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1854.

Re COLQUHOUN.

general law of the country and cannot be reversed by a rule of practice in the taxing master's office.

Mr. Follett, the taxing master (who, at the request of their lordships, attended in Court), stated the practice of the Court to be in conformity with the certificate with which he had furnished the Vice-Chancellor (a).

(a) The following is a copy of the certificate:

"Re Colquhoun. To the Vice-Chancellor Stuart.-Sir,In compliance with your Honor's directions I have looked into the papers relating to this taxation, and beg leave respectfully to state as follows:-1. The propriety of the taxation appears to me to depend entirely on the nature of the retainer originally given by Mr. Ford to Mr. Colquhoun, and neither in Mr. Ford's petition to tax, nor in the bill itself, nor in the petition of the assignees complaining of the taxation, is there any statement whether Mr. Ford retained the solicitor for himself separately, or whether jointly with all or with some of the other Defendants, who were also clients of Mr. Colquhoun, nor are there stated any circumstances from which I am able to infer the nature of the retainer. 2. The bill appears to be taxed on the assumption that Mr. Ford was liable severally for his own share of the costs and nothing else, and, assuming that to be the fact, then a taxation allowing against him all that relates to himself severally, and a proportionate part of the general costs, would be in ac

Mr.

cordance with the established practice of the Court (Harman v. Harris, 1 Russell, 157; Cradock v. Piper, 1 Mac. & G. 664). 3. The practice of the Court as regards the bills of costs of several Defendants employing one solicitor, so far as regards themselves and the other parties in the suit, is free from doubt, and the taxations according to such practice are of constant occurrence. It is thus stated in Mr. Smith's Practice: The Plaintiffs in a suit in Chancery, however numerous, can have but one bill of costs; and the same rule applies to Defendants appearing by the same solicitor, however large their number, or however diversified their interests. Thus, if one solicitor is concerned for any number of Defendants, whatever their interests may be, he is only entitled to one bill of costs for them all, although he may in that bill charge for any separate answers which are proper for any of them, or for the employment of separate counsel at the hearing. In such cases he can, however, charge only one term fee and one attendance in Court for all of them' (5th edit. p. 580). The subject of apportionment of costs in re

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Mr. Glasse and Mr. T. H. Hall, for Dr. Ford were

not called upon.

lation to the matter of the suit has been already considered; there may also be an apportionment in relation to the persons who are parties. Thus, if one solicitor appears for three Defendants, and the bill is dismissed with costs as to one of them, the Plaintiff can only be compelled to pay the costs of such proceedings as exclusively relate to that Defendant, and onethird of the costs of the proceedings taken jointly for all three Defendants' (p. 580). 4. These principles are applicable to the dealings between the solicitor and bis clients on his demands against them for work and labour, because the solicitor is bound, as I conceive, to make his charges against his clients and to keep his accounts with them according to the rules and practice of the Court. 5. But, nevertheless, the extent of the liability of the client may vary according to the circumstances of each case; in other words, according to the retainer of the solicitor of the Court. 6. Thus each Defendant may, on his retainer, be liable severally for his own costs only; or all or several may be liable jointly, or one may have made himself liable for his own defence, and also for that of one or more of his co-Defendants. 7. The solicitor is, however, as I conceive, bound to keep and deliver his accounts, with reference

1854.

Re

The COLQUHOUN.

both to this liability and to the practice of the Court. 8. If, therefore, the liability be a several, and not a joint liability, he is to charge against the client all the work he does for him severally, and his proportion of the general charges which are applicable to him and others. 9. If, however, the liability be joint, the solicitor makes out one joint bill against all the clients, and whether he sues them at law, or proceeds against them in this Court under the statute, his proceedings must, I apprehend, be against them jointly. 10. And, on the other hand, it has been decided, both in equity and at law (Re Chilcote, 1 Bea. 421; Hobby v. Prichard, 2 Meeson & Welsby, 124), that one of two persons jointly liable on a solicitor's bill cannot have an order to tax, because the solicitor is entitled to the undertaking of all to pay (although, no doubt, under special circumstances, as in case of a paid bill (Re Stephen, 2 Phill. 562), or, probably also, on the Petitioner bringing the amount into Court, taxation would be ordered). After judgment on a joint bill, whether in this Court under the statute, or at law, the solicitor could undoubtedly levy his whole demand against one Defendant, but such Defendant would, in such case, be entitled to contribution over (Edger v. Knapp, 5 Man. & Gr.753). 12. And when

11.

1854.

Re

The LORD JUSTICE KNIGHT BRUCE.

