niture, and that it was his own. He then executed a bill of sale. [The bill of sale was put in and read.] I saw it signed by him. I did not register it till some time afterwards. At the same time he gave me a promissory note, dated 25th Nov. 1868, for 121. [C. CAS. R. one of several matters which went to make up the transaction, and for which the prisoner, though civilly liable, was not amenable to the criminal law. In R. v. Codrington, 1 Car. & P. 661, where the defendant was charged with obtaining money by falsely pretending that he was entitled to a reversionary interest in a sum of money, when in The joint and several note of himself and of John Holton, payable on demand. [The note was put in and read.] After the bill of sale was registered, I went to Hatcham Park-road and found the goods had been cleared out an hour before. I found them at the Herne Tavern, belong-fact he had previously disposed of it, Littledale, J. ing to his brother. I had not consented to their removal. Before I registered my bill of sale, I was not aware there was another bill of sale. I put a man in possession for three weeks, and after a notice I removed him. I have not been paid one shilling. Cross-examined: I have carried on my business ten or eleven years. The bill of sale and promissory note are for 121. I handed over to the prisoner 81. 198. 5d. I deducted one month's interest, though the note is payable on demand. I took proceedings against Holton, the surety, in the Lord Mayor's Court, after prisoner left Hatcham Park-road. Mr. Noon, of Bucklersbury, is my attorney. The gentleman who prepared the bill of sale is an accountant. Prisoner drew the promissory note. I took no guarantee from Holton. In every case I take bills of sale and promissory notes. I saw the furniture before I lent the money. I have an inventory I made. The house at Hatcham contained two parlours, three bedrooms, and kitchen. The fair value of the furniture between man and man would be 251, to 301. Re-examined: I did not lend the money on the guarantee of Holton. I would not have lent the money on the bill of sale or promissory note if I had not had the assurance of the prisoner that the furniture was in his disposilion. Patrick Wood, money lender, 2, Queensburychambers, London-wall: About the 12th Nov. 1868, prisoner came to me to borrow 201. on his furniture in his house at Hatcham Park-road. I lent it him on the 25th Nov. 201. between two and three p.m. He then executed to me a bill of sale [bill of sale put in and read]. He also gave me a promissory note. He never paid a penny. I went to Hatcham Park-road about three weeks afterwards, the goods were gone. I found them at the Herne Tavern. I took possession of them and sold them. The piano was gone. I never saw it. Cross-examined: The bill of sale recites a loan of 251. I gave prisoner 201. I believe prisoner was managing the tavern for his brother. It is a pretty large house. We removed the goods from the tavern. We got 61. for them, and had to pay expenses. I gave prisoner no notice, but believe his wife and friends were present at the sale. At the close of the case for the prosecution, the counsel for the prisoner contended that there was no case to go to the jury, inasmuch as the case was precisely similar to R. v. Codrington, 1 C. & P. 661, and that on the authority of that case the jury should be directed to acquit the defendant. The court, however, having referred to the cases of Reg. v. Burgon, 25 L. J. 105, M. C., and Reg. v. Crossley, 2 Moo. & R. 17, considered that the case should be left to the jury, and put it to the jury, that if the defendant made the representations charged in the indictment, and if they were false, and if they constituted an essential inducement to the prosecutor to part with his money the jury should find the defendant guilty, and they returned a verdict of guilty accordingly; but, on the application of the defendant's counsel, the court granted a case for the determination of the Court for consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, whether on the above facts, on the authority of R. v. Codrington, the jury should not have been directed to acquit the defendant. Judgment was respited, and consent given to defendant being bailed, but as yet he has not found bail. THO. TILSON, Chairman. J. Thompson, for the prisoner.-It is submitted that there was no evidence to support the indictment. No doubt the declaration that the goods were unencumbered was untrue at the time it was handed to the prosecutor by the prisoner, but that was no more than a misrepresentation in respect of said: "The doctrine contended for on the part of the prosecution, would make every breach of warranty or false assertion at the time of a bargain, a transportable offence. Here the party bought the property, and took as his security a covenant that the vendor had a good title. If he now finds that the vendor has not a good title, he must resort to the covenant. This is only a ground for a civil action." In Rex v. Crossley, 2 M. & R. 17, where the prisoner was indicted for obtaining a loan of money (300) by falsely pretending that he was prepared with funds to pay a large sum, all but 3004, it was proved that not only was the prisoner not in possession of such funds, but was at the time insolvent, and did not intend so to apply the 3007., Patteson, J. said: "The words of the Act are