weight alone, and could be removed without removing the caps which were affixed to the staddles by mortar :-Held, that the wood-work and thatch of such a barn was not affixed to the freehold, but was a chattel, for which trover might be maintained. Wandsborough v. Maton,

37.

TURNPIKE ROAD.-See HIGHWAY. VESTRY.-See OFFICER. OVERSEER, 2.

WARRANT OF JUSTICES.

1. Persons applying under a statute for a warrant to enforce payment of rent for gas supplied, and who by themselves or their officer afterwards execute it, cannot set up the warrant as their justification in an action brought against them by the party whose goods have been seized under it. Painter v. The Liverpool Oil Gas Company, 233.

2. It seems that the warrant ought to state the demand of the rent, and the summons and hearing on which the conviction proceeded. Id.

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY.
See INSOLVENT. PRACTICE, 39.

Judgment entered up on an old warrant of attorney, on an affidavit that the defendant had been seen alive eight mouths previously in New South Wales. Johnson v. Fry, 292.

WILL.

Testator devised "to the use of my grandson J. G., and his assigns, during the term of his natural life, without impeachment of waste, and immediately after the decease of the said J. G.," to trustees to support contingent remainders, "nevertheless to permit and suffer J. G. and his assigns, during his natural life, to receive the rents, issues, and profits; and immediately after his decease, to the use of the first, second, and every other son of the said J. G., severally and successively in remainder, one after another, according to the priority of their respective births, and the heirs male of the body of such son, so that every elder of the same sons, and the heirs male of his body, shall always be preferred to every younger of the same sons and the heirs male of his body." By a codicil, he devised all his freehold, copyhold, and personal estate to his daughter A. M. H. for life, and after the determination of that estate, to his grandson J. G. and his heirs, in strict entail, as in my said will directed:" and in failure of issue of the

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said J. G., he ordered that his said estate and effects should go and descend as is by his will directed :Held, that under this will and codicil, J. G. took only an estate for life. Graves v. Hicks, 74.

LONDON:

C. ROWORTH AND SONS, PRINTERS, BELL-YARD, TEMPLE BAR.

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