As Mr. Bacon and Mr. Clarke say, the principle of COLQUHOUN. taxation which has been acted upon in this case is open

a solicitor sues his client for his bill at law, and the client disputes his liability to the whole or any portion of the demand, he may have the bill taxed without prejudice to his liability, and may afterwards try before the jury whether he is liable to pay the whole, or any, or what portion of the bill, the items of which have been so ascertained by the taxation; but in this Court the amount and the liability are both to be ascertained by the Master. 13. It appears to me, therefore, that the position, that the solicitor in this instance could at law have recovered his whole bill against any one of his clients, must be made with great reservations, and must depend on the circumstances of the case (whether the liability be joint or several is a question for the jury; see Hillings v. Gregory, 1 Carrington & P. 627). 14. The allegation in the petition of appeal that each Defendant is severally liable for the whole of each general fee or proceeding, so that the amount be not increased by its being taken on behalf of several persons, and not to the proportion only, does not appear to be in accordance with the practice of this Court, or with the practice of the Courts of law. If a bill against two Defendants appearing by the same solicitor be dismissed with costs against one, and with

to

out costs as to the other, all the general costs are divided, though if there had been only one Defendant, the amount would have been the same (Harmer v. Harris, 1 Russ. 155); so, in an action at law, if the verdict be for one Defendant and against another (Griffiths v. Jones, 2 Cr., M. & R. 333; Starling v. Cozens, 2 Cr., M. & R. 445); so, in the common case of an attorney attending at the assizes to try two actions for two distinct clients, the expenses of his journey and attendance are equally divided, and a moiety only charged to each. And in none of these cases is it ever taken into consideration whether the remaining moiety will ever be received or not, that being considered a question entirely between the solicitor and the person liable to pay such moiety. 15. It does not appear to me that the petition presented by Mr. Ford for the order to tax the bill (to which I have referred), contains any admission which varies or increases his original liability, whatever that may be. He says that he, the Petitioner employed Mr. Colquhoun to defend him in a certain suit, wherein A. was Plaintiff and B. and others were Defendants; that the solicitor had delivered him a bill of fees and disbursements which contains many extravagant and unreasonable charges, and he

1854.

Re

to objection, both practically and theoretically; but I am afraid that it has taken too deep a root to be altered, otherwise than by a general order. If the question of COLQUHOUN the propriety of making such a general order should be entertained, the reasons would be fully considered on both sides. In the meantime we ought not to disturb the existing practice: by so doing we should in fact be changing the settled law of the Court.

The LORD JUSTICE TURNER.

I am also of opinion that if the practice is to be altered at all it ought to be by a general order and not by decision. In considering the expediency of making such a general order many points might deserve attention which

prays for taxation, being ready and willing to pay what may be found due from him; and the order thereupon directs the taxation and an account between the parties, and that the solicitor gives credit for what he has received on account from Ford; but it is to be observed that if Ford was to pay the joint bill of himself and others, he would be entitled to credit for anything which might have been paid on account by the parties jointly liable with him. If the demand were a joint demand, this order might, I apprehend, have been discharged by Mr. Colquhoun for irregularity; but while it stands, it is, I think, sufficient to warrant the finding against Mr. Ford of whatever may be justly due from him in either view of the case, though, for the reasons above given, I do

not think it in any way varies his
original liability. 16. It seems
to me that it must be a question
for your Honor's consideration,
whether, under the circumstances
of this case, the Petitioners should
be allowed, if they desire it, a fur-
ther opportunity of showing the
circumstances of Mr. Ford's re-
tainer, and of establishing against
him, if they can, a liability to
pay anything more than his own
share of the costs; but in the ab-
sence of any evidence to that
effect, the taxation appears to me
to have been made in accordance
with the long-established practice
of the Court, from which, except
on sufficient legal proof to vary
the liability, I apprehend the
Master has no discretion to de-
part. I have, &c.-- Rob. B. Fol-
lett."

1854.

Re COLQUHOUN.

which are not suggested by the discussion of a particular

case.

Mr. Glasse asked for costs.

Mr. Bacon. This appeal was suggested by the ViceChancellor.

The LORD JUSTICE KNIGHT BRUCE.

It is not usual to give costs when the Judge, whose decision is appealed from, has recommended an appeal.

Feb. 24. Before The LORDS JUS

TICES.

The taxing master ought not to require a receipt stamp to be affixed to counsel's signature to a fee before allowing the charge on taxation.

A

In the Matter of BEAVAN.

QUESTION arose on a taxation in a matter in lunacy, whether the taxing master ought to require the signature of a counsel to a fee on a brief to be written across a receipt stamp, as a condition of allowing the charge on taxation of costs. Mr. Parkes, the taxing master, had declined to allow payments not thus verified.

Mr. T. C. Wright submitted the point to their lordships, who held that the charge ought to be allowed without a stamp.

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