very large, and I do not think I can withdraw the case from the jury. If they are satisfied that the prisoner fraudulently obtained the 3001. by a deliberate falsehood, averring that he had all the funds to take up the bill except 3004, when, in fact, he knew that he had not, and meaning all the time to apply the 300l. to his own purposes, and not to take up the bill, the jury ought to convict the prisoner." [BRETT, J. read on: "In the case of R. v. Codrington, it does not appear that the prisoner did distinctly allege that he had a good title to the estate which he was selling." That passage gets rid of Codrington's case.] Scarcely, for the observation is hardly consistent with the facts stated in the report of it. In Reg. v. Burgon the facts were very strong, and showed that the whole device was a mere sham. So also in Reg. v. Watson, 27 L. J. 18, M. C., it was held that if a person is induced by false representations as to the nature and profits of a business to enter into and continue in partnership with another, and to give him money as part of the capital of the concern (the whole scheme not being a mere sham), the latter cannot be indicted for having obtained the money by false pretences. The test, it is submitted, is not whether any of the incidents to the contract were false, but whether the whole was a fraudulent affair and a mere sham. The representation in this case was no more than saying that the goods were not encumbered to their full value. No counsel appeared for the prosecution. KELLY, C. B.-The conviction must be affirmed. The prisoner falsely represented that his goods were unencumbered, but the truth was, at the time he made that statement, they were encumbered by a bill of sale, which he had executed only a few hours before, and he must therefore have known that the representation was false. The only question reserved for us is, whether on the facts the chairman ought to have withdrawn the case from the jury, and directed an acquittal. It is impossible to support such an argument. The rest of the Court concurring, Conviction affirmed. Q. B.] REG. v. EDWARD PELLEW PLENTY. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by T. W. SAUNDERS and J. SHORTT, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. April 28 and May 10, 1869. Municipal corporation-Voting papers-Initial letters By sect. 32 of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76 (The Municipal Corporation Act), burgesses are to vote for councillors by voting papers, containing the christian names and surnames of the persons for whom they vote; and by sect. 142, it is enacted that no misnomer in any voting paper shall hinder the full operation of the Act. Certain voting papers were filled up with the initial letters only of the candidate's christian names : Held, that this was merely a misnomer, and that the voting papers were sufficient. This was a special case upon a quo warranto information against Mr. Edward Pellew Plenty, for exercising the office of town councillor for the borough of Newbury. It appeared that at the annual election of town councillors, on the 1st Nov. 1867, there were four vacancies and five candidates, two of whom were Mr. Edward Pellew Plenty and Mr. William Penford. Upon the poll being taken, the three other candidates had unquestionable majorities; but, as regarded the two above-named gentlemen, Mr. Plenty had 272 votes, and Mr. Penford 271, whereupon the mayor declared Mr. Plenty to be duly elected. Upon a scrutiny of the votes, it appeared that for each of these two candidates a number of voting papers were given in at the poll in which the initials only of the christian names of such candidates were given, as "E. P. Plenty," and "W. Penford," and that if these voting papers were not rejected, there would remain a majority of good votes for Mr. Penford. By sect. 32 of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76 (Municipal Corporation Act), it is enacted, That every election of councillors within any borough according to the provisions of this Act shall be held before the mayor and assessors for the time being of such borough and the voting at any such election shall commence at 9 o'clock in the forenoon and shall be conducted in manner following, that is to say, every burgess entitled to vote in the election of councillors may vote for any number of persons not exceeding the number of councillors then to be chosen, by delivering to the mayor and assessors, or other presiding officer as hereinafter mentioned, a voting paper containing the christian names and surnames of the persons for whom he votes, with their respective places of abode and description, such paper being previously signed with the name of the burgess voting, and with the name of the street, lane, or other place in which the property for which he appears to be rated on the burgess roll is situated. By sect. 142 (interpretation clause) it is enacted That no misnomer or inaccurate description of any person, body corporate, or place named in any schedule to this Act annexed, or in any roll, list, notice, or voting paper required by this Act, shall hinder the full operation of this Act with respect to such person, body corporate, or place, provided that the description of such person, body corporate, or place be such as to be commonly understood. [Q. B. schedule D contains the form and gives the christian name at full length. Erle, J.'s judgment in that case is very strong in my favour: "It is clear upon affidavit that A. W. Dobing was well understood in Hartlepool to mean Anthony Wilson Dobing, and that the claimant was the only person of that name there; and as there was before the mayor sufficient information in my judgment to that effect, I think that the mayor would have been fully justified in placing the name of the applicant on the roll." There was here no mistake as to the identity of the candidate, as there was no other person of the same name nominated, and there could be no mistake therefore as to who was meant. The interpretation clause, sect. 142, would cure this defect. the court to disregard the statute by overruling the Gray, Q.C., contra.