Q. B.] REG. V. THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF EXETER. [Q. B. say that he had heard the tenant say he had paid removal of a female pauper, it was shown that, required would be to produce a witness who would the father of the pauper's husband had occupied and paid rent for a tenement in the appellant parish. In order to prove the amount of that rent, the respondents' counsel offered to show that whilst in the occupation of the tenement, the father said to his son that he occupied the same as tenant at an annual rent of 20%; and it was held that the evidence was admissible. In that case Cockburn, C. J., in giving judgment, says: "I am of opinion that this evidence ought to have been received. It is well established that a declaration made by a person in occupation of real estate that he holds as tenant, is admissible after his decease to rebut the presumption of law arising from the fact of occupation that he was owner in fee simple. The question here is, whether if a person at the time he admits that he is not the owner in fee but is only tenant of the property, states also the amount of rent which he pays for it, that declaration is admissible, not merely to show that his occupation is an occupation as tenant, as distinguished from that of owner, but to show what in fact was the amount of rent which he paid as tenant? Now, it has been held over and over again in the analogous case of declarations against pecuniary interest, that the declaration of the deceased person may be received not only to prove so much contained in it as is adverse to his pecuniary interest but to prove collateral facts stated in it; at all events so far as relates to facts which are not foreign to the declaration, and may be taken to have formed a substantial part of it. That being settled, I cannot see in principle any reason why the same effect should not be given to declarations against proprietary, as to declarations against pecuniary interest. It is true that in this case the declaration was oral, and it has been pressed upon us that a declaration of that kind does not stand on the same footing as an entry made in the course of business which was the evidence in Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East, 109, and I quite admit that as regards the effect of the evidence there is a great difference between them; but that goes rather to weight than the admissibility of the evidence. I am disposed to hold that there is no distinction in principle between written and oral declaration if the other element of admissibility is present, i.e., that the declaration was against pecuniary or proprietary interest; and either is admissible to prove what are not very properly called collateral facts. If in Higham v. Ridgway, instead of an entry, a verbal statement of the same fact had been offered in evidence, the same consequence would have followed." So far, therefore, as authority goes, it is in favour of the appellants. But independently of that, I should be prepared to say that as soon as it is established, which it now is, on the authority of Higham v. Ridgway, and the other cases that you may receive the declaration of a deceased person, as showing not only something adverse to his interest, but all incidental facts contained in that declaration, so far as they are not foreign to it, it follows as a consequence that those collateral facts may be proved by the declaration; and that principle applies to the case before us." This decision exactly meets the present case. If the declaration is admissible at all, it is admissible for all purposes. Lopes for the appellants.-The evidence ought not to have been admitted. Here there are two declarations, one verbal and the other in writing. If such evidence is admissible, it is of a very dangerous kind. Suppose an action of ejectment were to be brought, and it were necessary to prove payment of rent by the tenant, all that would be HAYES, J. delivered the judgment of the court. — This was a case from the Middlesex sessions respecting the admissibility of evidence on the trial of an appeal relating to the settlement of one James McGuire, who had been removed from the Strand union to Exeter, where it was alleged that he had a derivative settlement from his maternal grandfather, gained in St. Sidwell's parish, Exeter, by renting a tenement. It was proved that the grandfather, who had been long since dead, had rented and occupied a house in St. Sidwell's parish for four years ending at Midsummer 1830. The pauper's mother was called to prove that she had heard her father say that he had rented the house of James Brook at 221. a year, and had paid the rent for it; and she produced a book containing entries in his handwriting stating that he had paid Brook two sums amounting to 51. 10s. for the quarter's rent due at Midsummer 1830. The verbal statement and the entries in the book were both objected to as inadmissible evidence as to the fact of the payment of the rent; but the sessions received them subject to a case which was argued before us in last term, and we are of opinion that they were rightly received by the sessions, as the four years' occupation by the grandfather would have been good presumptive evidence of a seisin in fee by him. His declaration which rebutted the presumption and cut down his estate was clearly admissible as a declaration against proprietary interest. The case is undistinguishable in this respect from Reg. v. Birmingham, 1 B. & S. 763, where it was held on a similar question, a declaration by a deceased occupier of a house, that he held it as an annual tenant at a rent of 201., was evidence, not merely as to the fact of the tenancy, but also as the amount of the rent, and we consider it equally evidence as to the fact of payment. It would be absurd to hold that a declaration