found universally to be in moral things, a state of trial and of discipline. Wherever we turn our eyes, Providence has thrown difficulties in the path in which we are commanded to walk, and has subjected the mind, as well as the heart, to its temptations to error. In natural religion and in moral philosophy; in what we are to believe and what we are to do in every social and civil and religious relation, we have obstacles to overcome in running aright the race that is set before us. Had revelation, therefore, been so cleared of difficulties that men could not possibly doubt, it would have violated all the notions we have derived from experience and meditation upon the usual course of God's dealings with his creatures. Some causes of doubt, then, there always must be left with regard to our belief in the Scriptures; because the exercise of faith by doubt, as well as of virtue by temptation, would seem to be one of the most just and general objects of our probation in this sublunary world. And if the trial of our faith, in some method or other, be thus necessary and right, what method, I would ask, could be imagined at once so merciful and so certain of attaining that end, as by the permitted existence of those "things hard to be understood," which, whilst they minister occasion for doubts, call forth at the same time our talents and diligence to solve

them; and, when solved, become subservient to the more decided establishment of our belief? Thus in revelation also, as well as in nature, is the great Creator's universal law of tempering judgement with mercy fulfilled, and thus out of the very temptations which the difficulties of Scripture create, is there made a way to escape that we may be able to bear them. Why then should it be required, or how could it have been justified, that inspiration should interfere to banish those obscurities from the Bible, whose whole character and operation are in such strict harmony with the ordinary proceedings of the Almighty, both in natural religion and in moral things?

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It has thus appeared that the presence in the Scriptures of things hard to be understood" is positively beneficial in many respects: First, because the existence of the ordinary difficulties of a philological and historical kind affords a very cogent internal argument for the genuineness and authenticity of the Bible; whilst at the same time the elucidation of such as are extraordinary and more particularly difficult, is of material use in protecting our faith from danger in the evil hour of temptation, and preserving it, in the bustle of worldly business, from decay. Secondly, because mysteries were to be expected as natural and almost necessary in a communi

cation from infinite wisdom; and would, therefore, if unnaturally and unnecessarily absent from the Bible, have thrown a strong and unanswerable suspicion upon its divine origin: Thirdly, because Scripture difficulties have dignified every kind of human learning, and sanctified every kind of literary and scientific pursuit, by rendering them capable of being employed in the service of religion; which would not have been the case, in any thing like an equal degree, had no difficulties, or not so many, or so varied been found. These are the benefits we derive from the permitted existence of "things hard to be understood;" benefits of considerable weight both in an evidential and intellectual point of view. On the other hand, I do not deny that the existence of difficulties in Scripture is attended with one inconvenience. They are certainly liable to excite doubts in the mind. But this is only to say, in other words, that they try our faith; which is by no means an objection to their appearance in the word of God; because it is perfectly consistent with the general proceedings of Providence, in other ordinary things, that our faith should be tried; and because they do it in the wisest and most merciful manner. Upon the whole, therefore, the balance seems to be decidedly in favour of the existence of " things hard to be understood;" more especially when

we reflect that their absence would have led to objections which it would have been impossible to remove. Consequently it would not have been wise, or proper, or expedient for inspiration to have interposed, to prevent the operation of those causes which, in any other ancient work of a similar kind, would necessarily have produced the difficulties which now appear in the Bible. In other words, the existence of difficulties is not inconsistent with the character of the Scriptures, as an inspired work.

Thus have we arrived at the conclusion we desired; and having found by a strict and rigid scrutiny into the merits of the whole case, both the expediency and utility of difficulties in the inspired Word of God, we need no longer confine ourselves to the dry details of reasoning, but may be allowed to expatiate with warmth and gratitude upon the wisdom of their permitted existence, and to gather the whole of our remarks into one brief and comprehensive summary.

It is not then, merely upon the ground that the obscurities of revelation form no insuperable or even plausible objection to its inspired and heavenly origin, that we would defend their appearance and extent. That indeed we do firmly support and sincerely believe. But we support

also with equal firmness, and believe with equal sincerity, that they are of essential and positive advantage, both in an evidential and intellectual point of view. We maintain that, had no difficulties at all existed in the Bible, the faith of believers would have been deprived of a great portion of the present internal evidence in favour of that religion which the Bible contains. The human understanding too would, as we believe, in the absence of religious difficulties, have wanted one great stimulus to improvement, and human learning, by being confined in its application to the purposes of this life only, and having but little or no connection with the elucidation of religious truth, would have been liable to be despised as needless, or neglected as an incumbrance, by those whose thoughts and hopes and labours were directed principally to the attainment of heavenly things. So would piety have run the risk of becoming illiterate, and those who were struggling for eternity have neglected the tedious and painful acquisition of knowledge as irrelevant to the best interests of the soul; and hence the Christian, like the Mahometan world, would have sunk lower and lower in the scale of intellectual creation. But happily with us, that can never, as things are now constituted, be justly the result. So kindly, as well as skilfully, has Christianity been framed for the advantage of