-The other side are asking express words of sect. 32. When the burgess signs his christian name he may sign by initials only, but this is otherwise with the christian name of the candidate. In Reg. v. Avery, 18 Q. B. 576; 21 L. J. 428, Q. B., Lord Campbell held that under sect. 32, it was sufficient according to the language of that clause, which speaks generally of the burgess singing his name, for the voter to sign with the initials of his christian names, but he adds, "In some cases the Legislature has required both the christian names and surnames to be signed at full length, and in those cases that must be done." I do not contend that the christian name must be written at full length with all its letters, an understood contraction will be sufficient. [LUSH, J.As "Geo." for " George."] Yes, or "* Willm." or "Wm." for "William." In Reg. v. Bradley, 3 Ell & Ell. 634; 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 853, which arose upon the election of an alderman, and the question was whether a voting paper in which the party voted for was designated "Wm. Bradley was good, in giving judgment, Wightman, J. says, "I am of opinion that the votes objected to on the ground that the voting papers contained abbreviations of the defendant's christian name, instead of the name at full length, are good. The statute requires each voting paper to contain the christian name and surname of the persons for whom the vote is given. Now, admitting that a mere initial could not be regarded as a christian name, I think that contractions of a christian name, which like those in the present case are perfectly well known and in ordinary use, are sufficient to satisfy the statute." Crompton, J. also said "The statute which appears to have been decided to be imperative requires that the voting papers shall contain the christian name and surname of the persons for whom the votes are given, together with their respective places of abode and descriptions. I think that this requirement is satisfied as far as the christian name is concerned, if the voting paper contains something in writing which shows what christian name is intended. As to the present case, although the mere letter W. might have been open to the objection that it possibly represented some other name than William, the contractions "Wm." and "Willm.," though it is just possible that they might refer to some other name, would both be understood by any person reading them to mean "William." Hill, J. says, "Now I think that although an initial cannot be regarded as a christian name, a wellknown contraction of a name which cannot be misunderstood, may be so regarded, and is tantamount to the name in full." [Lush, J. A. Rogers appeared for the relator.-The question is whether inserting only the initials of the christian names of the candidate is sufficient? I submit that it is not necessary that the christian name should be in full. In Reg. v. Hartlepool, 2 Low. Max. & Pol. 666; 21 L. J. 71, Q. B., which was under sect. 17 of the Act, it was held that a claim to be inserted in the burgess list, signed with the initials-Suppose, instead instead of "Wm." he had put only of the claimant's christian names was sufficient. [LUSH, J.-That section does not in terms require the christian name to be at length, the claimant is merely to give notice according to the form in the schedule, or to the like effect.] The "Wr.," which stands for Walter, that would have been a misnomer, and might have been amended. What is the difference if he had omitted the "r" and had left only the "W."?] It would not have been a compliance with the statute. This is not a misnomer; the voter intended what he did; he intended the initials to stand for christian names; he made no mistake. [HANNEN, J.-You say it is not a mis-nomer but a non-nomer. Suppose no initials were given?] That would not do. [LUSH, J. -It sounds odd that if the christian name is undoubtedly wrong it may be cured, but if it is only doubtful it cannot be.] The interpretation clause was not intended to cure such irregularities. Hill, J.'s judgment in Reg. v. Bradley is very strong upon the point. The statute does not say you are to designate the person, but that you are to give the Christian and surnames. Eidsforth v. Farrer, 4 Com. B. 9; 16 L. J. 132, C. B., shows that this cannot be treated as a mere inaccurate description or misnomer. The initials E. P. Plenty would not enable a person to read off Edward Pellew Plenty. Lord Campbell says that an initial is not a misnomer or a misdescription. [LUSH, J.