was admissible, but to hold that it was no evidence as to one of the main facts which it imported. The principle that a declaration against interest was evidence as to all that formed an especial part of it, was long since settled as to declarations against pecuniary interest, by Higham v. Ridgway, and the numerous cases that followed; and this principle was applied to declarations against proprietary interest in the case of Reg. v. Birmingham, as it had been in several earlier cases. It was pressed on us that there was a distinction between the declaration and the written entry; but we cannot appreciate this distinction. It was a question of fact, for what the rent was payable; and having regard to the entry and the evidence in the case, it was plain that the entry could only apply to the house occupied by the grandfather. Having regard to the great changes that have in recent times been made admitting the evidence of interested witnesses when alive, it would be most objectionable to lay any narrow restrictions upon the reception of declarations in any way against interest which have been made by witnesses since deceased, and which are frequently the only evidence that can be obtained on the subjects to which they refer, and Q. B.] where the courts are frequently obliged to supply the want of evidence by presumption. Indeed, in cases like the present, we think that, independently of the declarations, the undisturbed occupation by the tenant of the premises for four years would, of itself, lead to the presumption of the fact of payment of the rent. THE GUARDIANS, &c. OF HENDON UNION (apps.) v. WILLIAM BOWLES (resp.) Judgment for the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, Allen and Allen. Saturday, May 29, 1869. THE GUARDIANS, &C., OF THE HENDON UNION (apps.) v. WILLIAM BOWLES (resp.) Nuisances removal-Nuisance upon premises from the sewage of parties at a distance-18 & 19 Vict. c. 121, s. 12. In consequence of the overflow of the sewage from the premises of the respondent and the premises of other persons, it ran some distance to the premises of A., where it accumulated and constituted a nuisance. Whilst it was upon the premises of the respondent and the others it was no nuisance, and became such only when it reached the premises of A.: Held, that an order might be made upon each party whose sewage assisted in causing the nuisance, and that the justices therefore in such case should ascertain whether the discharge from the premises of the defendant was sufficient to create a nuisance, and make an order accordingly. This was a case stated by justices under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, upon a refusal by them to make an order for the abatement of the nuisance. The case was as follows: This case, as re-stated by direction of this honourable court by us the undersigned, two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the county of Middlesex, according to the statute made and passed in the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. At the first hearing of the case it was admitted that a notice dated 14th March 1867, addressed to the respondent, signed by the inspector of nuisances for the parish of Hendon, was duly served upon the said respondent, stating that there existed upon certain premises in the occupation of one Smith and others, of which the said respondent was the owner, cesspools which overflowed and drained into an open ditch upon premises occupied by one Charles Appleyard, and which then became and was a nuisance, and was injurious to health, and that the said respondent, being the person by whose act or default such nuisance arose, was thereby required to abate the same, and for that purpose to execute such works and do all such things as might be necessary within five days from the service thereof. The nuisance so complained of was not removed within the time stated, and on the 21st March a summons was issued addressed to and duly served on the respondent to attend at the petty sessions, in the same terms of complaint as were contained in the notice. The respondent admitted the service of notice and summons, and that he had not complied with the notice to remove the nuisance. The complaint against the respondent was made under the stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121, s. 12, which enacts: In any case where a nuisance is so ascertained by the local authority to exist, or where the nuisance in their opinion did exist at the time when the notice was given, and, although the same may have been since removed or discontinued, is in their opinion likely to recur or be repeated on the same premises, or any part thereof, they shall cause complaint thereof to be made before a justice of the peace, and such justice shall thereupon issue a summons requiring the person by whose act, default, permission, or sufferance the nuisance arises or continues, or, if such person cannot be found or ascertained, the owner or occupier of the premises on which the nuisance arises, to appear before any two justices in petty session assembled at their usual place of [Q. B. meeting, who shall proceed to inquire into the said complaint. And if it be proved to their satisfaction that the nuisance exists, or did exist at the time when the notice was given, or, if removed or discontinued since the notice was given, that it is likely to recur or to be repeated, the justices shall make an order in writing, under their hands and seals, on such person, owner, or occupier for the abatement or discontinuance and prohibition of the nuisance as hereinafter mentioned, and shall also make an order for the payment of all costs incurred up to the time of hearing or making the order for abatement or discontinuance or prohibition of the nuisance. And it is further enacted by sect. 21 of 29 & 