-It may be that the voter never knew the christian names of the candidate for whom he votes, but knows only the initials.] That may have been so; and if it had appeared that he knew no better something may have been said in favour of the vote, though it would have been his business to have ascertained the christian names. If a wrong initial is put by mistake it may be cured, but here there was no mistake. [LUSH, J.-You say that a mistake in fact may be cured, but that a mistake in law cannot.] That is so. Here the voter made no mistake in fact; he wrote the initials only because he thought it was sufficient to do so. Rogers was heard in reply. 66 Cur adv. vult. May 10.-HANNEN, J. delivered the following judgment:-The question in this case is, whether William Penford was in Nov. 1867 duly elected a councillor for the borough of Newbury. It appears from the case that he was so elected if he was entitled to count as valid certain voting papers in which he was designated by the initial of his christian name (thus, W. Penford) instead of by his christian name and surname in full. By the 32nd section of the Municipal Corporation Act (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76) it is enacted that every burgess entitled to vote .. may vote. by delivering a voting paper containing the christian names and surnames of the persons for whom he votes, with their respective places of abode and description. The interpretation clause (sect. 142) enacts that no "misnomer or inaccurate description of any person, body corporate, or place. . . in any voting paper required by this Act shall hinder the full operation of this Act. . . . Provided that the description of such person, body corporate, or place, be such as to be commonly understood." We are of opinion that the voting papers in question were valid, on the ground that the designation of the person voted for by the initial of his christian name is "a misnomer," and is, therefore, cured by the interpretation clause. It was contended for the defendant that where the initial is only used, there is a total omission of the name, which is not cured by the interpretation clause; and in support of this contention, the case of Reg. v. Bradley, 3 E. & E. 634, was referred to, where Hill, J. says that an initial cannot be regarded as a christian name. The question for consideration there, was whether the abbreviation "Willm." for "William," vitiated the vote? and the court held that it did not. The dictum referred to was, therefore, not necessary for the decision of the case. The initial W. is certainly intended as an abbreviation of some name or other; its defect is, that it may be taken to be an abbreviation of any one of the other names beginning with it-such as Walter instead of the right one, William; but if any one, or [Q. B. even all of the wrong names which it might be mistaken for were written in full, this would certainly be cured. That being so, it is impossible to suppose that the Legislature did not intend to include under the term "misnomer" an abbreviation which could be, and in this case undoubtedly was, understood to indicate the correct name. We are of opinion that the word "misnomer," which means a naming amiss, is wide enough to cover the faulty indication of a christian name by means of the initial: (See Bac. Abr., title "Misnomer.") This construction has already been put upon the word "misnomer" in another statute. By the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 11, it is enacted that no plea in abatement for a misnomer shall be allowed in a personal action, but that in all cases in which a misnomer would but for that Act have been by law pleadable in abatement, the defendant shall be at liberty to cause the declaration to be amended upon summons. In Rust v. Kennedy, 4 M. & W. 587, it was sought to set aside the writ and declaration for irregularity on the ground that the defen dant was described by his initial only, the action not being on a bill of exchange or other written instrument. It was there contended, as here, that it was not a mere case of misnomer, because the initials were no name at all. But Parke, B. pointed out that before the statute of 3 & 4 Will. 4, this was an objection which was pleadable in abatement as a misnomer, and that since that Act the only remedy was by summons and that this case was within the statute. Our judgment, therefore, will be for the relator. Judgment for the Crown. Attorneys: southgate; Rickards and Walker. Consecrated Monday, May 3, 1869. REG. V. TWISS. ground-Faculty to desecrate-Ecclesiastical Court-Prohibition. A piece of ground was formally consecrated in 1778 as a churchyard for the parish of S. In 1865, by an Order in Council, burials were ordered to be discontinued in the churchyard, none having taken place there for forty years previously. In the same year the guardians of the parish, in rebuilding their workhouse erected part of the buildings, including a chapel for the inmates of the workhouse, on a portion of the consecrated ground where no corpses had ever been buried, and then applied to the Consistory Court for a faculty to authorise this use of the portion of consecrated ground built on. On application by a stranger to the parish for a prohibition to restrain the judge of the Ecclesiastical Court from granting the faculty. Held, that although ground once consecrated cannot, without the authority of an Act of Parliament, be used for secular purposes, yet a prohibition should not be granted in this case, as the faculty applied for had reference partly to the erection of a chapel on the consecrated ground, which the Consistory Court might authorise, and this court would presume that the inferior court would not act beyond its jurisdiction; and (2) because the applicant for a prohibition was an entire stranger to the parish. In this case a rule nisi had been obtained so far back as the 21st April 1865, calling on the worshipful Travers Twiss, judge of the Consistory Court of London, to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue, directed to him, to prohibit him from further proceeding in a certain suit instituted upon a petition of the board of guardians of the parish of St. Leonard's, Shoreditch, praying for a licence or faculty to desecrate and erect certain buildings, being part of a new workhouse, upon a Q B.] REG. v. TWISS. burial ground set apart and duly consecrated for the use of the parishioners of the said parish. The person on whose behalf this rule was applied for and obtained was not an inhabitant or a ratepayer of the parish of St. Leonard's, Shoreditch. About the middle of last century a piece of land which belonged to certain persons in the parish of St. Leonard's, Shoreditch, was vested in certain trustees; and in the year 1778 was consecrated by the then Bishop of London as a burial ground for the parish. By an Act of 21 and 22 Vict. c. cxxxii., a board of guardians was established for the poor of the parish of St. Leonard's, Shoreditch, and (except as therein otherwise expressly provided) all the estates, lands, buildings, property, moneys, choses in action, &c., of which the trustees were seised, possessed, or in any way entitled at law or in equity, or otherwise howsoever, with the appurtenances, and not by that Act vested in the charity trustees, were transferred to and vested in the board of guardians according to the tenure, nature, and quality thereof respectively. Sect. 31 enabled the board from time to time to maintain, or, with the order or consent of the Poor Law Board, to take down, alter, rebuild, enlarge and repair all or any part of the then present or any future workhouse of the parish, and to hire, enlarge, or repair any other house for the reception of the poor of the parish; and in order thereto, by agreement to purchase or take on lease any lands in the parish. By an Order in Council dated 7th Jan. 1865, burials were ordered to be discontinued in the churchyard. No person had in fact been buried there for the previous forty years. No tombstones, mounds, or other external marks of previous burials had ever been erected, and divers buildings, consisting of cottages, outhouses, and other premises, had, from time to time, during those forty years been inadvertently erected upon portions of the churchyard. In the same year it having become necessary to build a new and larger workhouse under the authority of the Poor Law Board the guardians entered into a contract for that purpose, and the workhouse was erected, part of it being on a portion of the old consecrated ground in which no corpses had been buried. The guardians would appear not to have been aware of this fact until the workhouse was completed, when they applied by petition in the ordinary form to the Consistory Court for a faculty to use a portion of the consecrated ground for the purposes mentioned in the petition, namely, a portion for the workhouse itself and the rest for a chapel for the inmates of the workhouse. On the petition coming before the Consistory Court the Charity Trustees appeared and claimed that by virtue of several Acts of Parliament, and dealings with the property, the soil in the churchyard was in them, and not in the board of guardians, and they applied for an inhibition to the guardians from further proceeding to get the faculty. When that question came on to be argued, the judge of the Consistory Court decided that he had no jurisdiction to enter into the question of right, and refused the inhibition. The argument of the rule nisi stood over from time to time for various reasons, and now at length the matter came before the court for final adjudication; it being agreed between the parties that the only question for argument should be whether the Consistory Court had jurisdiction to grant such a faculty as was sought to be obtained from it by the board of guardians. Amongst the documents made use of on the argument, was an affidavit made by Mr. Wm. Tarn Pritchard, proctor, of Doctors' Commons, to the effect that he had searched the records in the registry of the Diocesan Court of London, and had [Q. B. found from those records that faculties or licences had been issued under the seal of the court in the following cases: On the 27th May, 1851, for the erection of a vestry room on the churchyard of the parish of St. Mary Abbotts, Kensington; for confirming the removal (which had taken place shortly prior to the grant of the faculty), of certain monumental tablets and gravestones, and for removing certain further tablets and gravestones in the churchyard; on the 14th March, 1859, for erecting on a part of the churchyard of the parish of St. Botolph, Bishopsgate, an infant school for that parish, and a dwarf brick-wall to enclose the school; on the 18th June, 1859, for the levelling, laying out, and planting as ornamental ground, of the