30 Vict. c. 90: The nuisance authority or chief officer of police shall previous to taking proceedings before a justice under the 12th section of the Nuisance Removal Act 1855, serve a notice on the person by whose act, default, or sufferance the nuisance arises or continues, or, if such person cannot be found or ascertained, on the owner or occupier of the pre mises on which the nuisance arises, to abate the same, and for that purpose to execute such works and to do all such things as may be necessary within a time to be specified in the notice: Provided, first, that where the nuisance arises from the want or defective construction of any structural convenience, or where there is no occupier of the premises, notice under this section shall be served on the owner; secondly, that where the person causing the nuisance cannot be found, and it is clear that the nuisance does not arise or continue by the act, default, or sufferance of the owner or occupier abate the same without farther order, and the costs of so of the premises, then the nuisance authority may itself doing shall be part of the costs of executing the Nuisance Removal Acts and borne accordingly. It was contended by the respondent that the nuisances in question did not exist upon the premises of the respondent, but only upon the premises of Mr. Appleyard, at a considerable distance from the respondent's premises. It was admitted by the respondent that one cesspool, marked D as shown in the accompanying plan. was upon his premises receiving the sewage of his hotel, and other cesspools marked B and C on the premises of a neighbouring owner, Mr. Spear, which received the sewage of his houses as well as those of Mr. Spears, from which cesspools it was conveyed by a covered drain to a culvert at C, under the highway, whence it was conveyed for a distance of about twenty yards by covered pipe drain into an open ditch on the premises of Mr. Appleyard, and at a considerable distance from the said houses. At this ground it became a nuisance for the first time, and was a nuisance only after it had left the premises of the respondent, and had passed into the premises of another person over which the respondent had not control, and where he had no power to do any act for the removal of the said nuisance. It was contended by the appellant that the respondent was nevertheless responsible for the nuisance, and that an order might be probably made upon him to remove it, inasmuch as the source of such nuisance was in the cesspool on the respondent's premises and the other cesspools on Mr. Spear's premises used by him, and therefore that he was the person by whose act, default, permission, or sufferance the nuisance arises or continues within the meaning of sect. 12 of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121. It was the opinion of us the said justices that, the nuisance being actually upon the premises of Mr. Appleyard, he was the person by whose act, default, permission, or sufferance the nuisance arose and continued, and that the complaint should have been against him; and that, there being no nuisance whatever upon or near the premises of the respondent, it was not competent to us the said justices to trace the original cause of such nuisance to its source, and inquire into the matter in which various persons causing no nuisance individually contributed to form what in the aggregate constituted a nuisance when it was conveyed to the distant premises of another person; and we therefore refused to make such order of removal upon the respondent. Whereupon the local authority, within three days after the said refusal, namely, on the 19th April last, duly applied to us the said justices to state a Q. B.J THE GUARDIANS, &C., OF HENDON UNION (apps.) v. WILLIAM BOWLES (resp.) case setting forth the facts and grounds of our determination for the opinion of this honourable court, and duly entered into the required recognisances, and the said case was stated by us accordingly. The said case came on for hearing before this honourable court on the 22nd Jan. 1868, and, as we are informed, it was the opinion of this honourable court that the party against whom an order for the removal of a nuisance may be made is not of necessity the party upon whose premises such nuisance is actually existing, but that it is competent to and is the duty of the justices to trace such nuisance to its source, and to ascertain by whom and by whose act or default it is that the matter by which such nuisance is caused in the locality where it is found is conveyed to such locality; and that the case was by your honourable court remitted to us the said justices to be reheard and restated with reference to the view of it so expressed by this honourable court. Accordingly, on the 27th May 1868, the parties again appeared by their counsel before us the said justices, and the case was fully heard with reference to the said directions of this honourable court, and the facts were ascertained to be as follows: The land coloured green upon the annexed plan is the property of the respondent; the land coloured yellow is the property of Mr. James Spear. Upon the land of the respondent are built an hotel and four large dwelling-houses, marked 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the plan; on the land of Mr. Spear are twelve dwelling-houses of smaller size. The four houses of the respondent are drained by a sealed drain that runs, as shown by the red line upon the plan, along a road to a cesspool on the land of Mr. Spear (marked B upon the plan), and thence the overflow runs, also by a sealed drain, to the ground C upon the plan, where it joins another drain that carries the overflow from the cesspool marked D upon the plan, which receives the drainage of the hotel by the sealed drain as indicated by the red line. By