churchyard of the parish of Christchurch, Spitalfields; on the 29th Nov. 1859, for authorising the use of a burial ground formerly used for the interment of the paupers of the parish of St. Luke, Old-street, in the county of Middlesex, as an addition to the airing court for the male inmates of St. Luke's Hospital for lunatics in that parish; on the 14th May, 1860, for confirming the erection (which had taken place without a faculty), of a national school on the churchyard belonging to the parish of St. Matthew, Bethnal-green; on the 9th Oct. 1860, for the erection of parochial schoolrooms for boys and girls, with class rooms and other necessary offices on a portion of the churchyard of the parish of St. Sepulchre, in the City of London; on the 20th March 1861, for removing the then existing vestry room, and building in lieu thereof a new and enlarged vestry room upon the same site, and upon a portion of the churchyard of the parish of St. James, Westminister; for excavating for that purpose a portion of the said churchyard, and removing certain coffins and remains therein interred; for converting a vault in the said churchyard into a muniment room for the records of the said parish, and for laying flat the upright head and foot stones, and lowering box tombs in the said churchyard, and for laying out the said churchyard in an ornamental manner; on the 8th June 1864, for the erection of national schools for the children of the poor of the parish of Christchurch, Newgate-street, upon certain ground, including part of a piece of ground called the lower burial ground, belonging to the said parish. W. T. Barnard, Tayer, and Dr. Pritchard now showed cause against the rule.-This matter is exclusively one for the cognisance of the Ecclesiastical Court; it has jurisdiction to deal with consecrated ground, provided secular rights are not interfered with, and the question whether such rights are interfered with is also for its determination. There is no example of this court granting a prohibition in a case like the present. The case of The Rector &c., of Saint George Hanover Square v. Stewart, 2 Strange, 1126, relied on by the other side in moving for the rule, is not inconsistent with this power to deal with consecrated ground; for there the prohibition to erect a charity school on a portion of the churchyard was granted partly on the ground that the Ecclesiastical Court cannot compel the rector and parishioners "without their consent." In that case an attempt was made to deal with the freehold without the consent of the owners; that is not so in the present case. Neither does any question arise here as that which was decided in Pew v. Cresswell, Ib., 1013, viz., that though the interrupting the use of a churchyard as a churchyard, is properly cognisable in the Ecclesiastical Court, yet the bounds of it, which is matter of freehold, ought not to be determined there. In Walter v. Montague, Cur. 261, where a question arose as to making a new footpath across a churchyard, Dr. Lushington says as to the jurisdiction of the Consistory Court, "The churchyard being conse Q. B.] REG. v. TWISS. [Q. B. crated ground, this court has cognisance of the | Square v. Stewart supports this. In The Rector and matter, and it is my duty to protect it against Churchwardens of Saint John, Walbrook v. The any unauthorised or illegal invasion whatever." Parishioners thereof, 2 Rob. 517, Dr. Lushington, If there is anything properly of ecclesiastical cog- in giving judgment, says: "I well remember that nisance in the subject matter of the faculty this an application was made to Sir Wm. Wynne, when court will not interfere by prohibition, but will pre-judge of the Arches Court, to grant a faculty for sume that the Consistory Court will not exceed the converting a part of the churchyard at Ewell in limits of its jurisdiction. In Hallack v. University of Surrey, into the public road requiring to be widened; Cambridge, 1 Q. B. 593, it was held that a prohibition and that learned judge refused the motion, stating to the Arches Court did not lie, where several dis- that nothing short of an Act of Parliament could tinct things were comprised in the faculty, some of enable him to accede to the prayer," the reason which might be granted consistently with common being, according to the reporter, "that a sentence law, though others might not. At p. 614, Lord of consecration is definitive." The same learned Denman, C. J., says: “It appears that the faculty judge says, in Campbell v. The Parishioners, &c. of prayed for has two objects. First, the confirming Paddington (sup.), "The Court is at all times realterations in the Church made by the university luctant to refuse an application which has reby agreement with the parishioners; and secondly, ceived the assent of the parishioners and the patron the appropriating the extensions to the members of of the living, who in this instance is the bishop of the university. It is not pretended that the grant- the diocese; but the court is, nevertheless, bound to ing a faculty as to alterations in a church, and as recollect the limits of its own power and authority. to the distribution of seats in general, is not matter When ground is once consecrated, no judge has of ecclesiastical cognisance; neither is it pretended power to grant a faculty to sanction the use of such that there is anything objectionable in the faculty ground for secular purposes.” Again, in Harper v. now prayed for, so far as the first object of it goes. Forbes, 5 Jur. N. 8, 275, "I may at once declare The whole objection rests upon the second object what I believe to be undoubted law, that it is not .... and therefore this court is called upon to pro- in the power of any Ecclesiastical Court whatever to hibit the Ecclesiastical Court from entertaining the allow any portion of consecrated ground to be suit for the faculty altogether. This is obviously devoted to secular uses, or to grant a faculty premature. This court has no power to prohibit to confirm such an appropriation ;" and in similar the Ecclesiastical Court from granting a faculty to language the old books speak of the perpetually confirm the alterations which have been made; inviolable character of ground once consecrated the suit, therefore, must proceed quoad them, in for the purposes of Christian burial. The order that the Ecclesiastical Court, within whose parishioners," says Coke, 2 Inst. 489,"ought to proper jurisdiction that matter is, may deter- repair the inclosure of the churchyard, because the mine whether the faculty shall be granted or bodies of the more common sort are buried there, not. With respect to the other object of the and for the preservation of the burials of those that faculty, assuming, for the sake of the argument, were, or should have been whiles they lived, the that the extensions cannot be legally appropriated temples of the Holy Ghost: and cœmeterium is deas prayed, and also assuming that a prohibition rived of the Greek verb xapaw, that is, dormio, and will lie in respect of an application ex gratia for therefore cœmeterium est quasi dormitorium quia mortui a faculty before it is granted (which is by no domire dicuntur usque ad resurrectionem, &c." So, in means a clear point), still we are not to presume the form of consecrating a churchyard, given in the that the Ecclesistical Court will not take care to App. to 2 Gibson's Cod.: "Idcirco, nos Johannes limit the faculty (if any be granted) to those archiepiscopus antedictus, authoritate quà fungimur ɔbjects which may be legally embraced in it." This in hâc parte, quantum in nobis est, ac de jure et reason for refusing a prohibition applies here, statutis hujus regni Angliæ possumus, decernimus because it is clearly within the competence of the quod imposterum perpetuis futuris temporibus omnes Consistory Court to grant a faculty for the building et singuli qui posthac infra dictam parochiam Sancti of the chapel, at any rate, on part of the consecrated Thomæ in Le Clive prædict' decedere, et ab hâc luce ground. In Campbell v. The Parishioners, &c., of Pad- migrare contigerint, infra dictum vacuum locum, &c., dington, 2 Rob. 558, a faculty was granted for the per parochianos et inhabitantes ibidem pro sepulerection of a vestry room on consecrated ground, turæ loco (ut præmittitur) comparat' sepelientur et Dr. Lushington observing that "a charity school is inhumabuntur: et quod dictus vacuus locus sive purely secular; but a vestry room is of rather a solum pro cœmeterio et loco sepulturæ dictorum different character-a vestry room is employed for parochianorum et inhabitantium perpetuis futuris ecclesiastical as well as secular uses." A further temporibus habeantur, ac omnibus et singulis priviground of objection to the application for a pro- legiis, loco religioso ac publicæ et Christianæ sepulhibition is that the promoter of the present oppo- turæ destinato debitis, munitum censeatur; quem quisition to the granting of a faculty is not a parishioner dem locum in cœmeterium et Christianæ sepulturæ of Shoreditch, or a person in any way personally in omne ævum duraturum tenore præsentium facimus, interested in the matter, but an entire stranger; constituimus et ordinamus," &c.: (1 Burn's Eccl. and the court will not interfere in such a case on Law, 323, also referred to, and the form of consethe application of a mere stranger. Finally, all that cration given in p. 333.) As to the argument that is now sought to be obtained by the faculty asked no precedents are to be found in the reports or old for is an immunity from ecclesiastical censures for books for prohibitions in cases like the present, the what has already been done. The practice disclosed answer is that such was the reverence paid in olden by the affidavit of Mr. W. T. Pritchard, as above times to ground once consecrated that the interferreferred to, was also relied on in support of the juris- ence of the court to prevent a desecration was not diction of the Consistory Court to grant a faculty needed. in the present case. The Solicitor General (Sir J. D. Coleridge) in support of the rule. It is not within the competence of any Ecclesiastical Court to alter a definitive sentence of the ecclesiastical authority recognised by the common law of the land, by which a portion of ground has been consecrated for the purposes of burial. The Rector, &c. of Saint George Hanover COCKBURN, C. J.-I am of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the rule must be discharged. At the same time I do not hesitate to express a very decided opinion that the doctrine laid down by Dr. Lushington in the case of The Rector and Churchwardens of Saint John Walbrook v. The Parishioners thereof (sup.) is perfectly correct, namely, that ground once consecrated for the |