this culvert at C the entire drainage of all the premises on the plan is conveyed under the highway, and emerges on the other side of the highway at E, into a field occupied by Mr. Appleyard as tenant, where it becomes and is an existing nuisance; but the respondent has no right to enter the premises of Mr. Appleyard for the purpose of removing it, cleaning it, sealing it, or otherwise, and so long as he has the control of it the cesspools and drains are sealed, so that no nuisance arises from them. It was proved that the culvert was built by the respondent with the consent of the surveyors of the highway. It appeared that the overflow of all the twelve houses belonging to Mr. Spear also drains into the same cesspool (B) as the four houses of the respondent. The consequence of this arrangement of the drains is, that at the culvert C there passes the entire of the overflow of the sewage of all the houses belonging to the respondent, as also of those belonging to Mr. Spear. It appeared also that the surface and percolating water passing into the cesspools, they of necessity overflow, and such overflow if fouled by the contents of the cesspool, and wheresoever that overflow may merge, it must unavoidably, and does in fact, cause a nuisance. As to the relative contribution of the respondent's houses and the houses of Mr. Spear to the quantity of sewage flowing into the culvert C, which by emerging from it on the other side on Mr. Appleyard's premises causes the nuisance, no accurate proofs could be obtained. All of the respondent's drains are intercepted by cesspools, so that he contributes only the overflow of such cesspools; but the twelve houses of Mr. Spear's are also drained into the same cesspool B, as are the four houses of [Q. B. the respondent, and the nuisance at the culvert to which all is conveyed is caused partly by the overflow of the cespool B common to the respondent and to Mr. Spear, and partly to the overflow of the cesspool D connected with the hotel, and which is used exclusively by the respondent. No default is attributable to the respondent's tenants in keeping the cesspools and drains clear. The drains of the respondent are properly constructed, well sealed, and produce no nuisance whatever until they pour out their contents in the land of the adjoining proprietor, Mr. Appleyard where the respondent has no power of entry to cleanse, drain, or otherwise. The conclusion at which we the said justices arrived was, that no nuisance existed upon the premises of the respondent; that a nuisance existed upon the premises of an adjoining owner, Mr. Appleyard (which is the nuisance complained of), caused by sewage flowing from a drain through a culvert whose contents flow into an open ditch in the premises of the said Mr. Appleyard. That the sewage flows from two cesspools, one of which, D, belongs to and is used solely by the respondent, and the contents of the other, B, are supplied in about equal proportions by the four houses of the respondent, and by the twelve houses of Mr. Spear. That the respondent cannot in any way control the sewage after it leaves the culvert, and that up to the limit of his power over it, it is prevented from becoming a nuisance. The opinion of this honourable court is requested whether, under the circumstances stated, an order upon the respondent to abate the said nuisance under the above cited section of the statute was properly refused by us. By sect. 34 it is enacted, In case of any demand or complaint under this Act to which two or more persons being owners or occupiers of premises, or partly the one or partly the other, may be answerable jointly or in common or severally, it shall be sufficient to proceed against any one or more of them without proceeding against the others or other of them; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the parties so proceeded against from recovering contribution in any case in which they would now be entitled to contribution by law. Channell appeared on behalf of the appellants.— There was nothing to prevent the respondent from being convicted, as it was by his act, together with that of others, that the nuisance arose. [LUSH, J. Suppose instead of fourteen houses there had been 1000, all contributing to the nuisance; could you summon any one of the occupiers?] The persons who send down the sewage which creates the nuisance are liable. [COCKBURN, C. J.-You say that, although they cannot ascertain the relative proportions of the sewage sent down by each party, yet, as the respondent contributes something, it is sufficient to justify an interference.] The 24th section shows that where there are several contributing to a nuisance one only may be proceeded against, who may in turn obtain contribution from the others. [CоckBURN, C. J.-There is certainly no reason why Appleyard should suffer. MELLOR, J.-He indeed would seem to be the only innocent party amongst them.] Brown v. Bussell, L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 251; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 19, is quite in point. Mellish, Q. C. (J. C. Mathew with him) for the respondent.-The Act of Parliament has not provided for such a case as this. There is no power to abate a part of a nuisance; the whole nuisance must be abated. [COCKBURN, C. J.-The 34th section would seem to provide for that by giving contribution.] That section does not apply to a case of this sort, for its language is limited to the cases of owners or occupiers of premises whereon the nuisance exists. The Act is incomplete in not Q. B.1 BIRCH V. THE VESTRY OF ST. MARYLebone. providing for the case where a nuisance is contributed to by several independent parties. [HAYES, J.-May not an order be made that the respondent shall stop his own contribution to the nuisance?] He would not object to being required to stop any flow from his own premises, but he does object to being required to abate a nuisance caused by other people. COCKBURN, C. J.-If the magistrates are of opinion that the nuisance arises from the act of several, they may make an order upon each. Though the Act in its language speaks only of one individual, yet if each man's contribution to the nuisance can be ascertained, an order may be made upon him. We think, therefore, that the case should go back to the magistrates, with directions to ascertain whether the discharge from Mr. Bowles's premises was sufficient to create a nuisance; and, if so, that they should make an order upon him to abate it. Case sent back, with directions accordingly. Attorneys for the respondents, Harrison, Beal, and Harrison. Attorneys for the appellants, C. and J. Allen. By stat. 57 Geo. 3, c. xxix, ss. 80 and 82 (taken in conjunction with 18 & 19 Vict., c. 120, s. 90) the Vestry of St. Marylebone is authorised to alter, widen, &c., any of the streets or other public places within the parish; and "if any houses, walls, &c., or any part thereof shall be adjudged" by the vestry, "to project into, obstruct, or prevent them from so altering, turning, widening, &c., the said streets or public places within the said parochial or other district, and that the possession, occupation, and purchase of such houses, walls, &c., will be necessary for that purpose;" the vestry is to treat, contract, and agree with the owners, &c., for their purchase; and if the owners, &c., refuse to treat or agree, or do not agree, the vestry is empowered, and they are hereby "required, to issue" their warrant to the sheriff, &c., for the purpose of having the value of the houses, &c., assessed by a jury. In an action for a mandamus to compel the vestry to issue their warrant, a declaration which avers that the defendants had given the plaintiff notice to treat for the purchase of her house and premises, is not bad because it does not allege that her house, &c., had been adjudged to project into, obstruct, or prevent the defendants from altering, &c., the streets, or that the possession, occupation, and purchase of her house, &c., was necessary for the purpose of altering, &c., the streets. Quære, whether a public body, which is empowered under certain circumstances to purchase houses or lands, may not reply to an action for a mandamus that the notice to treat given by them was given under a mistaken apprehension as to the existence of those circumstances which were necessary to give them power to purchase. The fact that the vestry is a public body does not exempt them from the obligation imposed by a notice to treat for the purchase of houses or lands which has been given by them. The statute containing no provision that the owner or occupier should give particulars of her estate and interest, pleas that such particulars were not given within twenty-one days from the service of the notice, [Q. B. or within a reasonable time after such service, were held bad on demurrer. Reg. v. The Commissioners of Woods and Forests 15 Q. B. 761, distinguished. The declaration alleged that after the making and passing of a certain Act of Parliament made and passed in the fifty-seventh year of the reign of his late Majesty King George the Third, and entitled, "An Act for better paving, improving, and regulating the streets of the metropolis, and removing and preventing nuisances and obstructions therein," and after the making and passing of the Metropolis Local Management Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), and before and at the time of the service of the notice to treat hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiff was possessed and entitled under and by virtue of an indenture of lease, bearing date the 16th July, 1852, of and to a certain dwelling-house, messuage, and premises, with the appurtenances, situate and being No. 4, Hinde-street, Manchester-square, in the parish of St. Marylebone, together with the coach house and stables in the rear thereof, situate and being No. 3, Hinde Mews, in the said parish; and thereupon the defendants, in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by the said Act, did, on the 2nd Sept. 1867, give to the plaintiff notice in writing that for making certain alterations and improvements therein mentioned, and by the said first-mentioned Act authorised, the defendants required to purchase and take the said dwelling house, messuage, and premises, with the appurtenances, situate and being No. 4, Hinde-street, Manchester-square, aforesaid, together with the coach house and stables in the rear thereof, situate and being No. 3, Hinde Mews, aforesaid, belonging fendants, were willing to treat, contract, and agree to the plaintiff as aforesaid; and that they, the dewith the plaintiff for the purchase of the same; and as to the sum to be paid as compensation, recompense, and satisfaction to be made to the plaintiff for any injury or damage whatsoever that might affect or be sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the making of the said alterations and improvements; and the defendants did, by the said notice, demand of the plaintiff that she should deliver to the defendants within twenty-one days from the service of the said notice, the particulars of her estate and interest in the said dwelling-house, messuage, and premises, with the appurtenances and the said coach house and stables in the rear thereof, and appurtenances so required as aforesaid, and the claim made by the plaintiff in respect thereof. And the defendants thereby further gave notice to the plaintiff that if she should refuse to treat or agree, or should not agree with them for the sale or conveyance of her respective estate and interest therein, they would in pursuance of the powers and authorities in them vested in that behalf, issue their warrant or precept directed to the sheriff of the county of Middlesex, authorising, directing, and requiring him to empannel, summon, and return a competent jury, to be drawn according to law, to inquire into the value of such dwelling-house, messuage, and premises, with the appurtenances, and of the said coach house, stables, and appurtenances, and of the proportionable value of the respective estates and interests of the plaintiff, and of all and every other person and persons seised and possessed thereof, or interested therein, or in any part or parts thereof, and to assess and award the sum or sums of money to be paid to the plaintiff, and such person or persons, party or parties respectively, for the purchase of such dwelling-house, messuage, and premises, with the appurtenances, and the said coach house, stables, and appurtenances for such respective estates and interests therein, and also for goodwill and improvements, or any injury or Q. B.] BIRCH V. THE VESTRY OF THE PARISH OF ST. MARYLEBONE. [Q. B. pensation, and was prevented from having the full The declaration also claimed a peremptory writ Pleas (1) not guilty; (2) that a reasonable time for the defendants to issue their said warrant or precept had not elapsed before the commencement of this suit; (3) that the plaintiff did not deliver to the defendants the said notice as alleged ; (4) that the plaintiff did not deliver to the defendants within twenty-one days from the service of the said notice, the particulars of her estate and interest in the said dwelling house, messuage, and premises, and the said coach houses and stables in the rear thereof, and appurtenances as required as aforesaid, or in any part of the same, and the claims made by the plaintiff in respect thereof; (5) that the plaintiff did not deliver to the defendants within twenty-one days from the said service of the said notice, or within a reasonable time afterwards, the particulars of her estate and interest in the said dwelling house messuage and premises, with the appurtenances and the said coach houses and stables in the rear thereof, and appurtenances as required as aforesaid, or in any part of the same, and the claims made by the plaintiff in respect thereof. The plaintiff joined issue on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th pleas; and demurred to the 4th and 5th pleas. There was also a demurrer to the declaration. Sect. 80 of 57 Geo. 3, c. xxix. (An Act for better paving, improving, and regulating the streets of the metropolis, and removing and preventing nuisances and obstructions therein) enacts damages whatsoever that might affect the plaintiff, I was deprived of the said purchase-money and com- and That for the improvement of the streets and public places in the parochial or other districts within the jurisdiction of this Act, and for the public advantage, it shall and may be lawful for the commissioners or trustees, or other persons having the control of the pavements of any parochial or other district, from time to time, and at all times hereafter to alter, widen, turn, or extend any of the streets or other public places within any such parochial or other district (except turnpike roads), and to lengthen and continue or open the same from the sides or ends of any streets or public places within any parochial or other district, into any other street or public place within such or any other parochial or other district, and to raise, level, lower, drain, ballast, gravel, or pave such new part or parts of any such streets or public places so altered, widened, extended, opened, or lengthened as aforesaid; and that if any houses, any part thereof shall be adjudged by the said commissioners walls, buildings, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, or or trustees or other persons as aforesaid to project into, obstruct, or prevent them from so altering, turning, widening, extending, lengthening, continuing, or opening the said streets or public places within the said parochial or other district, and that the possession, occupation, and purchase of such houses, walls, buildings, lands, tenements, or hereditaments will be necessary for that purpose, it shall trustees, or other persons as aforesaid, and they shall and may be lawful to and for the said commissioners, or have full power and authority to treat, contract, and agree, or to employ any person or persons to treat, contract, and agree with the several owner or owners, occupier or occupiers, of all such houses, walls, build. ings, lands and hereditaments, of whatsoever nature, tenure, kind, or quality, for the purposes aforesaid, and to pay for the same such sum and sums of money as shall be agreed on by the said commissioners, or trustees, or other persons as aforesaid, and the owner or owners, occupier or occupiers thereof, out of the money to arise and be raised, by them, either by virtue of any local Act Acts of Parliament relating to such parochial or other district, or of this Act, and to pull down, use, sell, or dispose of such houses, walls, and buildings, and the materials thereof, and lay the sites thereof, and also such other lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or so much thereof as they the said commissioners or trustees or other persons as aforesaid shall think proper, into the said streets or other public places, and all such new parts of such streets or public places, &c. or Sect. 82 enacts: That if any body or bodies politic, corporate or collegiate, or any other person or persons seised or possessed of or interested in any such houses, buildings, lands, tenements, or hereditaments as aforesaid, shall refuse to treat or agree, or shall not agree, or by reason of absence or disability cannot agree with the said commissioners or trustees or other per |